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
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
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AN IMPARTIAL

H I S T O R Y

OF THE

WAR in AMERICA;

From its first Commencement, to the present Time;

TOGETHER

With the CHARTERS of the several COLONIES, and other
AUTHENTIC INFORMATION.

LIKEWISE,

The RISE, PROGRESS, and POLITICAL SPRINGS
of the WAR now carrying on between

G R E A T - B R I T A I N;

And the UNITED POWERS of
FRANCE, SPAIN, HOLLAND, and AMERICA;

With a particular Account of the several
ENGAGEMENTS both by SEA and LAND.

By the Rev. JAMES MURRAY, of NEWCASTLE,

Assisted by several GENTLEMEN of EMINENCE in EUROPE,
and the Continent of AMERICA.

Arma Virumque cano—

—Bella; horrida Bella!

Et Tybrim multo spumantem sanguine cerno.

VIRGIL. Æneid. VI. 86.

VOLUME THE SECOND.

NEWCASTLE upon TYNE:

Printed by and for T. ROBSON, Head of the Groat-Market;

And sold by R. BALDWIN, No. 47, Pater-noster-Row, London;

N. FROBISHER, York; C. ELLIOT, Edinburgh;

And DUNLUP and WILSON, Glasgow.

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CHAP. X.

Transactions in Virginia—The Powder removed from the Magazine at Williamsburgh—The Magazine plundered—Lord Dunmore repulsed in his attempting to destroy the town of Hampton—A Proclamation for martial law, and to set the Negroes at liberty—Action near the Great Bridge—Connelly taken—His Scheme for raising the Indians defeated—Lord Dunmore reduces Norfolk to ashes, &c.

THE colony of Virginia, which had entered heartily into the general association from the beginning, began now to feel the effects of their opposition to government. They had not as yet proceeded to any acts of violence, though they were ripe for the most violent measures. What contributed much to incense and irritate them to the highest pitch, was the haughtiness and fury of the governor: A nobleman of a furious temper, and insufferable pride, who being of an arbitrary disposition, was more disposed to rule according to his own will, than according to the laws of the colony, and the spirit of the English constitution. The colony having delegates at the general congress, fully declared their principles, and shewed what their opinions of the government were.

The governor considered it as an affront to his power for the colonists to choose commissioners to represent them in an assembly which held the power and authority of Great Britain at defiance. He proceeded therefore to such measures, as plainly hinted his jealousy of the loyalty of the Virginians, and intimated by palpable signatures that he mistrusted them, and intended to behave towards them as a people really disaffected to his Majesty's government. The Virginians had very different notions of loyalty from Lord Dunmore; they considered loyalty to be directed by certain laws which set bounds to it; whereas he measured his ideas of loyalty by the power of his majesty, and the emoluments that attended it. Respect to the sovereign must always keep pace with the laws of the land, otherwise it degenerates into servile adulation, and issues in actual slavery. Almost every viceroy lays claim to dignity and dominion equal to the sovereign himself, and is more disgusted at opposition to his power and interest, than at opposition to his master's authority. An hungry nobleman, educated in all the high notions of his own consequence without patrimony to support his dignity, is of all men whatever, the most unfit for a substitute of royalty; his vanity will grasp at an empire, and his pride would devour the habitable world. When once he is exalted to preferment, where emoluments are likely to be had to encrease his power, he soon turns oppressor to advance a step higher. The ranks of men beneath him are only considered as so many beings made for no other end than to serve the purposes of his avarice, power, and ambition. The Virginians had always been among the first in expressing their resolutions, and the readiest in shewing their determinations

nations to support at all risks and events what they judged or termed the rights of America. In other respects they preserved the greatest order, quietness, and tranquility in the province; and notwithstanding the anxiety excited by the prorogation and dissolution of their assemblies, and the expiration of their militia laws in consequence thereof, which in that country where a great part of the people are in a state of slavery, was a circumstance of an alarming nature, yet with these causes of complaint the people seemed to pay a more than ordinary degree of attention and personal regard to the Earl of Dunmore, their Governor. In this state of affairs however the want of a legal assembly seemed to give some sanction to the holding of a convention: upon which a provincial congress was assembled in the month of March, 1775, who under the colour of an old law of the year 1738, which was still said to be in force, took measures for arraying the militia; but to supply the defects in that law in some measure, to remedy which it was pretended all the subsequent ones had been passed, they recommended to each county to raise a company of volunteers for the better defence and protection of the province.

This proceeding greatly alarmed the Governor. for it was an interference with the power of the crown, in a matter of very great consequence; and it is supposed that the Governor had either neglected his duty, or that they intended no longer to trust the defence of the province in his hands. Such daring proceedings would have probably roused a man less susceptible of an affront than Lord Dunmore, and have produced some enquiry into the cause thereof. His Lordship instead of making a particular enquiry into the

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the cause of this resolution, which he apprehended he perfectly understood, proceeded immediately to prevent the effects, which he foresaw would follow of consequence. There was a public magazine belonging to the colony in the capital of Williamsburgh, which was laid up there, in case of an emergency arising from the tumults of the negroes, or any other accident that might happen in the country. The Governor intended to secure this magazine for fear the colonists should make use of it in a way detrimental to the interests of government. He employed the captain of an armed vessel which lay at a few miles distance in James's river, with a detachment of marines to convey the powder by night aboard the ship.—Tho' this measure was conducted with great privacy, it was by some means discovered the next morning, when the apparent secrecy and seeming mysteriousness of the act increased the consternation and alarm among the inhabitants, who immediately assembled with such arms as they had in their possession, with an intention of demanding or perhaps obtaining restitution of the gun-powder. The mayor and corporation however prevented their proceeding to any extremities, whilst they presented an address to the Governor, stating the injury, reclaiming the powder as a matter of right, and shewing the dangers to which they were peculiarly liable from the insurrection of the slaves, a calamity which for some time had been particularly apprehended, and which the removal of their only defence would at any time accelerate.

His Lordship acknowledged that the gun-powder had been removed by his order, and said that as he had heard of an insurrection in a neighbouring country, and did not think it secure in the magazine, he had

had removed it to a place of perfect security; but promised that it should be returned when ever any insurrection rendered it necessary. He also said, that it had been removed in the night to prevent giving an alarm; and expressed great surprize at the people's assembling in arms;—and further observed, that he did not think it prudent to put powder into their hands in such a situation. Whether this answer satisfied the magistrates or not does not appear very evident, but for the present they prevailed on the people to retire quietly to their own houses, without any particular outrage being committed. It appeared that they were far from intending any outrage, for it was proved by the most incontestible evidence before the assembly that the officers of the men of war on that station, and particularly the gentlemen that removed the powder, and were most particularly obnoxious, appeared publicly in the streets during the time of the greatest commotion without receiving the smallest insult. A report being however spread in the evening, that a detachment from the men of war were upon their march to the city, the people again took to their arms, and continued all night upon the watch, as if in expectation of an attack from an enemy.—They also from this time encreased the night paroles; and shewed an evident design to protect the magazine from any further attempts.

The whole value of the gunpowder and arms in the magazine, for any purpose to which they were capable of being converted, either in the hands of friends or enemies, appeared very inadequate to the alarm, suspicion, and disturbance which this measure excited.—The quantity of powder removed amounted only to fifteen half barrels, containing fifty pounds each,

of a very ordinary fort, and the remaining stock left in the magazine, to about six of the same sort. Neither does it appear that the number of serviceable muskets was sufficient to answer any essential purpose, or even to justify apprehension; and the caution of stripping these of their locks only marked their suspicion, from whence it proceeded. A considerable quantity of old arms and common trading guns were not touched. Upon the whole, this act derived its only importance from time, manner, and circumstance. A jealousy had arisen between the governor and the colonists, from a cause exceedingly obvious, and neither the conduct of the one nor the other was directed by candour and disinterestedness. The governor seems to have been exceedingly irritated at the behaviour of the people in these commotions, and probably resented it too highly, (considering the times) assembling in arms, not only without, but with an evident intention to oppose his authority. In this warmth of temper some threatenings were thrown out which, upon cool reflection would probably have been avoided. Among these a threatening of setting up the royal standard, of enfranchising the negroes, arming them against their masters, and destroying the city, with other expressions of a similar nature and tendency, spread a general alarm throughout the colony, and excited a sort of abhorrence of government, and an incurable suspicion of its designs.—Several public meetings were now held in different counties, in all which the measures of seizing and removing the powder, as well as the governor's threatenings were reprobated in the strongest terms. Some of the gentlemen of Hanover, and others of the neighbouring counties, were not satisfied with simple declarations. They

They assembled in arms to a considerable number, under the conduct of a Mr. Henry, who was one of the provincial delegates to the general congress, and marched towards Williamsburgh with an avowed design to obtain restitution for the gun-powder, and to take such effectual measures for securing the public treasury, as should prevent its experiencing a similar fate with the magazine. A negotiation was however entered into with the magistrates, when they had arrived within a few miles of the town; in which it was fully settled, that the Receiver-general of the colony's promise for paying the value of the powder, should be accepted as a restitution; and that upon the inhabitants engaging for the future to guard both treasury and magazine, the insurgents should return to their habitations.

The Governor began now to perceive that the affair was serious, and that the people were in earnest; he thought himself and his family in danger, and provided for safety aboard the Fowey man of war in James's river; while his Lordship, with the assistance of a detachment of marines, converted his palace into a little garrison, fortified it in the best manner he was able, and surrounded it with artillery. A proclamation was then issued by the Governor and his council, in which Henry and his followers were charged with rebellious practices, in extorting the value of the powder from the Receiver-general, and the present commotions were attributed to disaffection in the people and a desire of changing the established form of government, serving only to afford more room for altercation, and to encrease the heat and discontent. Several county meetings were held, the conduct of Henry vindicated and applauded, and

Vol. II. B resolutions

resolutions passed that at the risque of every thing dear, he and his followers should be indemnified from all suffering, loss, and injury, upon that account. The charge of disaffection was peremptorily denied, and those of changing the form of government, and causing the present troubles, retorted. They insisted that they wanted nothing but to preserve their ancient constitution, and only opposed innovations, and that all the disturbances sprung from the Governor's late conduct.

As there are times when all circumstances seem to conspire towards the nourishment and increase of political as well as natural disorders, so it appeared now in Virginia, every thing tended to one common centre of distrust, jealousy, and discontent. The copies of some letters from the Governor to the Minister of the American department were by some means procured and published; severe censures passed upon them, as containing not only unfavourable, but unfair and unjust representations, as well of facts, as of the temper and disposition of the colony. Thus one distrust begot another, until all confidence being totally lost on both sides, every false report that was circulated was believed on either, and served up for a time to keep up the public fever.

In this state of commotion and disorder, upon the arrival of dispatches from England, the General Assembly was suddenly and unexpectedly convened by the Governor, June 1st. The grand motive for this measure was to procure their approbation and acceptance of the terms included in Lord North's conciliatory motion, and the parliamentary resolutions founded thereon. His lordship accordingly in his speech used his utmost address to carry his point: he
stated

stated the favourable disposition of parliament as well as of government towards the colonies, the moderation, tenderness, and equity which induced the present advances towards a happy reconciliation. He dwelt upon the justice of their contributing to the common defence, and bearing an equitable proportion of the public burdens; and observed, that as no specific sum was demanded, they had an opportunity of giving free scope to their justice and liberality, and whatever they gave would be a free gift, in the fullest sense of the terms; that they would thus shew their reverence to parliament, and manifest their duty and attachment to the sovereign, and the kindness with which it would be taken, that they met on their side the favourable disposition shewn on the other towards bringing the present unhappy disputes to a period. He also took pains to convince them from the resolutions and proceedings of parliament, that full redress of grievances would be the immediate consequence of their compliance. This speech, though flattering and plausible, was considered only as words of course, intended to answer the purpose of the government, without any intention of redressing any of those grievances which were complained of. It was not fully credited, that provided the assembly would grant the supplies which were wanted, that any more notice would be taken of the heavy grievances they were groaning under.

The first act of the assembly was, the appointment of a committee to enquire into the cause of the late disturbances, and particularly to examine the state of the magazine, that necessary measures might be taken for supplying the want of what had been taken away. Tho' the magazine was the property of the colony,

it was in the custody of the governor, who appointed a keeper, so that an application to him was necessary for admittance. While some dispute arose concerning this subject, and before the order for admittance was obtained, some people in the town and neighbourhood broke into the magazine, and carried off some of the arms. Several members of the House of Burgeses used their personal interest and application in getting as many of them returned back as they could. It appeared by the report of the committee, that they found most of the remainder of the powder buried in the magazine yard, where it had been deposited by the governor's orders, and suffered considerable damage from the rains; the depriving the muskets of their locks was likewise discovered, as well as the nakedness of the magazines in all respects. Among other things which tended to provoke the people, was the planting of spring guns in the magazine, without giving any public notice of this mode of security, and some effect they had taken at the time of the late depredations. Whilst the governor's speech, with the propositions which it recommended, were yet under the consideration of the assembly, and before the address was determined, conscience, which makes cowards of all guilty persons, had made his lordship, for fear of consequences, retire with his lady on board the Fowey man of war, which then lay near York-Town, on the river of the same name. It is highly probable that his lordship had been informed of the rage of the people upon the discovery of the spring guns, and being conscious of some guilt in that matter, thought fit to withdraw to a place of more security and safety. He left a message behind him for the house of Burgeses, informing them, that he
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thought it prudent to retire to a place of safety, as he was fully persuaded that both himself and his family were in constant danger of falling sacrifices to the blind and unmeasurable fury of the people, but that so far from interrupting their sitting, he hoped they would successfully acquit themselves in the great business before them, that he would render the communication between him and the house as easy and as safe as possible; and that he thought it would be more agreeable to them to send some of their members to him as occasion should require, than to have the trouble of removing their whole body to a nearer place. He assured them that he should attend as usual to the duties of his office, and of his good disposition to restore that harmony which had been so unhappily interrupted. Such meanness and imbecility in the governor tended much to weaken the cause of government in that province; for it urged both a suspicion of guilt, and a distrust of the people, which was not the method to reconcile their minds to any plan the government should propose.

When the message was produced, the Council and Burgesses sent an address to his Lordship, declaring their unbelief that any person in the province could meditate so horrid and atrocious a crime as his Lordship apprehended, lamenting that he had not acquainted them with the grounds of his uneasiness before he had adopted that measure, as they would have used all possible means to have removed every cause of disquietude: they feared that his removal from the seat of government would be a means of increasing the uneasiness which unhappily prevailed among the people, and they declared that they would cheerfully concur in any measure that he should propose for the security

security of himself and family; observing how impracticable it would be to carry on the business of the session with any degree of propriety or dispatch while he was at such a distance, and inconveniently situated. They concluded by intreating him to return with his Lady and family to the palace, which would afford great public satisfaction, and be the likely method of quieting the minds of the people.

Upon the tenth of June, Lord Dunmore returned a written answer, in which he justified his apprehensions of danger from the public notority of the commotions and tumults among the people, as well as from the menaces and threatenings with which they were attended; besides he complained of the general conduct and behaviour of the House of Burgeses, and specified several charges against that body.— That they had countenanced the violent and disorderly proceedings of the people, particularly with regard to the magazine, which was forced open and plundered in presence of some of the members; that instead of committing those persons who had been guilty of so daring and heinous an offence, they only endeavoured to procure a restitution of the arms.— That the House or its Committee had proceeded to a step fraught with the most alarming consequences, in appointing guards without his approbation or consent, under pretence of protecting the magazine, thereby shewing a design of usurping the executive power, and of subverting the constitution. He took notice that no means could be effectual for affording the security they proposed to concur in, but by reinstating him in the full powers of his office, by opening the courts of justice, and restoring the energy of the laws, by disarming all independent companies, or
other

other bodies of men raised and acting in defiance of legal authority; by obliging the immediate return of the king's arms and stores, and by what was no less essential than any other matter, their own example, and their endeavours to remove that general delusion which kept the minds of the people in a continual ferment, and thereby to abolish that malice and spirit of persecution, which now operated so dangerously against those, who, from duty and affection to their king and country, opposed the present measures, and who, from principle and conviction, differed with the multitude in political principles. That these were the means to afford security requisite for all parties; and that for the accomplishment of those ends, together with the great object and necessary business of the session, he should have no objection to their adjournment to the town of York, where he would meet them, and remain till the business was finished. He concluded by representing, that unless they had a sincere and active regard of seizing the opportunity which was now offered by parliament, of establishing the freedom of their country upon a fixed and known foundation, and of uniting themselves with their fellow subjects of Great Britain, in one common bond of interest and mutual assistance, his return to Williamsburgh would be as fruitless to the people as it might possibly be dangerous to him; but that if their proceedings manifested that happy disposition, he would return with the greatest joy, and consider it as the most fortunate event of his life, if they gave him an opportunity to be an instrument of promoting their happiness, and of being a successful mediator between them and the supreme authority.

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The softening terms in the conclusion of this long and tedious message, were by no means equal to remove the acrimony excited by those severe charges and implications in the former part of it. They considered the smooth words as nothing more than political court finesse, to which all courtiers are accustomed, without ever intending to perform what they say. The charges which his Lordship brought against the House of Burgeses produced a reply of an uncommon length, under the form of an address, which was full of the bitterness of recrimination, as well as of defensive arguments, and an examination of facts. This was a method of address no ways pleasing to the pride and ambition of the Governor, who wanted to conceal some facts by which his honour and character were much tarnished.

The house had now received the report of its committee concerning the cause of the late disturbances, backed with the disposition of a number of British merchants, who were resident in different and remote parts of the colony, all whose testimonies tended to shew the general tranquility which prevailed previous to the affair of the powder, and the Governor's declaration with regard to the emancipating of the slaves; the latter of which, so far as it was believed, had particularly irritated the people, yet notwithstanding quiet and order were every where restored, and still continued; that there was a general acquiescence every where in the determinations of the general and provincial congress; but they all concurred in believing that the people had no design or wish of an independency on Great Britain; on the contrary that they had an eager desire for such a connection, as it stood before the late acts of parliament.

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They were unanimous in their opinion, that a redress of grievances complained of, would establish a perfect tranquillity, and produce a reconciliation with the parent state.

To refute the charges of disaffection and disloyalty, the House of Burgesses took a retrospective view of the behaviour of the people, and of several transactions in the colony for some years back; they stated the happiness which they derived from the conduct of former Governors, as a striking contrast to their present situation. They attributed that happiness particularly in a very late instance to the discountenancing of tale-bearers and malicious informers, to the proper examination of every subject, and the taking of nothing upon trust; and finally, to the transmitting home a faithful representation of things in the colony. They stated their former conduct with respect to his Lordship, and observed that changes seldom happen without some sufficient cause; that respect was not to be obtained by force from a free people:—that nothing was more likely to insure it, than dignity of character, a candid and exemplary conduct. That they did not mean to insinuate that his Lordship had designedly misrepresented facts; but it was feared he too easily gave credit to designing persons, who to the great injury of the community, possessed much too large a share of his confidence. They denied the facts, and examined with great severity the representations contained in two letters which were sent to Lord Dartmouth, which have already been hinted. These they represented as exceeding imperious and unjust, being founded on misconception, misinformation, the height of colouring, the mistaking of the assumption of facts without proof or evidence to support

Vol. II. (them.

them. They then proceeded to justify the steps that had been taken with regard to their supposed countenance to the acts done concerning the magazine, and the other matters which excited, and afterwards inflamed the controversy.

Upon the fourteenth of June the House of Burgesses presented their address in answer to the Governor's speech, in which they entered into a long discussion of the proposition contained in the parliamentary resolution, founded upon Lord North's conciliatory motion. This they combated upon the same principles and grounds, with a variety of arguments, of the same nature with those that have been already stated; and they ultimately declared, that as it only changed the form of expression, without lessening its burthen, they could not close with the terms. They observed that these were only offered as the sentiments of an individual part of the whole empire; and for a final determination they referred the affair to the General Congress, before whom they would lay the paper. To them also they referred the discovery of the proper mode of representing their well-founded grievances, which his Lordship assured them would meet with the attention and regard so justly due to them. In behalf of themselves, they made the following declaration: We have exhausted every mode of application which our invention could suggest, as proper and promising. We have decently remonstrated with parliament; they have added new injuries to the old; we have wearied our King with supplications, and he has not deigned to answer us. We have appealed to the native honour and justice of the British nation; their efforts in our favour have been hitherto ineffectual.—When the reasonings on both
sides

sides are impartially considered, it must be allowed that the tempers of the disputants appear very manifestly intermingled with their arguments. Their interests also appear visibly to weigh heavy in the scale of disputation, which in all things that relate to human affairs, bear a mighty sway. Lord Dunmore probably imagined to rule in Virginia in such a manner, (according to his inclination) and for such a time till his fortune was sufficiently enlarged, and being disappointed in his view, would be likely to colour his account of the proceedings of the colonists in the highest taste. The Virginians, who considered themselves as a free people, and not under the jurisdiction of a legislature where they were not represented, viewed all those acts which the Governor was for putting in execution as acts of tyranny and oppression, which he for the sake of his own interest wanted to force upon them. They were irritated with the thought of having new taxes imposed upon them, without their consent, and were not likely to speak favourably of the agent immediately employed to enforce the payment of them. New taxes have always been unpopular in all states, when the people could not perceive their own interests in paying of them; and it is highly impolitic to propose a taxation that is universally contrary to the minds of the subjects.—What makes taxation still more disagreeable is, when the government of a nation creates places of sinecure, which are supported merely by burdens laid upon the people. In this case the subjects consider their substance wasted for no valuable purpose, but rather uselessly spent in supporting idle and useless members of the community, that might be otherwise engaged in some active employment. A labouring and industrious people, who gain

their substance from labour and frugality, can never well endure to see it spent upon haughty noblemen and insolent courtiers.

It will be readily suggested, that in this state of ill-humour and distrust on both sides, every day would produce new occasions of dispute and altercation.—Every new occurrence afforded new reasons of suspicion, and fresh bickerings happened every day:—There was a continual intercourse by addresses, messages, and answers, between the House of Burgesses, and the Fowey man of war, which was now the court of the Governor. This was a singular situation; an attempt to govern without choosing or finding it safe to set a foot on shore in the country to be governed; it had all the appearance of an abdication, or deserting the government, at a time when there was the most need of steadiness, advice, and execution.

When the necessary bills were passed, and the advanced season required their attendance in their several counties, the Council and Burgesses jointly entreated the Governor's presence to give his assent to them, and finish the session. They took notice that though the business had been greatly impeded by his absence from the seat of government, and they had submitted to the inconvenience of repeatedly sending their members twelve miles to attend his Excellency on board a ship of war, they could not but think it highly improper, and too great a departure from the constitutional and accustomed practice of transacting business, to present the bills to him at any other place than the capital. His excellency returned a rough answer to this request. He insisted upon his right of calling them to any place of the colony where the exigency of affairs might render their attendance necessary.

sary. He further observed, that as he had not been acquainted with the whole proceedings of the assembly, he knew of no bills of importance, which, if he were inclined to risque his person again among the people, they had to present to him, nor whether they were such as he could assent to if they had.

To obviate these objections, though it was an unprecedented act, the assembly sent the bills, as well as other papers which were afterwards demanded, on board the *Fowey*, for his inspection. The most important and interesting of these bills seemingly to all parties was, that for the payment of the forces who had lately under his Lordship's command suffered considerably, at the same time they had done essential service to their country by their bravery and success in the Indian war. The bill was objected to by the Governor, for its imposing a tax upon the importation of slaves, and for some informality in respect to the emission of paper money. The other bills were approved of.

The House of Burgesses upon this returned an address to his Lordship, intreating him that he would meet them the ensuing day at Williamsburgh to pass the bills that were ready; they expressed their hopes that he could not still entertain any groundless fears of personal danger; but declared, that it was impossible he could remain under so strange an influence, and pledged their honour and every thing sacred for his security. If nothing could prevail, they requested that he would grant a commission for passing such bills as he approved. This was the last address of the House of Burgesses to his Excellency. Lord Dunmore persisted in the objections he had made to the bill; and said that the well-ground-

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ed cause he had for believing his person not safe at Williamsburgh encreased daily. That he therefore could not meet them, as they requested, at the capital, but that he would be ready to receive the House on the following Monday, at his present residence, for the purpose of giving his assent to such bills as he should approve. This answer put an end to all public correspondence and business between Lord Dunmore and the colony. The transferring the legislative council and house of representatives of a great country on board a man of war, was evidently not to be expected. The danger of the members of the council and house of representatives in such a situation, if on other accounts it were possible they could put themselves into it, was no less than Lord Dunmore's could be upon land. To have put themselves into the hands and power of an enraged Governor, who had declared them guilty of rebellion, and threatened them with military laws, would have been an instance of imprudence unworthy of any people of common sense. The Governor's general character as a man of prudence and discretion, was not so remarkable as to tempt them to run such a risk. They therefore wisely declined going on board to his Lordship, and voted his Lordship's demand a breach of privilege.— They said, the unreasonable delays thrown into their proceedings, and the evasive answers given to their sincere and decent addresses, gave them reason to fear that a dangerous attack was meditated against the unhappy people of that colony, and it was therefore their opinion that they should prepare for the preservation of their inestimable rights and privileges.— They concluded by strongly expressing their loyalty to the king and regard to the mother country, and
upon

upon this they concluded the session. Thus unhappily was an end put for the present to the English government in the colony of Virginia, which it is doubtful, if ever it shall be restored again either by force or good-will.

Upon the 18th of July, a convention of delegates was appointed to supply the place of the assembly, who had an unlimited confidence reposed in them by the people, and became accordingly possessed of an unlimited power in all public affairs. These immediately took in hand the raising and embodying of an armed force, as well as providing means for its support, and pursued every other means which could tend to place the colony in a strong state of defence. —These were dangerous steps, the consequence of which issued in actual rebellion against government, and exposed the colonies to the vengeance of the former executive power. Against the charge of rebellion they vindicated themselves by tracing the measures of government that led to the present unhappy state of public affairs. They set forth the cause of their meeting, and shewed the necessity of immediately putting the country in a state of defence for the protection of their lives, liberties, and properties. —They concluded that what they had done was pursued with the strongest regard to faith and loyalty, and they declared, that as on the one hand they were determined, at the peril of the extremest hazards, to maintain their just rights and privileges; so on the other hand, it was their fixed and unalterable resolution to disband such forces as were for the defence of the colony, whenever their dangers were removed, and America restored to its former state of tranquillity and happiness.

In disputes of this sort it is common for each party to think themselves in the right, and their arguments will always partake of that colouring which is nearest to private interest. Persons who have been educated from their infancy in ideas of royal prerogative and the omnipotence of government, will always think it strange to hear a people insisting upon the principles of the social compact, and the rights of society; this in the first degree has a rebellious sound in their ears, and they are ready to conclude that such a people deserve the severest punishment for indulging such disloyal notions and sentiments. In free states, where men are accustomed to examine all things freely, it appears strange to hear of the will of a few being a law to a whole society, and every one to bend his neck at the nod of a grand monarch.—Such a state of existence to free men, appears to be worse than none at all, and they would sooner die than live under such a slavery. Reason on both sides will determine the point speedily, would each party stand to her impartial dictates; but passion for the most part takes the lead, and the voice of reason is but little regarded. Yet it will be found next to a maxim, that the common people seldom depart from reason till they are corrupted by the precepts or example of the great. Their demands are generally reasonable, and founded upon principles of common sense, till they are corrupted and misled by their superiors, who often corrupt them for their own interest; and make them at last dupes to their lusts and passions. For as corrupt as human nature is said to be, it is manifest, that provided men were to have the tutorage which God has provided unadulterated, the common ranks of men would show more virtue than those under

der the influence of the greatest refinement. It appears marvelous to a plain well-meaning man to hear it affirmed that persons whom he sees daily committing all sorts of vice without shame is best qualified to be a magistrate or ruler of the people. He can hardly bring his mind to think that reverence is due to such as do not reverence God and love truth.

Upon this occasion Lord Dunmore fell into that mistake which the government at home, and almost all the governor's abroad have fallen into. He imagined that he could persuade the slaves to take up arms; and that government had more friends in the colony than there really were. This had been an universal mistake all along in the ideas of government. They have continually imagined, and also declared, that their friends in the colonies were numerous, and their cause prosperous, when the event declared the very contrary. Whatever was the present ground of his progress, he was determined though he should be obliged for the present to relinquish, not to abandon his hopes, nor entirely to lose sight of the country which he had governed. Being joined with those friends of government who had rendered themselves obnoxious to the people; to continue with safety in the country; as well as by a number of run-a-way negroes, and supported by the frigates of war which were upon the station, endeavoured to establish such a marine force as would enable him, by means of the rivers which render the most valuable parts of that rich country accessible by water; to be always at hand, and ready to profit by any favourable occasion that offered.

Some such system as this he seems to have intended to pursue: for by degrees he equipped and

armed a number of vessels of different kinds and sizes, in one of which he constantly resided, never setting his foot on shore, but in an hostile manner. This force, thus put together, was however only calculated for depredation, and never became equal to any essential service. The former indeed was in some degree a matter of necessity; for as the people on shore would not serve those on board with proper provisions or necessaries, they must either have starved, or endeavoured to provide them by force. The Virginians pretended that while the depredations were confined to those necessary objects, the respect which they bore to the rank of the governor, prevented his meeting with any resistance; but their nature was soon changed into open and avowed hostility. Obnoxious persons, they said, were seized and carried a-board the ships; plantations were ravished and destroyed, the negroes carried off; houses burnt, and at last lives lost on both sides. In one of those expeditions his lordship destroyed a number of iron cannon, and carried off some others, which he supposed were provided for the purposes of rebellion, though the Virginians affirm they were ship guns. These proceedings occasioned the sending some of the new raised detachments to protect the coasts, and from thence ensued a little mischievous plundering war, incapable of affording honour or benefit, and in which at length, every drop of water and every necessary was purchased, at the price and the risque of blood.

During this state of hostility, Dunmore procured a few soldiers from different parts, with whose assistance an attempt was made to burn a port town in an important situation called Hampton. It would appear that

that the inhabitants had some previous notice of this design; for they had sunk boats in the entrance of the harbour, and thrown such other obstacles in the way as rendered the approach of the ships and consequently the landing impracticable on the day on which this attack was begun. The ships cut a way through the boats in the night, and began to cannonade the town in a furious manner in the morning; but in this critical situation they were relieved from their apprehensions and danger by the arrival of the detachment of riflemen from Williamsburgh, who had marched all night to their assistance. These joined with the inhabitants, attacked the ship so vigorously with their small arms, that they were obliged precipitately to quit their station, with the loss of some men, and of a tender which was taken.

Upon the seventh of November, in consequence of this repulse, a proclamation was issued by the Governor, dated on board the ship William off Norfolk, declaring, that as the civil law was at present insufficient to prevent and punish treasons and traitors, that martial law should take place, and be executed throughout the colony; and it required all persons capable of bearing arms to repair to his Majesty's standard, or to be considered as traitors.

This measure of setting the slaves at liberty gave less surprize, and probably had less effect in exciting an insurrection from its being so long threatened and apprehended, then if it had been more immediate and unexpected. It was however received with the greatest horror in all the colonies, and was severely condemned at home, as tending to loose the bonds of society, to destroy domestic security, and to encourage the most barbarous of mankind to the commission of

the most horrid crimes and the most inhuman cruelties. This was confounding the innocent with the guilty, and exposing those who were the best friends to government to the same loss of property, danger, and destruction, with the most incorrigible rebels.— It was said to establish a precedent of a most dangerous nature in the new world, by giving a legal sanction to arraying and embodying of African negroes, to appear in arms against the white people, and to encounter them upon an equal footing in the field; for however ill-founded distinctions with respect to colour may appear, when examined by the test of nature, reason, and philosophy; yet while things continue in the present state, while commerce, luxury, and avarice, render slavery a principal object in the political system of every European power that possesses dominion in America, the idea of a pre-eminence must always be cherished, and considered as a necessary policy.

This reason, however plausible, is in its own nature immoral and unjust, and the Virginians, as well as the government who encouraged and gave sanction to slavery, could not well expect that providence would always look on and suffer them to tyrannize over poor innocents that had never done them any harm, and by nature deserved as much to be free as themselves. Claims of liberty made by men who themselves keep others in slavery, are made with a very ill grace; and had the British government by emancipating the slaves meant well to the rights of mankind, every wise and good man would have wished them success.

The proclamation, with Lord Dunmore's presence, and the encouragement of the small marine force he had with him, produced some effect in the town of
Norfolk,

Norfolk and the adjacent country, where many of the people were well-affected to government. He was accordingly joined by some hundreds, both of blacks and whites, and many others who did not choose to take an active part publicly abjured the Congress with all its acts, and all conventions and committees whatever. Lord Dunmore probably now expected that the facility and good disposition which he experienced here, would have been so general as to have enabled him to have raised a considerable body of armed troops, and probably without any foreign assistance, to have had the glory of reducing one part of the province by the means of the other. This pleasing expedition was interrupted by intelligence that a party of the rebels were marching towards them with all expedition. To frustrate their design and to protect the well-affected, he took possession of a post called the Great Bridge, which lay at some distance from Norfolk, which was a pass of great consequence, being the only way that they could approach to the town. Here he constructed a fort on the Norfolk side of the bridge, which he furnished well with artillery, and rendered as defensible as the time would admit. Notwithstanding the loyalty of the people in this quarter, which included two small counties, it does not appear that his force was at all considerable, either as to number or quality; he had 200 regulars, including the grenadiers of the 14th regiment, and a body called the Norfolk Volunteers; the rest were a motley figure of blacks and whites. The colonists under the command of Colonel Woodford fortified themselves also within less than cannon shot of his lordship's forces; they had a narrow causeway in the front, which behoved to be passed to come

at their works, so that both parties appeared pretty well secured from surprize. In this state they continued quiet and peaceable for some days, until at length his lordship formed a design of surprizing them in their entrenchments. This was undertaken before day-light by Captain Fordyce, who at the head of his grenadiers, amounting to about sixty, led on the attack. They boldly passed the causeway, and marched up to the intrenchments with fixed bayonets, and with a coolness and intrepidity which excited both the astonishment and praise of their enemies;—for they were not only exposed nakedly to the fire in front, but enfiladed by another part of the works.—The brave captain, with several of his men fell, the lieutenant with others were taken, and all who remained of the grenadier company, whether prisoners or not, were wounded.

The fire of the artillery from the fort enabled our troops to retire without pursuit, as well as to carry off many of the dead and wounded. It was reported that the slaves did more injury to the King's party than they did to their enemies, which shews how little they were to be trusted in any enterprize of consequence. It has been said that our people were led into this unfortunate affair through the designed false intelligence of a deserter, who was instructed for the purpose; whatever there was in this, it was a great pity that such uncommon bravery should have been wasted to no purpose. The conquerors interred Captain Fordyce with all the honors of war, and with the respect that was due to his merit as well as to the gallantry which signalized his last moments. The English prisoners were treated with
great

great kindness; but the Americans who had joined the King's standard were treated with rigour.

The King's forces retired from the post at the Great Bridge the ensuing night without any other loss than some pieces of cannon, and some trifling stores which they left behind; and as all hopes in this enterprize were now at an end, Lord Dunmore thought fit to abandon the town and neighbourhood of Norfolk, and retired again with his people aboard the ships, which were considerably increased in number by those which they had found in that port. Many of the friends of government, who were called tories by the other party, thought it prudent with their families to seek the same shelter, whither they also carried the most portable and valuable of their effects. Thus his Lordship formed a considerable fleet with respect to the number of vessels and tonnage, and these were also crowded with people; but the ships were without force, and continued months without hands to navigate them. The rebels took possession of Norfolk, and the fleet removed to a greater distance. While these things were carrying on, a scheme had been in agitation for raising a considerable force at the back of the colonies, particularly at Virginia and in the Carolinas, where it was known there were many well affected to the King's government, it was hoped that some of the Indian nations might be induced to become parties in this design; and that thus united, they not only would make such a diversion as would greatly alarm and distress the rebels, but that they would penetrate so far towards the coast as to form a communication with Lord Dunmore. This shews how earnest the partizans were in pursuing a favourite scheme, at the expence of honour, truth, justice and

and mercy: This design was framed by one Connelly, a native of Pennsylvania, an active, enterprising man, who appears to have been well calculated for any enterprize where villany and intrigue were necessary. Lord Dunmore approved of his project, who by this time was ready to grasp at every shadow of an opportunity to gratify his revenge against the Virginians. Connelly having obtained his Lordship's approbation began and carried on a negociation with the Ohio Indians, and his friends among the back settlers upon the subject. Having, as he imagined, succeeded according to his wishes, he returned to Lord Dunmore, who sent him with the necessary credentials to Boston where he received a commission from General Gage to act as Colonel-commandant, with assurances of assistance and support, at the time and in the manner appointed. Promises of this sort were easily made, but often when the fulfilment was required difficulties arose which rendered them totally abortive. It was intended according to this scheme, that the garrisons which Great Britain had at Detroit, and some other parts of the remote back settlements, with their artillery and ammunition, should be subservient to this design, and the adventurer expected to draw some assistance, at least of volunteers and officers, from the nearest part of Canada. He himself was to grant all commissions to the officers, and to have the supreme command of the new forces in all things, and as soon as they were in condition he was to penetrate through Virginia to meet Lord Dunmore at a certain time in the month of April, in the neighbourhood of Alexandria, upon the river of Pontowmac, who was to bring such a naval force, and other assistance as was judged necessary for the purpose

pose. It was also a part, and no inconsiderable one of this scheme, provided it had succeeded, to have cut off the communication between the northern and the southern colonies.

So far had matters succeeded in idea, and the scheme had something of a favourable appearance in it; but then it was not yet put in execution, and the practical part of it remained to be tried. Connelly with his imagination full of new schemes, set out on his expedition, but on his road through Maryland to the scene of action, and when he was so far advanced, that the worst seemed nearly over, the vigilance or suspicious temper of one of the committees frustrated all his hopes. He was taken up upon suspicion with one of his associates who travelled along with him, his papers betrayed every thing.—Among these was the general scheme of the design; a letter from Lord Dunmore to one of the Indian chiefs, with such other authentic testimonies as left nothing to be doubted. The papers were published by the congress, and the undertakers sent to prison. As it does not appear that the loyalists were very lenient to those that differed from them in political opinions during the short time of their superiority in the county of Norfolk and the adjoining parts, so now upon the turn and change of affairs, the obtaining a plausible shew of justice, under the colour of retaliation, afforded such a favourable opportunity for the practice of severity, and the gratification of private pique and natural malignity on the other side, as is never known to be neglected by any party in similar circumstances. For though many had taken shelter a-board the ships, a much greater number remained behind, some of them being willing to run a little

Vol. II. E danger

danger rather than abandon their property:—others hoped that their conduct from its moderation would bear an enquiry, and the majority from their having no prospect of subsistence if they quitted their homes, and an expectation that their obscurity would save them from notice. But such charges of oppression, injustice, and cruelty were made on both sides as are usually done in such cases.

In the mean time the people in the fleet were distressed for the want of provisions and necessaries of every sort, and were cut off from every kind of succour on shore. This occasioned frequent skirmishes between the armed ships and boats, and the forces that were station on the coast, particularly at Norfolk. The Liverpool man of war at length arrived from England; a flag was sent ashore, to put the question whether they would supply his Majesty's ships with provisions, which being answered in the negative and the ships in the harbour being continually annoyed by the fire of the rebels from that part of the town that lay next the water, it was determined to dislodge them by destroying it. Previous notice being given to the inhabitants that they might remove from the danger, the first day of the new year was signalized by the attack, when a violent cannonade from the Liverpool frigate, two sloops of war, and the Governor's armed ship the *Dunmore*, seconded by parties of sailors, who landed and set fire to the nearest houses, soon produced the desired effect, and the whole town was reduced to ashes. There were at that time various accounts concerning the burning of Norfolk; the loyalists affirmed that the rebels burnt a great part of it themselves, and they on the other hand throw the whole of the charge upon Lord *Dunmore*

Dunmore and the King's friends. From a Gazette published in the governor's ship, whither he had removed the printing press, it appears that it was only intended to destroy that part of the town which most annoyed the ships, but Lord Dunmore's Gazettes are not to be considered of much more credit than the accounts of the Virginians. Whoever was the author of this catastrophe, it is certain that the town was consumed to ashes in this unfortunate contest. When a fire is once kindled, it is not easy to prescribe limits to its progress, or to determine by what accidents it may be extended beyond the bounds that may be designed by those who kindled it at first. On this occasion a few of those who landed were killed, as also some of the townsmen and the provincials.

Such was the fate of the unfortunate town of Norfolk, the most considerable for commerce of any town in the colony, and so growing and flourishing was it before these unhappy troubles, that in the two years from 1773 to 1775, the rents of the houses increased from 8,000*l.* to 10,000*l.* a year.—The whole loss was estimated at above 300,000*l.*—Though Lord Dunmore might think he had just reasons for what he did on this occasion, and might probably plead necessity for this measure, it was undoubtedly a grievous office, as well as an odious task for a governor, to be himself a principal actor in burning and destroying the best town in his government. The rebels, after this dismal transaction, attempted to cut off every resource from the ships, and partly to punish the friends of government, burnt and destroyed all the plantations within reach of the water, and obliged the people to remove with their cattle, provisions, and profitable effects farther into the country.

The situation of other governors in America was not more eligible than that of Lord Dunmore.—Lord William Campbell in South Carolina, having as they said, entered into a negociation with the Indians for coming in to support government in that province; and having also succeeded in exciting a number of those back settlers, who are distinguished in the Carolina stile by the name of regulators, to espouse the cause, the discovery of those measures before they were ripe for execution, occasioned such a tumult among the people, that he thought it necessary to retire from Charlestown on board a ship of war in the river, from whence he returned no more to the seat of his government. It is somewhat strange that these governors should have had so little regard paid them, and so little authority in these provinces, as in none of them to have a majority of the people upon their side. They must certainly have been exceedingly unpopular in former times, and ruled with rigour in their governments, otherwise it could never have happened that the general voice of the people would have been so universally against them.—To prevent any ill effects from Campbell's negociation, Mr. Drayton, who was judge of the superior court, and one of the most leading men in the colony, marched with a strong armed force to the back settlements, where a treaty was concluded between him and the leaders of the regulators, in which the differences between them were attributed to misinformation and misunderstanding of each other's views and designs, and a tenderness of conscience on the parts of the latter, which prevented their signing the associations, or pursuing any measures against government; but as they were engaged neither by word or act to im-

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
pede or contravene such proceedings as should be adopted and pursued by the province in general, nor give any information, aid, or assistance, to any British troops as should at any time arrive in it; so they were to be entirely free in their conduct, otherwise to enjoy a safe neutrality, and to suffer no molestation for their not taking an active part in the present troubles. It is probable that the report of Lord William Campbell's misfortune, and the force under Mr. Drayton, prevailed more with these regulators than any principles of justice and moderation. They found that their schemes were discovered, and they wanted to colour them in the best manner they could. It was prudent in Mr. Drayton to make this agreement, and thereby free himself and the colony from a war which must have greatly embarrassed them on this occasion.

The government of the province was now lodged in the council of safety, consisting of thirteen persons, with the occasional assistance of a committee of ninety one. As they were informed that an armament was preparing in England, which was particularly intended against the colony, no means were left untried for its defence, in disciplining the forces, procuring arms and gunpowder, and particularly in fortifying and securing Charlestown. Similar measures were pursued in North Carolina, with only this difference—Governor Martin was more active and vigorous in his proceedings, but attended with as little success as the other governors. The provincial congress, committees, and governors, were in a continual state of the most violent warfare. Upon a number of charges, particularly of fomenting a civil war, and exciting an insurrection among the negroes, he was declared an enemy

enemy to America in general, and to that colony in particular, and all persons forbidden to hold any communication with him. These declarations he answered with a proclamation of an uncommon length which the provincial congress resolved to be a false, scandalous, scurrilous, malicious, and seditious libel, and ordered it to be burnt by the hand of the common hangman.

The governor had a palace at Newburn, which he now fortified with an expectation that by means of the back settlers and the Scotch inhabitants, as well as the Highland emigrants, which were numerous in the province, he would be able to raise a large force and make a considerable diversion. But the watchful eye of jealousy, which seldom suffers the smallest hints given by an enemy, to escape an interpretation, perceived the designs of the governor. Before his design could be effected, the moving of some cannon stirred up such a commotion among the people, that he found it necessary to abandon his palace, and to retire on board a sloop of war in Cape Fear river.—The people upon this occasion discovered powder shot, ball, and various military stores and implements that had been buried in the palace, garden, and yards, This served to enflame them exceedingly, every man considering it as if it had been a plot against himself in particular. In other respects the province followed the example of their neighbours in South Carolina, by establishing a council and committee of safety, with other substitutes for a regular and permanent government. They also pursued the same method of providing for defence, of raising, arming, and supporting forces, and of training the militia, and shewed equal vigour and readiness in all their proceedings. The provincial

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GENERAL HOWE.

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provincial congress published an address to the inhabitants, of the same nature with several others that have been mentioned, containing the strongest expressions of loyalty and affection, and declaring an earnest desire of reconciliation. Such were the proceedings in the southern colonies during this season;—but we must now return to the proceedings in Massachusetts-Bay, and particularly of the armies in and about Boston.

General Gage having returned to England the beginning of October, the command in chief devolved upon General Howe.—This officer soon after his taking upon him the command issued a proclamation, by which such of the inhabitants as attempted to quit the town without licence, were condemned to military execution, if detected and taken, and if they escaped, to be proceeded against as traitors, and their effects to be forfeited.—By another proclamation, such as obtained permission to leave the town, were by severe penalties excluded from carrying more than a small specified sum of money along with them. He also enjoined signing and entering into an association, by which the remaining inhabitants offered their persons for the defence of the town, and such of them as he approved of were to be armed, formed into companies, and were to be instructed in military exercises and discipline, the remainder being obliged to pay their quotas in money towards the common defence.

The limited time for which the soldiers in the provincial army before Boston were enlisted, was near about expired, and it was necessary that some measures should be taken for supplying their place. A committee of the general congress, consisting of some of
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the most respectable members, were sent thither to take the necessary measures, in conjunction with General Washington, for keeping it from disbanding.— This was a work of small difficulty, for the whole army enlisted for a year to come, for certain. Of all the difficulties which the Americans met in attempts towards establishing a military force, nothing affected them so grievously, or was so hard to remedy as gunpowder. For though they used the utmost diligence in collecting nitre, and all the other parts of the manufacture, the resource from their industry was slow and with regard to any considerable effect it was distant. They had not yet opened that commerce, nor entered into those measures with foreign states, which have since procured them a supply of military stores. The scarcity of powder was so great, that it was said the troops at Bunkers-hill had not a single charge left at the end of that short engagement; and it is also said by some that the weakness of the army before Boston in that respect was at one time so great, that nothing but General Howe's ignorance of that circumstance could have saved them from being dispersed and ruined. They left nothing undone to supply that defect, and among other temporary expedients had contrived to purchase without notice or suspicion all the powder upon the African coast, and plundered the magazines in the island of Bermuda of about 100 barrels, which was carried off, as was pretended, without the knowledge of the inhabitants.

While plundering, threatening, and hostility was constantly carried on upon the sea coast, the town of Falmouth in the northern part of Massachusetts-Bay, was doomed to share in the calamities which were dispensed to Norfolk in Virginia, upon October 18,

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on account of some violence or misbehaviour relative to the loading of a mast ship, drew the vengeance of the Admiral on that station upon this devoted place, and occasioned an order for its destruction.

The officers who commanded the ships upon that occasion, gave two hours previous notice to the inhabitants to provide for their safety, and this time was further enlarged till next morning, under the cover of a negociation for delivering their artillery and small arms at the price of saving the town. This however they refused to comply with, but had made use of the intermediate time in removing as many of their effects as they could procure carriages for, or as the darkness and the confusion of the night would admit.

About nine o'clock in the morning a cannonade was begun and continued with little intermission thro' the day. About 3000 shot, besides bombs and carcasses; were thrown into the town, and the sailors landed to compleat the destruction, but were repulsed with the loss of a few men. The principal part of the town which lay next the water, consisting of about 130 dwelling houses, 278 stores, and warehouses; with a large new church, a new handsome courthouse, with the public library, were reduced to ashes; about 100 of the worst houses being favoured by their situation and distance, escaped destruction, though not without damage. Tho' the settlements in this quarter were new, being mostly established since the last war, this small town was amazingly thriving, being situated on a fine harbour, and having a very considerable trade, so that it was computed to contain about 600 families, though little more than one-third of that number of dwelling-houses. The burning of churches and libraries is a new species of warfare, left to the

Vol. II. F improvement

improvement of this polite age to be practised by a people who boast of their civilization, humanity and politeness. In the most barbarous ages, churches, colleges, and seminaries of learning, were held sacred by all parties, and it was never known, that either in the civil wars or in any foreign ones that Englishmen waged war with learning and religion. This species of warfare was left to disgrace the present age, and to be handed down as a reproach to the government of Britain to the latest posterity.

The destruction of Falmouth provoked the congress to the last degree, and probably pushed on the assembly of Massachusetts-Bay to the daring measure of granting letters of marque and reprisals, and establishing courts of admiralty for the trial and condemnation of British ships. In this law they declare an intention of only defending the coasts and navigation of America; extending the power of capture only to such ships as should be employed in bringing supplies to the armies employed against them. From this time they did all that was in their power to seize such ships as brought supplies to the troops.

During the course of the summer, articles of confederation and perpetual union between the several colonies which were already associated, with liberty of admission to those of Quebec, St. John's, Nova Scotia, the two Floridas and Bermudas, containing rules for their general government in peace and war, both with respect to foreigners and each other, were drawn up by the general congress, and by them transmitted to their different colonies for the inspection and consideration of their respective assemblies. If these articles met with their approbation, they were to empower their delegates to the ensuing congress to ratify and confirm

confirm them; and from that time the union which they established was to continue firm until (besides a redress of grievances) reparation was made for the losses sustained by Bolton, for the burning of Charlestown, for the expences of the war; and until the British troops were withdrawn from America:—When these events took place, the colonies should return to their former connections and friendship with Great Britain; but on failure thereof, the confederation was to be perpetual.

The people in general were not however, sufficiently provoked, nor their affections and prejudices sufficiently broken, to accede to a confederacy, though conditionally framed and worded, which yet led to a total separation from the mother country. For though they had taken up arms and opposed the government, yet still it was general, under the hope of obtaining thereby a redress of grievances; and that being the more near and agreeable object, they would not willingly look to any thing further, especially to one so dreadful as a total separation. It required more time in the contemplation of real or supposed injuries, and in contemplation of future ones, together with fresh and constant sources of irritation, to arrive at that habit of hatred and vexation, which was necessary to break ties of so long a continuance, and to render so new an idea familiar.

When the autumn approached, and the appearance of plenty gave the colonists ground to conjecture what might be spared out of the abundance of a plentiful harvest, it was resolved by the congress that if the late restraining laws were not repealed within six months from the 20th of July, on which they commanded that the custom-houses should be every where shut up, and

their ports from that time to be open to every state in Europe which would admit and protect their commerce, free of all duties, and for every kind of commodity excepting only teas and the merchandize of Great-Britain and her dependencies. And the more to encourage foreigners to trade with them, they passed a resolution that they would to the utmost of their power maintain and support such freedom of commerce for two years certain, after its commencement, notwithstanding any reconciliation with Great Britain, and as much longer as the present obnoxious laws should continue. They also immediately suspended the non-importation agreement in favour of all ships that should bring gun-powder, nitre, sulphur, good muskets fitted with bayonets, or brass field pieces, such ships to be freighted in return with the full value of their cargoes.

About the close of the year, the general congress published a declaration as an answer to the royal proclamation for suppressing rebellion and sedition, which was issued at St. James's on the twenty-third of August. In this declaration they denied the charges of forgetting their allegiance, of treason and rebellion, and took particular notice of the dangerous tendency and indiscriminate nature of a clause prohibiting, under the severest penalties, the carrying on of any correspondence from England with any persons in rebellion, or the aiding or abetting of such.—But not content with critical observations, they conclude with a declaration in the name of the people of the united colonies, that whatever punishment shall be inflicted upon any person in the power of their enemies, for favouring, aiding or abetting the cause of American liberty, would be retaliated in the same kind

kind and the same degree upon these in their power, who have favoured, aided, or abetted, or should favour or abet the system of ministerial oppression.

We shall leave for a while the political manœuvres of both sides, and give a more particular account of the armies within and about Boston.

By the delays and misfortunes which the transports and victuallers from England and Ireland experienced, our forces in Boston were reduced to great distress. What added to these afflictions which they already suffered, was the mortification that they had of seeing several vessels which were laden with necessaries and comforts of life, taken in the very entrance of the harbour; whilst different circumstances of tide, wind, or situation, disabled the ships of war from preventing the mischief. The loss of most of the coal ships was severely felt, as fewel could not be procured, and the climate rendered that article indispensable. The miserable inhabitants were still in a more deplorable condition. Detained against their will, cut off from all intercourse with their friends, exposed to all the consequences of that contempt and aversion, with which a great part of them were regarded by the soldiers, and at the same time in want of every necessary of life. Grievous however as this situation was, it served as a sort of refuge to those who were either zealous in favour of the king's government, or so dissatisfied with the new state of things that they could no longer live with comfort, some of them hardly with safety in their own homes.

It was now greatly dreaded that the military stores would fail, and salt provisions at last grew scarce.—The troops at Bunkers-hill suffered great hardships, being obliged to lye in tents all the winter under the
driving

driving snows, and exposed to the almost intolerable winds of the climate in that season, which, with the strict and constant duty, occasioned by the strength and nearness of the enemy, rendered that service exceedingly severe both to the private men and the officers. Many and various attempts were made to remedy and lessen some of the wants that now prevailed in the army. That of firing, which was most immediately and intolerably pressing, was in some measure relived by the destruction of houses. It must undoubtedly have been a bitter reflection to men of any feelings to think of the cause of pulling down the dwellings and habitations of their own brethren and friends, to supply the necessity of wants created by yielding obedience to an authority which the constitution never had nor could give any sanction. Severe afflictions brought on in the course of providence, in which men have themselves no active hand, may be borne with patience and fortitude, in hopes of better things; but when men rush wilfully into miseries, by pursuing either doubtful or manifestly bad measures, reflection adds much to their sufferings. The commander in chief, who had in the British senate declared his opinion concerning this unjust and ruinous war, could not but feel the pangs of remorse, in being now a chief agent in bringing miseries both upon himself and his fellow subjects. When the ideas of honour and heroism are directly opposed to justice and conscience, they will be found wanting in their influence to support a man in extreme distress, provided he has the smallest degree of sensibility.

The attempts made to procure provisions were not attended with great success. Some vessels were sent to Barbadoes to procure what could be had of such necessities

necessaries as the island afforded, and by the assistance of the governor, a very moderate quantity was obtained; and it was supposed, and not without reason, that had the matter been fully known, they would not have succeeded so well as they did. These islanders being now cut off from their usual resources, and having, as they said, a famine staring them in the face, with 80,000 blacks and 20,000 white people to feed, and no sufficient stock in hand, nor any certain supply in prospect, could not be supposed to spare much for the relief of the army at Boston. The conduct of the governor was loudly complained of, and occasioned a direct address to the king from the assembly, setting forth, in a detail, their own melancholy situation, and imprudence of the conduct of the governor.

As necessity is one of those laws which rouses the human faculties to invention, and makes men try every possible measures to relieve themselves, another scheme was fallen upon to supply the troops with provisions and necessaries. A detachment of marines, with an armed ship and some transports, were sent to Savannah in Georgia, with a view, as the event seemed to declare, of obtaining cargoes of rice and other provisions, either by force or otherwise. The militia therefore betook to their arms, and would not permit them to land, nor the ship to hold any correspondence with the shore. In the course of the debate which arose upon this occasion, some officers belonging to the colony were seized and detained on board the ships, and their release being haughtily refused, and other provoking circumstances occurring on both sides, some batteries were speedily erected by the militia on the banks of the river, and an engagement with

with cannon and small arms took place, in which some blood was spilt, and seven loaded vessels belonging to the colony, and which the commanders of the King's armed vessels by some collusions with the captains and owners, had got possession of and whose cargoes would have effectually answered their purpose, were designedly burnt in the conflict.

In this state of matters with the King's forces the provincials before Boston were well covered, and well supported in their lines. They waited with the greatest anxiety the setting in of the frost, which in that part of the world sets in about Christmas, and generally covers the harbour and all the adjoining rivers and creeks with a surface of solid ice. They founded their great hopes upon this as a most powerful assistant, by whose aid they had not only extended their views to the recovery of the town, but to the seizure and destruction of the fleet, as well as of the land forces.

The openness and mildness of the winter disappointed those sanguine hopes; for the weather was uncommonly mild, and the frosts had none of those effects which they sanguinely expected. Their expectation, probably had some influence upon their operations, and their continuing more quiet than they otherwise would have done. The arrival of a copy of the King's speech, with an account of the fate of the petition from the continental congress, is reported to have excited the greatest degree of rage and indignation, amongst them; as an evidence of their indignation, they burnt his Majesty's speech publicly in the camp, and on this occasion they changed their colours from a plain red ground which they had hitherto used, to a flag with thirteen stripes, as a symbol of the union and number of the colonies.

Some

Some vessels at length arrived at Boston from Britain and Ireland, which in some measure alleviated the distresses of the king's forces both in the town and the camp; and though the winter was not so severe as to answer the expectation of the provincials, the climate had so much influence as to make both parties fond of their ease, to check the spirit of enterprize, and to prevent the effusion of blood; so that for near three months an universal quiet prevailed.

During this state of affairs, the American cruizers and privateers, though exceedingly poor and contemptible, being for most part no better than whale-boats, grew daily more numerous and successful against the transports and store-ships, and among a number of other prizes, had the fortune of taking one which gave a new colour to their military operations. This was an ordnance ship from Woolwich, which had separated from her convoy, and being herself of no force, was taken without any defence by a small privateer. This vessel contained, besides a small mortar upon a new construction, several pieces of fine brass cannon, a large quantity of small arms and ammunition, with all manner of tools, utensils, and machines necessary for camps, and artillery in the greatest abundance. The loss of this ship was much resented in England, and occasioned some severe reflections upon the admiralty, both within and without doors, for hazarding a cargo of such value and importance in a defenceless vessel. This ship and cargo gave new strength to the provincials, and furnished them with many things they stood much in need of. Besides, it gave them fresh spirits when they perceived what they could do by properly exerting their strength, and the natural powers and opportunities

Vol. II. G which

which Providence had given them. These successes by sea made them more attentive, and caused them in all quarters to keep a sharp look out, while the king's fleet were through necessity confined to the harbour of Boston. It indeed highly provoked and chagrined the army in the town and on Bunker's-Hill, to see provisions and other necessaries just taken from them before their eyes, and when their hopes were at the height of expectation of possessing them. Notwithstanding these severe disappointments, the town and camp remained quiet and unmolested by the enemy until the end of February.

When all things seemed perfectly calm on both sides, the tranquility of Boston was on the beginning of March unexpectedly disturbed, by some sudden and unexpected movements on the side of the colonists. This was said to be occasioned by the Congress receiving intelligence of the prohibitory acts, and of hiring foreign troops; upon this information, they immediately dispatched instructions to General Washington, totally to change the mode of carrying on the war, and to bring the affair at Boston to the speediest decision that was possible, in order that the army might be disengaged, and at liberty to oppose the new dangers with which they were threatened.—Whatever might be the reason of this sudden alteration of affairs, a battery was opened at a place called Phipps's Farm, near the side of the water, on the night of the 2d of March, from whence a severe bombardment and cannonade was carried on against the town, and repeated on the ensuing nights. This greatly alarmed the army in the town, and all hands were busily employed in quenching fires, and extinguishing the flames of houses, the usual attendants of
such

such attacks. While they were employed in this sort of exercise, they saw with inexpressible surprize, on the morning of the 5th of March, some considerable works appear on the other side of the town upon the heights of Dorchester Points, which had been erected in the preceding night, and from whence a twenty-four pounder and a bomb battery were soon after opened. Some British officers who were present confessed that the expedition with which these works were thrown up, with their sudden and unexpected appearance, recalled to their minds those wonderful stories of enchantment and invisible agency, which are so frequent in the eastern romances. They were ready to imagine they had got into fairy land, where spiritual agency is supposed to supply the place of bodily exertions. They could not however but consider, that they were now dealing with a people who were in earnest, and who were not inferior to themselves in industry, to support the cause they were engaged in. Both the art and the industry of the colonists began now to be alarming to our troops; they perceived that the men whom they had been taught to despise as cowards and poltroons, were now their equals, if not their superiors, both in application and intrepidity. The situation of our army was now very critical. The new works, along with those which it is evident would soon be constructed on some neighbouring hills, would command the town and a considerable part of the harbour and beach, from whence an embarkation must take place in the event of a retreat, and render the communication between the troops in the works at Boston Neck and the main body, difficult and dangerous.

In these circumstances, no alternative remained but to abandon the town, or dislodge the enemy, and destroy the new works. General Howe adopted the latter, and took the necessary measures for the embarkation on that very evening for five regiments, with the light infantry and grenadiers, upon a service which the whole army must of course have ultimately been engaged in. Providence at this time frustrated the designs of the general, and probably for his own good, for had he proceeded to attack the works, it is not improbable that his whole army would have been ruined. The provincials were eager for a battle, and they were provided for an attack, and would have made such a resistance as would have been fatal to our army.

This design was frustrated by a violent storm, which raged that night, and rendered an embarkation impossible, and so saved the lives of many brave men, who must have fallen in such a rash rencounter.—Whatever intrepidity there might be in General Howe's intention on this occasion, it does not appear that his purpose was dictated by wisdom; for before he had stormed the works of the enemy, his army must have been greatly thinned, and the colonists were likely after that to have stood on their ground, and to have disputed every inch with his excellency for the palm of victory. Bunker's Hill might have taught the general what the provincials could do, even when they were but indifferently armed, and ill provided with ammunition; and now, that they were greatly reinforced and supplied with stores, arms, and ammunition of all sorts, they were not likely to give way so easily, but to use their utmost power to be revenged upon men whom they considered as invaders

vaders of their country, and murderers of their friends. The General's scheme was the very scheme the colonists wanted him to pursue, and had he pursued his design, his whole army must have been cut off.

It is not however to be wondered at, that with an high sense of the British military honour, as well as of his own, the General should hazard much, rather than submit to the indignity of abandoning the town. He commanded a force which he knew had been considered and represented here as sufficient to look down all the opposition in America, and which in reality, with respect to the number of regiments, if not of men, the excellency of the troops, the character of the officers, and the powerful artillery which they possessed, would have been respectable in any country, and dangerous to any enemy. With such troops to give up that town which had been the original cause of the war, and the constant object of contention since it commenced, to a raw and undisciplined militia, seemed exclusive of all other ill consequences, a disgrace not to be borne. But these brave men had by a variety of events, and perhaps it will be thought, and not without good reason, through original error and misconduct in the arrangement of the war, been reduced to such circumstances, and hedged in in such a manner, that no means were left for the exertion of their force and courage; that they were now subject to the greatest danger, without affording any prospect of success. The wild *roda montade* of British valour, which has been resounded through all corners of the empire, were now proved to be only empty sounds, without any meaning; for tho' British troops will fight as well as any others, when under a proper influence; yet there is nothing in either the men or
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the country that gives claim to an exclusive monopoly of bravery. They were now fighting with their own countrymen, animated with the strong inspiring spirit of liberty, with all that is dear to mankind at the point of their swords, and not with men who were fighting for the honour of a *grand monarch*, whose interest and theirs are very different. Though the idea of military glory may inspire some officers that have suffered their minds to think it a glory to die in battle, yet the common soldiers are not acquainted with such refinement, but both feel and fear natural evils, especially when their consciences hint to them some doubt concerning the justice of the cause of a war.

Fortune, or in better phrase, Providence prevented the perilous trial which the General proposed. On the day that succeeded the tempest, the design was resumed; but on a closer inspection new difficulties arose; it was discovered that a new work had been thrown up, which was much stronger than any of the former, and that the whole were now so compleatly fortified, that all hope of forcing them was at an end. It now also became evident that Boston was not a place very happily chosen for the improvement of any advantage which might be obtained towards the reduction of the colonies. This was foreseen by many from the beginning, but the ministry, who were so sure of conquering the colonists with a few grenadiers and red coats, thought all places equally easily subdued. It was an infatuation which from the beginning of this ruinous war had possessed all its friends, that they have always boasted of their own strength and despised

despised their enemies; from the meanest court toady-eater to the minister himself, nothing was ever to be heard but the sound of the victories, valour, and intrepidity of the British troops; when after all, every year has been attended with repeated losses, disappointment, and disgrace. People that think gravely, and believe in providence, have all along inferred, that there has been something of a divine hand in our present disasters, and that the national infidelity and wickedness has had a great share in our misfortunes, while others reciprocate the blame upon each other, and endeavour to clear themselves of having an hand in the mismanagement, but have done every thing for the best. In ages past, which we, now turned a polite people, call barbarous, it was always the fashion in going to war to consider providence as the best ally, and for that reason our fathers seldom neglected to use the proper means to procure the assistance thereof, but this is now accounted a weakness and imbecility of mind, unworthy of an enlightened age.

Upon viewing the situation of the rebels, and the resolution which they shewed to make a vigorous resistance, if not a bold attack upon our men, nothing remained but to abandon the town, and to convey the troops, artillery, and stores aboard the ships. This last resort was not free of difficulty. This part of the history of the war is very differently represented. Government writers affirm that the enemy remained quiet during the time of the embarkation, and made not the smallest attempt to give the troops any disturbance, while others, and some who were present witnesses and had a share of the disaster, have affirmed that our troops suffered prodigiously by an heavy fire from the provincials, owing, as they affirm, to a breach of agreement

agreement on the part of General Howe, who had engaged with Washington to remove peaceably, and not destroy any of the stores which he did not carry away, nor touch the works and fortifications of the town. This agreement was broken by the English General, it is said, upon which the enemy opened their batteries upon our men, and destroyed many of them in the embarkation. This can hardly be believed of General Howe, who is a man of honour and veracity, and must certainly have proceeded from some other cause. The ministry have declared that there was not any convention or agreement between the two Generals, though it has been generally understood that the saving of the town depended upon some sort of convention between them. It is not very probable that the English troops would have left Boston without demolishing it, had there not been some promise made on both sides for this purpose. Had the troops set fire to the town before the embarkation, the provincials would have attacked them with all their force, and probably have ruined the whole army, but as they did not stir at the first till the embarkation was almost finished, it gives reason to conclude that there was some agreement which some of the soldiers might break through, when they thought they were nearly safe from the attack of their enemy.—This might happen without the General's knowledge. That there was a design of burning the town, is confirmed from combustibles being laid, and ready for firing in different parts of the town, and that the select men were permitted to go out and hold a conference with General Washington upon the subject. This seems not to have been contradicted on either hand.

Notwithstanding

Notwithstanding all the security that was taken, the embarkation could not be regulated as could have been wished, though ten days were spent in the carrying it into execution; many disorders and some loss happened through haste, precipitation, and hurry. It resembled more the emigration of a nation, or the breaking up of a camp, than a simple embarkation.—Fifteen hundred of the inhabitants, whose attachment to the royal cause had rendered them obnoxious to their countrymen, incumbered the transports with their families and effects. The officers were great sufferers on this occasion; they had laid out their money on furniture, and such other conveniencies as were necessary to render their situation agreeable; but no purchasers could be found for these effects, and it would have been extreme cruelty for many of them to have been under the necessity of leaving their whole substance behind them. The soldiers were embarrassed with continual duty, and all carriages and labourers that could be procured in the town were of course monopolized by the emigrant inhabitants.—Every person had some private concern which was sufficient to employ his time and thoughts. The sick and wounded, women and children, called for every care and attention; and of course encreased their embarrassment and distress. It will be easy to suppose some part of the confusion incident to such circumstances.

The general was in a pitiable situation; but he bore it with great fortitude, and conducted the whole with great temper and address. Some discontents appeared, which were to be endured and allayed. Scarcity of provisions and ill success always breed discontents in camps, and as many, both officers and

Vol. II. H soldiers,

soldiers, were not altogether hearty in the war, they were on that account more ready to complain. This was in some measure the case upon this occasion. The general having received no advices from England since the preceding month of October, they considered themselves in a great measure abandoned, and left to extricate themselves as they could out of the unfortunate situation in which they were involved.— Mutual discontents and jealousies prevailed between the army and the navy; each attributing to the other the cause of some part of that uneasiness itself felt.— Discontents are exceedingly fruitful; one generates many others in a short space of time. The intended voyage to Halifax was subject to circumstances of a very alarming nature. The coast, which is at all times dangerous, was most dreadfully so at this tempestuous equinoctial season, and the multitude of ships, which amounted to 150 increased the difficulties and apprehensions. As the high north-east winds now prevailed, they were also liable to be blown off to the West Indies, without a stock of provisions in any degree sufficient to subsist them in such a passage. And what rendered matters still more irksome, they were going to a barren miserable country, which was incapable of affording those reliefs which they so much wanted. It could not escape the observation, and was highly vexing to the military, that all this dangerous voyage when compleated, was directly so much out of their way. They were going to the northern extremities of the continent, when their business lay in the southern, or at least about the centre.

The necessity of their present situation left no choice of measures, and regret was useless. Upon March 17, as the rear embarked, General Washington marched into the town with drums beating, colours

hours flying, and all the triumph of victory. And indeed it was a compleat victory for the present, seeing he had made troops that were reckoned invincible, abandon a town which they had fortified as well as they could, with all the precipitation that usually happens in signal defeats. The evacuation of Boston which in the stile of the day was called only a change of position, was certainly a flight under as great apprehensions of fear and destruction as ever happened to any army. The marks of fear and hurry were visible in what they left behind them. They left a considerable quantity of artillery and stores upon Bunkers-hill and Boston-neck, which they had not time to carry off, through hurry and fear; and though they attempted to render the cannon unserviceable, the hurry which then prevailed prevented that design.—They threw some mortars and cannon into the water, which were afterwards weighed by the people of the town. But all circumstances concur to shew what influence panic and dread had upon them in the embarkation.


When General Washington entered the town, he was received by the remaining inhabitants, and acknowledged by the refugees, who now recovered their ancient possession with every mark of gratitude and respect that could be possibly shewn to a deliverer. The assembly of the province were not less zealous in their public acknowledgements. His answer was proper, modest, and becoming his situation.—He spoke like a man that did not pursue vain glory, but sought the welfare of his country, and maintained the natural rights of mankind. The policy of Britain had made him a rebel, but his country looked upon him as a saviour and deliverer. What is the genu-

ine character of the parties concerned, time and after ages will declare better than the present can do.

Thus was the long contested town of Boston at length given up, the colony of Massachusetts-Bay freed from a war, and left at liberty to adopt every measure which could tend to its future strength and security. It was above a week before the weather permitted the fleet to get clearly out of the harbour and road; but they were afterwards well compensated in their passage, their voyage to Halifax being shorter and more happy than could have been reasonably expected. Several ships of war were left behind to protect the vessels which should arrive from England; in which they were not perfectly successful. The great extent of the bay, with its numerous creeks and islands, and the number of small ports that surrounded it, afforded such opportunities to the provincial armed boats, and privateers, that they took a number of those which were still in ignorance that the town had changed its masters.

Upon the British forces leaving Boston, it might have been expected, that they would have left a garrison in Castle-William to have kept the command of the harbour; but this was not thought a safe measure. By the motions of the colonists, and particularly their taking their stations on the neighbouring islands, it was conjectured that they intended to attack Castle-William, the possession of which would have been a means of shutting up the ships of war in the harbour. General Howe before he left the place, blew up the fortifications to render them unserviceable for the time. It argues that he was afraid of the expedition of the provincials, that they should even take the castle before he got the ships out of the harbour; this does
not

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GENERAL WASHINGTON.

Printed for T. Robson, Newcastle, upon Tyne.

not say that he put much trust either in the valour of his troops, or the naval force he had in Boston harbour. Of all the defeats that have been given to the colonists since the beginning of this dismal war, there does not appear to have been either as great signs of hurry or flight in any of them, as happened to the British forces in this change of their position.

General Washington was now in possession of the capital of Massachusetts-Bay; but being ignorant of the destination of the fleet, and apprehensive of an attempt upon New-York, he detached several regiments for the protection of that city, on the very day upon which he took possession of Boston. The royal army were not as yet in a situation which admitted of their undertaking any expedition. They wanted both provisions and refreshment before they undertook any expedition of consequence. They did not, it was said exceed nine thousand effective men, and were in other respects very ill provided. This army, which was three times more numerous than was thought sufficient to conquer America, was now, like the Trojans, sent to traverse the sea to seek new habitations, with a number of the inhabitants of Boston, who had carried all they could along with them, in hopes of better times. This was a mortifying blow to the schemes of the ministry, who had given out that the sight of a few grenadiers would frighten the whole colonies into a compliance with their measures. Their invincible troops were now obliged to abandon Boston before a new raised militia, who were cowards accounted at home, that neither would nor could fight.

The estates and effects of those emigrants who accompanied General Howe to Halifax were ordered

to be sold, and the produce applied to the public service. Some who ventured to stay behind, though they knew themselves obnoxious to the present government, were brought to trial as public enemies and betrayers of their country; and the estates of such as were found guilty were confiscated in the same manner. But nothing occupied so much the mind of the people at Boston, or had so much attention paid to it by the province in general as the putting of that town in such a state of defence as might prevent a repetition of those evils which it lately experienced. For this purpose the greatest diligence was used in fortifying the town and harbour, some foreign engineers were procured to superintend the works, and every inhabitant devoted two days in the week to its construction. Some have much doubted if Boston can be rendered tenable against an army, though the works may preserve it from insult. It will not be easy, however, for a fleet to approach it, provided Castle-William is well fortified and well manned, to defend the harbour. No fleets or armies have attempted to molest that town since General Howe's departure.

We had left Colonel Arnold before Quebec; it will be necessary to take a view of his proceedings before that city. While these things we have now related were carrying on at Boston, the blockade of Quebec was continued by Arnold under great hardships and difficulties. Reinforcements arrived slowly, and the Canadians, who are exceedingly fickle and inconstant, were disheartened and wavering. Some have thought that the Congress were unequal in conduct as well as resources, to the management of so many operations at the same time; and it is not to be wondered

wondered at, if they should not be able to manage so many things at once according to their wishes, when the government of Britain blundered so egregiously in one leading object. Whatever there was in this, it is certain that the succours that were sent suffered incredible hardships in their march, which they endured with that fortitude which had hitherto distinguished the provincials in this war. On the other hand, Gen. Carleton with his usual vigilance, guarded against every effort of fraud, force, or surprize; but as all supplies were cut off from the country, the inhabitants and garrison suffered many distresses.

As the season approached in which supplies from England were expected, the Americans grew more active in their operations. They again renewed the siege, and erected batteries, and made several attempts by fire-ships and otherwise to burn the vessels in the harbour. They failed in these attempts, tho' some of them were executed with great boldness and intrepidity. Their troops were at one time drawn up, and scaling ladders, with every other preparation in readiness for storming the town, during the confusion which they expected the fire would have produced.— Though they had not all the success they wished, they however burnt a great part of the suburbs, and the remaining houses being pulled down to prevent the spreading of the flames, afforded a most seasonable relief of fuel to the town, which had for some time been exceedingly distressed for the want of that necessary. While matters were in this situation, upon the 25th of March, a party of Canadians which had been embodied by Mr. Beaujeu with a design of raising the siege, were encountered and easily dispersed by a detachment of the rebels. This gave spirits to
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the provincials, but the effect was temporary and could not last long. Having failed in all their attempts of burning the town with bombs and hot balls, their hopes of taking it by storm failed, while those of taking it by a regular siege daily lessened. Their artillery were too small and light to do much execution against a walled town well fortified, and though not at present well defended, yet it was supplied with a garrison equal to the number of the besiegers. Although considerable reinforcements arrived in the remote parts of the province, the various impediments of bad roads, and want of necessaries suitable to the service, prevented them from joining the troops engaged in the siege. In this state of despondency, the small-pox, the scourge and terror of the western world, broke out, and made great ravages among them. Nor was the immediate effect with respect to life and health the worst consequences of this calamity: for that disorder being considered by the Americans as a plague, and regarded with all the horror incident to that name, the dreadful infection broke in upon every other consideration, and rendered it difficult, if not impracticable, to sustain discipline, or preserve order. In this situation they intended to raise the siege before the arrival of succours from England to the garrison, which were soon expected.——General Wooster had gone to Montreal to make preparation necessary for facilitating that purpose, when the Isis man of war, and two frigates which had sailed from England, had forced their way through the ice, and arrived at Quebec before it was practicable for the provincials to make a retreat. The unexpected sight of the ships threw them into confusion, which was heightened by the immediate effect of cutting

cutting off communication with their forces on the different sides of the river.

General Carleton was too well versed in military affairs to lose an opportunity of seizing the advantages which the present situation afforded. A small detachment of land forces which arrived with the ships of war, together with the marines, being landed with the utmost expedition, and joined to the garrison upon the 6th of May, the governor marched immediately to the provincial camp. He found every thing there in the greatest confusion; they had not even covered themselves with an intrenchment, and having already begun a retreat, upon the appearance of the king's troops they fled, abandoning their artillery, scaling ladders, and other matters of incumbrance. The flight was so precipitate as scarcely to admit of any execution, nor were the king's troops in any condition for a pursuit, if prudence could even have justified the measure.

Thus Quebec was freed from a mixed siege and blockade, after it had been invested about five months, and Canada preserved by the fortitude and constancy of General Carleton and the garrison, which did them great honour. From this time the provincials experienced a continued series of losses and misfortunes in that province. The governor shewed himself worthy of his success, by an act which immediately succeeded, and which does credit to his humanity.—A number of sick and wounded provincials lay scattered about and hid in woods and villages, when they were in the greatest danger of perishing under the complicated pressure of want, fear, and disease. To prevent this melancholy consequence, he issued a proclamation commanding the proper officers to find

Vol. II. I out

out these unhappy persons, and to afford them all necessary relief and assistance at the public expence, whilst to render the benefit compleat, and to prevent obstinancy and apprehension from marring its effect, he assured them that as soon as they were recovered, they should have their liberty to return to their respective provinces. This was truly generous as well as humane, and speaks for General Carleton more than the greatest victory could have done. Such a noble greatness of mind must procure the esteem of his greatest enemies, and adorn his character in the view of all worthy men. It is only a great man that can perform such noble and disinterested deeds, and soar above the mean and pitiful passion of revenge and resentment.

About the end of May, several regiments from Ireland, one from England, and another from General Howe, together with the Brunswick troops, arrived successively in Canada, so that the whole forces in the province, when complicated, were estimated at about 13,000 men. The general rendezvous was at the Three Rivers, which lies half way between Quebec and Montreal, and at the computed distance of about ninety miles from each. This place lies on the north side of the river St. Lawrence, and takes its name from the neighbourhood of one of the branches of a large river, whose waters are discharged through three months into that great reservoir.

The provincials after their flight from Quebec continued to retreat till they arrived on the banks of the river Sorrel, which falls into the river St. Lawrence, about 140 miles from Quebec, where they joined some of their reinforcements that had not been able to proceed farther to their assistance; but they were now
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sunk in their spirits, and much enfeebled in their actions ; and to compleat their misfortunes, the small-pox had spread through all their quarters. These discouraging circumstances were not sufficient to damp the spirits of their enterprizing leaders. Notwithstanding all their past fatigues and disappointments, they formed a very daring plan with great address, which had it succeeded according to its intention, would have been severely felt by the king's forces. This plan was to surprize the British troops at the Three Rivers ; which if it had taken place, and been attended with all the success it was capable of, might have been ranked among the most considerable military exploits of the nature ever performed.

The British and Brunswick forces were at this time much separated. A considerable body was stationed at Three Rivers under the command of Gen. Nisbet, who lay near them on board the transports. The largest body was along with the Generals Carleton, Burgoyne, Philips, and the German General Reidesal, in several divisions, by land and water, on their way from Quebec. The distance from Sorrel was about fifty miles, and the several armed vessels and transports full of troops, which had got up higher than Three Rivers, lay full in the way. In the face of all these dangers and difficulties, a body of about 2000 men, under the command of Major General Thompson, embarked at Sorrel in fifty boats, and coasting the south side of the Lake St. Peter, where the river St. Lawrence spreads to a great extent, arrived at Newlet, from whence they fell down the river by night, and passed to the other side, with an intention of surprizing the forces under the command

of General Frazer. The place called Three Rivers is rather to be considered as a long village than a regular town; and the design was to make the attack before break of day, with a strong detachment, while two smaller parties were drawn up in readiness to cover or support them.

The circumstances concurring to give effect to this design, were too numerous to afford any strong confidence of success. It was one of those bold undertakings which might have produced great advantages, but it was of too perilous a nature for any thing less than the most desperate situation to justify. The provincials were neither sufficiently numerous, nor provided with artillery for such a daring and dangerous encounter; their troops were but lately raised and unexperienced in the art of war, and they were now going to engage old troops under the command of great and experienced officers, furnished with every thing necessary either for attacking or resisting an enemy. Though the circumstances of the parties had been equal, the issue would still have been doubtful, as some of the best forces in Britain, and perhaps in the world, were under the command of great officers, whose honour as soldiers and commanders of the best troops, was likely to prevent them from behaving unworthy of the character they had so long sustained.— There were many, if not every probable chance against the colonists: They were uncertain of arriving at the time proposed, as conveyance of troops by water is exceedingly uncertain as to time. The smallest squall of wind on the lake might retard or interrupt their passage, and instead of arriving at the time proposed, as actually happened, they might be a great while longer in reaching the desired point. The attempt

tempt was therefore a most desperate enterprize, scarcely consistent with any rules or maxims of common prudence.

They missed their time by about an hour, and tho' they passed the armed ships without observation, yet they were discovered, and the alarm given at their landing. They afterwards got into bad grounds, and were involved in many difficulties, which threw them into disorder and confusion. In this condition they found General Frazer's corps ready to receive them, having landed several light six-pounders, which were played upon them with great execution. While they were thus engaged in the front, Brigadier Nesbit, whose transports lay higher up the river, landed his forces full in their way back. Nothing was now left but a retreat, the performance of which was a thing more to be wished for than reasonably expected. Nesbit's corps kept the side of the river to prevent their escape to their boats, while Frazer pursued them and galled them severely with his light artillery. Between both they were driven for some miles through a deep swamp, which they passed with inconceivable toil, exposed to constant danger, and enduring every degree of distress. The British troops at length grew weary with the pursuit, and the wood afforded them a wished-for shelter. The first and second in command, with about two hundred others, were taken prisoners, and it is somewhat strange that they were not all taken or destroyed. The British forces were but lately arrived, and were not recovered from the fatigues of a long voyage, they were therefore as unable to pursue as the others were to stand a severe attack.

This

This was the last vigorous push which the provincials made for the conquest of Canada. The British army having joined at Three Rivers, pushed forward by land and water with great expedition. They had now nothing but the ordinary chances of the way to interrupt their march, and they made all the expedition that they could to arrive at the Sorrel. They arrived there upon the 15th of June, and found the enemy had abandoned the place some hours before, and dismantled the batteries which they had erected to defend the entrance into the river, and had carried off their artillery and stores. A strong detachment was landed here, under the command of General Burgoyne, with orders to advance along the Sorrel to St. John's, while the remainder of the fleet and army sailed up the river Longueil, the place of passage from the island of Montreal to La Prairie on the continent. Here they discovered that the enemy had abandoned the city and island of Montreal on the preceding evening, and that if the wind had been favourable, they might have met at this place. The army was immediately landed on the continent, and marching by La Prairie, crossed by the peninsula formed by the river St. Lawrence and the Sorrel, in order to join Gen. Burgoyne at St. John's, where they expected a stand and a strong resistance would have been made by the colonists.

Burgoyne pursued his march along the Sorrel without intermission, but with much caution, as was necessary in a country where there was still a suspicion of an enemy, and where their last and most desperate efforts were to be expected. In this the King's Generals were greatly mistaken; for it appeared afterwards not to have been any part of the plan of the rebels

rebels to make any stand at those places where the British forces expected. General Burgoyne arrived at St. John's on the evening of the 18th of June, where he found the buildings on flames and nearly every thing destroyed that could not be carried away. The provincials acted in the same manner at Chamblee, and burnt such vessels as they were not able to drag up the rapids in their way to Lake Champlain, where they immediately embarked for Crown Point. Though their flight was precipitate they sustained no loss, and General Sullivan, who commanded the retreat, received public thanks for the prudence with which he conducted it, by which he saved their ruined army, at a time when it was encumbered with a vast number of sick, most of whom were ill of the small-pox.

An end was now put to the war in Canada; the advantages of which however were considerably checked by the restraint which was now laid upon the further operations of the army in that quarter. For as the colonists were masters of Lake Champlain, it was impossible for the forces to proceed to the southward until such a number of vessels were constructed or obtained, as would afford a superiority, and enable them to cross the lake with safety. The doing of this was a work of much labour and time; for though six armed vessels were sent from England for that purpose, the falls of Chamblee rendered the means of conveying highly difficult, and a matter which required much ingenuity and industry. A vast number of other vessels were also necessarily to be constructed, both for conveyance and protection. But we must for a while leave General Burgoyne and his army, and proceed to the operations of some other part of the continent.

North.

North Carolina was this year in a state of great commotion. The governor and the assembly were at open war, and each party used their utmost endeavours to destroy the other. Governor Martin, we have already observed, was obliged to seek refuge on board a ship of war in Cape Fear river. This disaster did not damp his ardour in the service of government, nor restrain his attempts to reduce the province of North Carolina to obedience. He had received intelligence, that a squadron of men of war with seven regiments, under the conduct of Sir Peter Parker and Lord Cornwallis, were to depart from Ireland on an expedition to the southern colonies in the beginning of the year, and that North Carolina was their first if not their principal object. This encreased his confidence and roused him to attempt something in the mean time. He also was informed that Gen. Carleton with a small detachment, was on his way from New-England to meet him at Cape Fear. He had formed a connection with a body of desperate renegades, who had lately been considered as rebels, and enemies to the provincial establishment, who went by the name of Regulators, and have been taken notice of in this history. Having assembled a number of these and some Highland emigrants, he thought to accomplish the reduction of the insurgents, even independent of the expected force. The colony was deemed the weakest in America except Georgia; and the two parties we have mentioned were numerous, active, and daring, and the former as well as the latter were zealously attached to the cause of government. The Highlanders were considered as naturally warlike, and the Regulators, from their situation and manner of living, to be much bolder, hardier, and better marksmen, than those

those who had been bred to other courses, and in more civilized parts of the country. The governor sent several commissions to these people, for the raising and commanding of regiments, and granted another to one Mr. M'Donald to act as their general.— Along with the commission he sent also a proclamation commanding all persons upon their allegiance to repair to the royal standard, which was erected by General M'Donald about the middle of February. Governor Martin had not well considered the character of either the general or troops he was now employing, though they were desperate and wicked to an extreme, and capable of the most daring actions, when there was no immediate danger, yet being unprincipled, and having fixed the object before them, and being under no discipline, they were by no means to be trusted.— All causes were alike to them, unless their own interest, which did not appear to be more connected with the cause of government than with that of the colonists. Their after conduct declared that they were not to be depended on. They were in general a sort of free-booters, who delighted more in the plunder that attended commotions than in the defence of any cause whatsoever. Their manner of war was against those who had no arms of defence, but when they met with force they were ready to fly, unless when they were surrounded and could not get away. Such were the men, by means of whose assistance, Governor Martin thought to reduce the province of Carolina to obedience.

This new general and his new raised army were not long until they were brought to a trial of their prowess; for upon the provincials receiving advice of their

assembling at a place called Cross Creek, Brigadier-general Moore was immediately ordered to march against them at the head of a provincial regiment which he commanded, with such militia as he could collect, and some pieces of cannon. He marched within a few miles of them, and took possession of an important post called Rockfort Bridge, which, as he was much inferior to them in strength, he immediately entrenched and rendered defensible. He had not been many days in this station, where he was receiving and waiting for succours, when general M'Donald approached at the head of his army, and sent a letter to Moore, inclosing the governor's proclamation, and recommending to him and his party to join the king's standard, by a given hour next day, or he must be under the necessity of considering them as enemies.

As Gen. Moore knew that the provincial forces were marching from all quarters, he protracted the negotiation, in hopes that the tory army, as they were called, might have been surrounded. In his final answer, he declared, that he and his officers considered themselves as engaged in a cause the most glorious and honourable in the world—the defence of the liberties of mankind; he reminded the emigrants of the ungrateful return they had made to the kind reception they had met in the colony; and the general, with some of his officers, of an oath they had taken a little before, and upon which they were permitted to come into the country, that they only came to see their relations, without any concern whatever in public affairs. In return to the proclamation, he sent them the test proposed by the Congress, with a proffer that if they subscribed it and laid down their arms, they should be received as friends; but if they refused

refused to comply, they might expect consequences similar to those which they had held out to his people. In the mean time Mr. M'Donald perceived the danger he was in of being enclosed, and abruptly quitting his ground, endeavoured with considerable dexterity, by forced marches, the unexpected passing of rivers, and the greatest quickness of movement, to disengage himself. It is thought to have been the scheme of this party to bring Governor Martin, with Lord William Campbel, and General Clinton, who had by this time joined them, in the interior part of the country, which they judged would be a means of uniting all the back settlers of the southern colonies in the royal cause, of bringing forward the Indians, and of encouraging the well affected to shew themselves in all places.

The provincials were however so close in the pursuit, and so alert in cutting the country and seizing the passes, that M'Donald at length found himself under the necessity of engaging one Colonel Caswell, who with about 1000 militia and minutemen had taken possession of a place called Moore Creek Bridge, where they had thrown up an intrenchment. The royalists were by all accounts much superior in number, being about 3000 strong; even M'Donald himself after the battle confessed that they were 1500.—The emigrants began the attack with great fury, but M'Leod, the second in command, and a few more of their bravest officers being killed at the first attack, they suddenly lost all spirit, fled with the greatest precipitation, and, as the colonists affirm, deserted their general, who was taken prisoner, as were nearly all their leaders, and the rest totally broken and dispersed. It is often the fate of the Highlanders, when

they meet with a steady resistance, and lose any of their chiefs, to make a precipitate flight. Their fury is violent, but it is soon over; and if the troops whom they engage can stand their first attack, they will be very ready to conquer them, or at least to put them to flight.

This victory greatly elated the Carolinians. They had shewn that their province was not so weak as was imagined; for though their force in the engagement was not considerable, they had raised 10,000 men in the space of ten days. But what was still more flattering, they had encountered Europeans who had held them in the most sovereign contempt, both as men and as soldiers in the field, and had defeated them with an inferior force.

Had the zeal of this people been kept dormant till the forces had arrived from England, it is highly probable that the southern colonies would have considerably felt the impression of the insurrection of the Regulators and emigrants. But now their force and spirits were so entirely broken, their leaders being sent to different prisons, and the rest stripped of their arms, and watched with all the eyes of distrust and suspicion, that no future effort could reasonably be expected from them. Governor Martin appears to have had more zeal than discretion for the cause of government, and seems to have been totally ignorant of the temper and disposition of the colony he governed;—for as he was informed of the destination of the troops from Ireland to the southern provinces, he ought to have waited till their arrival, when his emigrants and Regulators could have done some service: But the method which he took was an effectual one to arm the province, and have it in readiness when
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COMMODORE HOPKINS.

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the King's troops arrived, to give them a warm reception. By all that we can learn from the history of this war, it seems to have been raised by the ignorance and pride of the several governors of the provinces, who misinformed government with regard to the state of the colonies. There does not seem to have been any of them on the side of government, that either knew the number of their friends, or the power of their enemies. Martin and his friends were totally mistaken in rating the prowess of the insurgents, and despising the power of the colonists.— And it is a mistake that has prevailed at home since the beginning of this destructive war, that the valour and power of our troops could not be resisted, and that the colonists were mean spirited, cowardly, and insignificant. It must be confessed that it is extremely difficult to regulate or restrain the caprice or violence of those leaders, who assume authority on such occasions. They have not always been the wisest in the kingdom of Great Britain that have been sent to be governors of our colonies: they are generally the friends of the minister, or some of their friends, and that is accounted a sufficient qualification.

The congress were not inattentive to their own interests in the midst of those tumults in the different colonies, and they turned their view to objects of importance in all parts of the colonies. The blunders of our ministry and their late governors taught them wisdom. They joined execution with design, and endeavoured to execute their plans as speedily as prudence required. Upon the third of March they fitted out a squadron of five frigates, under the command of Commodore Hopkins, who sailed to the Bahama islands, when they stripped the island of Providence, which

which is the principal one, of a considerable quantity of artillery and stores. They were however disappointed in the powder, which they most wanted, through the prudence of the governor, who sent an hundred and fifty barrels of it away in a small vessel the night before they landed. They brought off the governor, and some other public persons, as prisoners; and after taking several prizes in their return, fell in at last with the Glasgow frigate of war, accompanied with a tender, the latter of which they took, and the former escaped with difficulty, after a sharp engagement.

All this time, Lord Dunmore, with his fleet of fugitives, continued on the coasts, and in the rivers of Virginia, and remained in a hovering situation for a great part of the year; but as every place was now strictly guarded, these unhappy people who had put themselves under his protection, suffered very great distresses. The heat of the weather, and the badness and scarcity of water and provisions, with the closeness and nastiness of the small vessels, in which they were crowded, by degrees produced that infectious and malignant distemper which is known by the name of pestilential fever. This dreadful disorder made great havoc among them, but particularly affected the negroes, most of whom it swept away. After various adventures, in which they were driven from place to place, and from island to island, by the Virginians, several of the vessels were driven on shore in a gale of wind, and the wretched fugitives became captives to their own countrymen. At last, every place being shut up against them, and hostile to the remainder, and neither water nor provisions to be obtained even at the expence of blood, it was found necessary
towards

towards the beginning of August to burn the smallest and least valuable vessels, and to send the remainder, amounting to 40 or 50 sail, with the exiles, to seek shelter and retreat in Florida, Bermudas, and the West Indies. In this manner ended the hopes entertained by the employment of the negroes, to suppress the rebellion in the southern colonies. This measure, rather invidious than powerful, tended much to inflame the discontents in these colonies, without adding any strength to the King's arms. The unhappy creatures who engaged in it are said to have perished almost to a man. This conduct of Lord Dunmore's, in employing the negroes, and in burning Norfolk, was extolled by the Tories at home as the most righteous and heroic proceeding, and all the venal newspapers in the kingdom echoed his Lordship's praises, and commended his transactions. His losses and defeats were denied or concealed by government as long as possible, till Dunmore's disgrace drove the ministry to still more desperate experiments, and every new project to fulfil their designs exposed more and more their folly and malignity. Every new step in their proceedings, demonstrated the darkness of their understanding, and real want of system and method in all they attempted to perform.

Providence for a season seemed also to frown upon their schemes and measures, and what was either pursued without wisdom, or carried on through pride and ambition, was frustrated by an immediate hand of providence. The fleets, transports, and victuallers which had been sent to America, met with exceeding bad weather in their passage, and so many delays and untoward circumstances of different sorts befel them, that in a great degree frustrated the end of their

their destination. Sir Peter Parker's squadron, which sailed from Portsmouth in the end of the year, met with unexpected delays in Ireland, and bad weather afterwards, so that they did not arrive at Cape Fear till the beginning of May, where they were detained by various causes till the end of the month. They met there with General Clinton, who had already been at New-York, and from thence proceeded to Virginia, where he had seen Lord Dunmore, and finding that no service could be effected at either place with his small force, came to this place to wait for them. This season of the year was very unfortunate for the troops, and much against any operations which they intended to perform. The excessive heat rendered the troops sickly, even at Cape Fear, notwithstanding the plenty of refreshments they procured, and the little labour they had upon their hands. They found it necessary to do something; and Charlestown, the capital of South Carolina, being within the line of Sir Peter Parker and Lord Cornwallis's instructions, they determined to make an impression in that quarter. They had little information of General Howe's situation, nor did General Clinton know of his evacuating Boston but through the channel of an American newspaper. And it happened unfortunately, that a vessel which Gen. Howe had dispatched from Halifax, with orders for their proceeding to the northward, met with such delays in her passage that she did not arrive at Cape Fear till after their departure.

The fleet anchored off Charlestown bar in the beginning of June. They were joined before they proceeded to action by the Experiment man of war; and the naval force then consisted of the Commodore

Sir

Sir Peter Parker's ship of 50 guns; the Experiment, of the same force; the Active, Solebay, Acteon, and Syren, of 28 guns each; the Sphynx, of 20, an hired armed ship of 22, a small sloop of war, an armed schooner, and the Thunderer bomb-ketch. The passage of the bar was a work of time, difficulty and danger, especially to the two large ships, which tho' they had taken out their guns, and used every other means to lighten them as much as possible, both touched the ground, and stuck several times. The land forces were commanded by General Clinton, Lord Cornwallis, and Brigadier-General Vaughan. It is somewhat surprizing that at the time General Clinton sailed from Boston, General Lee at the head of a strong detachment from the army before that place, immediately set out to secure New York, from the supposed attempt, the former would have made upon that city. Having succeeded in that object; General Clinton could not but be surprized at his arrival in Virginia, to find Lee in possession, and in the same state of preparation in which he had left him at New York. Upon Clinton's departure from Cape Fear, Lee traversed the continent with the utmost expedition, to secure North Carolina. And at length upon the further progress of the fleet and army to the southward, General Lee again, with equal celerity, proceeded to the defence of Charlestown. It was scarcely credible that so much expedition could have been made by any man in such a warm climate at that season of the year, and perhaps no man ever posted so swiftly amidst so great difficulties and disadvantages.—The animating spirit of liberty gives wings to invention, and vigour to the animal spirits, which slaves and dupes to power know nothing of. It could not

Vol. II. L have

have been in the power of those whose minds were not invigorated by some animating principle, to have gone through the fatigues, wearinesses, and watchings of such a tedious journey.

The first object of our forces, after passing the bar, was the back of a fort which had been lately erected, though not yet quite furnished nor rendered altogether compleat, upon the south west point of Sullivan Island. This fort commanded the passage to Charlestown, which lay farther west by six miles distance;—and though it had been but lately constructed, was properly considered the key of that harbour. It was said that it was represented to our officers as in a more imperfect state than it was found; but supposing it had been more perfect than it was, they could not imagine that a raw militia could have been able to have defended it any length of time against the great weight of metal and the force of fire from our ships, even excluding the co-operation of the land forces. So partial were our people in their judgment concerning their own prowess, and the force and valour of their enemies. The colonists had considered the danger before they engaged in it, and knew the opinion which the British forces had of their courage; they were determind for once to put the British intrepidity to trial, and shew them a specimen what a militia, animated by the spirit of liberty, could do.

Our troops were landed on Long Island, which lies nearer, and to the eastward of Sullivan's being separated only by some shoals, and a creek called the Breech, which are deemed passable at low water, the ford being represented to our people as only 18 inches in depth in that state. The Carolians had posted some forces with a few pieces of cannon near
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the north-east extremity of Sullivan's island, at the distance of two miles from the fort, where they had thrown up works to prevent the passage of the royal army over the breach. General Lee was encamped with a considerable body of forces upon the continent at the back and to northward of the island, with which he had a communication open by a bridge of boats, and could by that means at any time march the whole or any part of his forces to support that post which was opposed to our men's passing from Long Island. The latter is a naked burning sand, where the troops suffered greatly from their exposure to the intense heat of the sun. Both the fleet and army were greatly distressed through the badness of the water: that which is found upon the sea coast of Carolina being very brackish. Nor were they in better condition with respect to the quantity or quality of their provisions. 'Tho' the greatest dispatch was necessary on account of these inconveniences, yet such delays occurred in carrying the design into execution, that it was near the end of the month before the attack on Sullivan's island took place; a season which was applied by the provincials with great diligence for completing their works. Every thing being at length settled between the commanders by sea and land, the Thunderer bomb, covered by the armed ships, took her station in the morning, and began the attack by throwing shells at the fort as the fleet advanced. About eleven o'clock the Bristol, Experiment, Active, and Solebay, brought up directly against the fort and began a most furious and incessant cannonade.—The Sphynx, Acteon, and Syren, were ordered to the westward, to take their station between the end of the island and Charlestown, with a design to explode the

works of the fort, and, if possible, to cut off the communication between the island and continent, which would of course cut off the retreat of the garrison, as well as all succours for its assistance. There was also another intention in this position of the ships, namely, to prevent any attempt of sending the ships to interrupt the attack. This part of the design was rendered unfortunate by the strange unskilfulness of the pilot, who entangled the frigates in the shoals called the Middle Grounds, where they all stuck fast; and though two of them were in some time got off with danger and difficulty, it was then too late, and they were in no condition to execute the intended service. The *Acteon* could not be got off, and was burnt by the officers and crew the next morning, to prevent her materials and stores from becoming a prey to the enemy.

Whilst a continued cannonade from the ships seemed sufficient to shake the firmness of the bravest foe, and daunt the courage of the bravest soldiers, the return made from the fort was equally terrible, and could not fail of calling for respect, as well as of striking terror into every British seaman.

In the midst of that dreadful roar of artillery, they stood to their guns with the greatest firmness and constancy, and fired with such deliberation and coolness that they seldom missed their aim. The ships suffered prodigiously; they were almost torn to pieces, and the slaughter was dreadful. Scarcely was ever British valour put to so severe a trial, nor ever did our army in any engagement of the same nature, meet with so rude an encounter. They began now to find that Sullivan fort was not so easily taken as they apprehended, and that the cowards in Carolina had chang-
ed

ed their character. The springs of the Bristol's cable were cut off by the shot, and she lay for some time exposed as a mark to the fire of the fort, and was most terribly raked. Capt. Morris, who had shewn much bravery, was covered with wounds, though he still kept his station, and refused to retire, until his arm being shot off, he was carried away in a condition that did not afford a possibility of his recovery. The quarter-deck of the Bristol was once cleared of every person except the commodore, who stood alone a spectacle of firmness and intrepidity, which has never been excelled, and seldom equalled.—The others on that deck were either carried down to have their wounds dressed, or were killed in the conflict. Captain Scott of the Experiment, had his own share of the danger or glory, who, besides the loss of an arm, received so many other wounds, that his life was at first despaired of. Our fleet thought once that they had silenced the fort, and concluded that the day was their own, and that the forces on shore might have taken possession thereof, but in this they were mistaken; for this silence proceeded from the want of ammunition, which the provincials had to carry from the continent. It seems indeed extraordinary, that a detachment of land forces was not ready to take the advantage of the silence of the fort, and improve this opportunity. The reasons of this has never been sufficiently cleared up by any well-authenticated accounts: some have blamed the commander in chief for not co-operating with the fleet, whilst others have attempted to shew that it was impossible for the land forces to afford them any assistance. To set forth the bravery of our seamen, it was strongly asserted at home, that they drove the Americans from the fort;

but

but this does not at all appear to have been the case. For the garrison received the thanks and praise of the Americans, as well as of General Lee, which is a proof that they did not believe that they abandoned the fort, deserted the guns, or were changed, though they might be, and certainly were, reinforced.

During this very severe and hot contest, the seamen looked often and impatiently towards the east, to see the land forces advance from Long Island, to draw the rebels from the fort and entrenchments. In these hopes they were grievously disappointed. What was the reason of this inaction of the land forces has never been fully explained. The papers published by authority are so totally defective and unsatisfactory upon this point, that it is impossible to learn any thing from them to clear up this matter. The Gazette upon this occasion is the most jarring and inconsistent account that ever was given of any transaction of such a nature, and it is impossible to form any other conclusion from that paper, than that it was composed to throw mist and darkness upon the subject. From the day that the action at Bunker's-hill happened till this present time, the literary composition, as well as the art of war, seems to have forsaken the British ministry and officers; for in their account of the various transactions of this unhallowed war, there appears to be nothing but confusion, inconsistency, and want of method.

The Gazette says, that the king's troops were stopped by an impracticable depth of water, where they expected to have passed almost dryshod. This is such an imputation upon the character of the officers, and particularly the commander in chief, as sets
them

them forth in the most despicable light. To suppose that General Clinton and his officers should have been nineteen days in that small island, without ever examining until the very time of action, the nature of the only passage by which they could render any service to their friends, and answer the purpose of their landing, and the end of the expedition, appears an intolerable want of military prudence and circumspection. In the way the Gazette tells this story, General Clinton deserved to have been severely censured and punished for his negligence and inattention; for provided he had intended to have driven a flock of sheep over the continent, it would have been necessary to have sounded the depth of the water, beforehand to have found whether it was possible to pass them over without drowning them. There might perhaps be reasons for concealing the true state of this affair, and probably no blame to be imputed to the commander and officers. General Clinton certainly acted wisely in not attempting to pass over the continent, for there was such a force under General Lee, and so well posted, that had our men advanced as was expected, it would have been impossible to have saved them from a total overthrow. The commander in chief in that expedition was never believed to have written these accounts that were printed in his name concerning his mistake about the depth of the water: this was always considered as a ministerial apology framed by those who manufactured the Gazette, who for want of common sense, inserted that absurdity in the paper.—They were not willing to allow that the colonists had either force or courage to oppose our men, and therefore they created seven feet of water to preserve their power and courage,
and

and to support their own idea of the American pusillanimity. It was not the depth of the water that prevented General Clinton from attacking Sullivan fort; but his own prudence and sagacity, who, when he perceived, upon a nearer inspection, the force of the enemy, and that to attack them would be attended with certain destruction to his own army, he wisely desisted from an experiment that could do no good; but would have been attended with much evil, both to himself, and the cause he was engaged in. It has been the ill fortune of those brave officers who have served the present government in this ruinous war; never to have their actions fairly stated in the public accounts of their proceedings. They have at one time been extolled beyond all the limits of discretion, as heroes of extraordinary magnitude, and by the very same authority lessened and depreciated to the lowest degree of character.

By comparing all accounts concerning the attack upon Sullivan's Island, it appears that our people had been mistaken in estimating the strength and force of the colonists, and that they found they had much more to do than subdue Sullivan fort. An army ready appointed and well posted was prepared to receive them, which if they had proceeded to attack, they must have fallen a sacrifice to their own folly and rashness.

This action continued till the darkness of the night compelled the assailants to desist; they however shewed much unwillingness notwithstanding their weariness, loss, and fatigue, to give up the enterprize. Sir Peter Parker after using every effort which bravery is capable of, finding that all hope of success was at an end, and the ebbing tide near spent, withdrew his shattered

tered vessels between nine and ten o'clock of the evening, after an engagement which had been supported for above ten hours with uncommon courage and bravery. The Bristol had 111, and the Experiment 79 men killed and wounded, and both ships had received so much damage, that the provincials conceived hopes that they could not have been got over the bar. The frigates did not suffer so severely, for the provincials pointed their fire principally at the great ships. The bomb vessel did little service upon this occasion; there appeared to be a real want of art in the management of the mortars, for some were overcharged, and the beds so shattered and loosened that they were rendered useless.

It was not expected that their small insignificant fort would have been able to withstand the heavy fire of our ships the space of one hour, though upon trial it was found that after ten hours severe cannonade, it was as far from being reduced as at the beginning. The provincials shewed on this occasion both skill and intrepidity, which would have done honour to veteran troops; both officers and men performed their duty to the amazement of their enemies, and conducted their fire with such deliberation and design, that almost every shot did execution. The carnage aboard the Bristol and Experiment was dreadful, and the ships were hulled in a terrible manner. The guns of the fort are said to have been 42 pounders, and were formerly those that belonged to the Foudroyant man of war, which had been formerly taken from the French: these did dreadful execution. The British sailors did all that brave men could do, but as the land forces could not possibly

assist them, they were obliged, with great reluctance, to give up this dangerous and fatal attempt.

Colonel Moultrie, who commanded in the fort, received great and deserved praise from his countrymen, for the courage and conduct by which he was so much distinguished in its defence. The garrison also received great applause, and a serjeant was publicly honoured with a present of a sword, from the president of the Congress, for a particular act of bravery. This defence greatly raised the character of the Carolinians, and the southern colonies, and taught our ministry that the colonists in all quarters were in earnest. They had falsely affirmed, that the colonists in the south were not so hardy and brave as the New England ones, and those in the north, and that the climate or something peculiar to these colonies, made them all naturally cowards. This was now fully refuted by an experiment which the ministry could not help feeling in the most tender manner, though their pensioned scribblers continue to harp still upon the same string, and repeat the same notes. Men who are themselves slaves either to their lusts, or to the will and pleasure of other men, have no ideas concerning those exertions, both of mind and body, with which the spirit of liberty inspires those that are possessed with it. It is with such as it is with dishonest men, who themselves pay no regard to truth, they believe that there is no such thing as honesty in the world.

The apologies at home for this miscarriage were as inconsistent as the attempt itself. The blame was laid upon the heat of the weather and the depth of the water, which was not foreseen till the moment of action, and by this kind of apology, when they were commending

commending the wisdom of the officers and the bravery of the British troops, they were exposing them to the world as destitute of common sense and discretion.—The heat of the weather might have easily been foreseen, and the depth of the water sounded in the space of nineteen days. But the advocates for the schemes of the ministry were willing rather to publish the grossest absurdities than to admit that their schemes were erroneous, or that the colonists had any courage.

Before we proceed to the progress of the grand army under General Howe, it must be observed, that during the transactions in Carolina, the continental congress took an opportunity to sound the minds of the people concerning a declaration of independency, and by every possible means to prepare them for it.—Upon the 15th of May they sent a sort of circular manifesto to the several colonies, stating the causes which rendered it, as they said, necessary, that all authority of the crown should be totally suppressed, and all the powers of government taken into their own hands. As this was an adventurous proceeding, and new in the history of society, we will be obliged to take a view of the arguments offered by the colonists in defence of their practice, as well as of those offered by government for their claims of legislation. To set this matter in as clear a light as possible, we shall first take a view of the proceedings of parliament, which occasioned this manifesto, and afterwards the resolution of the congress. This shall be nearly done in the words and stile of the debates and speeches in both houses. The subject is copious, and though it is abridged as much as possible, yet it still will appear bulky to the view of many, but it will be impossible to understand the merits of this controversy without

some particular consideration of the transactions at home. To determine fairly with respect to this unhappy dispute, the springs of action must always be kept in view, and these we only can learn from the various proceedings and debates which were antecedent to the operations of the different ships of war. Administration were now so closely entangled in the American war, and a system of their own devising, that there was scarcely a possibility of overthrowing the one without overthrowing the other: and that system was so firmly supported, that nothing less than some extraordinary and violent convulsion appeared even capable of shaking its foundation. Yet notwithstanding this security, the ministry could not help feeling great uneasiness at the accounts they were daily receiving from the colonies during the sitting of parliament. For though the opposition were not very strong in number, they were very quick sighted in discovering their faults, and as indefatigable in exposing them, and having effect through all their winding mazes up to their causes. Matters were now come to that pass that it was scarcely possible to put a good face on them either to the parliament or to the nation. The ministry were on this occasion put to their last shifts to make things appear with any kind of decent grace to the public.

C H A P. XI.

Proceedings in Parliament—A letter from New York.—Petition from the Congress by Penn—Petition from Newfoundland—The Americans declare themselves Independent—Preparations for War—Lord Howe arrives at Halifax—Arrives at Staten Island—Sends Papers to Washington—An attempt upon Long Island resolved—The Progress of the War, &c.

THE calling of a new parliament had rubbed off some ministerial incumbrances;—all engagements, promises, and mistakes, with the old, were now obliterated with one dash. But a new and heavy reckoning had already been contracted in one session, which had elapsed of that present parliament. The restraining bills passed by the new parliament were to have affixed a seal to all the acts of its predecessors. The general distress arising from a general punishment in the colonies, would, it was hoped, render the majority the avengers of the cause of government, and the punishers of the incorrigible. The conciliatory resolution, independent of every other thing, in its double capacity of converting and dividing, was supposed to be well adapted to accomplish all that was wanted. To these was also added, an army sufficient as the sanguine opinion, to look America into subjection, without the trouble of striking a blow. And to crown

crown the whole, a naval force was to be sent, which of itself would be almost equal to accomplish the whole purpose. Time has already shewn how badly the ministry have been acquainted with the state of the Americans.

These branches of the scheme of the ministry became a subject of animadversion, and it was not an easy task for their friends to set aside the charges of misinformation, ignorance, misconception, and want of capacity, which would attend them. The questions concerning the war were exceedingly embarrassing. It was asked, since extremities were determined upon, why was not a sufficient force sent in time to prevent or overcome all opposition? Why has a course been pursued for several years to provoke the colonies, warn them of their danger, and give them time to put themselves into the present strong state of defence? If it now appears, said the opposers of the ministry, that five times the number are not sufficient for the service, how could the ministry be so totally ignorant and misinformed as to suppose that 10,000 men could subdue America without bloodshed?—These and many other questions were put to the minister, which he could not easily answer.

To remedy the evils arising from past tardiness and inaction, it was now determined to carry on the war with a vigour that would astonish all Europe, and to employ such an army in the ensuing campaign as never before had been seen in the western world. This it was alledged, besides the main and grand object, would most effectually silence all clamours, and prevent troubles and useless enquiries. When the people were once heartily engaged in a war, they would not take time to recollect, much less to animadvert
upon

upon the original cause of the dispute, but would in their usual manner, and from their natural disposition, carry it on with keenness, and if gratified now and then with a brilliant stroke of success, take no further notice concerning future burthens and consequences; by this method the public opinion would be secured. They had already shewn a decided superiority in parliament, and the efforts of the minority struggling with the general opinion, and directed against the apparent national interest, would only tend to render them every day more feeble, and deprive them of that popularity that is the soul of opposition. This was good enough reasoning for a cabinet exercise, but the practice of it was not so very easy. The Americans were now upon their guard, and provided for the worst they could do, and there were now many things to dim the brilliance of the strokes of success they had in view. As the public opinion depended upon these brilliant strokes, it was impossible to gain it before they were made, and as all they had yet done was of a different character, the public could not give them credit for any thing that was yet to come.

There was one thing which greatly shewed the fickleness and the inconstancy of the people. The late checks which the Americans had given our troops affected the national and military pride. Many of those who had not approved of our late conduct with respect to the colonies, thought it now too late to look back, or to inquire into past causes; they now thought that government was to be supported at all events, and that they were not to hesitate at any expence or danger to preserve our dominions, and whoever was right in the beginning, the American insolence deserved chastisement at that present time. This was a method
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of reasoning immoral in its nature, and destroyed every principle of truth and virtue ;—for if the Americans were right in the beginning, and we were in the wrong, it would certainly have been a laudable and just proceeding to have confessed our error, and to have forsaken it. But because our brethren would not depart from justice, rather than confess our faults and reform our conduct, we would pursue them to death for their insolence of being virtuous. This sets forth a number of men in a most pitiful and disadvantageous point of view, who throw justice and equity out of the question, and for the sake of a selfish policy pursue the most iniquitous and immoral practices.—We shall see when we come to the arguments upon the principal merits of this controversy, what has been said upon this point.

The loss arising from the want of the American commerce was for some time not felt. The prodigious remittance in corn during our scarcity, which, we must do the commercians the justice to say, they with honesty made in discharge of their debts, with the much larger than their usual sum which they were enabled to pay, from the advanced prices of oil and tobacco, and other commodities, all together occasioned a prodigious influx of money. The sailing of the flota from Spain, the armament against Algiers, and the peace between the Turks and the Russians, occasioned an unusual demand for goods and manufactures of various sorts, from Spain, the north of Europe, and Turkey, which keeping up a brisk circulation in trade, business, and money, all contributed to the same effect. The supplying of an army and navy with provisions and necessaries of every sort, at so prodigious a distance, gave employment and emolument to an infinite

nite number of people engaged in the transport service, which would have been otherwise idle, and caused such a bustle of business and circulation of cash, as checked all observation of other deficiencies, and stifled all attention to future consequences. A golden harvest was not only opened to the view of contractors, but they had already enjoyed such a share of the fruits, as was sufficient to excite the most eager rage for its continuance and renewal. It would be superfluous to mention the numberless dealers and gamblers in the lottery, stocks, and other money transactions, who generally profit by all wars. These contributed for a season to keep up the spirits of the people, and to animate them to this civil contention.—This temporary flow of the spirits of some individuals in the nation, could not animate the whole body, nor long continue to flow in the same manner in the same persons. It was no more than a sort of temporary impulse arising from an accidental cause, which was soon likely to cease, when a consumption equal to the irregularity of the former motion of spirits in the body politic would readily happen. The American, West Indian, and African merchants, with the planters in the West Indies, had long foreseen, and already too deeply experienced the fatal effects of the present unhappy contest. They with several merchants in the capital and Bristol, still wished and struggled to have matters restored to their ancient state, and reprobated all the measures that tended to the present crisis.

A great number of the people in other places, tho' less loud in their demand for peace, still more dissatisfied with the present measures. In Ireland almost

all the people, except a few pensioners or some of the clergy, were against the measures of government.

There was a strange indifference and want of feeling prevailed at this time among all ranks of people, with regard to public affairs, thro' all the country; of which there was a strong proof given which will readily recur to every body's memory, that the accounts of many of the late military transactions, as well as political proceedings of very great importance, were received with as much indifference, and canvassed with as much coolness and unconcern, as if they had happened to two nations with which they were no ways connected. We must from these observations except the people of Scotland, who almost universally, so far as they could be described or distinguished under any particular denomination, not only applauded, but offered their lives and fortunes in support of the present measures. The same approbation was also given, and assurances made, though with less earnestness and unanimity by a great number of towns in England. One thing which may be considered as a political barometer with respect to the sentiments of the lower ranks of people in cases of that nature, was at this time exceedingly low, namely, the recruiting service. This went on slowly, and very few either in England or Ireland were fond of either the land or sea service, though great encouragement was given, and no means was left untried for making of extraordinary levies. In the midst of all these political commotions, the city of London made a capital figure in opposition to the ministry and the measures which they were now pursuing. A petition and remonstrance was agreed upon by the livery of that city, which strongly reprobated the measures that were going

going on, but as the King would not receive it upon his throne, it was not presented.

Some short time before these transactions of the city of London which related to the petition and remonstrance, a letter was received from the committee of New York, addressed to the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and common council, together with a copy of their association, a recital of most of those grievances and complaints which we have often taken notice of in this history. In this paper they rejected and censured severely Lord North's conciliatory propositions. They declared that the colony was willing and ready according to the ancient constitution, and upon equitable emergencies, to contribute to the support of the empire; but also declared, that as Englishmen they would do it of their voluntary gift, and not by arbitrary compulsion. They testified their fidelity and inviolable loyalty, with their affection to their country; they stated the great danger of further provocation with respect to the colonies, declaring the unanimity of their citizens in defending their rights at all risks, and they signified their confidence and trust in the vigorous exertions of the city of London towards restoring union, mutual confidence, and peace to the whole empire. All these proceedings marked the spirit and temper of the people both at home and in the colonies; but the ministry being bent upon their own schemes, remained callous to all notices, advice, petitions, remonstrances, and exhortations.— It appears that this was to them and their party the hour and power of darkness.

The officers in the army were not altogether fond of the American war; some persons of the first rank who had commissions, resigned and refused to serve

any longer in a service so unnatural in itself and ruinous to the British empire. Among these the Earl of Effingham made the first figure. This nobleman whose military genius had led him when a youth into the army, and since prompted him to ripen theory with practice, wherever real service was to be found, by acting as a volunteer in the war between the Turks and Russians, had since his return, as a peer in parliament, uniformly opposed the whole system of measures pursued against the Americans, and finding that it was inconsistent with his character, and unbecoming his dignity to enforce the measures with his sword which he had utterly condemned as a legislator, he accordingly, after declaring his readiness to serve his King and country against their enemies, resigned his commission.

The Earl of Effingham's resignation, or rather the cause from which it proceeded, gave great offence, and his request of retaining his rank in the army was not complied with. Several officers had not shewn that willingness in going upon this service that they would have shewn upon any other occasion. A few who could not overcome their repugnance to it, now quitted and gave up. But the majority thought that where the superior power of King and parliament had decided, it was no part of their military duty to enquire into the justice and policy of the quarrel. The conduct of Lord Effingham rendered him extremely popular among those who held similar opinions with regard to American measures, and who composed a numerous body in England and Ireland. This soon appeared in the city of London, where among the resolutions passed in the common-hall on

Midsummer

Midsummer-day, and which were afterwards presented to the king, public thanks were ordered to be given to the Right Honourable the Earl of Effingham, who having consistently with the principles of an Englishman, refused to draw the sword which has been employed to the honour of his country, against the lives and liberties of his fellow subjects in America. And soon after an address of thanks, but still in stronger terms, was presented to him from the guild of merchants in Dublin.

This last body, who in Dublin form a corporation, presented also an address of thanks to the several peers, who, as they observe, in support of the constitution, and in opposition to a weak and wicked administration, protested against the American restraining bills. This address to the protesting lords, to which was affixed the corporation seal, was sent to each separately, and a separate answer given, all of which were published at that time. The sheriffs and commons of the city of Dublin had for some time endeavoured to obtain the concurrence of the lord mayor and the board of aldermen, in a petition to the throne against the measures pursued with respect to the colonies, but were answered by the latter, upon their first application, that the matter was of the highest importance, and therefore inexpedient. Upon a subsequent occasion however, they seem to have concurred in the measure, as a committee of six aldermen, with as many commoners, and the recorder, were appointed to draw up a petition and address. This task being at last accomplished, was arrested in its progress by a negative from the mayor and aldermen.—This occasioned a dispute between the sheriffs

riffs and commons, and the mayor and court of aldermen, which was carried on with great warmth, and ended in some serious resolutions and declarations.

The impossibility of purchasing and providing for negroes, which the present dispute had occasioned in our West India islands, together with the loss of the American markets for slaves, and the impediment caused by the proclamation of council against the exportation of arms and ammunition, had, altogether, nearly extinguished our American trade. This loss was more particularly felt by the port of Liverpool, which had possessed a much greater part of that commerce, than any other in the kingdom. When the Guinea ships arrived, they were laid up, in an uncertainty of their future disposition, while their crews looked in vain for other employment. As the branches of commerce were also slackened in a great degree, and that the crews of the Greenland ships upon their return in July and the beginning of August, were according to custom discharged, the number of seamen out of employment in that town became great, and according to some calculations amounted to near 3000.

In this situation the seamen complained that an attempt was made by the merchants to lower their wages, in consequence of which a violent commotion was raised among them, in which they cut the rigging of some ships to pieces, assaulted some houses, and committed other acts of violence. They at last dispersed, and all things became quiet. But the seizing a number of them and sending them to prison, rekindled the flame with greater violence, so that nothing could have been expected but the destruction of that flourishing town. The sailors immediately assembled, procured not only fire arms, but cannon, and were proceeding

ceeding to the destruction of the prison, when its safety was procured by the enlargement of their companions. But their rage was too much heated by liquor to be appeased by concessions. They not only proceeded to destroy the houses of obnoxious persons, but marched in a body to demolish the exchange.—The exchange was barricaded, shut up, and defended by the merchants and townsmen, and some lives were lost upon this occasion; but the arrival of some light horse put an end to this disorder. In a short time there was sufficient employment found for the sailors in the king's service.

About this time Mr. Penn, late governor, and one of the proprietors of Pennsylvania, arrived from thence with a petition from the general congress to the king, which he presented through the hands of the Earl of Dartmouth. During the time that this petition hung in suspense, the most sanguine hopes were formed by those who were in earnest for peace, or friends to America, that it would have led to an happy reconciliation, especially as it had already transpired that it contained expressions of the greatest loyalty, and was couched in the most humble and moderate terms. But in proportion as these hopes were received, was the degree of the disappointment to those who so eagerly wished for so desirable an event, when they found that Mr. Penn was informed that no answer could be given to his petition. The Americans had also laid great stress upon the success of this final application, and were said to have relaxed their operations considerably upon that idea, until they heard the event. This petition, which was subscribed by all the members of the Congress, was full of expressions of duty, respect, and loyalty to the king
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and affection to the parent state. They attributed all the differences and misfortunes which had hitherto taken place, to a pernicious system of government adopted at the end of the last war, and to the evil designs and conduct of ministers since that time. They declared that they not only ardently desired that the former harmony between the mother country and the colonies might be restored, but that a concord might be established between them, upon so firm a basis as to perpetuate its blessings, uninterrupted by future differences, to succeeding generations in both countries. That notwithstanding the sufferings of his majesty's loyal colonies during the course of the present controversy, their breasts retain too tender a regard to the kingdom from whence they derived their origin, to request such a conciliation as might in any manner be inconsistent with her dignity or her welfare. That these, related as they were to her, honour and duty, as well as inclination, induce them to support and advance; and the apprehensions that now oppress their hearts with unspeakable grief being once removed, his majesty will find his faithful subjects on that continent ready and willing at all times as they have ever been, with their lives and fortunes, to assert and maintain the rights and interests of his majesty, and of their mother country.

When this ruinous war and all its consequences are considered, and the lengths which the parties had proceeded to are remembered, they suggest a doubt of the security of the sentiments that were set forth in this petition. But the following part explains the particular intention of what has just now been mentioned. "With all humility submitting to your majesty's wise consideration, whether it may not be expedient for facilitating

facilitating these important purposes, that your majesty be pleased to direct some mode by which the united applications of your faithful colonists to the throne, in pursuance of their common councils, may be improved into a happy and permanent reconciliation; and that in the mean time measures may be taken for preventing the further destruction of the lives of your majesty's subjects, and that such statutes as more immediately distress any of your majesty's colonies may be repealed."

Whatever the inward intentions of the parties might be, the language was conciliatory, and the request not immoderate. Such as favoured the plan of pacification by concession, complained loudly of Lord Dartmouth's answer, as calculated to drive the colonies to the last extremities of independence and foreign connections: for this reception, they said, of so dutiful and decent an address, amounted to no less than a renouncing of their allegiance. The friends of the ministry took it in a favourite light. They granted that the petition had a very decent appearance: but then the authority of parliament was not formally acknowledged. They were also still in arms, and on that account there was no security that they could give that could be relied on. It was said that they wanted to gain time by a negociation, until they had formed a government, and established their strength in such a manner as would render all efforts for their reduction ineffectual. We had already gone too far in the expence of a war, and should not now stop short, but reap the benefits to government which always arise from an unsuccessful rebellion. And besides these great objects of punishing the obnoxious, and providing for our friends, to rivet, without leav-

Vol. II. O ing

ing room for a future contest, that unconditional submission upon America, which no treaty or negotiation could ever obtain. If amicable terms were entered into, all our expence and preparation would be thrown away ; we must shrink back from our proposals made to foreign princes for hiring their troops, which would disgrace us in their eyes, as our tameness in putting up with the insolence of our own people, would render us contemptible in the eyes of all Europe ; and all that we had done would neither impress the colonies with a sense of our dignity nor with the terror of our power. It was added, that the nation was prepared by the language of war for the event, and it was not certain, if the temper of the nation was suffered to cool, that the people at another time would be so ready to support such an undertaking. This favourable disposition was therefore to be cultivated and employed in the critical moment. This was a part of the ministerial reasoning at that time, and shews the spirit with which they were possessed.

As the time of the meeting of the parliament drew near, addressees were poured in from all quarters, some in the most violent, and some in a more moderate style, but all condemning the conduct of the Americans, approving of all the acts of government, and in general recommending a perseverance in the same strong measures, until the colonies were reduced to a thorough obedience, and brought to a full sense both of their errors and duty. In some of these addresses, severe and unjust reflections were thrown forth against those gentlemen who had opposed administration in the present American measures, who were represented as factious and desperate men, and stigmatized

tized as being not only encouragers, but in a great measure the authors of the American rebellion.— This greatly inflamed the leaders of the minority against the procurers of the addresses, and only served to irritate the spirit of opposition against the ministers and measures which these addresses were intended to support. It is well known with how much difficulty many of the addresses were procured, and how few, after all the diligence of ministerial agents, subscribed them. All sensible men considered them as nothing more than the dictates of the ministry, and the subscriptions forced signatures or testimonies of the worthlessness of the subscribers. In some places the subscribers consisted principally of pensioners, crown officers, and dependents upon some friends at the court. Some of these were truly reputable and of an independent principle of mind, and refused to sign such addresses as their hearts could not consent to. What made some of those addressers more suspicious was, they were generally promoted by such as were never remarkable for their attachment to the revolution principles, and who had been deeply involved in an unnatural rebellion against King George the Second, in behalf of the pretender. These were now leading men in promoting the addresses both in England and Scotland, which made those who were called whigs suspect that there was some secret carrying on unfriendly to the constitution, and that the American war was only a colour for a deeper scheme, which was negotiated in secret, and would be revealed when all things were ready for its execution. People who were acquainted with the Jacobites throughout the kingdom, and knew something of their private conversation, could not but be astonished at their

zeal for the present government. It alarmed the friends of the revolution to see all things put into their hands when they were certain they still held the same principles which gave occasion to the revolution. It was said that they had seen their error, and were now friends to government, from a principle of conviction; but such as knew them were certain that this was false; for in their private cabals, and among their friends, they fully discovered their sentiments concerning the *good old cause*. It gave great ground of suspicion that the addressees were a mere delusion, when the town of Manchester, remarkable for its rebellion in the year 1745, took the lead in this proceeding.

The opposition on this occasion set forth the conduct of the addressees in the strongest colours, and perhaps all the charity that was necessary was not practised in their descriptions. It was said that the addressees were the legislative offspring of tory towns, though they sprung up accidentally in others from the tory party; and all the reproach of encouraging civil war and devastation was thrown upon them; and it was added, that distraction at home and dishonour abroad were the constant effects of the predominance of tory councils. These charges were laughed at on the other side, who being strong in the sanction of authority, turned the tables upon the whigs, and charged them not only with causeless opposition, but with disaffection to government; that if they appeared to support it for a time, it was only because they had rendered it subservient to their own faction; but that whenever it was put upon an independent and respectable foundation, their eternal enmity could not be concealed. About this time the preachers began

gan after a long intermission to enter upon politics.— Some of those distinguished by the name of methodists began to revive the doctrines of passive obedience and non-resistance, nearly as it had been asserted in the last century. By degrees this mode of preaching went higher, and all the jargon of Sir Robert Filmer was retailed in several pulpits. On the other hand, several clergymen, especially amongst the dissenters, espoused the cause of liberty with much fervour.— Among all the champions on either side of the question, none distinguished themselves so much as Dr. Price, who professedly defended civil liberty, upon principles that all his opponents, who have been very numerous, were never able to confute. Many ingenious things have been said by Dr. Johnson and Dr. Shebbeare, but it is easy to perceive a pension operating through the whole of their discussions.

The whigs were now divided into two parties, or rather tories under colour of that name, opposed the real whigs. Their dispute took now a new turn.— The court whigs, as they were called, reproached the other with having abandoned their principles.— They said that true whigs were the strongest supporters, not the mean betrayers of the rights of parliament. That formerly whigs opposed the crown when it set up prerogative in opposition to parliament, but that now corrupt degenerate whigism, maliciously and unconstitutionally, opposed the crown because it acted in concurrence with parliament, and in support of its inherent rights. That those whom the opposition called tories, (at a time when toryism is lost in loyalty and love of liberty) were much more deserving the appellation of whigs, than they who now prostituted its name, and disgraced its principles by abetting an insolent

insolent and slavish rebellion against the sole guardians of freedom and order.

The other party retorted these charges with scorn. They said that the court whigs were so fond of their new allies, the tories, that they had perfectly gleaned their opinions, arguments and language, and that they denied toryism to exist because they had become tories themselves. It was asserted that whigism did not consist in supporting the power of parliament, or any other power, but of the rights of the people: That as long as parliament protected these rights, so long was a parliament sacred: But if parliament should become an instrument of invading them, it was no better in any respect, and worse in some, than any other instrument of arbitrary power: and that the ancient whigs, like the moderns, contended not for names, but for things. They affirmed further, that the tories now, as well as formerly, are true to their principles. They never quarrelled with a parliament of their own party; that is, a parliament subservient on the crown, arbitrary, intolerant, and an enemy to the freedom of mankind. That if parliament destroy the liberty of the subject in America, they are turning its principles every where. They said, that to be burdened by parliament is not law and liberty, as the tories, in the mask of whigs, have the effrontery to assert; but to have the public exigencies judged of, and its contribution assessed by a parliament or some assembly (the name is immaterial) of *its own choice*; this is law and liberty, and nothing else is so. Such they say were whig principles; because if they were different, the whig principles could not be for a scheme of liberty, but would be just as slavish as any that were imputed to the rankest slavery.

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The nation by this method of reasoning was divided and sub-divided, and for a time became so much engaged in debates, that they forgot their own interests. Towards the meeting of parliament, they began to revive a little, and to throw off that languor which had for some time seized them. Petitions now met the addresses from several parts of the kingdom, and it was for some time doubtful which way the scale would preponderate. From the cities of London and Bristol very long representations were presented, dwelling chiefly upon the inefficacy of all the late coercive and restrictive measures; the mischiefs which were inevitable to our trade from the destruction of the American commerce, and the advantage which our rival neighbours would derive from our divisions. The distresses of the Newfoundland fishery became now an object of attention: government had not considered a point that every ordinary discernor might have perceived with half an eye. The Americans by way of retaliation had cut off all provisions from the fishers in that part of the world, which threw them into the greatest confusion, and brought distress upon all those who were employed by sea or land. To prevent the dreadful consequences of famine, a number of ships, instead of being loaded with fish, were necessarily sent off light to procure flour and provisions where they were to be found.

Upon the whole, it was computed, that to the value of a full half million sterling was left in the bowels of the deep, and for ever lost to mankind, by the first operations of the fishery bill. Those who were averse to the American measures considered the calamities which fell on the British fishery as a sort of judgment from Heaven against those who made laws to deprive

deprive mankind of the benefits of nature. To the same cause they were ready to attribute a dreadful tempest, the fury of which was chiefly discharged on the shores of Newfoundland. This awful wreck of nature was as singular in its circumstances, as fatal in its effects. The sea is said to have risen thirty feet almost instantaneously. Above seven hundred boats with their people perished, and several ships with their crews. Nor was their mischief less on the land, the waves overpassing all bounds, and sweeping every thing before them. The shores presented a shocking spectacle for some time after, and the fishing nets were hauled up loaded with human bodies.

These circumstances, together with the ill success of the last campaign, and the difficulty of recruiting at home, seemed for a while to cast a damp upon the spirits which had been raised and kept alive with so much industry, for carrying on the American war. But the court was not discouraged. Through all obstacles they proceeded directly to their object. They opened several negotiations on the continent of Europe, in order to supply the deficiency at home. It was however a matter of difficulty to procure the aid they wanted. The greatness of the distance, and the adventuring into a new world were terrifying, and rendered the prospect of return doubtful. Germany was the only open market for that sort of merchandize: but the sending of its people to such a distance being liable to be construed as contrary to the constitution of the empire, might have happened to be resented by the emperor, or by some other of the princes of the empire. And provided the opinions or desires of men, who were constrained to act like machines, had been matters at all to have been considered, the idea of such a voyage to an inland people, who

who scarcely knew the scabby report, must have been hateful and odious in the highest degree.

In these difficulties a negociation is said to have been set on foot with the court of Petersburg for 58,000 Russians, but without effect. A long negociation was also carried on at the Hague for the Scotch brigades, which had for many years been employed in the Dutch service, and always been allowed to be recruited from Scotland. The Dutch, who consider their own case once to have been the same with that of the Americans, avoided falling into any inconsistency in helping to oppress others by rejecting the proposal. The Dutch considered this war as extremely impolitical, and, except those in the Scotch interest, it was generally condemned over all Holland. It is not to the honour of Great Britain, that in all the countries of Europe, in which public affairs are a subject of either writing or conversation, the general voice has been in favour of the Americans. It is said that Voltaire and Rousseau, who seldom agreed in any one thing, were unanimous in their opinion in behalf of America, and condemned the measures of the British ministry. It has been always affirmed by the friends of the ministry, that the opposition of their measures was frivolous and unreasonable, and proceeded from disaffection ; but even men and philosophers quite uninterested, have had the same opinion with those that have been so unjustly charged with disaffection.

After that the ministry were disappointed in their hopes of assistance from Holland and Russia, they were obliged to apply to the petty German princes for a sufficient number of their slavish vassals to assist in enslaving the colonies. These little tyrants, who suppose that their subjects are made for no other purpose but to serve the ends of their ambition, and

supply that beggarly dignity which they affect to support, were ready to bring their slaves to so good a market, where they were secured in a sufficient price for them, whether dead or alive, to support the taudry splendor of their despotic courts. The princes of Hesse and Brunswick, and some others of inferior significance, furnished the quotas agreed for, but even these were still insufficient to accomplish the sanguinary purpose of a ministry who thirsted greedily after blood. It was thought also necessary to send five battalions of his Majesty's electoral troops to the garrison of Gibraltar, to replace the like number of English forces, with an intention to increase the power of the British army in America. Had the liberties of all Europe been at stake, or the Protestant religion been in the utmost danger, the government of Britain could not have shewn more anxiety than they did to have the colonists brought to unconditional submission to the will of ministers. In the midst of all this zeal and diligence to fulfil the ends of their schemes, they were dreadfully thwarted by the hand of Providence, which though themselves could not or would not perceive it, was observed by all the world beside, who had opportunity to contemplate the events. After providing 5000 oxen, 14000 sheep, and a vast number of hogs, and large quantities of vegetables, together with 5000 chaldron of coals, and large abundance of four crout, with near half a million value of salt provisions, the wind and weather proved unfavourable. The fleet was detained upon our coasts, and tossed about with tempests, till the greatest part of the sheep and hogs perished, so that the channel was strewed with floating carcases of these animals. The four crout fermented too fast, and of consequence perished. The wind and weather did not prove favourable

able after they cleared the coast.——In the mid-seas, wind and weather were particularly unfavourable, and the nearer they approached to America the wind grew more contrary and tempestuous. The periodical sands blew full in their teeth, and drove them from the coast, and several of them were blown to the West Indies, where they arrived in great distress. Others which were got entangled with the American coasts, were either taken or seized in those harbours and creeks where they put in for shelter. The few which arrived at Boston were prodigiously shattered, and their cargoes suffered greatly. Very little of the vast provision, procured at an enormous expence, arrived at the place of its destination.

The account of these disasters rendered the ministry still more unpopular, and the nation considered these misfortunes as much to proceed from mismanagement as from accidental causes. They perceived that neither the season of the year, nor the course of the winds had been taken into the scheme of the ministry; that they had sent away the fleets at an improper season, as if they intended to throw all the provisions into the sea, and wantonly to waste the substance of the nation. Their policy had failed in almost every thing, and their schemes were all abortive. Finding that the nation was more and more disgusted with their proceedings, they wanted to turn the views of the people to some new object. Nothing is more ready to attract the attention, and affect the minds of persons of any feeling, than objects of distress: the humanity of this country was now addressed in behalf of those who had suffered in the American war, and a subscription was opened about the end of the year, for the relief of the soldiers at Boston, and of the widows and children of those that were slain. The

scheme was most liberally supported, and several thousand pounds were subscribed in a short time. That part of the scheme that related to the soldiers was considered as by no means an act of charity; for as government had received money to supply the troops, it was thought fit they should be supplied therewith, without begging from the public. Many therefore with-held their bounty, both on that account, and also out of principle, because they would not have an hand in carrying on so unjust and unrighteous a war, as they considered this to be.— Others thought too much had been spent already, and therefore refused to give any support to a scheme that only would in the end ruin the nation. To move the sympathy of the nation, some ships were loaded with maimed soldiers, their wives and children, in the most wretched condition. The present was a most pitiful spectacle; and excited the humanity of the benevolent. This was the first ocular demonstration that we had at home that the Americans could fight. We had been told that the provincials would not stand, that they run away at the sight of our men; and few of our soldiers were either killed or wounded. But now the question was in every one's mouth, 'Who wounded and maimed them in such a manner?' Hence it began to be believed, even at home, that the colonists would fight, and that our loss had been greater than the ministers had told us. This subscription was considered as a sort of political touchstone, and the degree of attachment to government was supposed to be measured by the extent of the bounty.

The ministry were now at their last shift with regard to means to be used to keep up the spirit of the people in favour of the American war. Conspiracies were contrived to throw reproach upon the lords and

and gentlemen in opposition to the measures of government, and the most distinguished noblemen and gentlemen were pointed at. They were charged with being the incendiaries, who by their dark and wicked practices had kindled the war. This kind of stile was crammed into many addressees, and the newspapers were industriously filled with it. It was confidently asserted in their ministerial vehicles of scandal and abuse, that a very great number of letters from the most considerable peers and members of parliament had been intercepted, and were actually in the hands of government. These it was said would be laid before the council of the nation, when the Tower would be speedily fitted with persons of rank, and a rich harvest of impeachments and punishments succeed. This scandal was carried so far, that it was said a number of the members of both houses who were described and understood, would not venture to attend their duty in parliament at the meeting thereof. These were impotent malicious shifts, which generally attend a weak cause, and are never practised unless by desperate and wicked men. They always suggest the crimes which they accuse others of, and sometimes put into the minds of bad men, to do what they never would have thought of.

At the opening of the session of parliament, an extraordinary report of a conspiracy went abroad, which at first seemed alarming, but in the end appeared as full of folly as it was of wickedness. This matter is so well known, and was so fully set forth in the Gazette and other papers, that it is needless to enlarge upon it. It may suffice to observe, that Mr. Sayre, a banker in London, and an American by birth, was accused of a design of seizing the person of the king, to convey him out of the nation and then
overturn

overturn the government. The means said to have been provided for this end were so inadequate, that it could hardly have entered into the mind of any person in the use of their reason, either to have contrived such a scheme, or to have believed the existence of such a contrivance. The conclusion of this matter demonstrated the folly and wickedness of the agents, and the distress of government for schemes to divert the minds of the people from brooding upon **their** blunders and mismanagement. It never happens under wise governments that such inadequate means are proposed to answer such purposes, in all states where they have ranked among the follies and infirmities of the state, or statesmen who have pursued them. And this feeble device to scandalize the patriots, will stand posted among the follies of the British ministry for this year, in all the records where it is mentioned. Those who were in the opposition to the measures of the ministry, held his majesty's person as sacred as his most intimate cabinet friends, and in all things that belonged to his real honour would have ventured more than those who accused them of disaffection. Those who are guilty of giving princes bad council, are never those that can safely be trusted in the time of imminent danger. Since the days of Floddenfield, one honest man like the Earl of Douglass, is worth all the nobles of a nation for the safety and honour of a sovereign.

The speech from the throne fully declared the resolution of the cabinet, and nothing but war and unconditional submission was proposed to the colonists. The various addresses echoed the same doctrine, and the majority in parliament confirmed whatsoever the ministry proposed. The minority made a good defence, and opposed with much spirit the address that

was proposed to be made to the King's speech. The speech was taken to pieces, and every part of it most feverly examined. The ministers were charged with having brought their sovereign into the most disgraceful and unhappy situation of any monarch now living. Their conduct had already wrested the sceptre of America out of the hands of their sovereign, and now they wanted to attempt impossibilities, to recover what they had lost through wantonness and incapacity. The charge brought against the colonists with respect to their intention of independency **from** the beginning of the controversy was refuted by arguments which the ministerialists could not contradict. It was affirmed against them, and they could not refute it, that their accusing the colonists of this design was only to cover their own guilt and mismanagement; and that the Americans had not behaved insidiously, but fairly and openly, in all their transactions with government: that they had from the beginning told the ministry, openly, honestly, and boldly, without disguise or reserve, and declared to all the world, that they would not submit to be taxed arbitrarily by any body of men whatsoever, where they were not represented. They did not whisper nor conceal their sentiments in this particular, but had from the beginning spoken uniformly the same language. They had plainly told what they would do if pressed to the last extremity, and therefore the ministry were fully informed **from** the beginning with their whole design. But the accusations now brought against them were only mean patched coverings of the nakedness of base actions, which all men that were not lost to every feeling of human nature would be ashamed of.

The ministry could not at **this** time pretend that they had gone blindfold into those foolish and absurd measures

measures which they were bent in pursuing; for they had been warned every session of parliament what would be the issue. Their measures seem to have proceeded from wilfulness and obstinacy, rather than from ignorance and mistake: they were bent upon bringing the colonies to unconditional submission, with a view to render them subservient to arbitrary purposes of government, to serve their own passions and appetites for pensions and places.

It appears somewhat strange that at this time, and ever since, the ministry have thrown the reproach of the ill success of the American war, upon the gentlemen in the opposition, when there has never been any thing demanded in parliament for carrying it on, but has been granted according to their own desires and wishes. They were indeed forewarned by men who saw more clearly than they either did or would see, what would be the issue of such wild and impolitic measures, and were advised to desist from ruining the empire. This was all that the minority ever did, and this was all that they could charge them with in carrying on the American war, or interrupting its intended success. the ministry spilt upon a rock which has ruined them all along. They trusted to the information of their own pensioned Governors, who having fallen out with the colonists, were careful to misrepresent them, and to deceive their masters for the sake of their own emolument and advantage. These hirelings of State were now so soured by the opposition of the people to their measures and designs, and had met with such disappointments, that their whole information to government was dictated by a settled revenge.

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The design of bringing in foreign troops occasioned a long and severe debate in parliament. This measure was censured both as illegal and impolitical. To bring in a foreign force into the British dominions was considered contrary to the law of the land, and exposing our own weakness; and moreover shewed a design in government, rather than not rule absolutely over their own subjects, to cringe to German slaves, to help them to support their tyranny. It was said, that those who would not hear the reasonable requests of their own subjects, were now turned suppliants to petty states for aid to support their arbitrary measures.

There are times of general infatuation, when even those who disapprove of the public measures that tend to ruin them, give them as much support as if they were conducted with the greatest wisdom, and were calculated to promote their true interests. Tho' the country gentlemen in parliament were called upon to mind their own interests, and to oppose those steps of the ministry which led to the ruin of the nation, yet they still voted with the court, and divided in general with the minister. They were asked if they would for ever suffer their eyes to be blinded, and not suffer themselves to see the destructive measures that were carrying on, without once hesitating or reflecting upon the common ruin in which they were involving themselves and the whole nation? Would they still follow without examination or enquiry, those leaders who had deceived and misled them in every thing, until they had brought the nation into its present disastrous situation? Had they not yet had time to consider the difficulties attending the support of 70,000 men, on the other side of the Atlantic? Had they considered, or made any calculation, how many

Vol. II. Q thousand

thousand tons of shipping would be necessary for their conveyance and for their support, or what the expence might amount to of supplying them from Smithfield market, with vegetables, and all other necessaries from London and its neighbourhood.—

These were matters of serious consideration. The land tax was to be raised to four shillings in the pound, and the most sanguine imagination could scarcely hope that ever it would be again lowered, even supposing the most fortunate change of circumstances.— Many arguments were used by the minority to shew the present evil, and future bad tendency of carrying on the American war; but the ministry were so full of their own scheme of subjugating the colonists, that they would listen to no advice however salutary. These disputes proceeded from the King's speech, and they are so long and tedious that to give them at full length would be irksome to the reader. It is sufficient to observe, that the debates were principally carried on for and against an address to the King, on account of the speech from the throne. The amendment proposed by the minority was rejected by the majority, and the original question carried for the address without a division.

The next topic of debate was concerning the sending of Hanoverian troops to Gibraltar. In this debate, the friends of the ministry were divided in their opinion; even those who had warmly supported the American war opposed this measure, and when the measure came to be debated, the minister found many of those he thought were his friends joined with those in the opposition. It was insisted upon in the most peremptory terms, that the measure was illegal and unconstitutional in the last degree; that it was repugnant and subversive of the principles of the bill

bill of rights; that it would establish a precedent of a most alarming and dangerous tendency, as it recognized a right in the crown to introduce foreigners into Britain, and to raise armies without the consent of parliament; that it was still more alarming, and required the more immediate reprobation, from its being wanton and unnecessary in point of policy, and from its being so strenuously defended by the ministers, both of which afforded too much room for apprehension, that its avowed purposes covered others of a very different nature. The ministry vindicated the measures upon the plea of necessity, and the ground of precedent, namely, that of the Dutch troops being brought into England in the year 1745. It was also insisted upon as thoroughly legal and constitutional, and the crown lawyers endeavoured to restrain the construction of the bill of rights, by shewing that its operation extended no farther than this island. The minister was now pushed hard, both by some of his friends and those who had been uniformly in the opposition, to shew his real intention in proposing such a clause in the address to the King, as hinted that they considered it as a favour to have Hanoverian troops sent to Gibraltar, and wanted him to give assurance, that if the address was suffered to pass in that form, that he would, on some future day to be appointed, bring the legality of the measure under the consideration of the House. The minister was however absolutely inflexible upon that point. He considered this peevishness of his party as deserving rather reprehension than indulgence. They could obtain no direct answer from him; and at length, when he could no longer shift an answer, he said, with an apparent indifference, which he supposed would intimidate the deserters, that another time

would afford a fitter opportunity of discussing the subject than the present. Many of the country gentlemen considered this steadiness of the minister as exceedingly ill-timed; but he had as much interest and address as to set matters to right for the present, and got the threatened storm put over.

One particular circumstance which attended these debates, was the defection of General Conway from administration, who after expressing his utmost detestation of that ministerial principle, that persons holding places must implicitly support government in all cases whatsoever, and however contrary to their principles; he then condemned in the most decisive terms the American war, which he declared to be cruel, unnatural, and unnecessary; calling it in plain terms a butchery of his fellow subjects, and to which his conscience forbade him to give assent. He condemned every idea of conquering the colonists, upon all the rules of justice, expediency, and practicability. He spoke in the most unreserved terms against the right of taxation, and wished to see the declaratory law repealed, though it had been passed under his own auspices, when in administration; and though on abstract legal principles he thought it right, and at the time of passing proper and necessary, rather than it should be employed to colour designs the most opposite to the intentions publicly declared of those who supported it in parliament, and particularly opposite to those of his own at the time of moving it. He called upon the minister to give some information concerning the state of affairs in America, that they might know with certainty upon what ground they stood, and were likely hereafter to stand, before they passed a bloody address which would be a standing record against them, and which notwithstanding the profusion
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of sophistical arguments, that were now used to be palmed upon them, by endeavouring to explain away its substance, and to represent it only as froth and compliment, would not only be found a curb upon, but must in a great degree influence their conduct throughout the session, notwithstanding any information they might have to the contrary. Some of the country gentlemen likewise said, they had gone with the ministry in the preceding session, upon the supposition, that he had given them authentic information with regard to America, but now finding by the event that they had been imposed upon, and totally deceived, it became absolutely necessary to have a full and clear state of affairs laid before them, prior to their entering upon any business upon the subject.

This matter pressed very hard upon administration, and vexed them exceedingly. The accounts from America were at this time unfavourable; and it was doubtful whether we had any thing left there. The minister had influence enough to keep off any particular enquiry concerning information that was in his possession, but there was as much already gone abroad and published from other sources, as rendered it difficult to account for the failure of success in many instances, and to guard against the censure which of course attended it. Indirect acknowledgments were made, that matters had not been carried on as could have been wished, but where the error lay they could not tell: but that a great force was now to be sent out, which would insure success, and matters would take a new turn. Thus did the ministry promise one time after another, without having either any formed plan or design that had the smallest probability in them.

The Duke of Grafton at this time deserted the ministry, which alarmed them greatly;—he gave for a reason

reason that they had misled him by false information, and had never given a true account of the state of American affairs: that they had never given a true account of the facts with regard to the disposition of the colonists and that he had always been made to believe that matters would never come to an extremity of that nature which had happened, but that an appearance of coercion was all that was requisite to establish a reconciliation, and that the stronger government appeared, and the better it was supported, the sooner all disputes would be adjusted. He declared, that nothing less than a repeal of all the American laws which had been passed since the year 1763, could now restore peace and happiness, or prevent the most destructive and fatal consequences—consequences which could not ever be thought of without feeling the utmost degree of grief and horror. In the house of Lords it was fairly proved upon the Duke of Manchester's motion concerning the Hanoverian troops, that it was inconsistent with the bill of rights to bring in foreign troops, without an act of parliament, into any part of the British dominions; and that the doing thereof was dissolving the constitution, and setting aside the laws of the land, whereby the crown was made superior to all law, and the liberties of the subject totally overturned. The debates upon this subject on this occasion were warm, and all the arguments in favour of arbitrary power, and those against it, were canvassed again and again. Some lawyers maintained doctrines in defence of the measures totally opposite to the whole British constitution, for which they were severely reprov'd.

After many debates to no purpose, the estimates for carrying on the war were laid before parliament, and passed by a large majority. After this, some changes

changes happened in administration. The Duke of Grafton resigned the privy seal, and was succeeded by the Earl of Dartmouth, who was succeeded by Lord George Germaine. The Earl of Rochford having retired from business, was succeeded by Lord Weymouth, who had continued out of employment since his resignation on the affair of Faulkland's Island. Several other changes happened about this time, according as the humours of the court chanced to operate.

The petition of the congress, which had been delivered to his Majesty by Mr. Penn, became now the subject of a warm debate. A copy of this petition was brought before the Lords, among several other papers, when a noble Duke in opposition observed, that he saw Mr. Penn below the bar, and moved that he might be examined, in order to establish the authenticity of the petition, before they entered into any debates upon its contents, thereby to obviate the doubts which might arise upon that head, and be a means of interrupting their proceedings. This motion alarmed the ministry exceedingly. They easily perceived that the motion was not merely intended to authenticate the petition, but that it extended to laying before the House all the information concerning America, which they could draw from a person so much master of the subject as Mr Penn. They objected to the motion in point of order; on its informality; on its want of precedent, being contrary to the established mode of proceeding; that the bringing in of extraneous matter by surprize, and breaking in upon the most serious and important deliberations, by suddenly calling their attention off to the examination of witnesses, and to new subjects of discussion, would be destructive of the order and gravity which always distinguished

guished their proceedings. They also contended that this measure would establish a most pernicious precedent, as it would necessarily follow, that every petition from whatever quarter of the globe, must be accompanied by evidence to establish its authenticity. They observed, that improper questions might be asked Mr. Penn, which might draw from him what might tend to prejudice him with respect to his private fortune and affairs in America; that this evidence might have the same effect with respect to others who were friends to government in America, and who, by a public exposure of their private conduct in its favour, would be liable to personal danger, and ruin to their fortunes. These trifling objections were all answered in such a manner, that none of the ministerialists could make a reply, but the motion was rejected by a majority of 36 to 22. The nobleman who made the motion, and who is remarkable for his perseverance, made another, that Mr. Penn, be examined at the bar the next day. Tho' this motion could not be decently refused, yet so disagreeable was every species of enquiry to the ministry, that another debate arose upon it; but it was at length agreed that he should be examined, at a time appointed, which was the 10th of December.

Many curious particulars came out in the examination of Mr. Penn which government would have desired never to have been known. He informed the House in the most clear and distinct manner of all the particulars concerning which he was interrogated, and spoke with an ingenuity that did him much honour. He informed them concerning what the colonists intended to do, and what they did not, and among other things, declared that they had no intention

tion to attempt independency, unless they were driven to it by the violence of the mother country. He made no hesitation in declaring the strength of his own province, and informed them that the colony contained 60,000 men able to carry arms; that of these 20,000 had entered voluntarily to serve without pay, and were armed and embodied before his departure. Being asked concerning that volunteer force, he replied, that it included men of the best fortune and character in the province, and that it was composed generally of men who were possessed of property, either landed or otherwise. That an additional body of 4,500 minute men had since been raised in the province, who were to be paid when called out to service. That they had the means and materials of casting iron cannon in great plenty; that they cast brass cannon in Philadelphia, and that they made small arms in great abundance and perfection. He concealed nothing that could be of service to inform this nation of what was her interest and duty to observe, concerning the colonies.

After the examination was finished, the Duke of Richmond who had proposed it, made a motion for reconciliation with America upon the footing of the petition, which after a long debate was rejected by a large majority, and matters left to proceed upon the ruinous plan upon which they had been hitherto carried on. It was easy to perceive that government was determined to pursue the sanguinary measure of reducing the colonies to unconditional submission in spite of all conviction of the impossibility thereof; for though all conciliatory schemes were rejected, the prohibitory act was brought in and supported with great zeal. This bill was a full proof of the lengths they intended to go, and fully shewed the

extent of their purposes. This act totally forbid all trade and intercourse with the thirteen united colonies. All property belonging to the Americans whether of ships or goods, on the high seas, or in the harbours, are declared forfeited to the captors, being the officers and crews of his Majesty's ships of war; and several clauses of the bill were inserted, to facilitate and lessen the expence of the condemnation of prizes, and the recovery of prize money. There were several other clauses in this bill inconsistent with all the rules of justice and sound policy, which gave the Congress a sufficient handle in point of argument for proceeding to their act of independency. They were now thrown out of the King's protection, and made rebels and out-laws by a new act of parliament, which was considered by them as inconsistent with the several laws of the constitution; for which reason it was argued that the compact between the King and the people being thereby dissolved by an act of the ruling powers, the people in the colonies were thereby freed from all obligations of obedience, and were again brought back to a state of nature. There appeared a real want of wisdom and justice in this prohibitory bill; for though they had yet no proof that the province of Georgia had acceded to the association, yet that province was included in the bill, and given up by authority of parliament to be plundered by every war ship that should come upon the coast. But what was most barbarous and absurd in the restraining act was, that all those who would be taken on board any American vessels were indiscriminately to be compelled without distinction of persons to serve as common sailors in our ships of war. This was a refinement in tyranny, which was worse than death, and which the most savage nations had never thought of nor practised

vised. To make prisoners, who should have the misfortune to be taken in this plundering war, fight against their own families, kindred and countrymen, and after being plundered themselves, to become accomplices in plundering their brethren, was a stretch of cruelty beyond the invention of heathens, and could only be devised by papists or jacobites. This cruelty was still heightened by this dreadful circumstance, that these unhappy persons who were thus compelled were subject to the articles of war, and liable to be shot for desertion. This devilish and tyrannical law resembled much the Scotch law of inquisition by which the prisoner was squeezed or racked with boots and thumbikins till he discovered all his friends or accomplices, and thereby was made the instrument of the ruin of those that were dearest to him, and whom he loved best. If ever any human creature shall in any age of the world attempt to vindicate or colour this law with the varnish of humanity, he must be by all the friends of human nature considered as allied to a rank of beings who are strangers to every idea of mercy and benevolence. To be reduced to such a condition as this law supposes, is the last degree of wretchedness, and indignity to which human nature can be subjected. It obliged Englishmen to practice a cruelty unknown to the most savage nations. Such a compulsion upon prisoners as this bill enforced was never known to be practised in any case of war or rebellion; and the only examples of this sort that can be produced must be found amongst pirates, the out-laws and enemies of human society.

The chief author of this tyrannical law may easily be traced from a speech of a certain law Lord, who declared while the bill was depending, That we were not now to consider the questions of original right.

or wrong, justice or injustice ; we were now engaged in a war and must use our utmost efforts to obtain the ends proposed by it ; we must fight or be pursued ; and the justice of the cause must give way to our present situation. To this he applied the laconic speech of a Scotch foldier of fortune in the service of Gustavus Adolphus, who pointing to the enemy, said to his men, ‘ See you those lads ; kill them or they will kill you.’ Such a speech from one of the first judges of the nation, shews plainly what justice we may expect, provided our juries do not protect us. The severest punishment that could be inflicted upon such an enemy to human nature, would be to confine him to be a perpetual witness of supreme benevolence and philanthropy. It is sufficient to rouse the resentment of all who have the smallest degree of humanity in them to hear or read such a speech. It brings to the readers remembrance a speech which Milton puts into the mouth of one of his fallen angels : EVIL, BE THOU GOOD

The colonists who had hitherto deferred the project of independency, which was suggested to them by the measures of the parliament, were now driven to this measure by the violent proceedings that have been already mentioned. They found that they were now to be prosecuted with all the vengeance that the government could inflict, and that while they remained in a state of dependence upon Great Britain, no nation could afford them any assistance. They therefore came to a resolution to declare themselves independent states, and to renounce all allegiance to the British government, and all political connection with the mother country. In their declaration of independency they give the reasons of their proceedings, and

and set forth to the world the grievances they had long complained of without being heard. Their own words will best show their reasons and sentiments upon the subject.

Reasons assigned by the Continental Congress for the North American Colonies and provinces withdrawing their Allegiance to the King of Great Britain.

In C O N G R E S S, July 4, 1776.

A DECLARATION by the REPRESENTATIVES of the UNITED STATES of America, in General Congress assembled.

When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of Nature's God intitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold those truths to be self evident; that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; and, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter and abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and

and happiness. Prudence indeed will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed; but when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of these colonies, and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems of government. The history of the present——of———, is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations; all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world.

He has refused his assent to laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.

He has forbidden his governours to pass laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should be obtained; and, when so suspended, he was utterly neglected to attend them.

He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the rights of representation in the legislature; a right inestimable to them, and formidable to tyrants only.

He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository

tory of their public records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures.

He has dissolved Representatives Houses repeatedly for opposing, with manly firmness, his invasions on the rights of the people.

He has refused, for a long time after such dissolution, to cause others to be erected; whereby the legislative powers, incapable of annihilation, have returned to the people at large for their exercise; the state remaining in the mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsion within.

He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these states; for that purpose obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners, refusing to pass others to encourage their emigrations hither, and raising the conditions of new appropriations of lands.

He has obstructed the administration of justice, by refusing his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers.

He has made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.

He has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance.

He has kept among us in times of peace standing armies, without the consent of our legislatures.

He has effected to render the military independent of, and superior to, the civil power.

He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws, giving his assent to their pretended acts of legislation:

For

For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us :

For protecting them, by a mock trial, from punishment for any murders which they should commit on the inhabitants of these states :

For cutting off our trade with all parts of the world :

For imposing taxes on us without our consent :

For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefit of trial by jury :

For transporting us beyond seas, to be tried for pretended offences :

For abolishing the free system of English laws in a neighbouring province, establishing therein an arbitrary government, and enlarging its boundaries, so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these colonies :

For taking away our charters, abolishing our most valuable laws, and altering fundamentally the forms of our governments :

For suspending our own legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.

He has abdicated government here; by declaring us out of his protection, and waging war against us.

He has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people.

He is, at this time, transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries, to complete the works of death, desolation, and tyranny,* already begun with circumstances of cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the head of a civilized nation.

He

He has constrained our fellow citizens, taken captive on the high seas, to bear arms against their country, to become the executioners of their friends and brethren, or to fall themselves by their hands.

He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions.

In every stage of their oppressions we have petitioned for redress, in the most humble terms; our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated injury.—A prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.

Nor have we been wanting in attention to our British brethren. We have warned them frequently of attempts, by their legislature, to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us; we have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here; we have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity; and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred, to disavow these usurpations, which would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and consanguinity. We must therefore acquiesce in the necessity which denounces our separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends.

We, therefore, the representatives of the United States of America, in general congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world, for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name, and by

Vol. II. S the

the authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and declare, that these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, *Free and Independent States*, and that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown, and that all political connection betwixt them and the state of Great Britain, is, and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as free and independent states, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do. And for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honour.

Signed by order, and in behalf of the Congress,

JOHN HANCOCK, President.

Attest, *Charles Tompson*, Secretary.

Articles of confederation and perpetual union between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New-York, Pennsylvania, the Counties of Newcastle, Kent, and Suffex on Dalaware-river, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia.

N. B. These articles of confederation, after having been long weighed and discussed, line by line, in the congress, were at length resolved upon, and signed by all the delegates, the 4th of October, 1776, at Philadelphia, such as they are here set forth; and in consequence were immediately sent to the other states to be confirmed by them.

Article I.

THE Thirteen States above-mentioned, confederate themselves under the title of *The United States of America*.

II.

They contract, each in their own name, by the present constitution, a reciprocal treaty of alliance and friendship for their common defence, for the maintenance of their liberties, and for their general and mutual advantage; obliging themselves to assist each other against all violence that may threaten all or any one of them, and to repel in common all the attacks that may be levelled against all or any one of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, commerce, or under any other pretext whatsoever.

III.

Each state reserves to themselves alone the exclusive right of regulating their internal government, and of framing laws in all matters that are not included in the articles of the present confederation, and which cannot any way prejudice the same.

IV.

No state in particular shall either send or receive embassies, begin any negociation, contract any engagements, form any alliances, conclude any treaties with any king, prince, or power whatsoever, without the consent of the United States assembled in general congress.

No person invested with any post whatever under the authority of the United States, or any of them, whether he has appointments belonging to his employment, or whether it be a commission purely confidential, shall be allowed to accept any presents, gratuities, emoluments, nor any offices or titles of any kind whatever, from any kings, princes, or foreign powers.

And the General Assembly of the United States, nor any State in particular, shall not confer any title of nobility.

V.

Two nor several of the said States shall not have power to form alliances or confederations, nor conclude any private treaty amongst themselves, without the consent of the United States assembled in General Congress, and without the aim and duration of that private convention be exactly specified in the consent.

VI.

No State shall lay on any imposts, nor establish any duties whatsoever, the effect of which might alter, directly or indirectly, the clauses of the treaties to be concluded hereafter by the Assembly of the United States with any kings, princes, or powers whatsoever.

VII.

There shall not be kept by any of the said States in particular, any vessels or ships of war above the number judged necessary by the Assembly of the United States, for the defence of that State and its commerce ; and there shall not be kept on foot in time of peace by any of the said States, any troops above the number determined by the Assembly of the United States, to guard the strong places or forts necessary for the defence of that State ; but each State shall always keep up a well disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and equipped, and shall be careful to procure, and keep in constant readiness, in the public magazines, a sufficient number of field pieces and tents, with a proper quantity of ammunition and implements of war.

VIII.

When any of the said States shall raise troops for the common defence, all the officers of the rank of colonel, and under, shall be appointed by the legislative

tive body of the state that shall have raised the troops, or in such manner as that state shall have judged proper to regulate the nominations; and when any vacancy happens in these posts, they shall be filled up by the said state.

IX.

All the expences of war, and all other disbursements, that shall be made for the common defence of the general weal, and that shall be ordered by the Assembly of the United States, shall be paid out of the funds of a common treasury.

That common treasury shall be formed by the contributions of each of the aforesaid states, in proportion to the number of inhabitants of every age, sex, or quality, except the Indians, exempt from taxes in each state; and in order to fix the quota of the contribution, every three years the inhabitants shall be numbered, in which enumeration the number of white people shall be distinguished, and that enumeration shall be sent to the Assembly of the United States.

The taxes appropriated to pay this quota shall be laid and levied in the extent of each state by the authority and orders of its legislative body, within the time fixed by the Assembly of the United States.

X.

Each of the said states shall submit to the decisions of the Assembly of the United States, in all matters or questions referred to that Assembly by the present act of confederation.

XI.

No state shall engage in war without the consent of the United States assembled in Congress, except in case of an actual invasion of some enemy, or from a certain

tain knowledge of a resolution taken by some Indian nation to attack them, and in that case only, in which the danger is too urgent to allow them time to consult the other states.

No particular state shall give any commission to vessels, or other ships of war, nor any letters of marque or reprisals; till after a declaration of war made by the Assembly of the United States; and even in that case they shall be granted only against the kingdom of the power, or against the subjects of the kingdom or of the power against which war shall have been so declared; and shall conform, respecting those objects, to the regulations made by the Assembly of the United States.

XII

In order to watch over the general interests of the United States, and direct the general affairs, there shall be nominated every year according to the form settled by the legislative body of each state, a certain number of delegates, who shall sit at Philadelphia until the General Assembly of the United States shall have ordered otherwise; and the first Monday in November of each year, shall be the æra fixed for their meeting.

Each of the above-mentioned states shall preserve the right and power to recall, at any time whatever of the year, their delegates or any one of them, and to send others in the room of them for the remainder of the year; and each of the said States shall maintain their delegates during the time of the General Assembly, and also during the time they shall be members of the Council of State, of which mention shall be made hereafter.

XIII.

XIII.

Each State shall have a vote for the decision of questions in the general Assembly.

XIV.

The General Assembly of the United States, shall alone and exclusively have the right and power to decide of peace and war, except in the case mentioned in Article XI.—to establish rules for judging in all cases the legitimacy of the prizes taken by sea or land, and to determine the manner in which the prizes taken by the land or sea forces, in the service of the United States, shall be divided or employed;—to grant letters of Marque or reprisal in time of peace;—to appoint tribunals to take cognizance of piracies, and all other capital crimes committed on the high seas;—to establish tribunals to receive appeals, and judge finally in all cases of prizes;—to send and receive ambassadors;—to negotiate and conclude treaties or alliances;—to decide all differences actually subsisting, and that may arise hereafter between two and several of the aforementioned States about limits, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatsoever;—to coin money, and fix its value and standard;—to fix the weights and measures throughout the whole extent of the United States;—to regulate commerce; and treat of all affairs with the Indians who are not members of any of the States;—to establish and regulate the posts from one State to another, in the whole extent of the United States;—to give commissions to the other officers of the said troops, who shall have been appointed by virtue of Article VIII.—to appoint all the officers of marine in the service of the United States;—to frame all the ordinances necessary for the government
and

and discipline of the said land and sea forces ; and to direct their operations.

The General Assembly of the United States shall be authorized to appoint a Council of State, and such committees and civil officers as they shall judge necessary for guiding and dispatching the general affairs under their authority, whilst they remain sitting, and after their separation, under the authority of the Council of State. They shall chuse for president one of their members, and for secretary the person whom they shall judge fit for that place ; and they may adjourn at what time of the year, and to what place in the United States they shall think proper.—They shall have the right and power to determine and fix the sums necessary to be raised ;—to borrow money, and creat bills on the credit of the United States ; to build and fit out fleets ;—to determine the number of troops to be raised or kept in pay ;—and to require of each of the aforesaid States to compose the army, a contingent proportion to the number of its white inhabitants.——These requisitions of the General Assembly shall be binding, and in consequence the legislative body of each state shall nominate the particular officers, levy the men, arm and equip them properly, and these officers and soldiers, thus armed and equipped, shall proceed to the place, and within the time affixed by the General Assembly.

But if the General Assembly, from some particular circumstances, should think proper to exempt one or several of the States from raising troops, or to demand of them less than their contingent, and should on the contrary judge it convenient that one or several others should raise more than their contingent ; the number extraordinary demanded shall be raised, provided,

provided with officers, armed and equipped in the same manner as the contingent, unless the legislative body of that, or of those of the states to whom the requisition shall have been made, should deem it dangerous for themselves to be drained of that number extraordinary, and in that case they shall furnish no more than what they think compatible with their safety, and the officers and soldiers so equipped shall go to the place, within the time fixed upon by the General Assembly.

The General Assembly shall never engage in any war, nor grant letters of marque or reprisal in time of peace, nor contract any treaties of alliance or other conventions, except to make peace; nor coin money or regulate its value, nor determine or fix the sums necessary to be raised, or of the disbursements necessary to be made for the defence or advantage of the United States, or of some of them, nor create bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor dispose of any sums of money, nor resolve on the number of ships of war to be built or purchased, or on the number of troops to be raised for land or sea service, nor appoint a commander in chief of the land and sea forces, but by the united consent of nine of the states: and no question on any point whatsoever, except for adjourning from one day to another, shall be decided, but by a majority of the United States.

No delegates shall be chosen for more than three years out of six.

No person invested with any employment whatever in the extent of the United States, and receiving, by virtue of that employment, either by himself or through the hands of any other for him, any salaries, wages or emoluments whatever, shall be chosen a delegate.

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The General Assembly shall publish every month a journal of their sessions, except what shall relate to treaties, alliances, or military operations when it shall appear to them that these matters ought to be kept secret. The opinions *pro* and *con* of the delegates of each state, shall be entered in the journals as often as any of the delegates shall require it; and there shall be delivered to the delegates of each state, on their demand, or even of any one of the delegates of each state, on his demand, or even to any one of the delegates of each state, at his particular requisition, a copy of the journal, except of the parts above-mentioned, to be carried to the legislative body of his respective state.

XV.

The council of State shall be composed of one delegate of each of the states, nominated annually by the other delegates of his respective state, and the case where these electors might not be able to agree, that delegates shall be nominated by the General Assembly.

The council of State shall be authorized to receive and open all the letters addressed to the United States, and answer them; but shall not contract any engagement binding to the United States.—They shall correspond with the legislative bodies of each state, and with all persons employed under the authority of the United States, or of some of the particular legislative bodies.—They shall address themselves to these legislative bodies, or to the officers to whom each state shall have entrusted the executive power, for aid and assistance of every kind, as occasion shall require.—They shall give instructions to the generals, and direct the military operations by land or by sea;

sea; but without making any alterations in the objects or expeditions determined by the General Assembly, unless a change of circumstances intervening, and coming to their knowledge since the breaking up of the Assembly, should render a change of measures indispensibly necessary. They shall be careful of the defence and preservation of the fortresses or fortified posts.—They shall procure information of the situation and designs of the enemy.—They shall put in execution the measures and plans that shall have been resolved by the General Assembly, by virtue of the powers with which they are invested by the present confederation.—They shall draw upon the treasures for the sums, the destination of which shall have been settled by the General Assembly, and for the payment of the contracts which they may have made by virtue of the powers that are granted to them.—They shall inspect and reprove, they shall even suspend all officers, civil or military, acting under the authority of the United States.—In the case of death or suspension of any officer, whose nomination belongs to the General Assembly, they may replace him by what person they think proper, until the next Assembly.—They may publish or disperse authentic accounts of the military operations.—They may convene the General Assembly for a nearer term than that to which they had adjourned when they separated, if any important and unexpected event should require it for the welfare or benefit of the United States, or some of them.—They shall prepare the matters that are to be submitted to the inspection of the General Assembly, and lay before them at the next sitting all the letters or advices by them received, and shall render an exact account of all that they have done in the

interim.—They shall take for their secretary a person fit for that employment, who, before he enters on his function, shall take an oath of secrecy and fidelity. The presence of seven members of the Council will empower them to act.—In case of the death of one of their members, the Council shall give notice of it to the colleagues of the deceased, that they may chuse one of themselves to re-place him in the Council until the holding of the next general meeting;—and in case there should be but one of his colleagues living, the same notice shall be given to him that he may come and take his seat until the next sitting.

XVI.

In case that Canada should be willing to accede to the present confederation, and come into all the measures of the United States, it shall be admitted into the union, and participate in all its benefits. But no other colony shall be admitted without the consent of nine of the states.

The above articles shall be proposed to the legislative bodies of all the United States, to be examined by them; and if they approve of them, they are desired to authorize their delegates to ratify them in the General Assembly; after which all the articles which constitute the present confederation, shall be inviolably observed by all and every of the United States, and the union shall be established for ever.

There shall not be made hereafter any alteration in these articles, nor in any of them, unless that the alteration be previously determined in the General Assembly, and confirmed afterwards by the legislative bodies of each of the United States.

Resolved

Resolved and signed at Philadelphia, in Congress,
the 4th of October, 1776.

THIS subject was largely debated at home by writers of different characters and capacities.———The crimes of the colonists were painted in the strongest colours by several court writers. Their perjury in breaking their oath of allegiance to the King, their ingratitude to their mother country, which had nourished and brought them up like children, were strongly represented and insisted upon. The right of Britain to tax them in all cases whatsoever was set forth in the strongest light that the authors were able to represent it; and distinctions were devised to shew that all colonists when they leave a country must be ruled by laws in many cases different from those in the mother country. The lawyers found that the colonists possess no freeholds in the same manner that the parent state possess them, and upon this principle concluded, that as the colonists were not freeholders, they had no claim of a representation more than those in Britain who have not freehold estates.

The friends of the colonists considered this kind of reasoning, as unjust, absurd, and inconclusive. They insisted that the first colonists carried all the rights of Englishmen along with them, and were as much Englishmen in New England as in Old England. That they were not banished for any crimes they had committed in their own country, nor had they transgressed any laws which they were bound to obey; that they had purchased lands of the original proprietors, and had received a charter of protection from the mother

ther country at the expence of their trade and commerce ; and that their obedience to government, and protection from it were reciprocal. It was added, that no people are obliged to obey an authority which refuses to afford them protection when it is in its power to do it, but much less when it is exercised to deprive them of their liberty, and tends to enslave them. That there could be no arbitrary power lawful where the rulers are not absolutely perfect ; because the passions and appetites of men in the possession of power will always be ready to make them abuse it. That an absolute and uncontrollable power of the parliament over America could never be founded in right or sound policy, till once all the members of both houses were endowed with as much wisdom, prudence, and rectitude, as would infallibly direct them to command what was most conducive to the good of the whole upon plain and self-evident principles. And suppose they were possessed of these qualifications, they still could have no authority over persons equally free and wise, & without their own consent freely given. The reasoners on this side of the question considered the metaphysical quirks of court casuists and lawyers, as mean selfish subterfuges, calculated to throw mist upon reason and common sense, and in all their arguments confined themselves to those topics which were intelligible to the meanest capacities.

The principal objects of the war this campaign were the relief of Quebec, the recovery of Canada, an attack upon the southern colonies, and the reduction of New York. Some of the execution of the first parts of this plan has been shewn already, and the success which attended them fully set forth. Great hopes were founded upon this last part of the scheme.

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The greatest part of the province of New York is enclosed in islands, which being long and narrow were exposed on all sides to the hostilities of our fleets, and to the descent of our troops, with every advantage in their favour, whilst they continue in a state of enmity. When reduced, the protection of the ships of war would be as effectual in their preservation as their hostility had been in this reduction. The central situation of this province afforded great advantages. The war would be carried on with equal facility, either in Connecticut and the continent of New York on the eastern side, or in New Jersey and from thence to Pennsylvania on the western; or it might have been transferred to and from either place at pleasure. So that this situation enabled the British commander to prescribe the scene of action, and to quit it when he had a mind, while if the army was withdrawn from the field, he might by means of the Great North River, and the different channels between the islands and the main land, with his ships and detachments harass and ruin the adjacent countries; at the same time that the provincials, however powerful, could make no attempt upon the islands that would not be attended with the greatest disadvantages, and liable to the most eminent danger. Another great object in view from this situation, was that provided General Carleton could join General Howe by the North or Hudson's River, they would then cut off all communication between the northern and southern colonies. To crown these advantages, Long Island which was considered as a store-house for both the fleet and army, was to be held for the supply of all necessaries; and it was supposed the inhabitants were well-affected to the cause of government. Some part of the plan of operation

ation was not so very difficult, but experience proved that the whole scheme was by no means practicable.

The management of this last part of the plan was committed to Lord Viscount Howe and his brother Sir William Howe, two officers of good characters and known abilities, in whom the nation put much confidence, and the government seemed also to trust. A powerful army was appointed for this, besides the British forces of about 1000 Waldeckers and Hessians. The whole force, provided all the parts had been united at first, was supposed to have amounted to 35,000 men. Perhaps this might be only the calculation which was made upon paper, that generally exceeds the true complement by a considerable degree. It is not likely that ever such a number at one time could be brought to action in any place.—It was, however, a formidable armament, and a larger army than ever had been sent by any European power to the continent of America. With an army inferior in number to this, Alexander the Great made himself master of the whole Persian empire. The troops were supposed to be the best in the world, and under the command of as good officers as were in all Europe. They were well provided with all sorts of provisions, warlike stores, and ammunition, and besides supported by a numerous fleet, well appointed, and commanded by the best officers. The General and Admiral, besides their military power, were invested with authority as commissioners by act of parliament, for restoring peace to the colonies, and for granting pardon to such as should deserve mercy. It may be observed here that the ideas of mercy supposed in political states seldom answers the end proposed by the offering of it, and this appeared evidently in the method

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LORD HOWE.

Printed for T. Robson, Newcastle, upon Tyne.

thod now proposed of offering mercy to the colonists. It was mercy which was to be merited by actions, to be performed contrary to reasonable conviction of error, and was no way calculated to gain their affections or reach their hearts. Mercy never supposes merit, but always implies forgiveness freely and graciously bestowed, from a sense of which, all rebellious principles and errors of mind are overcome, and those that are forgiven, obey and return to their duty, merely out of love. Had Lord and General Howe's mercy proceeded upon this principle, the American war had been ended long ago, and Great Britain would not have smarted under the rod of a civil war, nor groaned under such a load of taxes and national debt as she does at present.

The situation of the army at Halifax, was far from being eligible; the country was barren, and not capable of affording a sufficient quantity of provisions, nor was the place even fit to afford sufficient quarters for the private men who were obliged to continue aboard the ships during the whole time they stayed there.

While the general waited at Halifax for reinforcements from Britain, he grew impatient, being pressed by the want of provisions, and other disadvantages.— He at last, without waiting for his brother Lord Howe, departed from Halifax with Admiral Shulldham, about the 10th of June, and arrived at Sandy-Hook about the end of the month. Sandy-Hook is a point of land that lies at the entrance into that confluence of sounds, roads, creeks, and bays, which are formed by New-York, Staten, and Long Islands, the continent on either side, with the North and Rariton Rivers. On their passage they were joined by six

Vol. II. U transports

transports with Highland troops on board, who had been separated from several of their companions in their voyage. These that were missing, with about 450 soldiers, and several officers, were taken by the American cruisers, and carried into Boston. General Howe found the place of access to New-York Island strongly fortified, defended by a numerous artillery; and guarded by a vast number of troops little inferior to our army. This made the general alter his resolution of making a descent on that part. Long Island on account of its extent, did not admit of being so strongly guarded;—it was however in a tolerable state of defence, and had considerable encampments on the end of the island next to New-York, and several works thrown up on the most accessible parts of the coast, as well as at the strongest internal passes. Staten Island being of less consequence, was neglected, and not so much attended to. This was certainly a great neglect in the provincials, who ought undoubtedly to have guarded against all possible attempts of their enemies, and from what they had experienced in the defence of Sullivan Island, ought to have remembered that a good resistance at first would have been ready to have damped the courage of the invaders, and have made them more timorous in their future attacks.

On the third of July, the general landed on the island without opposition, to the great joy of many of the inhabitants, who being on the side of government, had suffered greatly for their loyalty. The troops were cantoned in the villages where they received plenty of provisions which they now much wanted, and regaled themselves with the fruits of the island, and refreshed their spirits. General Howe was here met by governor Tryon, with several others, well-

well-affected to government who had taken refuge on board a ship at Sandy Hook. These gave him an account of the strength of the provincials. He was also joined by about sixty gentlemen from New-Jersey, who came to take up arms in the royal cause, and about 200 militia of the island, which were embodied for the same purpose. This afforded a flattering prospect to the general, that when the army was landed and collected in force to support the loyalists, such numbers would join it, as would contribute much to bring the war to a speedy conclusion.

This was an idea that misled both the government at home, and the officers abroad, and ruined the success of the greatest part of their measures: they judged of the body of the colonists from a few samples which they had of creatures that were under the influence of crown officers, and falsely concluded that all the provinces would be of the same temper as soon as they had an opportunity to discover their loyalty, but experience convinced them that they were mistaken, though they continued to boast of the number of their friends, and of the multitude of loyal colonists that flocked to the royal standard.

Lord Howe arrived at Halifax about a fortnight after the general's departure, from whence he proceeded to Staten Island, where he arrived about the middle of July. His first act was to send a flag ashore, with a circular letter to the several late governors of the colonies, acquainting them with his power, civil and military, and desired that they would publish, as generally as possible, for the information of the people, a declaration which accompanied the letter. In this declaration he informed the public of the powers with which he and his brother were invested, by virtue

of an act of parliament to grant general and particular pardons to all those, who in the midst of the tumult and disorder of the times, might have deviated from their just allegiance, and who were willing, by a speedy return to their duty, to reap the benefits of the royal favour, and of declaring any province, county, town, port, district, or place, to be at the peace of his majesty; in which the penal provisions of that law would cease in their favour. It also promised that a due consideration should be had to the services of all persons who contributed to restoring the public tranquillity.

These papers were immediately forwarded by General Washington to the congress, and as speedily published by them in all the news-papers, with a preface and comment in form of a resolution, setting forth their opinion of the nature and tendency of that declaration. They said that they had published it, that the people of the United States might be informed of what nature are the commissioners, and what the terms with the expectation of which the Court of Britain had endeavoured to amuse and disarm them; and that the few who still remained suspended by a hope founded either in the justice or moderation of that court, might now at length be convinced, that the valour alone of their country is sufficient to save their liberties. The comment, added to the declaration, took away all the influence and force that was in it, to produce the effect that was intended by it. It answered none of these purposes which the government and the Admiral had in view. The Americans turned it into ridicule, and branded it with the epithets of insidious and foolish. At this time several flags were sent on shore by Lord Howe, accompanied with letters to George Washington

Washington, Esq; which that officer refused to receive, as not being addressed with the title, and in the form due to the rank which he held under the United States. The Congress highly applauded the dignity of this conduct in a public resolution passed for the purpose, by which they directed, that for the future none of their commanders should receive any letter or message from the enemy, but such as should be directed to them in the characters which they respectively sustained. At length Adjutant General Paterson was sent to New-York by General Howe, with a letter to *George Washington, Esq; &c. &c.* Washington received him with great politeness, and the usual ceremony of blindfolding him in passing through the fortifications was dispensed with in his favour. Paterson regretted, in the name of his principal, the difficulties which had arisen with respect to addressing the letters, declared their high esteem for his person and character, and that they did not mean to derogate from the respect due to his rank; and it was hoped the *et ceteras* implied every thing, and would remove the impediments of their correspondence. The general replied, that a letter directed to any one in a public character should have some description or indication of it, otherwise it would appear a mere private letter; that it was true the *et ceteras* implied every thing, but they also implied any thing; and that he should absolutely decline any letter that was directed to him as a private person, when it related to his public station.—A long conference ensued on the subject of prisoners, and the complaints that were made on both sides, particularly by the congress, relative to the treatment they received.—The adjutant having observed, that the commissioners were armed
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with great powers; that they should derive the greatest pleasure from effecting an accomodation; and that he himself wished to have that visit considered as making the first advances towards that desirable object,—He received for answer, among other things, that by what had appeared, their powers were only to grant pardons; that those who had committed no offences, nor done any fault, wanted no pardon; and that they were only defending what they deemed their indisputable right. Paterfon was received by Washington in great military state, and the utmost politeness was observed on both sides.

It was about this time, and previous to the arrival of the fleet and army at New-York, that plots in favour of the royal cause were discovered in New-York and Albany, which occasioned much trouble. Some few were executed, great numbers were confined, and many abandoned their houses through the influence of their fears. These were pursued as outlaws and enemies to their country. The estates of these unfortunate people, against whom there were proofs, were seized. In the mean time some new forms of government were established in all those colonies which judged the former insufficient from their situation, and the others made the necessary alterations to adopt old forms to their new system. The declaration of independency was also published in all the colonies, and every where received and accompanied with the greatest testimonies of joy. This confidence and boldness in the midst of so untried and dangerous a struggle, and the approach of so formidable an invasion, made many conclude that the colonies were either very presumptuous, knew of some internal strength, or had certainty of foreign assistance. This might have been a
larming

harming to Great Britain, had not her governors been infatuated with the ideas of dominion and arbitrary power, that they could neither perceive what was for their own honour, nor the interest of their sovereign.

It was a long time before all the troops destined for this service arrived; the first division of the Hessians, with a number of British which attended them, sailed directly to Halifax, as Lord Howe had done, being still ignorant of the general's departure from that place. By this means the month of August was considerably advanced before they arrived at New-York, and it was of course longer before any expedition of importance could be undertaken by the commisioners. They were joined in the mean time by Sir Peter Parker and General Clinton, who had returned with the squadron and forces from South Carolina, as well as by some regiments from Florida and the West Indies. When all the forces, except the Hessians, which were expected were arrived, an attempt upon Long Island was resolved, as being most practicable, and therefore better fitted for the first essay than New York, because it afforded a greater scope for displaying military skill and experience with advantage: it also abounded with those supplies which so great a body of men as were now assembled by sea and land, demanded. Upon the 22d of August, the fleet having taken necessary measures for covering the descent, the army was landed without opposition near Utrecht and Gravesend, on the south west end of the island, and not far from the Narrows, where it approaches nearest to Staten Island. At that time General Putnam was encamped with a strong force at Brookland and Brooklyn, at a few miles distance on the North coast, where his works covered the breadth of a small peninsula,

peninsula, having the East River, which separated him from New-York on his left; a marsh which extended to Gowan's Cave on his right, with the Bay and Governor's Island to his back. The armies were separated by a range of hills covered with wood, which intersect the country from east to west, and are in that part called the Heights of Guana. The direct road to the enemy lay through a village called Flat Bush, where the hills commenced, and near which was one of the most important passes. As the army advanced, the north coast was to the left, the south to the right, and Flat Bush was nearly in the centre between both. The island, in that part, is formed narrow by Jamaica Bay in the right, but soon turns wide. General Putnam had detached a good part of his army to occupy the woody hills, and possess the passes; and provided the commanders had been skilful and vigilant, they could not have easily passed. It appears, however, that it was not the plan of the colonists to attempt any desperate experiment, till once they had exercised their troops, in skirmishes, and taught them the possibility of conquest in their turn. They knew that the British troops were brave, and longed for nothing more than an opportunity to signalize themselves, and put an end to the war by a bold push.—Their interest and safety both depended much upon speedy action. The colonists were as yet raw troops, and wanted experience in war; a sudden attack, and signal overthrow, would have dispirited them, and frustrated all their hopes of defending their country, and gaining their liberty.—What was by our troops called cowardice, was in them the greatest prudence, and truest wisdom.—They industriously avoided coming to any general action.

tion, because it was not yet their interest to do it.—The wearying and harrassing our forces answered all the purposes of a general engagement, without slaughter and bloodshed to themselves.

Lord Cornwallis, according to orders, marched on immediately with the reserve to Flat Bush, where finding the provincials in possession of the pass, he complied with his orders in making no attempt upon it. When the whole army was landed, the Hessians under the command of General Heister, composed the centre at Flat Bush. Major General Grant commanded the left wing which extended to the coast; and the principal army, containing the greatest part of the British forces, under the command of General Clinton, Earl Percy, and Lord Cornwallis, turned short to the right, and approached to the opposite coast at Flat Land. Had our Generals been going to attack the bravest troops that ever served in Flanders or Germany, they could not have been more on their guard than when they were going to attack men they had determined to be cowards and poltroons.

When every thing was prepared for forcing the hills, and advancing towards the lines of the provincials, General Clinton at the head of the van of the army, consisting of the light infantry, light horse, and grenadiers under Lord Cornwallis, with the fourteen field pieces, began in the evening of the 26th, as soon as it was dark, to march from Flat Land, and having passed through the part of the country called the New Lots, they arrived upon the road that crosses the hills from Bedford to Jamaica, where turning to the left towards the former of these places, they seized a considerable pass, which the Americans had through some

unaccountable neglect left unguarded. The main body, under Lord Percy, with ten field pieces, followed at a moderate distance, and the way being thus successfully opened, the whole army passed the hills without noise or impediment, and descended by the town of Bedford into the lower country, which lay between them and Putnam's lines. The engagement was begun early in the morning by the Hessians, at Flat Bush, and by General Grant along the coast, and a warm cannonade, with a sharp fire of small arms, was eagerly supported on both sides for some hours. During this time the King's troops gained no advantage, but were upon the point of being repulsed, had not the ships in the mean time made several motions to the left, and attacked a battery on Red Hook, both to distract the right of the colonists who were engaged with General Grant, and to call off their attention totally from the left and rear, where their greatest danger lay. Those who were engaged with the Hessians were the first who perceived the march of the British army, and the danger they themselves were in; they accordingly retreated in large bodies and in good order, with their artillery, with a design to recover their camp. They were however attacked furiously by the King's troops, and driven back into the woods, where they were met by the Hessians, and alternately intercepted and chased by the dragoons and light infantry. In these critical and desperate circumstances, some of their regiments, though overpowered by numbers, forced their way to the lines, through all the difficulties and dangers that opposed and surrounded them. Others, not less brave, perished in the attempt. Some kept the woods and escaped, while others, less fortunate, were lost under the same protection.

tion. The nature of the country, and the variety of situation, occasioned a repetition and continuance of small engagements, pursuits, and slaughter, which lasted for many hours.

Had the skill and attention of the American Generals on this occasion been equal to the bravery of their troops, the British Generals would have repented their landing upon Long Island; but Putnam suffered himself to be so effectually entrapped, that the bravery of his forces were rendered ineffectual through the want of capacity in their commander. The right wing of the provincials, which was engaged with General Grant on the coast, were so late in knowing what was carrying on in other parts, that they were intercepted in their retreat by some of the British troops, who in the morning had not only turned round the hill upon their left, but had traversed the whole extent of the country in their rear. Such of them as did not flee to the woods, which were the greatest number, were obliged to throw themselves into the marsh at Cowan's Cave, where many were drowned, and others perished in the mud. A considerable number, however, made their escape this way to the lines, though they were much thinned by the fire of the pursuers.

The loss of the Americans on this occasion was very considerable, but no so great as our accounts represented it; it was said that they lost 3,000 men, including about 1000 prisoners. Almost a whole regiment from Maryland, consisting altogether of young men of the best families, were said to have been totally cut off, but it was found afterwards that many of these had escaped among the rest. Their own accounts do not acknowledge any such numbers slain as our people affirmed; tho' it was confessed that they lost a

number of their best and bravest troops. But what was worst on their side, this defeat dashed all their hopes of success, and damped their spirits. New soldiers, full of spirits and pride of bodily strength, can scarcely conceive any advantage over them, which the old can derive from discipline, and a knowledge of their business. And if they are commanded, and skillfully led to action in this temper, so that those who oppose them are deprived of an opportunity of turning these advantages to account, they will do wonderful execution; for as they are not capable of perfectly understanding danger, and are not acquainted by experience of the pain and vexation of wounds, they are often more daring and adventurous than old soldiers. But when they find courage and strength totally useless, and when they are making the greatest, and, as they imagine, the most effectual efforts, and that they are surrounded, overpowered, and destroyed, by means that they cannot understand, they withdraw all due confidence from those things on which they had before placed too much, and ascribe an irresistible power to military skill and discipline, which they do not really possess. From these considerations they abandon their natural strength, and it is generally a long time before they dare trust their new knowledge and skill so far as to bring it effectually to action.

The commanders of the provincial troops committed unpardonable errors on this occasion; they scarcely discovered as much prudence and discernment as the meanest country peasant would have done, had he been placed at the head of their army: they had taken no care to watch the motions of their enemy, nor to guard those passes that might have been easily defended

fended against even a superior force, and would have prevented them from being surrounded.—They ought to have had scouts and watches placed in all parts of the island, and to have secured every post that was in the smallest degree tenable. They ought to have had parties concealed behind every hedge, wall, or ditch, to have fired by surprise upon every advanced party of their foes, which might have retreated to the main body when fore pressed, and given the alarm in due time. They might, as they knew the country, had flanking parties of swift troops, who might have thinned their enemies by occasional attacks, and fled to redoubts and thickets, and marched another way and made a fresh attack on another quarter. They ought to have neglected no possible methods of defence that could have been devised in such a trying and critical situation. The apologies of the American Generals are childish and trifling. They represented that they had no idea of so many troops being landed on the island; but they ought to have been acquainted with every circumstance, and watched every motion of the enemy. General Howe shewed a great measure of skill and conduct in his military arrangement, and the whole attack was conducted with much prudence and sagacity; the men also shewed much valour and intrepidity, and as soldiers behaved well. Their ardor was so great, that the Generals could with difficulty prevent them from attacking the American lines, in their keenness in pursuing the fugitives. And it was imagined by some sanguine people, that they would have carried all before them; but in such cases it is not easy for partizans to keep moderation in their conjectures. It is highly probable, that there was an emulation between the British and Hessian troops,

troops, to distinguish themselves in this engagement which made both parties more eager to do something that might be taken notice of. Three of the enemy's commanders were taken prisoners, viz. Major-General Sullivan, and the Brigadier-Generals Lord Stirling and Udell, and ten other field officers. The loss on the side of the British and Hessian troops was said to be very inconsiderable, being under 350 killed and wounded, of which the former did not make a fifth part. The provincial accounts rate our loss at much higher, and it is reasonable to suppose that our gazettes industriously concealed part of our loss at home, as many who were present in the action affirmed that the loss of the British forces was much more considerable. Our army encamped on the front of the enemy's lines, and on the 28th of August broke ground in form, at 600 yards distance from a redoubt, which covered the enemy's left.

It was a loss to the Americans that General Washington at this time did not command them, nor does it appear that the plan of operation was of his devising. He, during the time of engagement, passed over from New York to Long Island, and is said to have burst out in a bitter exclamation of grief, when he perceived the inevitable ruin of some of his best troops. Nothing was now left but to use the best means to preserve the remainder of the army upon Long Island. He knew that the superior power of the royal artillery would soon silence their batteries, and that if the lines were forced in their present situation, considering the superiority of the king's troops in number, and the present dejection of the provincial troops, there was little hope of preserving them from being either killed or taken. If he should rein-
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force them, he would hazard the loss of New York, which was already threatened on all sides, and kept in continual alarm by the fleet.—Another danger that threatened, which was equally to be avoided, the war ships only waited for a fair wind, to enter and take possession of the East River, which would have totally cut off all communication between the islands. In this situation there was no hope left but in a retreat, which was even exceedingly difficult under the watchful eye of an active enemy, with a powerful army flushed with success, almost close to their works.—This difficult task was however undertaken and executed, with great address and abilities, by General Washington. On the 29th, in the night, their troops were withdrawn from the camp, and their different works, and with their baggage, stores, and almost all their artillery, were conveyed to the water-side, embarked, and passed over the ferry to New York, with wonderful silence and order, that our army, tho' within 600 yards, did not perceive the least motion, and were surprized in the morning of finding the lines abandoned, and seeing their rear-guard in their boats, and out of danger. Those that are acquainted with the usual noise and confusion attending decamping so many thousands of men, even in open day, will be obliged to acknowledge, that the retreat required an extraordinary address to conduct it, and must be allowed a master-piece in its kind in the art of war. It shewed plainly, that General Washington knew how to profit by the miscarriage of others, and had the capacity to turn his misfortune to his own honour. After the retreat from Long Island, General Sullivan was sent upon parole, with a message from Lord Howe to the Congress. In this he stated, that tho' he could

not treat with them in the character of a congress, he was very glad of having a conference with some of their members, whom he would consider only as private gentlemen, and would himself meet them at such place as they should appoint. He said that he had, together with the General, full powers to compromise disputes between Great Britain and America, upon terms advantageous to both for obtaining which he had been detained near two months, and his arrival on that account had been prevented, before the declaration of independency took place. He wished that a compact might be settled at this time before any decisive blow was struck, and neither party could say that they were compelled to enter into the agreement.

That if the Congress had a mind to treat, many things which they had not yet asked, might and ought to be granted to them; and if upon the conference any probable ground of accommodation appeared, the authority of congress must afterwards be acknowledged or the compact could not be complete.

The answer of the congress was, that being the representatives of the free and independent States of America, they could not, with propriety, send any of their members in their private characters; but that ever desirous of establishing peace upon reasonable terms, they would appoint a committee to know whether he had any authority to treat with persons authorized by Congress for that purpose, in behalf of America, and what that authority was, and to hear such propositions as he should think fit to make respecting the same.— Dr. Franklin, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Rutledge were appointed as a committee upon this occasion, and accordingly waited upon Lord Howe, in Staten Island
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The committee summed up the accounts of this conference, which they laid before the congress in the following terms. "Upon the whole it did not appear to your committee, that his lordship's commission contained any other authority than what is contained in the act of parliament, viz. that of granting pardons, with such exceptions as the commissioners shall think proper to make, and of declaring America, or any part of it, to be in the king's peace upon submission. For as to the power of enquiring into the state of America, which his lordship mentioned to us, and of conferring and consulting with any persons the commissioners might think proper, and represent the result of such conversations to the ministry, who, (provided the colonies should subject themselves) might after all, or might not, at their pleasure, make any alterations in the former instructions to governors, or propose in parliament any amendment of the acts complained of, we apprehend any expectation from the effect of such a power would have been too precarious to be relied on by America, had she still continued in her state of dependence."

In this manner the hopes of negotiation ended between the commissioners and the congress. The ministerial demagogues at home called loudly out against the colonies for not accepting Lord Howe's and the General's proposals; they now devoted all the Thirteen United Colonies to destruction, and considered it as a most righteous, as well as a most necessary proceeding, to waste them by fire and sword. The right of Great Britain to do with America as she pleased, and to assess the people by acts of parliament without her consent, was always taken for granted as a first principle; while both the truth of

Vol. II. Y the

the principle, and its utility, were denied by the United Colonies. They considered the lodging of such a power in the hands of men, whose interest it was to burthen them to ease themselves, by oppressing them, was neither just nor reasonable, and contrary to all sound policy. It was said, that when the Romans sent out colonies they made them always as free as those at home, and never attempted to tax them more than other citizens: that they were always Romans, however far from Italy; had the same laws, immunities, and privileges that all other citizens possessed, and that when Governors or Prefects attempted to oppress any province, they were severely punished by the senate, and that any Roman citizen in any part of the empire, who had proper qualifications like others, might become a senator, as well as those within Italy. But this was not the case of the British colonists, who were not admitted to any share in the senatorial authority, except in a nominal sense, which was of no importance, without the sanction of a superior power. It was added, that the Romans behaved with much more respect to conquered nations than we did to natural born subjects and citizens; for provided the nations whom the Romans subdued inclined to become Romans, they were ruled by the same laws, and obtained the same privileges; and were supported and defended by the laws of the empire, as if they had always belonged to it.

The British commissioners having a double authority, when their hopes of negociation failed, they were determined to push their military power with more vigour. It would appear that men, when they act in the character of soldiers, consider moral obligation to be different from what it is when they act in other characters.

characters. The two commanders in chief had in the senate condemned the laws made against the Americans, but now they are employed to execute them at the expence of blood, and the danger of their own lives. The policy of nations, and the ideas of persons in high life concerning justice and equity, are very often contrary to the fundamental maxims of morality which men would desire to have practised when applied to themselves.

The royal army was now divided from the island of New-York by the East River, and the men were impatient to pass that narrow limit. They posted themselves along the coast wherever they could see or front their enemies, and erected batteries to answer, if not silence theirs. A fleet consisting of upwards of 300 sail, including transports, covered the face of the waters, while the ships of war hovering round the island threatened destruction to every part, and were continually engaged with one or other of the batteries, by which it was surrounded. The small islands between the opposite shore were perpetually objects of contest, until by the force of a well served artillery, the aid of the ships, and the intrepidity of the troops, they secured those that were most necessary for their future operations.

Thus an almost constant cannonade was kept up for many days, and the troops who had so lately escaped from imminent danger, had little time to quiet their apprehensions. At length all things being prepared for a descent, several motions were made by the ships in the North River, with a design to draw the attention of the provincials to that side of the island. Other parts were also threatened, to encrease the uncertainty of the real object of attack. The seizing of the

island of Mortrefor near Hellgate, and erecting a battery on it to silence one which the provincials had on Floren's Nook, had the appearance of landing in that part, which was near the centre of New York island. Whilst the colonists were in this state of suspense and expectation, the first division of the army, under the command of Gen. Clinton, with Earl Cornwallis, Major General Vaughan, Brigadier General Leslie, and the Hessian Colonel Dunop, embarked at the head of Newton-Bay, which runs deep into Long-Island, and where they were out of all view of the enemy. Covered by five ships of war upon their entrance into the river, they proceeded to Kep's-bay, about three miles north of New-York, where being less expected than in some other places, the preparation for defence was not so great. The works were notwithstanding tolerable strong, and supported with men, but the fire from the ships was so severe and well directed, that the works were deserted, and the army landed without opposition.

The provincials, who dreaded the fury of the men of war, abandoned New-York, with their other posts on that part of the island, and retired to the North end, where their principal strength lay. They were obliged to leave a great part of their artillery and military stores, which were considerable behind. They had some men slain, and a few taken prisoners in the retreat, and skirmishes which happened during their stay.—The King's troops suffered considerably, but this loss was concealed as much as possible,—and was never made public by government accounts. Many of the American regiments behaved badly on this occasion. Their late severe losses on Long-Island appeared visible in their behaviour at this time.—

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Part of the British army took possession of New-York, and the rest encamped near the center of the island, with their right on Floren's Nook, on the East River, and the left near Bloomingdale, and thus occupied the island from shore to shore, which, though it is about sixteen miles in length, is not above one in breadth. It appeared from the beginning, that the provincials did not account the island and city of New-York worth risking a general engagement, nor was it their plan, in general, to venture much at one time, but to exercise their troops in constant skirmishes, and waste the British forces by degrees. General Washington took post at Kingsbridge, by which he had a communication with the continent at New-York, and where he erected strong works on both sides of the passage, which seemed to defy a strong force. Their nearest encampment was on the heights of Haerlem, at the distance of about a mile and an half. There was between them M'Gowan's pass, and the strong grounds called Morris's Heights lay between it and Kingsbridge, which were defensible against a superior force. In this situation of the armies, skirmishes frequently happened, and it was found that by degrees the late apprehensions of the provincials began to wear away. This was the great object which General Washington had in view; he knew that when his men once began to perceive that they could fight without being killed, and could occasionally beat those who had defeated them, they would in process of time, become fitter for greater attempts, and conquer in their turn.

General Howe had not been many days in possession of New-York, when the city was set on fire by some that had stayed behind, and concealed themselves for that purpose, being determined, if possible, to prevent

vent its being of any benefit to the conquerors. They had prepared combustibles with great art and ingenuity, and took the opportunity of dry weather and a brisk wind to set fire to the city about midnight, in several places at the same time. Thus near a third part of that beautiful city was reduced to ashes; and unless the activity of the troops, as well as of the sailors, had preserved the remainder, it had all been consumed. Some of those who were thought to have been concerned in kindling the flames, were thrown into the midst of them by the soldiers, and burnt to death;—though it could never yet be ascertained who were the real authors of this conflagration, nor were the soldiers certain that those whom they threw into the flames had any hand in kindling of them. Those that know how little soldiers are given to enquire into the truth of a cause of this sort, will not wonder much at their burning the innocent as readily as the guilty.

General Howe finding that no attempt could be made with success upon the side of New-York, but that any attempt of that kind would be attended with the greatest danger, determined upon a new plan of operation, which would oblige the provincials either to quit their situation, or render their holding it extremely dangerous. For this purpose, on the 11th of October the greater part of the army embarked in flat boats, and other small vessels, proper for the service, and passed successfully through the dangerous navigation of Hell-gate, which forms a communication between the East River and the Sound, and landed on Frog-neck, near the town of East Chester, which lies on the continent belonging to New York, on the side of Connecticut.—Earl Percy, with two brigades of British troops and one of Hessians, continued in the
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lines near Haerlem, to cover New York. Had General Washington commanded old troops, which he could have depended upon, General Howe might have paid dear for this adventure. Had Washington attacked Percy at the time of the embarkation all the forces under the Earl might have been cut off, without the rest being able to afford them the smallest aid or assistance. There was only one thing which could have preserved them, namely the fleet, which surrounded the island, which could have afforded them protection almost in any situation into which they could have been reduced. This fleet was of vast service in all the operations of the army, and indeed it does not appear that our troops could have done any thing unless they had been protected by the fleet. In this the provincials were chiefly inferior, being totally destitute of any force of this nature. The army was obliged to halt for some days at Frog's Neck to wait for the arrival of provisions and stores, and for a reinforcement that was drawn from Staten Island. When these arrived they marched through Pelham manor to New Rochester, which lies on the coast of the Sound, which is the name of that channel which separates Long Island from the continent.—Here they were joined by the greater part of a regiment of light horse from Ireland, the rest of the troops had been taken in their passage by the American cruizers upon the coast. They were also joined by the second division of Hessians, under General Knyphausen, with a regiment of Waldeckers, both of which had arrived at New York since the army had departed from it. The chief object of this expedition was to cut off the communication between Washington and the eastern colonies: and if this measure did not
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bring him to an engagement, to enclose him on all sides in his fastnesses on the North end of York Island. The King's troops were now masters of the lower road to Connecticut and Boston, but to gain the upper it was necessary to advance to the higher grounds called the White Plains. This is a rugged, stoney, and mountainous tract of ground, and it is only part of an ascent to a country that is still higher, rougher, and of more difficult access. When the army advanced to the higher grounds it was judged necessary to leave the second division of Hessians with the regiment of Waldeck, at New Rochelle, to keep a communication between the supplies of provisions and necessaries that were to arrive at the port. The army was now so truly powerful, that it was enabled to support every service.

General Howe soon began to find that he had now another game to play than what he had upon Long Island.—Washington foresaw the intention of this scheme, and provided against its effects. He perceived the danger he would be in if the British General succeeded in his scheme; that he would be compelled to commit the whole fortune of the war, and the safety of all the colonies, to the hazard of a general engagement. In his present state this would have been highly imprudent; his troops were not well recovered from the terror of their late misfortunes, and in case he should have been defeated, there could scarcely be a possibility of a retreat. His army is said at this time to have been much reduced by sickness, which the severity of the service, indifferent quarters, bad cloathing, the want of salt and other necessaries, joined to a slovenliness that naturally prevailed in New England and the northern colonies, rendered general,

neral, and very fatal to their army. A grand movement was accordingly made by the whole; in a line of small detachments, and entrenched camps, which occupied every height and strong guard from Valentine's Hill, near Kingsbridge, on the right, to White Plains, and the upper road to Connecticut on the left. In this situation, they found the whole line of the King's troops as they marched at a moderate distance. The deep river Brunx covered their rear, whilst the open ground to the last afforded a secure passage to their stores and baggage for the upper country. A garrison was left to defend Fort Washington, the lines of Haerlem, and Kingsbridge.

General Howe, in this situation of the enemy, thought it necessary to proceed with caution and great circumspection. The progress of the army was slow, the march close, the encampments compact, and well guarded with artillery, and the whole was conducted in the most regular and warlike manner. In spite of all the caution of the General, the provincials conveyed parties over the Brunx, to intercept their march, which occasioned many skirmishes, in which the King's forces were conquerors. But it had this effect upon the colonists, that it gradually inured them to hardships, and rendered war familiar to them. When the King's troops approached White Plains, their enemies quitted their detached camps along the Brunx, and joining their left, took a strong ground of encampment before the British on the former. When all things were prepared and ready for action, the army marched early in the morning in two columns towards White Plains; with their left wing, commanded by General Heister. Before mid-day, all the enemy's advanced parties retired back within their works, be-

Vol. II. Z fore

fore the light infantry and the Hessian chasseurs. The army formed with the right upon the road, from Mamaroneck, about a mile distant from their centre, and the left to the Brunx, near about the same distance from the right flank of their entrenchments. The Americans had a party lodged in an advantageous post that was separated from their right flank by the Brunx, and which also by its windings covered that corps in front from the left of the British army. As this post would have been of great consequence in attacking that flank of the entrenchment, Brigadier General Leslie, with the several brigades of British troops, the Hessian grenadiers, under Colonel Denop, and a battalion of that corps were ordered to dislodge the enemy. Previous to the attack, Colonel Rall, who commanded a brigade of Hessians on the left, had passed the Brunx, and gained a post, which enabled him to annoy the enemy's flank, while they were engaged with the other forces in front.

The passage of the river was very difficult, but the troops performed it with readiness and alacrity, and the 28th and 35th regiments having passed first, formed with great steadiness on the opposite side under the fire of their enemies. On this occasion the public accounts say nothing of the loss of our troops, but such as were upon the spot have declared that our men suffered severely, and that the troops were greatly thinned by the fire of the enemy. They, however, ascended a steep hill, in defiance of all opposition, and rushing upon the enemy, drove them from their works. The rest of the troops shewed no less fortitude and steadiness in supporting these two regiments. The gaining of this important post took up a considerable time, which was prolonged by the enemy's still sup-
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porting a scattered engagement, under cover of the adjoining walls and hedges. In the evening the Hessian grenadiers were ordered forward within cannon shot of the entrenchments, the 2d brigade of the British formed in the rear, and the two Hessian brigades on the left of the second. The right and centre of the army did not remove from the ground upon which they were formed. In that position the whole army lay upon their arms during the night with a full intention and in the fullest expectation to engage in the morning, and to attack the provincial camp.—General Washington, with great address before the morning had measured out more work for the British forces. He had drawn back this encampment in the night, and greatly strengthened his lines by additional works. For this reason the attack was deferred, and it was thought necessary to wait for the arrival of the fourth brigade, and of two battalions of the sixth, which had been left with Earl Percy at New York. Upon the arrival of these troops, the necessary dispositions were made in the evening for attacking the enemy on the last day of October, but a very wet night and morning prevented the design from being executed as was intended.

General Washington, who knew the intention of our General, had not the smallest intention of venturing an engagement, while it was possible to avoid it.—He knew that delay was in some respects a victory to him and that small skirmishes, that could not in the least affect the public safety, would train his men to war and inure them to danger, better than a general engagement, which in one day might decide their own and the fate of their country.

The enemies of Washington confessed, that in the

course of this campaign, and more particularly in this part of it, he fully performed the part of a great commander.

It was said by the Americans, that upon our men covering four or five batteries with a powerful artillery preparatory to an attack, together with the general's knowledge, that by turning his camp the British forces might become possessed of the hills at his back, which totally commanded it, he found it necessary to change his situation. He accordingly quitted his camp in the night of the first of November, and took higher grounds towards the North Castle district, after having set fire to the town or village of White Plains, as well as to all the houses and forage near the lines. The King's troops next day took possession of their entrenchments. General Howe, finding that all his art could not draw Washington to an engagement, and that the nature of the country and his present situation did not admit of his being forced to one, determined not to spend his time in fruitless manœuvres, without performing any thing of consequence. He therefore resolved to take the opportunity to drive the provincials out of York Island, which their army could not prevent. For this purpose General Knyphausen crossed the country from New Rochelle, and having taken possession of Kingsbridge without opposition, entered York Island, and took his station to the north of Fort Washington, to which the enemy had retired at his approach. Fort Washington lay on the west side of New York Island, near to Kingsbridge, Bow and Jeffery's Nook, and almost facing Fort Lee on the Jersey side, from which it was separated by the North River. This was a strong work, but not sufficient to resist heavy artillery, and it was by no means

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of a sufficient extent for any other purpose, except strengthening the lines. But the situation was exceedingly strong, and the approaches difficult.

Upon the 13th of November the army returned slowly by the North River, and encamped on the heights of Fordham, at a moderate distance from Kingsbridge, with the North River on the right, and the Bronx on the left. Every thing being prepared for attacking the fort, a summons was sent to Colonel M'Gaw, who commanded it, to surrender, who declaring that he was determined to defend it to the last extremity, a general assault was resolved upon to save the time that would be lost in making regular approaches. The garrison consisted of near 3000 men, and the strong guards near the fort were covered with lines and works. Four attacks were made at the same time. The first on the north side, commanded by General Knyphausen, at the head of two columns of Hessians and Waldeckers. The second on the east, was led on by Brigadier-General Matthew, at the head of the first and second battalion of light infantry, and two battalions of guards, supported by Lord Cornwallis, with the first and second battalions of grenadiers, and the 33d regiment. These troops crossed the East River in flat boats, and as the enemy's works there extended the breadth of the island, redoubts and batteries were erected on the opposite shore, both to cover the landing of the troops, and to annoy those works which were near the water. The third attack, which was principally intended as a feint to distract the provincials, was conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling, with the forty-second regiment, who passed the East River lower down, between the second and fourth attacks. The last at-
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tack was made by Lord Percy, with the party that he commanded on the south part of the island. All the attacks were supported by a numerous, powerful, and well served artillery. The Hessians commanded by General Knyphausen, had a thick wood to pass, where the provincials were advantageously posted, and where a warm engagement was continued for a long time, in which the former were greatly exposed, and suffered much, though they behaved with much bravery and firmness. The light infantry were led on in the mean time, and were exposed both before and after to a very smart and continual fire from the enemy, who were covered by rocks and the trees, among which they were posted. The troops, however, with their usual alertness and activity, extricated themselves by climbing up a very steep hill, when they dispersed the enemy, and made way for the landing the rest of the troops, without opposition. During these transactions, Earl Percy having carried an advanced work on his side, Colonel Stirling was ordered to attempt a landing, and two battalions of the second brigade to support him. The colonel performed this service with great bravery, but with considerable loss; he advanced his boats through a heavy fire, which they bore with great firmness, and forcing his way to a steep place, gained the summit, and took 170 prisoners notwithstanding the enemy made a bold and good defence. While these things were carrying on, Colonel Rall, who led the column of General Knyphausen's attack, having forced the enemy, after a considerable opposition from their strong posts opposite to his line, pushed on to their works, and lodged his column within an hundred yards of the fort; and being soon joined by the General with the left column, who had

had at length overcome the impediments which he met with in the wood, the garrison surrendered prisoners of war. The loss on either side, according to the public accounts, was not so great as might have been expected from the length and variety of the action. The quantity of gunpowder found in the fort was utterly inadequate to the purpose of almost the shortest defence. A respectable authority observes, how so large a body was left with so poor a provision, is extremely unaccountable: and adds, ‘ But the narrative of all these transactions is hitherto imperfect’. To make this subject clear to the reader, it must be remembered, that the fortifying these places at this time with so many men, and with so short provisions, was intended to answer a particular design, which it did. General Washington knew that our troops would attempt storming the fort, provided it did not surrender; he therefore ordered his men to hold out as long as they could with convenient safety, and endeavour to thin the British ranks as much as possible, and at last surrender. Had he left only a few, they would have done but little damage to our troops, but as the garrison was tolerably strong, and secured within their works, they were on that account able to make a greater slaughter among our troops, and so make any future operation more easy to the provincials. The troops in the fort were few in comparison of the killed and wounded of our men in this unhappy attack; for Britain has not to this day, nor ever will get a true account of the killed and wounded at White Plains and Fort Washington. The people in the city of New-York were as great strangers to the transactions at White Plains as the people in Britain; for notwithstanding the multitude of killed, that were every

every day left upon the field, and the numbers that were carried to the hospitals, the people were made believe that every little repulse which was given to the Americans was attended with great loss on their side, and almost none on ours. The newspapers under the directions of the commanders in chief by sea and land, like our Gazette at home, always echoed the praises and victories of our troops, and defamed the colonists, not only as rebels, but as cowards that would not fight, but always ran away when an enemy appeared. A gentleman who was above six months at New-York and Long Island, and saw and knew most part of the transactions, from the first landing on Staten Island, declared that the number of wounded men which he saw brought in almost every day, was incredible; but how they happened to be wounded he never could learn, for he was always told that the Americans would not fight, but were perfect cowards. He also observed, that he imagined the reason why our men gave out that there were so few killed, when there were so many wounded, was to cover their real loss, under the pretence of the provincial fire not doing so much execution as their own. But according to the observations that he made, he found that the killed were as many in proportion to the wounded among our men as among the rebels. The British troops were undoubtedly much thinned by the engagements on White Plains and at Fort Washington, and though the best face was put upon matters that the case would admit of, yet it must be granted that the English forces suffered much, and lost more than they gained by the victory. The provincial commander understood his own interest better than to venture upon any general engagement, to expose his raw and unexperien-

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ced troops, to the fury of men who were desperate, and who considered even death itself a sort of victory, as relieving them from constant fatigue, hunger, and disappointment. He knew that constant little skirmishes would in process of time remove from the minds of men the horrors and dread of battle, and teach them to conquer as well as fight. Our men were at first flushed with success, when they saw their enemies flee from one post to another, and concluded that it was fear that made them retreat, and a sense of their valour that made them desert their posts; but in this they were mistaken. The Americans only fled because it was wise and prudent to do so, and they considered it to be a wiser method to preserve their troops than expose them for advantages of small importance. Many great enemies to America, who were witnesses of those transactions, have confessed of late, that our loss was greater than it was said to be at that time, and American cowardice has vanished away insensibly, no body can tell how. The provincials, who were in our gazette and court news-papers at that time said to have been three times the number of our men in every battle, have since, by the same channel, been proved to have been much inferior in number to General Howe's forces in every engagement, both when they lost and when they gained the day. It is very perplexing to an historian when he finds the same authority vary so often upon the same subject, and controvert matters of fact that it has already confirmed in the most solemn manner. It is manifest that the truth of facts cannot be certainly ascertained by any of the court or ministerial accounts of these times; for what they have at one time affirmed for truth, they have at another declared to be the grossest falsehood. Truth

is most likely to be found from the American records, who, though they may have coloured some points strongly, yet have supported consistency in their publications of matters of fact concerning this war.

When our troops had finished the conquest of Fort Washington, they next proceeded to over-run the Jerseys, and Lord Cornwallis was sent with a strong body of men to attack Fort Lee. The garrison of two thousand men abandoned the fort, and left their stores, artillery, and tents behind them. Our troops after this over-run the greatest part of the Jerseys without opposition; the enemy every way flying before them, and at length extended their winter cantonments from New Brunswick to the Delaware. It was thought had they had means of passing the Delaware, they might have taken Philadelphia, when the people were in a consternation at their progress: but the Americans were so prudent as either to destroy or carry off all the boats upon that river.

While these things were carrying on in the Jerseys, General Clinton, with some British and Hessian troops, and a squadron of ships under Sir Peter Parker, was sent to make an attack upon Rhode-Island. They succeeded easily in this enterprize. Upon December the 8th, the provincials abandoned the island, and the British and Hessian troops took possession of it without any loss, and at the same time blocked up Commodore Hopkins' squadron, which was in the harbour of Providence, on the adjoining continent.—The English squadron and troops continued here during the winter, where they had better quarters than any other of the King's troops. Hitherto the King's forces had succeeded in all their attempts since their landing on Staten Island. The provincial army was
much

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GENERAL CLINTON.

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much decreased, both by captivity and desertion, but they always found new sources of recruit and supply, which much astonished our Generals, as well as it alarmed the government.

C H A P. XII.

The Progress of the War in Canada—Preparations on Lake Champlain—An Engagement near the Isle of Volicour—Crown Point abandoned by the Provincials—General Carleton lands with his army—Reasons for attacking Ticonderago—Carleton returns to Canada—General Lee taken—The Congress persevere—Take measures for renewing their Armies—Address to the People—Petition to the Commissioners—Divisions in Philadelphia—The King's Troops surprised at Trenton—Lord Cornwallis returns to the Jerseys—Hindered from attacking the Enemy at Trenton by Obstacles—General Washington attacks Colonel Mawhood near Prince town—Cornwallis retires from the Delaware—The Americans over-run the Jerseys.

AS the progress of the British arms in Canada had been much retarded by many unforeseen accidents, as well as by the want of wisdom in the cabinet, it was now proposed to pursue the war with more vigour in those parts. Some strong efforts had been made in 1776 to remove the obstacles that had so long restrained its progress, and the officers employed in that service had surmounted wondrous difficulties.

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The burthen of this service fell upon the officers and men in that quarter of the world, whose abilities, zeal and perseverance, were worthy of the praises of those who employed them. It was an arduous task they were at this time to perform. They had almost to create a fleet of above thirty fighting vessels, of different sorts and sizes, all furnished with cannon, which was a very stupendous work; for though some of those that were at this time built were constructed from old vessels, the advantage, except what was derived from the materials, was very little. The labour in forming and building them was much the same as if the materials had been new. But this was not the hardest part of the labour, nor the greatest difficulty that stood in the way of the progress of this expedition. These vessels were to be transported over land, and dragged up rapids against the stream for a considerable length of way. It was a task of great magnitude to carry 30 long boats, a number of flat boats, a gondola, weighing 90 tons, and 400 batteaus, up the rapids of Therasa and St. John's. The labour, attending the execution of this work, appeared so grievous and perplexed, that it even damped the vigour of the English seamen. They did not intend to bear the whole burden of this work; the soldiers had also their share in the labour and fatigue; and, what was both unreasonable, and a thing to be lamented, the peasants and country people of Canada were taken from their plows and other employments, and compelled by power to bear a share in toils and labour, from which they could derive neither honour nor advantage. The whole proceeding had more the appearance of a project of knight-errantry, than a scheme of any utility for subduing the colonists. It shewed
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what zeal and strength could do, rather than discovered what reason would have suggested to men endowed with rational powers and faculties.

This equipment was compleated in the space of three months, but the nature of the service required that it should have been done sooner. The winter was fast approaching, two inland seas to be passed, the force of the enemy, which was not known, was to be conquered, and the strong posts of Crown Point and Ticonderago, defended and supported by them, were to be encountered sword in hand,

To these impediments were added, the communications between the Lakes Champlain and St. George did not admit the passage of those vessels of force, which, though successful in the one, might be equally wanted in the other. And though all these difficulties were surmounted, and Lake George passed, there still remained a long and dangerous march, through intricate forests, wild morasses, and an uncleared country, still in a state of nature, before they could reach Albany, which was the first post to the southward that could afford them the smallest accommodation. These difficulties vanished in the eyes of the commanders, who had promised much, and imagined that the ruggedness of the road would be the greatest impediment in their way to Albany. The force of the provincials was scarcely ever taken into the account. The objects which they had in view were great, the glory to be obtained tempting, and their anxious desire of obtaining the end which they had in view seemed to lessen difficulties which would have been insurmountable to persons of a cold and languid resolution. They suggested to themselves, that provided they could recover the Lakes, and reach Albany before

fore the severity of winter set in, the northern army would have a principal share in the glory of bringing the war to a period. They imagined that they could pour ruin at their pleasure either into the heart of the middle or of the northern colonies, each of which would be exposed to them in its most tender and defenceless parts. Whilst Hudson's River would secure their communication with General Howe, it would likewise separate and disconnect the southern and northern colonies, leaving the latter to fall under the weight of both armies, or to accept of such terms as they could obtain, without the participation of their brethren in the south. Nor could General Washington attempt to hold any post in New York or the Jerseys, with such a superiority of force as already oppressed him in front and Carleton's army in his rear.

The success of the forces on the side of New York, increased the ardour and impatience, as well as the jealousy of this northern army, every one imagining that the war would be over before he could have an opportunity of sharing in the honour of the event.

In all these speculations they forgot that the British navy could not assist them in their way to Albany after they passed the lakes, and that whatever progress the troops in New York had made, that it was more owing to the countenance of the navy, than their own intrepidity, that they had succeeded. They could expect no ships of war to enfilade the enemy at Still Water, or Saratoga; and in case they were violently attacked in some forest or swamp, they would have no war ships to defend them, nor transports to carry them off. It has been an infatuation that has constantly possessed the conductors of this war, that the valour and intrepidity of the British forces could surmount every

every difficulty, and that the provincials were absolute cowards and poltroons, that durst not face armed men. This language even in the midst of all our defeats and disgraces, has been continually used by every ministerial hireling, both at home and abroad. There could certainly be little honour or glory obtained by brave men beating cowards, and when the prowess of the British troops has been extolled to the skies, the Americans have always been represented as the greatest cowards.

Though our troops pursued their work with the most unremitting ardour and industry, yet it was not till the month of October that the new fleet was in condition to seek the enemy upon Lake Champlain.—The force was now considerable with respect to the place and service, and extraordinary with respect to the time spent in preparing it; and such as in former times would have been accounted a respectable force even upon the European seas. The ship called the *Inflexible*, which was the admiral's, had been newly constructed at St. John's in 28 days from the time of laying her keel, and mounted 18 six-pounders. One schooner mounted 14, and another 12 six-pounders besides howitzers; and a gondola, 7 nine-pounders; twenty small vessels under the denomination of gun-boats, carried brass field pieces from nine to twenty-four-pounders, or were armed with howitzers.—Some long boats were furnished in the same manner. About an equal number of large boats acted as tenders.—Those that have been mentioned were all intended for war vessels. There were besides these a great number appointed for the transportation of the army, with its stores, artillery, baggage, and provisions.

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The armament was conducted by Captain Pringle, and the fleet navigated by 700 prime seamen, of whom 200 were volunteers from the transports, who, after having rivalled those belonging to the ships of war in all the toils of preparation, now boldly and freely joined with them in the danger of the expedition. The guns were served by detachments of men and officers belonging to the corps of artillery. No equipment of the kind was ever better appointed, or more amply furnished with all kinds of provisions for the intended expedition. The force of the provincials upon the Lakes was in no respect equal to that which was sent against them, either with regard to the goodness of the vessels, the number of guns, the furniture of war, or weight of metal. Though the colonists were sensible of the necessity of preserving the dominion of the Lakes, and assisted in that design with the original force in their hands, with a great advantage in point of time for its increase, their intentions in that respect were counteracted by many essential, and some insurmountable deficiencies. They wanted timber, ship-builders, artillery, and all the materials necessary for such an equipment. Carpenters and all others concerned in ship-building were fully employed at the sea ports, in constructing and fitting out privateers, whilst the remoteness and the difficulty of the communication, rendered the supply of bulky materials extremely tedious.

Considering the difficulties they had to combat, the colonists discovered a great degree of ingenuity, forecast, and assiduity, and shewed as much spirit and perseverance as their enemies had employed against them. Their fleet amounted to fifteen vessels of different kinds, consisting of two schooners, one sloop, one cutter,

Vol. II. B b three

three gallies, and eight gondolas. The principal mounted twelve six and four pounders. They were commanded by Benedict Arnold, who had now to support upon an element, the reputation he had gained by a Canada expedition.—And considering the disadvantages he had to combat, gained as much honour as a sea officer, as he had done as a general of a land army.

Upon the 11th of October, General Carleton proceeded up the Lake, and discovered the enemy's fleet drawn up with great judgment, being posted in a very advantageous situation, and forming a strong line to defend the passage between the island of Volicour and the western main. They had at first placed themselves with so much skill behind the island, that their situation was only discovered by accident. Had not the royal squadron discovered their situation in due time, they would have left them behind, an event, provided it had happened, that would have been attended with the most serious consequences. It has been said, that the appearance of a three masted ship upon the Lakes threw the provincials into the utmost confusion. It does not appear however that a matter of such public nature should have been so long concealed from them. The confusion of the colonists at the sight of the king's troops was at that time a very common stile, and constantly affirmed by the friends of the ministry. The king's forces found by experience that they had more to do than merely to cross the Lakes. A severe battle ensued, and was vigorously maintained on both sides; but the wind proving unfavourable, so that the ship *Inflexible*, and some other vessels of force could not be worked up to the enemy, the weight of the action fell upon the schooner *Carleton*, and the gunboats

boats, which they sustained with great firmness.— Such amazing efforts of resolution were displayed, it was said, by both men and officers, as received the applause of the commanders. This plainly supposes that as so much praise was thought due to the British superior force, that the provincials had not behaved as cowards, but must have made a stout resistance.— The detachment from the corps of artillery were highly distinguished, and performed the most essential service in the gun boats. But the same impediments still continuing, Captain Pringle, with the consent of the general, thought it necessary for the present to withdraw those that were engaged, from the action. At the approach of night he brought the whole fleet to anchor in a line, and as near as possible to the enemy, in order to prevent their retreat. The king's forces had not much to boast of in this action, though the Americans suffered severely, having one of their best schooners burnt, and a gondola, carrying three or four guns, sunk. It is reasonable to suppose, that their other vessels suffered in some proportion. They were sensible of their inferiority, and took the opportunity of the night of endeavouring to escape under the protection of Crown Point. Arnold planned and executed this design with great ability, and so far succeeded that they were out of sight next morning.— The chase was however continued without intermission, both on that and the following day, and the wind at last changing, which had been at first favourable to the Americans, became otherwise, so that they were overtaken and brought to action a few leagues from Crown Point, about the middle of the day, upon the 13th of October.

A warm engagement now ensued, which continued for upwards of two hours, wherein the colonists made a bold resistance, and made the King's troops feel what they never expected. During the time of the battle, those vessels that were a head pushed on to Crown Point, and passing it, escaped to Ticonderago; but two gallies and five gondolas, which remained with Arnold, made a desperate resistance. During this action the Washington galley, with Waterberg, a Brigadier-General, and the second in command on board, struck, and was taken. Arnold at last found that it was impossible to withstand the superiority of force with which he was now attacked, and also found himself but badly supported by some of the Captains of the vessels, he was determined that his men should not be made prisoners, nor his vessels fall into the hands of his enemies. This almost seemed impossible to be prevented; but Arnold, whose genius was fruitful of resources, executed this design with equal dexterity and resolution, and run the Congress galley, in which he himself was, with the five gondolas on shore, in such a manner as to land the men safely, and blow up the vessels, in spite of every effort that was made to prevent it. The resolution of this intrepid officer struck even his enemies with surprise, and gave the English commander to understand, that he had now to engage with one who was in earnest, and who would lose no opportunity to make the most of both misfortunes and advantages. This defeat did not lessen, but raised Arnold in the esteem of his countrymen. He was praised and applauded for his conduct, and it was said that he had not only behaved like a brave soldier, but that he had fully executed the duty of an able naval commander. That
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the most experienced seamen could not have found a greater number of resources, by the dexterity of his manœuvres and evolutions, and the most advantageous choice of situation, to compensate for the want of force than he did; and when his vessels were almost torn to pieces, he retreated with the same resolution that he had fought; and by the most happy and most critical judgment, prevented his men and ships from falling into the hands of the enemy. But they chiefly gloried in the dangerous attention he paid to a nice point of honour, in keeping his flag flying, and not quitting his galley till she was in flames, lest the enemy should have boarded and struck it. Such intrepidity in any of the British commanders would have been echoed in all the venal newspapers throughout the kingdom, and considered as an act of heroism of uncommon magnitude.

Lake Champlain was now recovered, and the provincial force thereon nearly destroyed, a galley and three stout vessels being all that escaped to Ticonderago; but the design of this expedition was far from being fulfilled. Much was to be done before the northern army could co-operate with General Howe.—The provincials upon the defeat of their little fleet, set fire to Crown Point, and destroyed every thing which they could not carry away, and left the place, and returned to the main body at Ticonderago. General Carleton took possession of the ruins, where he was soon joined by the army. He remained there near a month, when winter began to approach, which is severe in these parts, so it was not practicable to pursue the present advantages far. Detachments and reconnoitering parties advanced at one time on both sides of the Lake, and proceeded within a small distance

tance of Ticonderago, at the same time that some spy vessels appeared within cannon shot of the works, to examine the nature of the channel and sound its depth. It was believed that the General ordered this to be done with a design to attack the place, and that he had this project in contemplation. But the strength of the works, the difficulties of the approach, the countenance of the enemy, and the ignorance of their number, with other forcible reasons, prevented this design from being executed.

It appears evident that this post could not be forced without considerable loss of men, whilst the advantages arising from success would have been comparatively nothing. Though even the provincials had been vanquished, and the King's troops had met with no more resistance, yet they could not, like the New-Englanders, march in winter through woods and thickets, in the midst of snow and rain, and carry their baggage and artillery along with them. This was a part of military exercise that our Generals were not acquainted with, and which they did not chuse to put in practice. To march on foot at the head of an army up to the knees of snow, to plunge through mud, to pass rivulets and waters up to the middle, to lye all night upon snow, in the open field, were manœuvres of warfare that even General Carleton had not essayed. To Arnold this would have been a task of difficulty, but he would have attempted it, and also performed it. Our men might have in some degree gone through the fatigue, but it would have been impossible for a great many of the officers to have endured it.

The season was so far advanced, that the passing of Lake George could not be undertaken without exposing

posing the army to a winter campaign in the inhospitable and impracticable wilds towards the south. All that could be expected from the taking of Ticonderago was only the reduction of works which was more indebted to nature than art for their strength, and perhaps a few cannon; but as the army could not stay there during the winter, the former might be repaired and the latter replaced by the provincials, before the army could interrupt their proceedings in the ensuing summer. But if the defence should be obstinate, although the King's troops should be successful, the army would thereby be so much weakened, that all the prospect of advantage for the future would in a great measure be rendered void.—The difficulty of keeping open the communication with Canada, and subsisting the army during the winter appeared obvious. General Carleton therefore re-embarked the army, without attempting to reduce Ticonderago, and cantoned his men in Canada for the winter in the best manner the country could afford.—It is manifest that the British forces in gaining the dominion of the Lake Champlain, met with a resistance which they did not expect, and that the vigour of General Carleton for an immediate campaign was sufficiently abated. Had he pursued his course with as much resolution as Arnold did his expedition to Canada in the former year, there is reason to conclude that he might have reached Albany without much opposition. But the troops and vessels had met with a more vigorous opposition than was expected, and the loss of the King's forces was greater than ever the public were made acquainted with. But it has been the continued practice throughout the whole war

war to conceal from the nation the losses which were sustained in the engagements with the colonists.

It may be now necessary to take a view of the progress of the war in the south, and consider the transactions of the grand army in New York and the Jerseys.————Near the conclusion of the last campaign, Lord Cornwallis had almost over-run the Jerseys, and had approached near Philadelphia.—Nothing, except the Delaware, appeared to be an impediment in the way of the royal army, becoming masters of the city of Philadelphia and the adjoining provinces. The Americans had at this time no army competent to resist the progress of the royal forces. The period of time that Washington's army had been enlisted was now expired, and the greatest part of his men were gone home to their respective places of abode. It was said that the number of his forces that continued embodied did not exceed three thousand men. At the opening of the campaign his army was rated at twenty-five thousand, and some affirmed that at that time it was more numerous, but now it was greatly reduced, and scarcely exceeded three thousand effective troops. Some small parties from personal attachment, local circumstances, or a superior perseverance or bravery, still continued with the Generals Washington and Lee, but were so inconsiderable a force as not to demand much attention from the royal army. it required some time to raise a new army, which in the mean time could afford but little assistance or comfort to the colonists.

About this time an accident happened which was very detrimental to the interest of America, and tended much to discourage the colonies. This was the taking of General Lee. That officer, at the head of a

a party of men, being on the march to join General Washington, who had assembled the Pennsylvania militia to secure the banks of the Delaware was from the distance of the British cantonments betrayed into a fatal security, by which, in crossing the uppermost part of New Jersey, from the North River, he fixed his quarters, and lay, carelessly guarded, at some distance from the main body. He was betrayed by an inhabitant, for the sake of a reward, who informed Colonel Harcourt of the situation he was in, who having made an excursion at the head of a small detachment of light horse, conducted his measures with so much address and secrecy, that the guard was evaded, the sentinels seized without noise, the quarters forced, and Lee carried off, though all that part of the country was in his favour, and several guard posts and armed patrols lay in the way. There seems to have been much carelessness in the conduct of the General on this occasion, and but little judgement in those who formed the posts, and set up the patrols. Had the posts and patrols been placed as they ought to have been in the time of war and invasion, it would have been impossible for one horseman, to have gone over such a tract of country, to say nothing of a detachment, without alarming the inhabitants, and assembling those that had arms. The smallest and the most secret postern way ought not to be neglected, from the margin of the sea bank to the centre of a country, and from the centre to the extremities of the whole. General Lee acted at this time with as little judgment as he did with care; for provided he had consulted the dictates of political wisdom and sagacity, he would have kept the strictest guard to have shewn the people an example, to put them in mind of the danger

Vol. II. C c they

they were in form a vigilant enemy, that watched every opportunity to take an advantage. By neglecting this practice, he, to his sad experience, shewed an example of the truth of this observation.

In many cases the making a single officer prisoner would have been a thing of very little consideration or moment; but in the then state of America, when their forces were raw, a general deficiency of military skill prevailed, and the inexperience of the officers was even a greater grievance than the want of discipline among the soldiers. In such a case the loss of a commander, whose spirit of enterprise was directed by great skill in his profession, acquired by active as well as actual service, was of the utmost importance, and the more distressing, as there was little ground to hope that it could be soon supplied.

As General Lee was considered by those at home as the very chief of all the American officers, it was imagined that his being taken would have had a considerable effect upon distressing the colonists, and putting an end to the war. The rejoicing among the tories and Jacobites, on account of this event, was scarcely prudent, decent or becoming. Some personal animosity between Mr. Lee and some other officers in the army, as well as persons of power at court, were supposed to have contributed not a little to the triumph and exultation on that occasion. The taking of General Lee was also attended with a circumstance which has produced much inconvenience on both sides, and of much pain and calamity to many individuals. Not long before this accident a cartel, or something of the like nature, had been established for the exchange of prisoners between the Generals Howe and Washington, which had been carried into execution so far as time

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GENERAL LEE.

Printed for T Robson, Newcastle, upon Tyne.



time and circumstances would admit. As General Lee was particularly obnoxious to government, it was said, and supposed, that General Howe was confined by his instructions from parting with him upon any condition, provided the fortune of war should put him into his power. General Washington not having at this time any prisoner of rank equal to Lee, proposed to exchange six field officers for him; the number being intended to balance the disparity; or if this was refused, that he might be treated and considered according to his station, according to the practice of all civilized and polished nations, and the precedent which the Americans had already shewn with regard to British officers in their hands, until an opportunity offered for a direct and equal change. The pride of our ministry, and the present spirit of the British officers were raised to a degree a little too high to listen to any request of this nature from a rebel commander in chief. It was expected that in a little time the colonists would be brought to the feet of the minister, and General Lee would be dealt with as a state prisoner, and treated as one of the chiefs in the rebellion. Proscriptions of a very great extent were meditated, and there was nothing wanting but success to let the world see how ministerial vengeance would be executed. General Washington therefore received for answer, that as Mr. Lee was a deserter from his Majesty's service, he was not to be considered as a prisoner of war; that he had not at all come within the conditions of a cartel, nor could he receive any of its benefits. General Lee had resigned his half pay at the beginning of the American contest, and was none of his Majesty's officers. He could only be considered as a subject of government, like the rest of those who were

in arms in America, and in no respect came under the description of a deserter from his Majesty's service. In the proposals for a cartel no particular exceptions of persons had been made, and Gen. Washington treated this doctrine of the ministry with the utmost contempt.

In the mean time Lee was confined in the closest manner, and watched and guarded with all the strictness and jealousy which a state criminal could have experienced in the most dangerous political conjuncture. This conduct not only suspended the cartel, but induced retaliation on the other side; so that Colonel Campbell, who had hitherto enjoyed every degree of liberty consistent with his condition, and had been treated with great humanity by the people of Boston, was now thrown into a dungeon, and treated with a rigour equal to the indulgence he had formerly experienced.—The officers who were prisoners in the southern colonies, though they were not treated so severely as Colonel Campbell, were however deprived of their parole liberty, and other conveniencies, which made their situation uncommonly easy. It was declared that their future treatment should in every degree be regulated by that which General Lee experienced, and that their persons should be answerable in the utmost extent for any violence that was offered to him. According to the rules of justice, our ministry could expect no other sort of conduct from the colonists towards our officers, and whatever might happen to them, the blame must have rested upon themselves.

According to the boasting of that time, General Lee was to have been brought over to England to be tried as a state prisoner, and there is no question, that if the ministry had not been embarrassed with regard to
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their own officers which were prisoners in America, General Lee would have felt their vengeance to the utmost extent. But though he was particularly ill used for a time, the situation of many British officers preserved him from the vengeance that was intended for him.

In the midst of the several trying circumstances which happened about this time, the American congress shewed a wonderful steadiness and resolution.—Far from desponding, or giving way to any thing like unconditional submission, they made no overtures towards any sort of an accommodation. Pride, shame, and the hope of subduing the colonists, prevent the government to make any proposals of accommodation to the congress. The colonists, as was necessary in their present situation, prepared to renew the war with all the vigour they were masters of, and to repair their shattered forces with the utmost diligence. It was imagined that by their losses in the Jerseys, and on other parts of the continent, that they would never be able again to make any resistance against the King's forces; and that the loss of General Lee would totally break their spirits. But all these events only roused them the more, and called forth into exercise every latent principle of exertion that remained in their souls. They were now convinced that temporary armies were not competent for the great object they had in view, and that though men engaged for a short and limited time might repel a sudden invasion, yet when opposed to the constant attacks of a powerful enemy, and the continual efforts of regular forces, they were far from being sufficient. They found in experience, that they could not hope with an army of new men, changed every year, to make any effectual stand against
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veteran troops, and their present critical situation did not permit time for changes of trained men for new levies, which for some time could be a little service. To remedy this evil for the future, which could not be guarded against at present, the congress issued orders about the middle of September for levying 38 battalions, the soldiers being bound by the terms of enlistment to serve during the continuance of the war.

The number of battalions which each colony was by this ordinance appointed to raise and support, may be considered as nearly an exact political scale of their comparative strength framed by those who were interested in its correctness, and well acquainted with their respective circumstances. Massachusetts's Bay and Virginia were the highest in the scale, being to furnish 15 battalions each; Pennsylvania came next, and was rated at 12, North Carolina 9; Connecticut and Maryland 8 each; New York and the Jerseys each 4, the latter being considered as one government.— This was the present compliment of men to be raised to make up a standing army during the continuance of the war, and when full, were thought sufficient for any emergency. It must be allowed that the congress took every rational step to form this army, and the army when raised did not disappoint their expectations. Money was not wanted, nor any encouragement that could be given to animate the spirits of the people to enlist.

The liberality of the congress in its encouragement to the troops was proportioned to the necessity of speedily completing the new army. They not only gave a bounty of twenty dollars to each soldier at the time of enlisting, but allotted lands at the end of the war to such as survived, and to the representatives
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of all that should happen to be slain in battle in different stated proportions, from 500 acres, the allotment of a Colonel, to 150, which was that of an Ensign; the private men and the non-commissioned officers were to have 100 acres each——To prevent the thoughtless, the prodigal, or worthless, obtaining for trifles what was due to the brave and meritorious, for their blood and services, all these lands were rendered unalienable during the war, no assignment being to be admitted as its conclusion. The congress had before, as an encouragement to their forces decreed, that all the officers, by sea or land, who were or might be disabled in action, should receive during life, one half of the monthly pay to which they were entitled by their rank in the service, at the time of their meeting with the misfortune. Though these encouragements were great, yet it appears as if the condition of serving during the war was not generally agreeable to a people so little accustomed to any kind of subordination and restraint. So that in the month of November the congress found it necessary to admit of another mode of enlisting for the term of three years. This was certainly more reasonable, though perhaps it might not answer the purpose of a standing army so well. According to this new mode, the soldiers were to receive the same bounty with others, but were cut off from any allotments of lands. It has been affirmed by the people at home that even after all these encouragements that the business of recruiting went on slowly. But this does not at all appear; for when the time of action called them forth, we do not find that their armies were deficient; and even the British minister in the senate affirmed, though
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afterwards he changed his tone, that they were double in number to the King's forces.

The reason of making promises of land to the soldiers was intended to be a counter balance to a similar measure adopted by the crown.——Large grants of vacant lands were made, to be distributed at the end of the troubles to every one of the royal highland emigrants, and some other new raised troops in America, as a reward for their expected zeal and loyalty in the reduction of the colonists. A measure which tended more to excite and increase the animosity of the people, than any others which could have been devised in such circumstances. For they universally considered the term vacant as signifying the same thing as forfeited, which being an effect of the treason laws yet unknown in America, excited the greater horror; the people being well aware, from the experience of other countries, that if the sweets of forfeiture were once tasted it would be equally happy and unusual if any other limits than those which nature had assigned, could restrain its operation. The annual supplies raised in the colonies by their respective assemblies being insufficient to provide for the extraordinary expences of so large an army, together with other numerous contingencies inseparable from such a war, the congress found it necessary to negotiate a loan to answer these purposes. They accordingly passed a resolution to borrow five millions of dollars at an interest of four per cent, and to pledge the faith of the United States for the payment of both principal and interest.

The wisdom and prudence of the congress did not forsake them in the time of the greatest hardships;—they always found expedients and resources answerable to the exigencies of their affairs. In this critical situation

situation of their country, when the preservation of their country, and the preservation of Philadelphia was almost hopeless, and at a time when Lord Cornwallis had over-run the Jerseys, and the British forces had taken possession of the towns and posts on the Delaware, the congress published an address to the people in general, but more particularly to those of Philadelphia and the neighbouring states. The intention of this address was to awaken the attention of the people, remove their despondency, renew their hopes and spirits, and confirm their intentions of supporting the war, by shewing that no other means were left for the preservation of their rights and liberties, for which they originally contended. But it was principally designed to promote the compleating of the new army, and to call out the inhabitants to the defence of Philadelphia. For these purposes they enumerated the causes of the troubles, the grievances they had endured, the late oppressive laws that had been passed against them; they insisted much upon the contempt that had been thrown upon their petitions and applications for redress of grievance; and to shew that no alternative but war, or a tame submission and resignation of all that could be dear to mankind; they asserted, that even the boasted commissioners for giving peace to America, had not offered, nor did yet offer, any terms but pardon upon absolute submission.— From this detail and these premises they deduced the necessity of the act of independence, affirming that it would have been impossible for them to have defended their rights against so powerful an aggressor, aided by large armies of foreign mercenaries, or to have obtained that assistance from other states which was absolutely necessary to their preservation, whilst they

acknowledged the sovereignty, and confessed themselves subjects of that power against which they had taken up arms, and were engaged in so cruel a war. They set forth the success that had in general attended their cause and exertions, contending that the present state of weakness and danger did not proceed from any actual loss or defeat, or from any defect of valour in their troops, but merely from the expiring of the terms of those short enlistments, which had in the beginning been adopted from an attention to the ease of the people. They assured them that foreign states had already rendered them essential services, and had given them the most positive assurances of further aid. And they excited the indignation of the people by expatiating upon the unrelenting, cruel, and inhuman manner in which the war was carried on, not only by the auxillaries, but even by the British forces themselves. They insisted, with an energy peculiar to men sensible of so great an injury, upon the behaviour of the British men and officers, in murdering the defenceless, plundering the innocent, ravishing women, and destroying infants. The colouring on this occasion might possibly be too strong, but it has been allowed on all hands that there was too much reason for complaints of this kind. This odium fell first upon the Hessians, and since that time has rested upon them, though the British troops were far from escaping a share of this imputation. The former being naturally fierce, cruel, and ignorant of the rights of mankind, were acquainted with no laws but those of despotism, and with no manners, except those established within the narrow confines of their own government, knew no distinction between ravaging and plundering an enemy's country, where no present advantage

vantage was intended, except booty, nor any future benefit, except that of weakening the enemy, and the reducing a mal-content people to a due sense of obedience to their sovereign.

It was said, to reconcile those barbarians to so new and strange an adventure, some idea had been held out to them in Germany, that they should obtain large portions of lands which they were to conquer in America; and that this notion, however absurd, had made them at first consider the original possessors as their natural enemies; but when they discovered their mistake, they considered the moveable plunder of the country not only as a matter of right, but as an adequate recompence for undertaking such a voyage, and engaging in such a war. Perhaps this military rapine and plunder may be accounted for without such adoption as this now mentioned. It was observed from the beginning, the most mortal antipathy subsisted between the Americans and Hessians; the former contending for freedom and filled with the highest notions of the natural rights of mankind, regarded with equal contempt and abhorrence a people whom they considered as the most sordid of all mercenary slaves, in resigning all their faculties to the will and pleasure of a petty despot, and becoming the ready instruments of cruel tyranny. They reproached them with the highest degree of moral turpitude in thus engaging in a domestic quarrel, in which they had neither interest nor concern, and quitting their homes in the old world to butcher a people in the new, from whom they had never received the smallest offence or injury, but who on the contrary, had for a century past, afforded a comfortable asylum to their harrassed and oppressed countrymen, who had fled in multitudes thither

to escape from a tyranny similar to that under which they were now acting, and to enjoy the blessings of a liberty most generously held out to them, of which these mercenaries would most impiously bereave the German as well as the English Americans. Such sentiments and reproaches did not fail to encrease their natural ferocity and rapaciousness, and it is said that they continued in a course of plundering until they became so encumbered and loaded with spoil, and so anxious for its preservation, that it turned to be a great hindrance to their military operations. It is a thing obvious to all who have considered human nature, and made observations upon the different characters of men in society, that those under despotic governments are generally the most ignorant and the most cruel of mankind, and keenest of plundering their enemies.—Men who are instructed in the rights of human nature, unless in the very heat of passion, will be ready to govern their behaviour by the laws of humanity, and shudder at cruelty which perverts the first principles of nature.

However much this conduct of the Hessian troops might be contrary to the nature and disposition of the British commanders, it was an evil not easily to be remedied. They were afraid to hazard the success of the war in so distant a situation, and such precarious and critical circumstances, by quarrelling with auxiliaries who were nearly as numerous and powerful as their own forces. Allowances were necessary, it was said, to be made for differences of manners, opinions, and even ideas of military rules and practice. Men must make some apologies for errors which they themselves in some measure pursue; and which, although they do not proceed in the same manner, in the end
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come to the same conclusion. It will be impossible, by any principles of moral rectitude, to vindicate either the practice of the warriors or the authors of the war.

General Howe had undoubtedly great difficulty to support that character which he and his family have long sustained, by acting according to his wishes in managing parties on this occasion. It was next to impossible that the devastation and disorder practised by the Hessians should not operate upon the British troops. It would have been difficult to punish transgressions on the one side which were practised without reserve or reprehension on the other. Every successful deviation from order and discipline in war is generally succeeded by others still greater. No relaxation can take place without the most ruinous consequences. The soldier who at first shrinks at trifling excesses, will, in a short time, if they pass without reprehension, proceed without hesitation to the greatest enormities.

From the causes above-mentioned arose these complaints of the Americans concerning the desolation that was spread over the Jerseys, and which, by affecting friends and moderate people, as well as enemies, did great injury to the royal cause. The latter were thereby united more closely, and urged to action, and the former were in great numbers detached from the royal cause. This effect was not confined to the immediate sufferers; it extended through the colonies, where the accounts of the conduct of the army was published, and embittered the minds of all the colonists against the military and the cause they were supporting. When the accounts of the barbarities of our army were transmitted to Europe, they greatly affected our national character, especially in France, where
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the people in general through the whole course of this contest have been strongly on the side of the Americans. Among those the reports were received greedily and as readily believed. There was one proceeding that was greatly censured by all our neighbours, and justly deserved to be reprobated by all civilized nations;—that was the destruction of the public library at Trenton, and of the college and library at Princetown, together with a celebrated orrery made by Pottenhouse, said to be the best in the world. These were destroyed by our army without remorse or compunction. It would appear that the English and German troops made war with literature itself; for the library at New-York seems to have met with the same fate, for a Glasgow bookseller declared in passing through Newcastle, that he published a book in Glasgow, which was part of the plunder of New-York. In the most Gothic times of barbarity it was seldom known that places of learning, or those of public worship were plundered by the fiercest enemy. It was left to the present polished and polite age, and the present mild government, to make war with literature and the gospel. To turn places of divine worship into theatres or playhouses, or to reduce them to ashes, was reserved for those heroes who acted under the auspices of a minister who had once been disgraced for cowardice and disobedience by the highest authority, and knew better to push on others to dangerous exploits than risk his own life in the smallest degree. The invisible energy of this cowardly influence, seems to have pervaded the whole measures of our army on this occasion, and pushed them on to practices which future ages will reflect upon with horror and astonishment. The president of the college of Princetown in New Jersey was become

become peculiarly obnoxious to the friends of government: he had been called from North Britain to that appointment, and had for many years been conspicuous for an attachment to liberty. The leading party in his own country, who were never his friends while he continued there, were the principal promoters of the American war in North Britain, and as he was well known to many in the army who were connected with that party and their friends, it was supposed that the dispute shewed to this college was principally aimed at the president. He was lately made a member of the continental congress, which rendered him still more conspicuous as well as obnoxious. A sermon which he preached before the congress, tho' a very moderate and sensible discourse, was served in Scotland in the same manner as the college over which he presided was served in America. It was published in Edinburgh and Glasgow with notes most disrespectful to the author, and the cause which he was engaged in supporting. The old enmity that was shewn to him when in his own country, on this occasion broke out with new violence, and that party which has long been sapping the foundation of the church of Scotland, shewed an inclination by their attacks upon his character to aim a blow at the churches in America. In England their observations were laughed at, and in America despised, but their intentions were thereby known, and their folly made manifest to all men.

In about a month after the taking of New York, the inhabitants of that island presented a petition to Lord and General Howe, the commissioners for restoring peace to the colonies, signed by Daniel Horsfmander and Oliver de Lany, and 946 others, declaring
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their allegiance, and their *acknowledgment* of the *constitutional authority* of Great Britain over the colonies; and praying that in consequence of former declarations issued by the commissioners, that the city and country might be restored to his Majesty's peace and protection. This petition to the commissioners was followed by another to the same purpose, from the freeholders and inhabitants of Queen's County in Long Island. It was observed of these petitions, that the acknowledgment of the constitutional supremacy in one, and of the constitutional authority in the other, was very guardedly expressed, all mention of parliament and the great question of unconditional submission being totally left untouched.——It is also remarkable, that though the inhabitants of New York Island, and Queen's County, besides raising a considerable body of troops for the king's service, and establishing a strong militia for the common defence, had given every other testimony of loyalty that could be expected or wished, yet their petitions were not taken notice of, nor were they restored to those rights which they expected in consequence of the declarations, as well as of the late law for the appointment of commissioners.

The doubtful and critical situation of Philadelphia, which by a night or two's frost would have been exposed to the British forces, obliged the congress, about the end of the year to remove to Baltimore Town, in Maryland. In this state of public danger, the Americans were not a little alarmed by some dissensions in the congress. The declaration for independency, as was already mentioned, had met with much opposition in Philadelphia, not only from the tories, but from many who in all matters had been amongst the most forward
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in opposing the claim of the crown and parliament.—The carrying of the question through the province by a great majority was far from lessening the bitterness of those who opposed it, among whom were most of the quakers, who were a powerful body in that colony. The discontented in this affair, as is often the case, forgetting their former professions and principles, mingled their passions and resentments with their present opposition, and joined with those they had formerly persecuted and despised, against their friends, whereby a strong and formidable opposition was formed. This opposition appears to have been formed of men who joined in opposition to government at first from principles of mere private interest, or had in the hurry of party been brought over to take a side, without considering well the consequences. These were somewhat like a party we have at home, who will exclaim loudly against the measures of the government, which appear to affect their own interest, but in the time of a general election, either for fear of some private loss, or for the sake of a bribe, will act diametrically contrary to all their professions of public spirit, and declared regard to the common weal.

In consequence of this dissention, and ill success of the provincial arms during a great part of the campaign, some who minded their own interest and safety more than the common cause of the colonies deserted the congress, and fled to New-York to the British commissioners to claim the benefit of the general pardon that had been offered, expecting as matters then stood to return speedily home in triumph. Among these was Mr. Galloway, whom we shall have occasion to take notice of afterwards; the family of the Allens, and some other leading men in Pennsylvania

Vol. II. E c and

and the Jerseys. These were not so troublesome to the colonists as some others who kept their places, who were so numerous that upon the approach of the King's forces to the Delaware, they prevented the order for fortifying Philadelphia from being carried into execution. This inconsistent and alarming operation in the feat of life and action, obliged General Washington to detach three regiments under the command of Lord Stirling, effectually to quell the opposition of party, and to give energy to the measure of fortifying the city. This decisive conduct answered all his purposes, except that of fortifying the city, a design which seems to have been given up as not practicable, or probably not thought necessary at this time.

The season of the year began now to turn severe, though the frost was not so set in as to make a passage across the Delaware; the King's troops found it necessary to go into cantonments about the middle of December. Their cantonments formed an extensive chain from Brunswick on the Rariton to the Delaware, occupying not only the towns, posts, and villages, which came within the description of the line, but those also on the banks of the Delaware for several miles, so that the latter composed a front at the end of the line, which looked over to Philadelphia. The royal forces seemed now to enjoy perfect tranquility, and there appeared no danger of their designs being interrupted, or of their security putting them in danger. The Americans were in such a situation, as seemed not to promise any thing in their favour, nor threaten any molestation to their enemies. In this state of affairs a bold and intrepid enterprize was executed, which in its first appearance shewed more of brilliancy than

than real energy, but in its consequences changed in a great measure the whole fortune of the war.

General Washington, who had more through design than necessity reduced his army to the seemingly low state in which it then was, had used all methods in his power to make the enemy believe in the present appearances, and had sufficiently impressed them with an idea of his impotency. On this account the King's forces, imagining there was now no danger, began to enjoy themselves in their winter quarters, and lived in a security consistent with their ideas of safety. Colonel Rall, a brave and experienced officer, was stationed with three battalions of Hessians, a few British light horse, and fifty Chasseurs, making in all about fifteen hundred, at Trenton, on the Delaware, which was the highest post that the British troops occupied upon that river. Colonel Donop lay at Bordentown, a few miles lower down the river; a third body was stationed at Burlington, within twenty miles of Philadelphia. The troops at Trenton, as well as the other corps in the neighbouring cantonments, partly from an apprehension of the weakness of the enemy, and partly from the contempt in which they held them, considered themselves in as perfect a state of security, as if they had been performing garrison duty in their own country, in a time of the profoundest peace. This supposed security, as is usual with military people, increased the licentiousness and laxness of discipline, which has been already taken notice of, and produced an inattention to the possibility of a surprize, which upon no principles of military prudence can be justified, in the neighbourhood of an enemy however weak and contemptible.

General Washington had partly foreseen what would happen, and made himself particularly acquainted with all the circumstances of the troops in these cantonments, and as he perceived the danger that was intended for Philadelphia, thought it was now a proper occasion to prevent it, by giving his enemies a blow that they would sincerely feel. To perform this design, he resolved to attack the British troops in their cantonments, by bringing his troops together in one point, and by making an attack upon them separately, make a bold push to defeat them in their sequestered and secure situation. Should he happen to succeed only in part of his plan, he was persuaded he could make his enemies contract their cantonments, and make them forsake the vicinity of the river when they found that it was not a sufficient guard to cover their quarters from insult and danger. By this means he would for the present secure Philadelphia, which was the principle object of his attention. For these purposes he took the necessary measures for assembling his troops, which consisted chiefly of drafts from the militia of Pennsylvania and Virginia. These were to march in three divisions to an appointed station on the Delaware as soon as it was dark, and with as little noise as possible. This was performed upon the evening of Christmas. Two of these divisions were commanded by the Generals Erving and Cadwallader, the first of which was to pass the river at Trenton-Ferry, about a mile below the town, and the other still lower towards Bordentown. The principal corps was commanded by General Washington in person, aided by the Generals Sullivan and Green, and consisted of about 2500 men, provided with a train of ten small brass field pieces. With his corps he arrived

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at Mr. Kenny's Ferry, at the time appointed, hoping before midnight to pass over that division, and the artillery, and then it would be no difficulty to reach that place before daylight, and effectually to surprize Colonel Rall's brigade. The passage was however difficult; the river was so encumbered with ice that it was with great labour they could work the boats cross the river, which retarded their passage so much that it was near four o'clock before it was completed. They were also hindered in their march by a violent storm of snow and hail, which rendered the way so slippery, that it was with difficulty they reached the place of their destination by eight o'clock.

The detachments were formed in two divisions immediately upon their landing, one of which turning to their right, took the lower road to Trenton; and the other, with General Washington, proceeded along the upper road to Pennington. Notwithstanding the delays and interruptions they met with, and the advanced state of day light, the Hessians had no knowledge of their approach, until an advanced post at some distance from the town was attacked by the upper division; the lower division about the same time driving in the out grounds on their side.—The regiment of Rall having been detached to support the picquet which was first attacked, was soon put into disorder by the retreat of that party, and obliged to rejoin the main body. Colonel Rall now bravely charged the enemy, but being soon mortally wounded, the troops were thrown into disorder, after a short encounter, and driven from their artillery, which consisted of six brass field pieces. Thus overpowered and nearly surrounded, after an ineffectual attempt to retreat to Princetown, the three regiments of Rall, Lossberg, and Knyphausen,

Knyphausen, were obliged to surrender prisoners of war. Some few of the Chasseurs, and some stragglers made their escape along the river side to Bordentown. Several of the Hessians that had been out plundering in the country, and accordingly absent from their duty that morning, took the same way of saving themselves, while their crime was concealed under the general misfortune.

The loss of the Hessians in killed and wounded was very inconsiderable; their loss in this respect did not exceed forty at most. The loss of the Americans was still more inconsiderable. The prisoners amounted to 918. Thus one part of General Washington's plan was executed with success; but the two others failed in the execution, the quantity of ice being so great that the divisions under Erving and Cadwallader, found the river at the places they were to cross impassible. Had not this happened, and that the first according to his orders had been able to take possession of the bridge over Trenton Creek, not one of those that fled to Bordentown would have escaped. Had the design been executed in all its parts, and the three divisions had joined after the affair at Trenton, it seems probable, that they would have swept all the posts on the river before them.

In his present situation, General Washington could not proceed farther in his plan of operation. The force he had with him was far from being able to maintain its ground at Trenton, there being a body of light infantry at Princetown, which was only a few miles distant, which by the junction of Donop's brigade, or other bodies from the nearest cantonments, would have soon swallowed up his little army. He accordingly repassed the Delaware the same evening, carrying

carrying with them the prisoners, who with their artillery and colours, afforded a day of new and joyful triumph in Philadelphia. This small success wonderfully raised the spirit of the colonists, It is a strange, but a general disposition in mankind to be more afraid of those they do not know, than of those with whom they are acquainted. Difference of dress, of arms, complexion, bread, colour of the hair or eyes, with the general mein and countenance, have on various occasions had surprizing effects, upon even brave and experienced soldiers. The Hessians had hitherto been very terrible to the Americans, and taking a whole brigade of them prisoners, appeared so incredible at Philadelphia, that at the very time they were marching to that city, people were contending in different parts that the whole story was a fiction, and that indeed it could not be true. The charm was however broken, and the Hessians were no longer terrible. These invincible troops were found both to be vulnerable, and capable of being subdued; and the Americans found, that by suitable exertions of their own strength they were a match for the most terrible of their enemies. From this time they began to understand their own importance, and made our men find their impression more heavily than for some time before. This so far turned the scale of success, that our troops never after that time gained an advantage that was of any real emolument to them.

General Washington was now reinforced by several regiments from Virginia and Maryland, as well as with those of that province under his command, were much distinguished in the hard service of the ensuing winter campaign. The surprize at Trenton did not excite less

less amazement in the British and auxiliary quarters than it did joy in those of the Americans. That three old veteran regiments of a people that made war a profession, should lay down their arms to a ragged and untrained militia, and that with scarcely any loss on their side, seemed an event of so extraordinary a nature, that it gave full scope to the operation of conjecture, suspicion, censure, and malignity, as different persons were differently affected. General Howe was blamed for making so extensive a chain of cantonments; Rall was blamed for marching out of the town to meet the enemy; and the Hessians were blamed for cowardice in the opinion of their allies. General Howe was certainly led into this error by the deep scheme which General Washington had laid,—and he was caught in a snare that very few persons could have escaped. The American General had so exquisitely counterfeited weakness, fear, and distress, that even his own friends had the same apprehensions that his enemies had concerning his situation. It was no wonder that General Howe imagined there was no danger from a General that appeared to have neither men, money, nor any present resources.—The friends of General Howe vindicated his character by alleging that he not only depended upon the weakness of the enemy, but was influenced to make such cantonments to cover and protect Monmouth county, where a great number of the people were well-affected to government. It was added in his defence, that perhaps no line of cantonments or posts can be so perfectly contrived as not to admit of an impression, in some part, by a force much inferior to the aggregate power of the defensive. It upon the whole appears that on this occasion General Howe was outwitted by General Washington.

General Washington. As to Colonel Rall, provided the charge against him was just, his misconduct proceeded from the same error which prevailed generally among both officers and men of the British as well as the Hessian forces. From their successes and superiority in the former campaign, which they perceived they had in every action, they held the colonists in the utmost contempt, both as men and as soldiers; and were ready to attribute all their advantages to their own personal bravery, which were in fact derived from a number of other occurrent circumstances; from military skill, experience, and discipline; from the superior excellence of their small arms, artillery, and of all other engines and supplies necessary for war; and still more particularly to a better supply, and a more dexterous use of the bayonet, which gave them a great superiority over the Americans, who were but badly furnished with this kind of arms, and were not expert in the use of them.

The King's troops began now to perceive that they had more to do than sport themselves in winter quarters. The alarm that was now spread induced the British and auxilliary troops immediately to assemble, and General Grant, with the forces at Brunswick to advance speedily to Princetown, whilst Lord Cornwallis, who was gone to New-York on his way to England, found it necessary to delay his voyage, and return to the defence of the Jerseys. They found that they were not without an enemy to encounter, for General Washington having received reinforcements, had again passed the Delaware, and was with his whole force at Trenton. Lord Cornwallis advanced presently to attack him, and found him strongly posted at the back of Trenton Creek, and in possession of

Vol. II. F f the

the Bridge and other passes, which were well covered and defended by artillery. After a few skirmishes, a cannonade ensued, which continued until night. The British forces on this occasion were obliged to proceed with considerable caution, and the remembrance of the fate of the Hessians made our officers more cautious than on some former occasions. A brigade of the British troops lay that night at Maidenhead, six miles from Trenton, and another upon its march from Brunswick, consisting of the 17th, the 40th, and 55th regiments, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mawhood, were at Princetown, about the same distance from Maidenhead. This being the situation of both sides, General Washington, who was far from intending to hazard a battle, having used the necessary precautions of keeping up the patrols, and every other appearance of remaining in his camp, and leaving small parties to go the rounds and guard the bridge and the fords, he withdrew the rest of his forces in the dead of the night, with the most profound silence. They marched with such expedition to Princetown, that suppose they took a large compass by Allentown, partly to avoid Trenton, or Assumpink Creek, and partly to avoid the brigade which lay at Maidenhead, their van fell in at surprise next morning with Colonel Mawhood, who had just begun his march. Mawhood, not having the smallest idea of their force, being^s prevented by the fog-giness of the morning and other circumstances from seeing its extent, considered it only as an attempt of some flying party to interrupt his march, and having dispersed those by whom he was first attacked, pushed forwards without further apprehensions. But in a short time he found that not only the 17th
regiment

regiment, which he led, was attacked on all sides by a superior force, but that it was also separated and cut off from the rest of the brigade, while he discovered by the continual distant firing, that the 55th, which followed, was not in better circumstances.

In this dangerous situation, Colonel Mawhood shewed much bravery, and his regiment behaved with great firmness. After a violent engagement, and the greatest exertions of courage and discipline, they at length forced their way through the enemy with their bayonets, and pursued their march to Maidenhead. The 35th was severely pressed, and finding it impossible to pursue their march, retreated, and returned by Hillsborough to Brunswick. The 40th regiment, which was still at Princetown when the action began, suffered less than the others, and retreated by another road to the same place. The colonists confessed the bravery of Colonel Mawhood and the 17th regiment, and declared that nothing could exceed their valour and intrepidity. The accounts of the killed and wounded on this occasion are so differently represented that it is not easy to extract the truth with certainty from so many various representations. Our accounts say that the number of killed, considering the warmth of the engagement, was not so considerable as might have been expected; it was however allowed that 200 of these three regiments were taken prisoners, and the killed were somewhat fewer. The loss of the Americans was said to be much greater, especially in killed, though from their own accounts we are informed that even in slain the number of their men was inferior to ours. They lost Major General Mercer belonging to Virginia, who was much esteemed and lamented. Some have endeavoured to account

for a phænomenon in this last war, which has always at home been represented as a fact, that there were always more of the colonists killed in every action than there were of the King's troops. The manner of accounting for this disparity in the slain is, that the arms of the colonists were not so good, nor did they know how to use them so well, as the King's forces; that in loading their pieces in the hurry of action they did not take time to charge properly.— This is a defect common to both sides, and if a piece is not properly charged, the goodness of it will produce little effect; all the effect proceeding from a good firelock depends upon the charging of it. The soldiers in our regiments were not all veterans more than the Americans; and a young recruit new come to a regiment, though he knows something of the exercise, will be just as raw in the day of battle as a militiaman or a colonist, and be in as great a hurry in loading his piece.

This phænomenon is resolved by the Americans by denying the fact, and asserting on the other hand that in all engagements upon equal ground and equal advantages, the difference of killed and wounded on each side was very nearly equal. Whatever there may be in this dispute, one thing is certain, that the colonists had the better in this engagement.

This spirited and unexpected movement of Washington, with its animated consequences, recalled Lord Cornwallis from the Delaware, who was not without apprehension for the safety of the troops and the magazines at Brunswick. The Americans still avoiding a general action, and satisfied with the present advantages, crossed the Milestone River, without any further attempt. In a few weeks however they over-
run

run East Jersey as well as the West, spreading themselves over the Rariton, even unto Effex county, whereby seizing Newark, Elizabeth-town, and Woodbridge, they became masters of the coast opposite to Staten Island. They took their principal posts with so much judgment, that it was not practicable to dislodge them. The King's army retained only the two posts of Brunswick and Amboy, the one situated a few miles up the Rariton, the other on a point of land near its mouth, and both holding an open communication with New York by sea. Thus by a few well-concerted and spirited actions was Philadelphia saved, Pennsylvania freed from danger, the Jerseys clearly recovered, and a victorious and far superior army reduced to act upon the defensive, and for several months restrained within very narrow and inconvenient limits. These actions, and the raising himself from the seemingly lowest state of distress in which he appeared to be in, exalted the character of General Washington as a commander very high both in Europe and America; and with his proceedings and subsequent conduct served altogether to give sanction to that appellation which is now generally applied to him, of the American Fabius. These events cannot be attributed to any misconduct in the British officers and the men whom they commanded, but depended entirely upon the happy application of a number of powerful and concurring circumstances, which were far beyond their reach to controul. Many of these things which now happened had been foreseen and foretold from the beginning, both by those who opposed publicly or regretted in private this war, and as others are obvious to all men, it may not be improper to mention some of those causes that clogged it with particular difficulties.

The principal of these were, the vast extent of that continent, with its unusual distribution into great tracts of cultivated and wild territory, the long extent of sea coast in its front, and the boundless wastes at the back of the inhabited countries, afforded resource or shelter in all circumstances; the numberless inaccessible posts and strong natural barriers formed by the various combinations of woods, mountains, rivers, lakes, and marshes. All these properties and circumstances, with others appertaining to the climate and seasons, may be said to fight the battles of the inhabitants in a defensive war. To these may be added others less local.—The unexpected union and unknown strength of the colonies, the judicious application of that strength by suiting the defence to the nature, genius, and abilities of the inhabitants, as well as to the natural advantages of the country, thereby rendering it a war of posts, surprises, and skirmishes, instead of a war of battles. To all these may be added, the people were not bridled by strong cities, nor fettered by luxury in those that were otherwise, so that the reduction of a capital had no effect upon the rest of the provinces, and the army could retain no more territory than what it occupied, which was again lost as soon as it departed to another quarter.

The army under Lord Cornwallis was now sadly straitened; during the remaining part of the winter, and the whole spring, while they continued at Brunswick and Amboy, they underwent a severe and unremitted duty, whilst their ranks were continually thinned by a continued series of skirmishes, which were productive of no rival advantages on either side, except that they inured the colonists to military service.

service. Now every load of forage that was procured, and every article of provision which did not come from New-York, was fought for and purchased at the expence of blood.

The consequences of the late military outrages in the Jerseys were now severely felt in the present change of circumstances. As soon as fortune turned, and the means were in their power, the sufferers of all parties the well disposed to the royal cause, as well as the neutrals and waverings, now rose as one man, to avenge their personal injuries and particular oppression, and being pushed on by a keener spur than any which a public cause or general motive could have excited, became its bitterest and most determined enemies. Thus the whole country, with a few exceptions became hostile: Those who were incapable of arms, acting as spies, and keeping a continual watch for those who bore them, so that the smallest motion could not be made, without its being exposed and discovered, before it could produce the effects for which it was intended. Such were the forward events that during the winter damped the hopes of a victorious army, and nipt the laurels of the foregoing prosperous campaign. Considering the behaviour of our army, it was a just act of providence which beset them, and the Americans were sufficiently vindicated in justice for the present retaliations.

It has been formerly taken notice of, that several attempts had been made to call off the attention of the southern colonies from the general alliance to their own immediate defence by involving them effectually in civil war and domestic contention, either through the means of the well affected in general, the Regulators and Highland emigrants in the Carolinas, or
of

of the negroes in Virginia. The charges which the insurgents brought against their governors have also been taken notice of, namely of endeavouring to bring the savages down against them, the people to promote their designs of tyranny and despotism. The disappointment in these attempts did not damp the zeal of the British agents among the Indian nations, nor rendered them hopeless of still performing some essential service by engaging these people to make a diversion, and to attack the southern colonies in their back and defenceless parts. The Indians are in general fickle in their faith, greedy of presents, and eager for spoil, and it is not difficult to work so upon these passions as to engage them in the most desperate and inhuman enterprizes. By a proper application of presents they may be persuaded to break treaties which they have lately made, or to pursue the most base designs against those with whom they appear to be in the strictest friendship.

The agents on this occasion used all the methods which were in their power to bring over those savages to their own savage purposes and designs. They held out to them that a British army was to land in West Florida, and after penetrating the Creeks, Chickesaw and Cherokee countries, and being joined by the warriors of those nations, they were to invade the Carolinas and Virginia, whilst another formidable force by sea and land was to make a powerful impression on the coasts. Circular letters were sent to the same import to Mr. Stuart the principal agent for Indian affairs, to the inhabitants of the back settlements, requiring all the well-affected as well as all those who were willing to preserve themselves and their families from the inevitable calamities and destruction

struction of an Indian war, to be in readiness to repair to the royal standard, as soon as it was erected in the Cherokee country, and to bring with them their horses, cattle, and provisions, for all which they were promised payment. They were likewise required for their present security and future distinction from the King's enemies, to subscribe immediately to a paper, declaratory of their allegiance. This scheme was so plausible that it seemed to operate wonderfully upon the minds of the Indians, and to have prepared them in a great measure for a general confederacy against the colonies. Even the six nations who had before agreed to a strict neutrality, now began to commit several small hostilities, which were afterwards disavowed by their elders and chiefs. The Creek Indians, more violent, began the southern war with all their usual barbarity, until finding that the expected succours did not arrive, they with a foresight uncommon among Indians, stopt suddenly short, and repenting of what they had done, were in the present state of affairs easily excused: and being afterwards applied to for assistance by the Cherokees, returned for answer, that they, the latter, had plucked the thorn out of their foot, and were welcome to keep it.

The Cherokees however fell upon the adjoining colonies with determined fury, carrying for a part of the summer ruin and destruction wherever they came, scalping and slaughtering the people, and totally destroying their settlements. They were soon however checked, and severely experienced, that things were much altered since the time of their former warfare upon the same ground, and that the martial spirit now prevalent in the colonies was extended to their remotest frontiers. They were not

only repulsed and defeated in every action by the neighbouring militia of Virginia and Carolina, but pursued into their own country, where their towns were demolished, their corn destroyed, and their warriors thinned in repeated engagements, until the nation was nearly extirminated, and the wretched survivors were obliged to submit to any terms prescribed by the victors, whilst the neighbouring nations were silent spectators of their calamities. The Indian war was not more fortunate with respect to its effects on the friends of government in those quarters, who are said to a man to have expressed the utmost aversion to the authors, and abhorrence of the cruelty of that measure, and that some of the chief leaders of the tories avowed a recantation of their former principles, merely on that account. It was in the midst of the bustle and danger of war, and when the scale of fortune seemed to preponderate against the colonists, by the defeat on Long Island and the reduction of New York, at a time when a great and invincible force by sea and land, carried ruin and conquest wherever it directed its course, that all the members of the congress ventured to sign that remarkable treaty of perpetual compact and union between the thirteen revolted colonies. As we have seen this treaty at large in another part, we shall now pass over it without saying any more concerning it.

As the political debates of this year and the proceedings in parliament, are exceedingly long and diffusive, an account of them in this place, though they naturally fall in, would disunite the history and the progress of the war; they shall therefore be added at the conclusion of the history of this year.

We

We have already given an account of the situation of the armies in America during the winter and great part of the spring. As the season opened and enlarged the field of enterprize, the British commanders seized the advantages and opportunities which their naval superiority presented to them in a country deeply intersected with navigable rivers, and continually laid open in other parts by the numberless inlets and channels which the peculiar construction of the islands and coasts admit in their connection with the ocean and those rivers. In the mean time, a considerable body of provincial troops were formed under the direction of Sir William Howe, which in process of time amounted to several thousands, and which under that denomination included not only Americans but British and Irish refugees from the different parts of the continent. The officers of this body were gentlemen, who, for their attachment to the royal cause, had been obliged to forsake their respective provinces, or those who lived under that protection in the New York Islands. These new troops were for the time of their service placed upon the same footing as to pay, subsistence, and cloathing with the established national bodies of the royal army: With this advantage to the private men and non-commissioned officers, that they were entitled to considerable allotments of lands at the end of the troubles. This measure, besides its utility in point of strength, afforded some present provision to those, who having lost every thing in this unhappy contest, were now thrown upon the crown, as their only refuge and support, whilst on the other side, instead of their being an heavy and unprofitable burthen to the crown, they were placed in a condition which enabled them to become

active and useful instruments in effecting its purposes. At the same time this addition of strength derived from and growing in the country, carried a very flattering appearance, and seemed to indicate resources for carrying on the war in the very scene of action. This was a deception which government continually indulged, and to which they have always been dupes. Those emigrants and tories, the greatest of which had fled from distant parts with their families, and with what they could carry with them, were much in the same situation with the army; they had no residence until the war was over, and could only for once recruit the troops. There were but few of them that were in possession of property, and during the time of war could be of no more service than common recruits; and provided the war should end successfully, could be of no more service than any others who should choose to settle in the country. Even in those parts that were considered loyal, it was only the presence of the army that made them so, and it was necessity, and not principle, that drove them to the royal standard.

Governor Tryon was placed at the head of this new corps, who already in his civil capacity, commanded the militia, and who had been at much pains in establishing it for the support of the royal cause. He now bore the rank of a Major-general of provincials. This junction of a few tory provincials with the royal army, was considered at home as a wonderful acquisition. The friends of the ministry began to boast that the Americans were all coming over to the King's forces, and that there were as many on the side of government as there were on the side of the congress. This foolish and indeed false gasconade exposed

posed the friends of government very much ; for it appeared exceedingly mystical that seeing there were so many of the Americans on the side of the royal cause, that there should be occasion every year for new recruits to the army, and new large sums of money for carrying on the war. Falseness and inconsistency are inseparably connected.

General Howe having found by experience that the colonists were not to be so easily conquered as he imagined, formed a plan of destroying their stores and magazines in all those places where he could reach them by the aid and assistance of the shipping. He was informed that they gathered considerable stores and magazines at a place called Peek's Kill, which lies about fifty miles up the North River from New York, which served as a kind of port to Courtland Manor, by which it had received provisions and dispensed supplies. The Americans during the winter had built and erected mills, as well as established magazines, in a rough and mountainous tract called Courtland manor. This was a grand repository, and a place of great security ; upon this they had bestowed much pains and expence and furnished it with immense stores and provisions of all sorts.

Sir William Howe was informed of these circumstances in general, and was convinced of the consequences which would ensue, provided these resources which the enemy had provided with so much labour and industry were cut off. He knew that a general attempt upon Courtland Manor would not only be dangerous on account of the strength of the country, but impracticable from the nature of the ground, and must prove abortive ; at the length, parade, and the manner of preparation, would afford the colonists
time

time for preparation, and warn them of his design; so that the force in that quarter would be gathered against him, and he would have to fight every inch of his way, under a moral certainty of loss, without any prospect of succeeding. And suppose he should even be able to defeat their troops, they would have time to carry away the magazines to another place.

Peek's-kill was however within reach, and the General determined to profit by that circumstance.— Colonel Bird, with 500 men, under the protection of a frigate of war, and other armed vessels, was sent up the North River for that purpose. They set out upon this expedition upon the third of March, and reached the place before the alarm was given to the country. Upon their approach, the provincials, either finding or imagining themselves unequal to the defence of the place, and being convinced that they had not time to remove any thing but themselves and their arms, set fire to the barracks and principal store-houses, and then retreated to a strong pass about two miles distance, which commanded the entrance into the mountains, and covered a road which led to the mills and other stores. The British troops found upon their landing that the provincials had left them little to do, and that they could not carry away what still remained for want of time completed the conflagration, and had the honour of burning their stores which had escaped the hands of the provincials.— The troops re-embarked after the service was performed, and the ornament, after destroying several small craft laden with provisions, returned.

This service however was far from fulfilling the main design of General Howe. Those magazines were not of so much importance and magnitude as
had

had been represented, and something was still to be done to distress the enemy, and to weaken their resources. He had received intelligence that large quantities of stores and provisions were deposited in the town of Danbury, and other places in the borders of Connecticut, which lay contiguous to Courtland manor. An expedition was accordingly undertaken for the destruction of these magazines, the charge of which was committed to Governor Tryon, who was assisted by General Agnew and Sir William Erskine. This expedition was said to have been formed upon a plan of General Tryon, who had flattered himself with finding many provincials in that quarter to join him as soon as he should appear at the head of the King's troops. This new General found himself under a very grievous mistake. The detachment appointed to this service consisted of 2000 men, who having embarked under the convoy of a proper naval armament, where landed in Norwalk, in Connecticut, upon April 25th about twenty miles to the southward of Danbury. As the country was no way prepared for such a visit, having no apprehension of such a design, the troops advanced without interruption, and arrived at Danbury the following day. They now perceived that the country was rising, not to join General Tryon's standard, as he imagined, but to intercept his retreat; and as no carriages could have been procured, if it had been otherwise, to bring off the stores and provisions, they immediately proceeded to the destruction of the provisions and magazine. In the execution of this service the town was reduced to ashes. This has been a method of carrying on war in which our army has been exceedingly successful; from whence it would appear that they considered

dered the country as no longer belonging to the King but totally an enemy's country, which was to be wholly laid waste. Tryon and his detachment found this expedition attended with more difficulties than he foresaw or was aware of; he did not expect that in that colony, where he promised himself so many friends, that he should meet with such resistance as happened to him in his return.—This detachment returned on the twenty-seventh, by the way of Kingsfield, without any fear that they would meet with any violent assault from the people of Connecticut. In the mean time the Generals Wooster, Arnold, and Sullivan, having collected as many of the militia as they could upon so sudden an emergency, marched with all expedition to cut off their retreat, or to interrupt their march, till a larger body of forces could be collected. Wooster hung upon the rear of the detachment, whilst Arnold, by crossing the country, gained their front, in order to dispute their passage through Kingsfield. Nor could the formidable appearance of the British forces, who had covering parties well furnished with field pieces on their flank and rear, nor the tumultuary manner in which a militia, not very numerous, were got together, prevent the Americans upon every advantageous ground from making bold attempts to interrupt the progress of the King's army. In one of these skirmishes General Wooster was mortally wounded. He was a brave and experienced officer, and had served with reputation in the two former wars; when he was verging upon the seventieth year of his age, he fell nobly and bravely supporting the liberties of his country, against a power which he considered despotical, and which wanted to enslave America. He died



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GENERAL SULLIVAN.

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ed with the same resolution that he had lived, and was much lamented by his friends. The royal forces had scarcely got clear of Wooster when they found themselves engaged with Arnold, who had gotten possession of Ridgefield, and with less than an hour's advantage of time had already thrown up an entrenchment to cover his front. The troops however forced the village, and drove back the colonists, who made a stout resistance, considering the smallness of their number and the hurry in which they had been brought together. The action was sharp, and Arnold displayed his usual intrepidity. His horse having been shot within a few yards of our foremost ranks he suddenly disentangled himself, and drawing out a pistol, shot the soldier dead, who was running up to transfix him with a bayonet. Our men on this occasion had but little to boast of, for upon equal grounds and advantages, Arnold's men were fully their match. General Tryon found none of those loyal Americans he hoped for on this expedition. He lay all night at Ridgefield, and renewed his march on the 28th.—The next day was not more auspicious than the former to our new General. The Americans were reinforced with troops and cannon, and harassed our army greatly during this day's march. Every advantageous post was seized and disputed, whilst covering parties on the flanks and rear endeavoured to disturb the order of the march, and to profit of every difficulty of ground. The army at length gained the hill of camps within cannon shot of the ships, which afforded the best prospect they had met with since they left them. It was now evening, and their ammunition was exhausted, although it is reported that they had been supplied with sixty rounds a-man, at their setting

Vol. II. H h out

out upon this expedition. The forces immediately formed upon the high ground, where the enemy seemed more determined and resolute in their attack than they had been hitherto. In this situation, the General ordered the troops to advance, and to charge with the bayonets. It was now the last push; they were obliged either to make their way to the ships through the enemy, or yield the day. They boldly broke through the provincial lines, and every thing being prepared for their reception, they embarked without further molestation.

In this expedition our men destroyed large quantities of corn, flour, and salt provisions; a number of tents, with various military stores and necessaries.—The loss of men on the King's side, according to our accounts, was very inconsiderable; this was the usual file on these occasions. The killed, wounded, and missing, amounted only to 172, of whom more than two-thirds were wounded. The general loss, according to all our accounts, on the side of the Americans was more than double, and the number of the slain about four to one. The Americans gave a very different account of these actions, and rate our loss as high as their own. Perhaps some allowances are to be made on both sides in giving an account of those transactions. It is plain to any impartial person who reads our own accounts of this expedition, that our men were hard pressed, and exceedingly glad to reach their ships, and that they never durst attempt to look for either stores or provisions, after they knew that the country began to rise; and if the impression of the Americans had been so feeble as for near two days only to kill and wound 172 men out of two thousand, they might have easily been driven back, dis-

perfed

perfed, and totally routed; and the army having purfued its march without fo much moleftation as it met with during the whole retreat. The enemy kept clofe upon them till they were under cover of their fhips, which appears to have been the only thing that faved them from being totally deftroyed or taken prifoners. On the fide of our troops there were no officers, it was faid, killed. The Americans, befides old General Woofter, loft feveral gentlemen, three colonels, and Doctor Atwater, a gentleman of confideration in that county. The number of officers that happened to be in thefe skirmifhes were out of all proportion to the number of men. The rawnefs of the militia, together with their weaknefs in point of number, obliged all the officers in that part of the country, as well as gentlemen, to act the part of common foldiers, and ufe the moft uncommon exertions, as well as to expofe themfelves in an extraordinary degree. This may account for the number of men of rank in their fervice who fell on their fide. Upon the whole effect, this expedition did not answer the expectation upon which it was founded. The ftores at Danbury were far from being what they were reprefented to have been; and though much mifchief was done, it was doubtful whether the lofs and the risk that was run on the one fide, was equivalent to the lofs fufained on the other. Thefe fecret expeditions had as yet come much fhort of General Howe's expectations, and General Tryon was fadly difappointed in his hopes of finding a loyal reinforcement in Connecticut.

It was not long till the people of Connecticut made a very fuitable retaliation, by paying a vifit to Long-Ifland. Having been informed that commiffaries had

for some time been employed in the east end of Long Island, in procuring forage, grain, and other necessities for the British forces, and that these articles had been deposited for embarkation at a little port called Stagg Harbour; the distance of that place from New York, and the weakness of the protection, which consisted only of one company of foot, and an armed schooner of twelve guns, afforded encouragement for frustrating that scheme of supplying the wants of the army. The chief difficulty lay in passing and repassing of the sound, which was continually traversed by the British cruizers. This difficulty was however surmounted, and the expedition put into execution.—Colonel Meigs, a daring and enterprizing officer, who had attended Arnold in the Canada expedition, and to whom danger as well as fatigue was become familiar. He had been taken prisoner in the attempt to storm the city of Quebec, and was now the conductor of this enterprize. Having passed his detachment in whale boats through the sound, and landed on the north branch of the island, where it is intersected by a bay that runs in far from the east end, and having carried their boats over the arm of land which was in their way, to prevent all discovery from the royal cruizers, they embarked again in the bay, which Meigs crossed with 150 men, and landed on the south branch of the island, within four miles of Stagg Harbour. They arrived at the place on the morning of the 24th of May, before break of day, and notwithstanding the resistance which they met with from the guard and the crews of the vessels, and the vigorous efforts of the schooner, which kept up a continual fire of round and grape shot, within 150 yards distance, they fully completed their design; having burnt a dozen

zen of brigs and sloops which lay at the wharf, and entirely destroyed every thing on the shore. They brought off with them about ninety prisoners, consisting of the officers who commanded, with the men, the commissaries, most of the masters and crews of the small vessels, which they destroyed. There is a circumstance which is somewhat curious, provided it is literally true, asserted by the Americans. They say that the party returned to Guildford, in Connecticut, in 25 hours from the time of their departure, having during that space not only effectually completed the design of their expedition, but having traversed no less by land and water than 90 miles. A degree of expedition that is a little incredible, and from which, if the fact is established, it would appear that Meigs possesses no small portion of that spirit which operated in the Canada expedition. In this manner did the people of Connecticut return the visit of his Majesty's forces, and gained as much advantage as their friend General Tryon, with a deal of less loss, and in a far shorter time. This was a signature of enterprize in the behaviour of the colonists, which was ominous to the King's forces, and shewed what the spirit of such men would lead them to, if once they were completely armed, and in a proper state of discipline.

The spring was now over, and the season for action far advanced, but from some improvidence and inattention very unaccountable at home, the army was restrained from taking the field through the want of tents and field equipage. Lord Cornwallis however made a shift with the old tents to encamp the forces at Brunswick, on the hills that commanded the Rariton, and formed a communication from that river to Amboy;

Amboy; the example being followed at the latter place by General Vaughan. This delay was of the greatest importance to the colonists. The winter campaign had been principally carried on by detachments of the militia, the greater part of whom returned home when the service was expired. Others, more generous, more patient of labour, or more sanguine in the common cause, out-stayed the allotted time, merely from a consideration of the weakness of the army, and the ruin which must attend their departure before it was reinforced.—The business of recruiting under the engagement of serving during the war, or even for three years, went on slowly. The term of service it is said, was contrary to the genius of the people, and the different provinces found the greatest difficulty in raising their compliment of men which had been allotted to them by the congress. Their last resort for the present was to make draughts from the militia. Such an act of violence upon those who were contending for liberty on the most enlarged plan, and who considered all the rights of freemen as sacred, was both wearisome and dangerous. Every method was tried to avoid having resource to this disagreeable measure and final resource. In some of the colonies the enlisting of apprentices, and of Irish indentured servants, was permitted, contrary to former resolutions and decrees, with a promise of indemnification to their masters. Another thing which hindered the sudden recruiting of the army in the Jerseys was, that the New England provinces, which abounded with men, were taken up with their own domestic affairs. An invasion was expected on the side of Canada; Hudson's-River and Rhode-Island afforded continual room for apprehension;—nor did an expedition

dition against Boston appear at all impossible; especially as the great number of British prizes that were brought into that port, had besides rendered it an object of the first importance, and renewed and even increased, if possible, the detestation and abhorrence with which that people had been long regarded. In such circumstances, the advantages of an early campaign, and the benefit which the colonists derived from a delay are obvious. The fine weather brought reinforcements from all the quarters to the Jerseys. Those who shuddered at a winter's campaign grew bold in summer, and the certainty of a future winter had no greater effect than distant evils usually have. General Washington having now received reinforcements quitted his former station in the latter end of May, in the neighbourhood of Morristown, and advanced within a few miles of Brunswick, when he took possession of the strong country along Middle Brook. A great part of the after events of the war in the Jerseys depended upon this movement. Washington turned that advantageous situation to every account of which it was capable. His camp winding along the course of the hills, was strongly entrenched and well covered with artillery; and it was also well secured by the difficulties of approach, which the ground in its front threw in the way of an enemy.— In this situation he commanded a view of the British forces encamped on the hills of Brunswick, and of much of the intermediate country towards that place and Amboy.

The British plan of operations was at this time a little perplexed: Washington had taken such measures as neither our ministry at home, nor our commanders abroad, had so much as thought of, even in

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idea. They had been well informed of many consequences, which they looked upon as visionary, which happened as they had been foretold, but they continued under the same delusion and infatuation.— There were two schemes which occurred to the British General. The first to penetrate from New-York through the Jerseys to the Delaware; to drive Washington before him, and clear those provinces of the enemy; reduce the inhabitants to so effectual a state of subjection as to establish a safe and open communication between New-York and the army. After this to secure the passage of the Delaware, become masters of Philadelphia, which would be the centre from which they would distribute conquest and correction to all the colonies. This was undoubtedly by much the shortest method; but even then there were several very great difficulties in the way of the execution of this project. Washington was to be brought to a decisive action and also defeated, otherwise they could not proceed without leaving all behind exposed to his army. This could not be done contrary to his inclination, and it was not probable that he would risk a battle without such visible advantages as would either insure the victory to him or render our army incapable of pursuing this plan of operation. Should our army leave him behind and pass the Delaware, they would have an enemy in front, and a strong army in the rear, which was far from being adviseable; and in case that this project should fail, it would be the ruin of the royal cause in America. Our ministry, who never had seen far before them, have since considered this as the most eligible plan, and blamed General Howe for not putting it in execution; but according to all the concurring

ring circumstances at that time; it appeared impossible to have put this plan into execution. The minister for the American department, who in his ideas of war has always differed from every brave officer, may perhaps imagine that this scheme might have been executed by observing the method which he practised at *Minden*; but as he gave no particular orders to General Howe upon this head, he ought not to accuse him for not doing what he found to be wholly impracticable.

The other plan, which was more tedious, but at the same time probable, and attended with less immediate difficulty and loss of blood, was to make use of the shipping, which had never failed in doing essential service, and to attack Pennsylvania by the side of Chesapeak-Bay. This opened the way into the richest and best of the central colonies, and led either directly or by crossing a county of no great extent, to the possession of the object intended. When this point was gained, Philadelphia was to become a place of arms, and the centre of action, whilst every part of the fertile and flourishing provinces of Pennsylvania, Virginia and Maryland, would, from their deep bays and navigable rivers, be exposed to the combined powerful action, and continual operation of the land and sea forces. But before this plan was adopted, measures were taken in the Jerseys, if possible to bring General Washington to an action.

But besides the operations intended to be performed in the central provinces, there was another to be carried on in the North, on the side of Canada, where a very considerable army had been collected, and by the success upon the lakes in the last campaign had a way opened for it to penetrate into the back parts

Vol. II. I i of

of the New England and New-York provinces.—The command of this army was committed to General Burgoyne, who was reported to be the author of the plan. The great body was to be seconded by a lesser expedition from the uppermost part of Canada by the way of Ojéwa to the Mohawk river. This scheme was eagerly adopted by the ministry, who founded the greatest hopes upon its success. All the advantages that had ever been expected from the compleat possession of Hudson's River, the establishment of a communication between the two armies, the cutting off all intercourse between the northern and southern colonies, with the consequent opportunity of crushing the former, detached and cut off from all assistance, it was now hoped would have been realized. The greater hopes were indulged concerning this plan, from the opinion entertained of the effect of the savages upon the minds of the Americans. It was known that the colonists in general were in great dread of them from their cruel and wasting manner of making war. These were therefore collected at a great expence, and with much labour from all parts of the continent. In a word, this expedition seemed to become the favourite ministerial object of this year. It was worthy of that minister, to whose care the management of the war in that department was committed, and in the history of his life will fill up some pages not much to his honour. The scheme and the execution will be seen more clearly afterwards when we come to the war in Canada.

A number of British and German recruits having at last arrived at New York, with tents and field equipage, Sir William Howe, about the middle of June, marched into the Jerseys, to endeavour to bring the provincial General to an engagement. The provincials
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were in possession of a strong post, from which it was not easy to drive them; and General Washington, besides the strength of his situation, was now rendered considerable by new reinforcements. Several strong bodies under the command of the Generals Gates, Parsons, and Arnold, advanced to the border of the North River, where they were ready to pass over to the Jerseys, whenever there should be an opportunity for action, or the necessity of their friends required their assistance. At the same time the Jersey militia assembled from all quarters with the greatest readiness and zeal, to assist in the general cause; so that whatever motion the army made, or whatever position it took, it was watched and surrounded with enemies. General Howe, trusting to the goodness of his troops, and the experience of his officers, tried every method he could devise to provoke Washington to an engagement, and to make him change his situation. He pushed forward detachments, and made motions as if he intended to pass him and advance to the Delaware. This measure failing of success, he advanced in the front of his lines, where he continued for four days, examining the approaches to his camp, and accurately scrutinizing the situation of his posts, hoping that some weak and unguarded part might be found, upon which an attack might have been made with some probability of success, or that when the armies were so near, chance, inadvertency, impatience, or error, might occasion some movements, or produce some circumstance, which would bring on a general engagement. General Washington knew the whole importance and value of his situation. As he had too much temper to be provoked or surprized into a measure which would have made him give up

his real advantages, so he had too much penetration to lose them by circumvention or flight. He had profited so long by his cautious line of conduct, from which he had not hitherto departed, nor deviated during the course of the troubles in America, of never committing the fortune of his country to the hazard of a single action, that he was not now inclined to alter his plan, nor change the rule of his conduct, when he was not pressed by any necessity to do it.

General Howe did not give up all hopes of bringing Washington from his strong situation, and pursued a plan that had well nigh answered his design.— Upon the 19th of June, he suddenly retreated and not without some visible signatures of precipitation, from his position in the front of the enemy, and withdrawing his troops from Brunswick, retreated with the whole army towards Amboy. This partly produced the effect which he intended. The army was eagerly pursued by several large bodies of provincial regulars, as well as of the Jersey militia, under the command of the Generals Maxwell, Lord Stirling, and Conway; the latter of whom was a colonel of the Irish brigades, and one of that numerous train of officers in the French service, which had taken an active part against Great Britain in this unhappy war. The royal army in this feigned retreat were guilty of some particular excesses; enormities, which were thought to have been permitted on purpose to enflame the passions of the colonists, and to promote the general design of bringing them to an engagement, were committed on this occasion.—To complete the delusion of the Americans, the bridge which was intended for the Delaware was thrown over the chan-

nel which separates the continent from Staten Island. The heavy baggage, and all the incumbrances of the army were passed over; some of the troops followed, and every thing was in immediate preparation for the passage of the rest of the army. By these measures, if the immediate design failed of success, every thing was forwarded as much as it could be for the intended embarkation; a measure with which the Americans were as yet unacquainted, and of which they had not any information. Every circumstance concurred along with the vanity natural to mankind, to induce the Americans to believe that it was a real and not a pretended flight, and that it proceeded from a knowledge of their superiority, and a dread of their power. General Washington, notwithstanding all his caution, was so far imposed upon by this feint, that he quitted his secure posts upon the hills, and advanced to a place called Quibble-town, to be nearer at hand to protect or support his advanced parties. Washington was very near on this occasion ensnared, and was certainly very much off his guard to suffer himself to become a dupe to a piece of mere artifice, which he might readily have perceived could proceed from none of these causes which he imagined determined General Howe to decamp, and pass his men over the channel. Some days past while these motions and manœuvres were carrying on, when the British General on a sudden changed his course and marched his army back by different routs, and with great expedition to Amboy. There were three things he had in view by this change of his position. To cut off some of the principal advanced parties, to bring the enemy to an engagement in the neighbourhood of Quibble town; or if this design should fail through
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the celerity of the enemy, it was intended that Lord Cornwallis, who with his column of troops was to take a considerable circuit to the right, should, by turning the left of the provincials, take possession of some passes in the mountains, which by their situation and command of ground would have reduced them to a necessity of abandoning that strong camp, which had hitherto afforded them so advantageous a security.— This part of Lord Cornwallis's appointment had more difficulties attending it than were at first perceived; for after he had dispersed some small advanced parties he fell in with about 3000 men under the command of Lord Stirling, strongly posted in a woody country, and well covered by artillery judiciously disposed full in his way, and seemingly determined to dispute his passage with great vigour and firmness. The British and Hessian troops, by a mutual emulation, exerted all their vigour, and fought with great intrepidity; they pressed forward to try who should first come to a close engagement with the enemy, and overcome all obstacles. The colonists, who both knew that they were not an equal match for the best British troops, and besides, were ordered not to hazard too much, made the best use of their artillery and small arms upon their enemy as they advanced, and then retreated as fast as they could. Several men on both sides were killed on this occasion, though we have never yet had a true and distinct account of the killed and wounded.

The Americans, who had the advantage of the woods, and had their artillery well placed and also well supplied, did considerable execution upon the British troops, of which our accounts make no mention,

tion. They were however forced to fly with some loss, and left three pieces of brass cannon in the hands of the British guards and the Hessian grenadiers. Our men pursued the fugitives as far as West-field, but the woods and the intense heat of the weather prevented the pursuit producing any effect. In this attack those who boasted of victory suffered more than the vanquished, and the fatigue of their march rendered them unfit for action in a short time.

General Washington by this time perceived his error, and speedily remedied it by withdrawing his army from the plains, and again recovered his strong camp upon the hills. At the same time perceiving the further design of Lord Cornwallis, he secured those passes upon the mountains, the possession of which by the British troops would have laid him under the necessity of a critical change of situation, which could not be executed without much danger. Thus was General Howe's well-concerted scheme of bringing the enemy to action, or at least of withdrawing them from their strong holds, rendered abortive, by the caution and prudence of General Washington. In this attempt General Howe shewed a great deal of military address and forecast, and did all that any officer could have done to fulfil the design which he had in view. But he was so well matched in point of generalship by General Washington, that the utmost bounds of his military plans and operations were investigated by that officer, either before they were executed, or as soon as they began to be put in practice, and generally prevented from producing any effect.

Sir William Howe was now convinced that Washington was too firmly attached to his defensive plan of operation.

operation in conducting the war, to be induced by any other means than by some very clear and decided advantage, to hazard a general engagement.— Nothing now remained to be done in the Jerseys.— To advance to the Delaware, through an enemy's country, and with such a force in their rear, appeared to the British commanders a project pregnant with folly, and approaching near to madness. They had found by experience that the provincials could fight when they perceived that it was for their advantage, and that in case of marching through the Jerseys to the Delaware, they would have many difficulties, and what aggravated the circumstances, was, that the King's troops knew of no friends before them in case of any misfortune. All delay and waste of time now in the Jerseys was fruitless, and could answer no valuable purpose; it was better to employ the troops in some other quarter, where some advantages might be gained. This was the opinion of the British officers in general, as well as of the commanders in chief. General Howe accordingly returned with his troops to Amboy, and passed them over to Staten Island, from whence the embarkation was to take place.

The preparation for this grand expedition excited a general alarm over all America. Boston, the North River, the Delaware, Chesapeak Bay, were alternately considered as its objects. Gen. Washington endeavoured to inform himself in the best manner he could concerning the object of this expedition; he made use of the spies he had about New York and other parts, to try if he could sift out the place of its destination, that he might put the people upon their guard, and provide against the impending danger.—

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—It was one of the manifest advantages of these sea adventures, that it was next to impossible for General Washington directly to know where the storm would fall. He was therefore under the necessity to continue in his present situation, and the King's troops were proceeding to the place of destination before he could be in readiness to resist them. By this means he could not have that choice of posts by which hitherto he had it always in his power to avoid an action.

While this grand expedition was preparing, and the Americans were in anxious apprehension concerning its destination, a spirited adventure was undertaken by a few of the provincials. This adventure not only retaliated the surprize of General Lee, but seemed to procure an indemnification for his person. Upon the 10th of June, Colonel Barton, a provincial officer, with some other officers and volunteers, passed over by night from Providence to Rhode Island, and though they had a long passage by water, they eluded the watchfulness of the ships of war which surrounded the island, and conducted their enterprize with such silence, secrecy, boldness, and dexterity, that they surprised General Prescott, who commanded in chief, in his quarters, and brought him and his aid de camp, through all those perils, safe to the continent. The method they pursued was, as soon as they came near the King's ships they muffled their oars, and rowed to the place of their destination, where the rowers lay upon their oars, and the colonel and his party went a-shore. They proceeded to the general's quarters, through a field of growing corn, unperceived by any of the guards upon the island, and came straight to the house where the general was; and having secured a sentinel at the door,

Vol. II. K k Colonel

Colonel Barton boldly rushed in, and found the general, with most of his cloaths off, going to bed.— There was not much ceremony used in conversation, he was ordered immediately to come off just as he was, and to keep silence, otherwise he should die that moment he made the smallest noise, both he and his aid-de-camp; but provided they did not make noise or resistance, they should be used as gentlemen, and receive no harm. They were carried off in this manner, and led by the colonel and his party through the field of corn, and brought to the boat that was waiting for their arrival, in which they were immediately put and carried to the continent. This was a most terrible mortification to General Prescott, who not long before this had carried matters to such a length as to set a price upon the head of General Arnold, and offered a reward of 1000l. for taking his person, as if he had been a common outlaw or a robber; an insult which Arnold returned by offering 500l. to such as should apprehend General Prescott, signifying that he did not think him worth a thousand pounds, nor of so much value as himself. Amidst all the hurry and threatening of war, the continental congress did not forget those secondary means, that as well as immediate interest, render men brave and intrepid in the cause of their country. As a testimony of public gratitude, and an excitement to virtue and true patriotism, they ordered that a monument should be erected at Boston in honour of Major General Warren, who commanded and fell at the battle of Bunker's-hill; and another in Virginia in honour of Brigadier General Mercer, who was slain in the action near Princetown, in the Jerseys. The resolution conveyed in very few words the highest eulogium

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on the characters and merits of the deceased. They also decreed that the eldest son of the former of these gentlemen, and the youngest son of the latter should be educated at the expence of the United States. As Gen. Mercer had a good estate, the propriety of adopting his youngest son as the child of the public is abundantly evident. It was easy to perceive, that men who were so zealous in pursuing wise and prudent measures in the most inferior parts of policy, were not to be over-reached by a people drowned in corruption, and sunk in vice.

Though the preparations for the grand expedition had been pursued for some time with great zeal and alacrity, and the crews of 300 vessels had given their assistance, yet such were the unavoidable delays incident to such extreme operations, that it was not till the 23d of July that the fleet and army could depart from Sandy Hook. With a design to deceive and perplex the provincials, the general ordered some transports, with a ship cut down to act as a floating battery, up the North River, a little before the embarkation was compleated; a feint which succeeded so far as to induce General Washington to detach a considerable body of his troops across that river.—

The force that embarked upon this expedition consisted of thirty-six British and Hessian battalions, including the light infantry and grenadiers, a powerful artillery, a body of New-Yorkers, called the Queen's Rangers, and a regiment of light horse. Seventeen battalions, with a regiment of light horse, and the remainder of the new provincial troops, were left for the protection of New-York and the adjoining islands. Seven battalions remained in Rhode Island. So much was the army weakened by keeping possession of

these places, which it was indispensibly necessary to hold as important posts. General Howe had once intended to have taken a greater force with him upon this occasion, but upon the representation of Sir Henry Clinton, who was to command in his absence, of the danger which the islands would be exposed to from the extensiveness of their coasts, and the great number of posts that were necessarily to be maintained; he acknowledged the force of these arguments by disembarking several regiments.

Many conjectures were formed by the provincials concerning this expedition, though they were as yet uncertain concerning its real destination. It however alarmed them greatly, though it did not dispirit them.—There was another thing that seemed to threaten them at this time with dreadful consequences, General Burgoyne was making a rapid progress in the north, and some of their own officers had behaved but indifferently. Ticonderago had been given up in a manner that was not expected, and some of the officers were greatly blamed for giving it up so easily.—They on this occasion behaved with a firmness that would have done honour to a Roman senate, and did not shew the smallest despondency under these misfortunes. They immediately issued orders to recall all the troops to the head-quarters, and an enquiry to be made into the conduct of the general officers who had abandoned Ticonderago;—they directed General Washington to appoint other commanders, and to summon such numbers of the militia from the eastern and central provinces for the northern service, as he should judge sufficient for restraining the progress of the enemy. The measures taken on this occasion to check the progress of General Burgoyne, in the conclusion

clusion fulfilled their most sanguine expectations, as we shall see it in its proper place.

This new expedition was at first not attended with favourable circumstances; the winds were contrary, and its progress to the place of destination slow.—It cost them a week before they could gain the Capes of the Delaware. When they arrived there the commanders received information that the enemy had taken measures for rendering the navigation of that river impracticable, which damped the spirits of the commanders in pursuing their design by that way. They at last gave it up, and adopted another plan. The passage by Chesapeak-Bay to that part of Maryland, which lies towards the east of that vast inlet, which is not far from Philadelphia, was now fixed upon, as more open, and being attended with fewer obstacles to hinder their operations. But here again the winds were contrary in this part of the voyage, so that it was past the middle of August before they entered Chesapeak Bay; this was a circumstance very unfavourable at this season of the year, when the weather was hot and when the ships were crowded with men and horses cooped up together in the same vessels. And which must have been attended with the most fatal consequences, provided the commander in chief had not taken care to guard against every event, by the unbounded provision he had made for the voyage, as a failure of any one article, even that of water, would have been irremediable in those parts at that season.

As soon as they entered the Bay the winds turned favourable, so that the fleet reached the mouth of the Elk, near its extremity, in safety, through a most intricate and dangerous navigation, for such a multitude

tude of vessels, in which the Admiral performed the different parts of a commander, inferior officer, and pilot, with great ability and perseverance. Having proceeded up the Elk as far as it was capable of admitting their passage, the army were at length relieved from its long and tedious confinement on board the transports, being landed without opposition at Elk Ferry on the 25th of August, in a degree of health and spirits scarcely to have been expected. One part of the army advanced at the head of the Elk, and the other continued at the landing place, to protect and forward the artillery stores and necessary provisions; for the General did not permit the troops to be encumbered with any baggage, and the scarcity of carriage rendered a great abridgement in the article of tents necessary.

General Washington, who had for some time been in suspense concerning the destination of this armament, was at last truly informed of the place of its appointment; this had generally been well conjectured from the first of its preparation, though none pretended to be particularly certain of the very point where it would operate. The General as soon as he was sufficiently informed of the landing of the enemy, marched his army from the Jerseys to the defence of Philadelphia, and upon hearing that the enemy was landed at the Elk, advanced to the Brandy-wine creek or river, which runs cross the country about half way to that city, and falls into the Delaware.—The force of the colonists, including the militia, amounted to near 15,000 men, making allowance for posts, and parties placed to keep a proper communication with those parts that were of the most essential service to them to maintain. The King's forces
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were near about the same number, or somewhat more numerous.

In order to quiet the minds of the people in Pennsylvania, Delaware counties, and adjacent parts of Maryland, and to prevent the total desertion and disolation of the country in the front of the army, the General published a declaration, promised that the strictest regularity should be observed, and good order and discipline kept up by the army; that the most effectual security and protection should be given to all his Majesty's peaceable and well disposed subjects;—extending at the same time this security and protection to such persons who not having been guilty of assuming legislative power, might otherwise have acted legally in subordinate stations upon the provision of their immediate returning to their habitation, and behaving peaceably for the future. This declaration also offered pardon to all officers and soldiers in arms, who should surrender themselves to the royal army.—This was like many other declarations of the same kind, very little regarded, and produced no effect.—It proceeded upon a supposition which has been the universal infatuation of the royal party from the beginning of this ruinous war, namely, that there were great numbers of persons well affected to the King through all the colonies, when in truth, except in a very few places, there were none but such as were thoroughly enemies to the royal cause, and were ready to take up arms against it. Had General Washington published a similar declaration to the King's army, he would have found as many deserters as Sir William Howe did, and his declaration would have produced much the same effect. There has been nothing which has rendered our General officers and

commissioners

commissioners more ridiculous than their proclamations and official declarations. These have been so defective in point of composition, and so enigmatical in their stile, that they have had generally the appearance of being the compositions of some blundering lawyers, who always write not to be understood. All the papers in general which have been published since the beginning of this war, whether the accounts of battles, the victories and other transactions have been written more in the stile of the Sibylline oracles, than in the expression of narrations, intended to inform the public concerning matters of fact.

The royal army did not leave the head of the Elk until the third of September, when they began their march towards Philadelphia. In the mean time the provincials had advanced from Brandy-wine, and taken post at Red Clay Creek, from whence they pushed forward detachments to seize the difficult posts in the woods, and to interrupt the march of the royal forces by continual skirmishes. As the country was woody and difficult, and not well known by the royalists, and the colonists understood how to improve such circumstances, the General was obliged to march slowly, and observe great caution; and considering his situation, and the character of the commander in opposition, there was much necessity for caution and circumspection, in every step of his march. The British troops were indeed brave, well commanded and under good discipline; they were ready and willing to fight at command, but then they could not perform impossibilities. They had lately felt that the colonists could fight, and make a more formidable impression upon their ranks than they had been taught to believe that they ever could. This had removed that

that fantastic apprehension that the provincials were all cowards, and made even the private soldiers become less sanguine in their ideas of victory.

General Howe was now from necessity, as well as from his humane disposition, sparing of his men. He knew that recruits were to be brought from a great distance, and procured with difficulty, even at the source. Every man killed, wounded, or taken, was to him an irretrievable loss, and so far as it went, an incurable weakening of the army for the present year at least.—On the other hand the enemy were at home. Every loss they sustained was not only immediately repaired, but the military abilities of the survivors were increased by every destruction of their fellows. This caution could not prevent some skirmishes, in which the royal forces were said to be always victorious. It must be observed, that in these skirmishes, the colonists generally fled, but it was from one post to another; when after they had killed a number of our men advancing, they retired to another post without any loss.

This was an effectual method to thin our army insensibly, without much loss to themselves, and was, in effect, a slow, but sure victory. It was thought at this time, that the Americans did not make all the use of the advantages of the country that might have been expected, by harrassing and interrupting the progress of the King's troops; but it is plain those that affirm this are not acquainted with the designs of General Washington, nor the scheme he had now in view.—He wanted to try his men by a more general action, with as much safety to his army and the main cause as possible; for this reason he retired beyond Brandywine, and took possession of the heights that covered

ed the fords, with an intention of disputing the passage of the river. In this situation upon the 11th of September, the British forces advanced in two columns towards the enemy. The right, under the command of General Knyphausen, marched directly to Chad's-ford, which lay in the centre of the enemy's line, where they expected and waited for the principal attack: their right and left covered less practicable fords and passages for some miles on either hand. An heavy cannonade began on both sides by 10 o'clock, which was continued and well supported during the day, whilst General Howe, to amuse and deceive the enemy, made repeated attempts for forcing the fords, as if the passage of the river had been the principal object he had in view. The Americans, to frustrate this intention, had passed several detachments to the other side, who continued a course of skirmishes, sometimes advancing, and sometimes retreating, till at last they were driven over the river. General Howe finding that he met with a more vigorous resistance than he at first expected, endeavoured to compleat by stratagem what he could not perform by force, continued the appearance of an attack, to keep up the attention of the colonists in the neighbourhood of Chad's-ford, were they supposed the whole of the King's forces were in front, but in the mean time detached Lord Cornwallis at the head of the second column to the left, to march in a long circle until he gained the forks of the Brandywine, where the division of the river rendered it more practicable. By this judicious movement his Lordship passed both branches of the river at Trimble's and Jeffery's Ford, without opposition or difficulty, about two o'clock in the afternoon, and then turning down the river, took the road

road to Dilworth, to fall upon the right of the provincials. General Washington received sooner notice of the manœuvre than General Howe expected, and had provided against its consequences as well as he could. He detached General Sullivan with all the force he could spare from the main body to oppose Lord Cornwallis. Sullivan performed the commission with great judgment and ability. He took a strong post on the commanding grounds above Birmingham church, with his left extending towards Brandy wine, his artillery was advantageously disposed, and both flanks covered with thick woods.

Lord Cornwallis, who did not at all imagine that his march was known by the enemy, was a little surprized to find Sullivan so well posted, and ready to oppose him. He was obliged to halt, and to form the line of battle, so it was four o'clock before he could begin the action. The British troops began the attack, and met with a warm resistance; the artillery and small arms played upon them furiously, and they left many on the field as they advanced. They however rushed on through all obstacles, and dislodged their enemies with much difficulty. The grenadiers and guards, and the best of our troops were engaged in this action.— Having driven the Americans from their post, they pursued them into the woods on their rear; but in the mean time a part of the provincial right wing which had not suffered so much, took a second post in a wood on the same side, where they made a stout resistance, and were driven from it with much difficulty.— Some of the British troops in the eagerness of pursuit were so deeply entangled in the woods, that it was night before they could join the main body. When now the British troops imagined that they had gained

a complete victory, and were advancing, they came upon a party of the enemy that had not yet been engaged, and which had taken a strong post to cover the retreat of the defeated wing of their army. A very warm engagement now ensued, and this post was so vigorously defended that it was some time after it was dark before it could be forced. Nor does it appear by comparing accounts that it was forced at all; because the provincials kept it as long as it was of any service, and they could see to fight, and then retreated in good order. The reason given why our troops did not pursue the enemy were, that the general did not know the ground, and was unacquainted with Gen. Knyphausen's situation, and was not able to proceed any further; all which were matters of fact.—Knyphausen, after successfully amusing the colonists all the day with the apprehension of an attack which he did not intend, made good his passage in the evening, when he found that his enemy was deeply engaged in the right. He carried the entrenchment, and took the battery and cannon which defended Chad's-ford. At this time the approach of the British troops which had been engaged in the woods, threw the provincials into confusion, and a retreat was ordered and made in the face of the King's forces. It was said that the lateness of the night, and the darkness of the evening prevented the King's troops from pursuing, as it had done those on the right wing, but the truth of the matter was, that both sides were sufficiently wearied with that day's exercise.

Such as follow the reports of government at that time have affirmed that a few hours more would have produced a total defeat to the Americans; but they knew but little of the operations of that tedious and hostile


hostile day's work that make this conclusion. The provincials had not suffered more than the King's troops, and though they gave way to the mad impetuosity of desperate men for a little, yet they recovered their posts, and raised redoubts which our troops were obliged to attack a-new, with a great expence of blood as well as much fatigue.

A great part of the American troops, among whom some of the Virginia regiments, and the whole body of their artillery behaved exceedingly well in the several actions of this day, and shewed such a degree of order, steadiness and valour, as would have done honour to the most veteran forces. Some of their more raw troops did not behave so well. The loss on both sides, when we compare the different accounts, was nearly about equal. In our Gazette the loss of the colonists was computed at about 300 killed, 600 wounded, and 400 taken prisoners. They also lost ten small field pieces, and a howitzer, of which, all except one, was brass. The loss on the side of the King's troops was estimated in the Gazette near to 500, of which the slain did not make one third. No officers of great note were killed on either side. The Americans did not deny that their loss was nearly to the amount that has been mentioned, but they say, and gave some reasons for what they affirm, that the loss on our side was equal, if not superior, to theirs. That there were some of the attacks of our men desperate, which exposed them to danger when they could do no execution upon their opponents; that the colonists kept up a well directed fire upon them as they advanced, and when they were out of breath and ready to fall on with the bayonets, they retreated faster than they were able to pursue them; that they
often

often led them on to meet a fresh party who after giving them a few well-aimed volleys retired and left them in the same manner to pursue as they were able. That by this method of fighting the provincials were very little exposed and yet did great execution upon their enemies.

In this engagement, General Howe acted the part of a skilful general, and did all that was in his power to obtain a complete victory.—His detaching of Lord Cornwallis and his column was a wise and prudent manœuvre, and in this he nearly out-schemed General Washington —But the other shewed a readiness of invention and penetration in detaching Sullivan, that shewed he knew how to make the best even of a disadvantage. Whatever may be the merits of both generals it must be granted that the King's army was led on with great judgment, and commanded with much sagacity, and the commanding officers did all that could have been expected of great commanders. It is to be observed, that in this battle the provincial forces were met in the open field, and with no great advantage of situation. The King's troops obtained a victory, but not of that final and decisive kind which the public were made to expect from the boasting of the ministry, and the supposed valour of our men. It had long been imagined by some, and positively affirmed by the sanguine supporters of this war, that provided the King's troops could meet the rebels in an open field they would soon put an end to the war; and now they had fought from break of day till the stars appeared, and were little farther advanced than when they began. The armies were nearly equal in number, and by the confession of our men and officers the ground nearly the same to both, and yet a whole day's

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GENERAL GREY.

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day's desperate fighting made very little alteration in the state of the war. General Howe had gained a victory and the enemy had fled, but the conqueror was obliged to be as cautious and as much upon his guard after the victory as before; which shews that it was no way decisive. General Washington soon repaired his loss and was in a few days ready for the field. The British army was now posted at Concord and Asherton, whilst a detachment was sent to seize Wollington, which was made a receptacle for the sick and the wounded. Upon his march towards Goshen, the British general received information, that the enemy had quitted Philadelphia, and were advanced upon the Lancaster road, a few miles above that place. Upon this advice he took such effectual measures for bringing them to an engagement, that nothing but the event which happened could have prevented his design. An excessive fall of rain which overtook both armies upon their march, and which continued without intermission for 24 hours, rendered both parties equally incapable for action.

General Howe lost his opportunity, and though he tried all his art for several days, and moved backwards and forwards, and in all directions belonging to the art of war, he could not bring the Americans into the situation they had been in before. While he was busied in marching and counter-marching, he received information that General Wayne with 1500 men, was lying in the woods upon some scheme of enterprize, in the rear, and at a small distance from the left wing of the army. He detached Major General Grey with two regiments and a body of light infantry to surprize them in the night. General Grey conducted this enterprize with equal ability and success

cess though perhaps not with that humanity which is so generally conspicuous in his character. In imitation of a similar proceeding at the battle of Minden, he took effectual measures that a single shot should not be fired in the course of the expedition, and that the execution should only be done by the point of the bayonets. The night favoured this design, as the troops marched silently on the enemy unawares; had they been perceived before they came near it would not have been easy to have attacked them, as they would have spent some fires upon their enemy, and retreated for safety. In pursuing this design the provincial out posts and pickets, were compleatly surprized and forced, without noise, about one in the morning, and the troops being directed by the light of their fires, rushed in upon the encampment, where a severe and horrible execution ensued, about 3000 being either killed or wounded upon the spot, and a number of prisoners taken. The remainder escaped by the darkness of the night, and some prudent dispositions made by the officer who commanded the Americans, with the loss of the greatest part of their baggage, arms, and stores. The conquerors in this action lost only a captain of light infantry, and three private men, and about as many wounded. The British troops as well as the officer that commanded them gained but little honour by this midnight slaughter.—It shewed rather desperate cruelty than real valour to put so many men to the sword who were not under arms, but the greatest part asleep in their huts or tents sunk in drowsiness which is common to all men in the night when they are expecting no danger.—The commanding officer of the provincials was much to blame for being at all off his guard when he was so near

an enemy: for had his out-guards been placed so as to have given the alarm in time, they might have been able either to have defended themselves, or fled from the fury of a desperate enemy.

It was said that a great number of those that were killed on that occasion, were people who had left their houses and fled for shelter into the woods, for fear of the enemy; that few of them had any arms, and were not in a situation to defend themselves. It is the unavoidable consequence of all wars, but especially civil wars, to involve the innocent and helpless in the same hardships and distress with the guilty; and it is frequently in some cases difficult to distinguish the one from the other in the midst of the bustle of war, and the commixture of parties. Accidents of this nature falling out in the hands of General Grey or Sir William Howe, carried a worse aspect than if they had happened under the authority of a Vaughan, a Grant, or a Prevost. The professions of liberty which these first gentlemen had so often made, and their former character, as humane and brave men, made any action that had the appearance of cruelty, or was inimical to the general rights of mankind, strike the attention of the public more forcibly than any transactions from the hands of those from whom no better things were expected. It was even painful to many true friends of the British constitution, that one of the first and greatest officers in Europe, and a professed friend of the natural rights of mankind, should so much as be suspected of an action unworthy of his character. They endeavoured to cover this transaction with the mantle of charity, and to put as favourable a construction upon it as possible. History must do justice to truth,

and transmit transactions to posterity as they happened, without respect of persons or regard to particular attachments. These ideas of honour, which military men are often possessed of, determine them to pursuits, which as philosophers, their minds can never approve. It has much the appearance of inconsistency, for men to disapprove of a war as unrighteous and oppressive, and yet become the principal conductors for it, and leaders in the oppression.

General Howe finding that the enemy could not by any means be brought to action, and that they were ardently abandoning the protection of the capital rather than hazard a final decision, took measures to possess himself of the command of the Schuylkill, which at length enabled him to pass the army over that river without opposition. Upon September 26, he advanced to German Town, and next morning Lord Cornwallis took possession of Philadelphia. Thus was this rich and flourishing city, the capital of the most rising colony, and the seat of the general congress of delegates, who gave laws and government to the continent of North America, reduced without opposition, and of consequence without damage. It remains as yet among the mysteries of this war, why the colonists so soon gave up this city, and why the king's troops so soon abandoned and left it. The Americans on this occasion acted with a prudence, and foresight, which was not the privilege of our commanders, and commissioners. They well knew that the keeping of this city, and the obstacles which they had prepared in the river Delaware to embarrass the enemy, would so weaken General Howe's army before he could receive any reinforcements, that they would have it in their power either
to

to make the city too hot for him, or make him abandon it, without running the risk of a general engagement in the open fields. Mud Island and Red Bank were left to be mortal thorns in the sides of the King's forces, where a few could do execution upon great numbers, and escape when they pleased with little injury to themselves. It will appear in the history of this campaign, that the Americans had other designs in giving up Philadelphia, than because they were not able to keep it.—It had been reported that the inhabitants of that city were determined to reduce it to ashes, rather than it should become a place of arms, and the centre of operation to British fleets and armies: but though this was proposed by some it was never agreed to. The Quakers at this time were very troublesome to the colonists: some of their principal people were greatly attached to the royal cause, and would give no security by word or writing for their behaviour. They would neither promise submission to the then government, nor engage to hold no correspondence with the King's forces. They even refused to confine themselves to their respective dwelling houses, and boldly appealing to the laws for redress and security to their persons, strongly reproached those who under the pretence of asserting and protecting the liberties of the subjects, had involved the whole continent in a civil war and contention; and who at the same time, in the most tyrannical manner, deprived them of their personal liberty, and of every security which they derived from the laws. It was replied, that the laws themselves, and all other considerations, must give way to public safety, in cases of great and eminent danger; that there was no new or particular

hardship in the presens measure, which was justified by the practice of all states in similar circumstances; that in England, in its highest state of freedom, and under its happiest government, the Habeas Corpus law was suspended in cases of internal commotion, or the apprehension of a foreign invasion, that their suspicion only was a sufficient ground for securing the persons of subjects, without regard to rank, quality, or any security they might propose to give for their peaceable behaviour; but that their situation was much more favourable, if their incorrigible obstinacy, their dangerous designs against the state, and their mortal enmity to the government had not precluded them from its benefits.—They were not retained in person merely upon suspicion, however strong and well grounded that was, and however justifiable the measures would be upon that ground only; it was immediately in their power to return in the most unrestrained liberty to their habitations, only by complying with that very moderate test of their principles and conduct which was required, and shewing that obedience to government, and good disposition to the state, which every member of society owes to the community to which he belongs, as a return for the protection he receives. But that as they denied all allegiance to the state, they of course disclaimed its protection and forfeited all the privileges of citizenship; whilst by refusing every security, for their peaceable demeanor, they could only be considered as its most dangerous and determined enemies. As these gentlemen were unconquerable in their resolution not to submit to the proposed test, they were all sent to Virginia as a place of security upon the approach of the royal army.

When

When Lord Howe received intelligence of the success at Brandywine, and the determined progress of the army to Philadelphia, he took the most speedy and effectual measures for conducting the fleet and transports round to the Delaware, not only to be at hand to concur in the active operations of the campaign, but to supply the army with provisions and stores, which he knew by this time would be indispensibly necessary. The voyage was intricate, tedious, and dangerous, and nothing less than a skill and ability equal to that which was exerted in the conduct and management of so great a number of ships, could have prevented the loss from being considerable.

The passage to Philadelphia was yet impracticable, the fleet drew up and anchored along the western or Pennsylvania shore, from Ready Island to Newcastle. After the British troops had taken possession of Philadelphia, their first object was the erecting of batteries to command the river, both to prevent the intercourse of the American vessels between their upper and lower posts, and to protect the city from any insult by water. The necessity and propriety of this measure became obvious as soon as it was determined upon. The day immediately after the arrival of the forces, the American frigate Delaware, of 32 guns, anchored within five hundred yards of the unfinished batteries and being seconded by another frigate, with some smaller vessels, they began and supported a very heavy cannonade for some hours upon the batteries and the town. They did not however discover the judgment which their knowledge might have been supposed to afford them; for upon the falling back of the tide the Delaware grounded,

grounded, so that she could not be got off. This was soon perceived by the grenadiers, who brought their battalion field pieces to play upon her with so true an aim and full an effect, that the Delaware was obliged to strike her colours, and was boarded by an officer and a detachment of the grenadiers. General Cleveland profited by the effect of the battalion guns, by directing the whole fire of the batteries against the other vessels, which were compelled to retire, with the loss of a schooner which was driven on shore.

The Americans had bestowed much labour and expence to render the Delaware unnavigable; they had constructed great and numerous works to render the passage to Philadelphia impracticable. In the prosecution of this design they had erected works and batteries, upon a flat low marshy island, or rather a bank of mud or sand, which had been raised and heaped up by the water near the junction of the Schuylkill and the Delaware, and which from its nature was called Mud Island. On the side opposite to New Jersey, at a place called Red Bank, they had also constructed a fort or redoubt, well planted with heavy cannon. In the deep navigable channel between and under the cover of these batteries, they had sunk several ranges of frames, to which, from a similitude in the construction, they had given the French name of *Chevaux de Frize*, being composed of converse beams, firmly joined pointing in various directions, and strongly headed with iron. These were so ponderous and heavy, and sunk in such a depth of water, as rendered it equally difficult for them to be weighed or cut through, and destructive to any one ship that should happen to strike upon them.

It

It was, however impossible to attempt to remove these, or to open the channel, till once the command of the shores on both sides was fully obtained. About three miles farther down they had sunk other ranges of these machines, and were constructing other extensive works for their protection, which though they were not yet finished, were in such forwardness as to be provided with artillery, and to command their object. This fortification was erected on the Jersey side, at a place called Bellings Point. These works and machines were further supported by several gallies mounting heavy cannon, together with two floating batteries, a number of armed vessels and small craft of various kinds, and some fire ships. In short the Delaware seemed to teem with every defensive preparation which could render the navigation of the river impracticable to the fleet, and exceedingly dangerous to all large vessels that should attempt to approach Philadelphia.

The first operation which was tried by the army was to dislodge the enemy from Billings Fort. This officer was appointed to Colonel Stirling, who performed the service effectually. For the provincials retired as soon as they heard of his approach, spiked up the cannon, set fire to the barracks, and abandoned the place. Captain Hammond of the Reebuck, with great difficulty, and some opposition from the enemy, cut away and weighed so much of the Chevaux de Frize, as opened a narrow passage for the ships through the lower barriers. After the detachment which was sent upon this first exploit were returning from Jersey, another regiment was sent to meet them at Chester, in order to form a sufficient escort for a large convoy of provisions to the camp. The army was

still lying at German-town, a very long and populous village, about six miles from Philadelphia, and which stretching on both sides of the great road to the northward forms a continued street of two miles in length. —The line of encampment crossed German-town at right angles about the centre, the left wing extended on the west to Schuylkill. That wing was covered in front by the German Chasseurs, both mounted and unmounted; a battalion of light infantry, and the Queen's Rangers, were in the front of the right; and the fortieth regiment, with another battalion of light infantry were posted at the head of the village. Lord Cornwallis lay at Philadelphia with four battalions of grenadiers, and as we have observed, three regiments had been detached on the side of Chester. The Americans were encamped at Shippack Creek, about sixteen miles from German-town. They had received some reinforcements, and were well acquainted with the situation of the royal forces: they knew that the army was weakened by the detachments made to Philadelphia and Chester. These circumstances induced an enterprize which was very little expected by General Howe, and which the former caution of General Washington had by no means promised. Instead of keeping as usual upon the defensive, the colonists now became the assailants. They quitted their strong post at Shippack Creek, at six in the evening, and marched all night to surprize the royal army in its camp at German-town. Upon the 4th of October their approach was discovered by the patrols, and the army was immediately called to arms. They began their attack upon the 40th regiment, and the light infantry by which it was accompanied. These troops after making all the resistance they were able,

were

were obliged to give way. Colonel Musgrave, who commanded in that quarter, threw himself and six companies of the 40th regiment into a large strong stone house, which lay full in the front of the provincials, which put a stop to their career, and their hope of immediately taking full possession of the town; which had they effected would have enabled them effectually to have separated the right and left wings of the Kings army. Musgrave kept his station, and fired out of the windows, till General Grey came to his relief with three battalions of the third brigade, who attacked the enemy with vigour, supported by Brigadier General Agnew at the head of the fourth brigade. The engagement was now for some time very warm, and it was for a season doubtful how matters would turn. The King's troops had now full use for all the skill and valour they were masters of, and with difficulty stood their ground against the fierce attack of the Americans. The latter were however attacked from the opposite side of the village by two regiments of the right wing, which put them into disorder, and they retired out of the town with considerable loss. These were not the only part of the king's forces that were engaged on this occasion; the Pickets on the right supported by the 4th and 45th regiments were warmly engaged with the left wing of the provincials. But General Grey, who had driven the right of the enemy out of the village, had now time to bring assistance to the right, who at this time were in considerable need of it: Upon his approach the Americans retreated, and were very gently pursued by our forces. The reasons given by our officers why they pursued with so little vigour, was

Vol. II N n that

that the country was woody, strong, and enclosed; that the pursuit they made was attended with no effect; and one thing which proves the provincials were not hard pursued, they carried their cannon clear off. It is manifest in this engagement that the British forces were pretty closely engaged, and were made to feel that the cowards in Washington's army, were on some occasions not so easily driven off. The morning being misty, prevented some part of the American success in this battle; for they could not improve the advantages they gained at first, on account that they did not see the true situation of the enemy; and before they could advance so as to pursue their advantage with success, the king's troops were recovered from their surprize, and in better condition to receive them. They also affirmed that they often could not see their own different bodies, and were on that account unable to act in concert. It was also said, that some of their parties in the thickness of the fog, poured their fire upon each other through a blind mistake on both sides, of being engaged with the enemy. General Washington was present at this engagement, and paid great compliments to his troops on the right wing, for their good behaviour, but as he was no witness to the behaviour of the left wing, he did not pay them so high compliments, because he had not sufficient ground to found his opinion.— This was a more desperate action than that of Brandywine, and the loss of the king's troops was much more considerable. Our accounts make our loss only 553 killed, wounded and prisoners, and the American loss about a thousand, killed wounded and taken. The Americans rate our loss considerably more, and their

their own less than our accounts do. Some of our bravest officers fell in this engagement; among the number of the killed were Brigadier General Agnew, and Colonel Bird, but the number of wounded officers was considerable. The Americans lost General Nash, and several other officers. In this battle the colonists made the attack, and though they were repulsed with some loss, shewed themselves formidable adversaries, capable of charging with resolution, and retreating with good order. This action damped the hopes of our generals concerning gaining any compleat victory, even in an open and fair engagement; they found that the British forces could do little more than stand their ground against the charge of the best troops of the colonists, and were even put into disorder by them, though fully upon their guard. This fully convinced General Howe, that provided the Americans should have been considerably reinforced, and inclined to make such another attack, that his whole force would not be able to withstand them, unless he could gain some remarkable post of defence, which he was not likely soon to obtain. The American troops began now to understand their own consequence, and perceived that the impression they made on their enemies was severely felt; they therefore became more daring, and considered our forces far from being invincible. General Washington, although he was cautious in engaging, yet in all those actions where he was present and led on the troops, he either gained some advantage, or made such an impression upon his enemies, that they severely felt the influence of his presence.

The taking of Philadelphia was not attended with all the advantages expected from that conquest. The American army still kept the field, and till the Delaware could be cleared, it was manifest that the army could not support itself in Philadelphia during the winter. The whole effect of the campaign depended upon cleaning the river, and receiving supplies from the fleet. About two weeks after the last battle the King's troops removed from German-town to Philadelphia, as being a more convenient situation for the reduction of Mud-Island, and for joining operations with the naval force in opening the navigation of the river. The Americans upon the removing of the King's troops, returned to their old camp at Shepach Creek, where they continued.

General Howe, and his brother the Admiral, were employed in concerting measures for opening the river, and removing all obstructions. This was an operation in which they found great difficulty, and which employed the utmost efforts of their military skill and ability. The General ordered batteries to be raised on the western shore, on the Pennsylvanian side, in hopes of assisting in dislodging the enemy from Mud-Island; the difficulty of access to which, was found to render the reduction of it much more tedious and difficult than had been expected. He also detached a strong body of Hessians across the river at Cooper's Ferry, opposite to the town, who were to march down and force the redoubt of Red Bank, whilst the ships and the batteries on the other side, were to carry on the attacks of Mud-Island, and the enemies marine force. The Hessian detachmant was led on by Colonel Donop, who had gained some reputation in several actions in this war; it consisted
besides,

besides light infantry and Chasseurs, of three battalions of greanadiers, and the regiment of Marbach. The American force at Red Bank was estimated about 800 men.

The disposition for his attack hath been represented as the most masterly in the kind; and the valour and courage of the troops highly extolled; but notwithstanding of all the vigour shewn by our forces both by sea and land, this enterprize failed of success, and the 800 cowards in Red-Bank killed a thousand of the bravest troops in the world. Colonel Donop attacked the enemy's trenches with the utmost gallantry, and after a very sharp action carried an extensive out-work; but he found the enemy better covered in the body of the redoubt, and the defence more vigorous than he expected. Some have thought that the Americans suffered him to enter the outwork on purpose that they might prevent him from ever getting out again; and if this was their design; they gained the point they had in view. For this brave colonel was there mortally wounded, and taken prisoner; several of his best officers were killed, or disabled; and the Hessians after a desperate engagement were repulsed with great loss. Colonel Mingerede, the next in command, was also dangerously wounded, and the detachment was brought off by lieutenant colonel Linsing; having suffered much in the approach to, and retreat from the attack, by the fire of the provincial galleys and floating batteries. The loss of the Hessians on this occasion, was on this side the Atlantic, reduced to 500 men, but from the best information on the other side, it was determined to be 1000, and not below 900 men. These German hirelings received the reward

of

of their service on this occasion, and though they behaved with great bravery, no person who considers their principles of action can lament their fall. For men to have hired themselves to fight against the rights of human nature, degrades them beneath the very beasts of the field; courage and bravery engaged against virtue and liberty, is like the Dragon and his angels fighting against Michael and his angels.

The attack by water was not more successful than that which was made by land; the men of war and frigates appointed for this attack, having passed with difficulty through the low barrier, took every possible disposition that the nature and situation of the works would admit for the destruction of the upper works and defences. But when all this was done the ships could not bring their fire to bear, so as to do much injury to the works. The Americans had by designed obstructions, so altered the course and channel of the river, the bed thereof was greatly changed from its natural course. By this means the *Augusta* man of war and the *Merlin* sloop, were grounded so fast at a little distance from the *Chevaux de Frize*, that there remained not the smallest possibility of getting them off. While they were in this situation they were in danger of being destroyed by four fire-ships, that were sent down by the enemy, upon the *Augusta*. The effect of these fire vessels was however prevented by the activity of the sailors; yet this was of little service to the *Augusta*, which took fire in the engagement, and obliged the others to make all the haste they could to get out of the reach of the explosion. In these pressing and difficult circumstances, the *Merlin* was speedily deserted, and laid in a train of destruction; and the greater part of the officers and crew

of

of the *Augusta* were saved. The second lieutenant, chaplain, and gunner, and a very considerable part of the common men unhappily perished. This is the first time we have had occasion to meet with a chaplain in the history of this war; and it is not easy to conceive of what service any of that character can be in carrying on such cruel and bloody transactions.—Men who carry on an offensive war, either upon absurd or doubtful principles, must be very ignorant to imagine that any creature like this that was unfortunately lost on this occasion, can, by any formal or occasional devotion, sanctify an action in itself immoral. If there was no other thing to blast the success of a war, the improper and irreverent devotion that is paid to the Almighty, both by the chaplains and their audiences, is sufficient to do it. There is no money worse spent than that which is laid out upon those military officers called chaplains: They are in general more the patterns of vice than of virtue, and with regard to sea chaplains, when the author of their installment is considered, there is not much good to be expected from them at present.

The bad success of this enterprize, though it staggered the confidence of the leaders of the war, yet it did not totally damp their resolution; and necessity, as well as a sense of military honour, spurred them on to make a new attempt to open the Delaware. Till this was done, all their former proceedings were as so much vain labour, and fruitless toil; they therefore adopted new schemes, pursued new measures, and took other ground. Nor were the colonists idle on their part, in preparing every obstruction they could devise to render all the efforts of the fleet and army unsuccessful. They knew of what consequence it was to
them

them, to keep the naval force separated from the army, and to render the communication between them tedious and difficult. They accordingly did all that they could to strengthen their defences. Though they did not expect that they would be able to withstand the united force of the fleet and army, yet they knew that they could weaken them both with little damage to themselves ; which upon the whole would be so much gain to them. After much preparation and severe labour, as well as imminent danger, the officers and seamen convoyed some heavy artillery, provisions, and stores up the river, by a different channel, on the west side, to a small marshy island, where they erected batteries, which greatly incommoded the works of the Americans. On the 13th of November every thing being prepared for the attack, the *Isis* and *Somerſet* men of war, passed up the east channel in order to attack the provincial works in the front : several frigates drew up against a new fort which was erected on the *Jersey* side near *Manto Creek*, which was so situated as to flank the men of war in their stations ; and two armed vessels, mounted with 24 pounders, made their way through the narrow channel on the west side, at the back of *Hogg-island*.—This was a matter of the greatest consequence with regard to the success of the attack, as these two vessels in concert with the batteries newly erected in *Province island*, enfiladed the principal works which the provincials had erected upon *Mud island*.—An heavy fire was begun and supported on both sides, till the ships of war and the armed vessels about night silenced the batteries on *Mud Island*.—The garrison, who understood that the utmost force of both army and navy would next morning be applied

to reduce the fort, set fire to all their works in the night, and retired.—It was never known what loss the provincials sustained in the several assaults upon this fort; in our accounts their loss of men is said to have been considerable, and certainly they must have suffered some loss; but the whole troops that were in the fort were not equal in number to the half of the slain on the side of the royal forces. The loss of our fleet was not considerable, considering the danger it was exposed to, though a great number were wounded, and several lost their lives on this occasion. The colonists left some artillery and stores, which fell into the hands of our troops. In a few days after Lord Cornwallis passed over with a detachment from Chester to Billings Fort, where he was joined by a body of forces just arrived from New York. They marched all together to Red Bank, which the provincials abandoned at their approach, leaving their artillery and some stores behind them.

The American shipping had now lost all protection on either side of the river; their galleys and other vessels took the advantage of a favourable night to pass the barriers of Philadelphia, and escaped to places of security farther up the river. To secure these, an officer with a party of seamen was ordered to man the Delaware frigate, which was lately taken and lying at Philadelphia, and to take such measures as might prevent the remainder from escaping. The crews of the American vessels finding themselves surrounded, set fire to their ships and left them. About seventeen of different sorts, including two floating-batteries and fire-ships, were all consumed. After gaining all these advantages, the season of the year and other obstructions, rendered the clearing of the river for any effectual purposes, altogether impracticable;

cable; so that the making or discovering such a channel, as might admit of transports or vessels of easy burthen with provisions and necessarys for the use of the army, was all that could be obtained at present.

General Washington was now reinforced with a recruit of 4000 men from the northern army, and advanced within 14 miles of Philadelphia, to a place called White Marsh, where he encamped in a strong situation with his right to the Wissaheehon Creek, and his front partly covered by Sandy Run. This movement made General Howe imagine that he intended some enterprize, and that his late reinforcement would encourage him to hazard a battle for the recovery of Philadelphia. This was not at all his intention; he knew that this movement would suggest this idea to General Howe, and make him draw out his army to the field, which in the middle of winter would harass the troops, and distress both the men and officers. The English general imagined that either Washington would give him battle, or that if he observed his usual caution, there might be some vulnerable part in his camp, where he might be attacked with success. For these reasons he marched his army on the 4th of December at night, and took post on Chestnut-hill, in the front of Washington's camp, on the next morning. Finding that their right afforded no opening for an attack, he changed his ground before day-light upon the seventh, and took a new station opposite to their centre and left.—A few skirmishes happened, in which the king's troops were the conquerors, who pursued the flying parties almost to their works. The general continued for three days constantly in their fight, and advanced within a mile of their works; but when he had examined

mined them with great attention, he found them inaccessible, and so gave up his design as entirely fruitless. The army suffered greatly from the severity of the weather, both officers and men being totally destitute of tents and field accoutrements. Sir William Howe accordingly began his march to Philadelphia upon the 8th in full view of the enemy, who suffered him to return as he came, without gaining one point except much toil and fatigue to the officers and the men. This General Washington foresaw would be the consequence, and it was all that he intended by his movement; for he immediately removed his camp from White Marsh to Valley Forge upon the Schuylkill, about 15 miles from Philadelphia, in a very strong and secure situation.

General Howe now as the season was too far advanced to admit of any other attention except what related to the accommodation of the troops, sent a grand detachment out to procure forage for the winter, which performed its purpose with success. The Americans continued during the winter season in huts in their camp, without returning to their homes, or going into winter quarters. This shewed their great zeal for the cause they were engaged in, and the unbounded influence which General Washington had over the minds of the Americans. Thus ended the campaign upon the Delaware; a campaign, concerning which there have been various opinions, and which affords room for very serious reflections. The British troops had been in general successful, without gaining any advantage; for with all their victories, and the strong tide of success which was said to attend them at the close of the campaign, the amount of all their labours and battles was simply a good winter's lodging in the city of Philadelphia; whilst the troops possessed

no more of the adjacent country than they immediately commanded with their arms. Another discouragement attended the conclusion of this campaign, was, that though the colonists might fight them when they had a mind, and with advantages to themselves, it was impossible for the royal army to bring them to an engagement against their will. This occasioned much uneasiness in England among the promoters of this unrighteous war; who had been so much elated with the news of the first successes, and had boasted in the most extravagant manner. Gloomy reflections began now to crowd upon them, and guilt and disappointment greatly chagrined their minds. They began to find that victory and defeat were nearly attended with the same consequences. The substance of the nation was wasted, its best blood was spilt, yet still there was nothing done. The American war was nearly in the same state that it was at the beginning, merely with this difference, that the colonists were inured to war, and could make no better defence. In the beginning of this year the ministerial boasting run very high, concerning the marvellous things that General Howe would do in the spring; and when they received the account of the defeat in the Jerseys, they had fixed their hopes upon the achievements which were to be performed by the northern army under General Burgoyne. We must now leave Sir William Howe in his winter quarters in Philadelphia, and look back to the affairs of Canada and the Lakes.

In viewing the history of the southern campaign, we have beheld a train of victories without any equivalent advantages, and heard of wonderful achievements, without so much as seeing one province subdued; a large fleet and a numerous army of the best troops

troops ever sent over the Atlantic, confined in their operations to the defence of a single city, without being able to secure two leagues of country for the space of a few days. The Northern campaign was still more unsuccessful ; for there we meet with nothing except disgrace, defeat and disappointment. The war upon the side of Canada and the Lakes was committed to Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, an officer whose abilities were unquestioned, and whose spirit of enterprize, and thirst for military glory, though it might be rivalled, could not possibly be exceeded. It is somewhat doubtful, notwithstanding the praises that were lavished upon that officer whether his capacity was adequate to the arduous undertaking he was now engaged in. The fertility of his imagination, and the brilliancy of his fancy, seemed to have prevailed more in his character, than soundness of judgment, true caution, or penetration.

The appointment of General Burgoyne to this command was far from being pleasing to General Carleton and his friends ; it gave great offence to the general, who by his good conduct preserved Quebec, defended Canada, and recovered Lake Champlain. He felt severely the affront, that when he had brought matters so forward, that the command should be taken from him and given to another, as if instead of having merited honour for his services, he had deserved disgrace and mortification. It was said that his powers had been diminished in proportion to the greatness of his services. His military command before extended to every part of America, whither he might find it necessary to conduct the army under his command. It was now suddenly restrained to the narrow limits of his own province. His friends observed that he
had

had in the preceding campaign, not only driven the enemy out of Canada, but had formed a great naval armament, and destroyed the enemies force upon Lake Champlain, recovered Crown Point, and put all things in that quarter in a fair way of succeeding the next campaign. That nothing prevented him from taking Ticonderago except the lateness of the season, when he would immediately prosecuted the war to the southward. He had during the winter, applied his usual industry in forwarding every preparation which might promote the success of the design in the ensuing campaign. When the season opened the communication with England, instead of the reinforcements he required, and expected the fulfilling of his purpose, he received an arrangement totally new, which was neither planned according to, nor was the execution in any degree left to his discretion. The minister for the American department had formed the whole scheme, and had proceeded so far as to determine every detachment to be made from the larger bodies to be employed in two separate expeditions. General Carleton was not even consulted concerning the number and nature of the troops, which were to remain under his command for the defence and security of Canada. In a word, the army which he lately commanded was taken out of his hands, and placed under the command of officers who had lately acted under his authority, and placed in independent commands, and ordered to receive their instructions from Sir William Howe; which was no less than an open insult to Sir Guy Carleton, who had been already informed by General Howe that the distance of their operations would prevent all communication between them. The minister on this occasion

sion shewed a real want of ability for directing such great and distant operations; he took for granted that he perceived the force of the enemy, and all the resources which they might have to frustrate his plan, when he did not so much as consider the difficulties that even rose from the very nature of the country. With regard to the force of the colonists in that quarter, neither the minister, nor any of the commanders appear to have had the smallest information. Generals and troops all at a sudden started up, that were never heard of, nor believed to exist till the very moment of action; and a thousand impediments were found to stand in the way of this expedition, that the minister never dreamed of and which his genius never suggested to him.

Sir Guy Carleton, notwithstanding the disgrace which the minister had done him, behaved with a greatness of soul which did him much honour. He shewed, that though he was sensible of the affront which he had received, yet he knew how to pass over an injury, and did not suffer any personal disgrace to hinder him from serving his country, and what he conceived to be the public cause thereof. He applied himself with the same diligence and activity to forward by every possible means, and to support in all its parts, the expedition, as if it had been his contrivance and solely his own plan. This conduct, though it was what government did not deserve from this officer, yet was absolutely necessary for carrying on the design of this expedition; and though in the end it misgave, it was more owing to the management of General Carleton, that it proceeded so far as it did, than to any good conduct of the minister who formed the plan thereof. The arrangement was so complicated, and the parts of the

the expedition so numerous, and many of them unknown in practice that it was no wonder that it did not succeed. In all its parts it appeared to be the offspring of folly and the creature of madness. Carleton did all in his power to give it birth, and though he was not its parent he acted the part of a good nurse, and withheld no assistance that was in his power to render it effectual.

The ministers at home and especially the lord at the head of the American department were deeply interested in the success of this expedition; they had founded the most sanguine expectations concerning it, and had, in idea, anticipated the glorious advantages that would be derived from it. Nothing was left undone on their side, as far as their penetration could reach to render it effectual. All things were prepared according to the number of troops that could be spared for that particular service, which were thought conducive to give efficacy to their operations. Canada was expected to afford a warlike though undisciplined militia, well calculated for and acquainted with the nature and service of the country. To strengthen and increase this irregular force, arms and accoutrements were amply provided to supply those numerous loyalists, who were expected to join the royal army as soon as it approached the frontiers of these provinces. A powerful artillery was provided to drive the rebels from all their posts and thickets; and it was considered as a thing impossible that any number of irregular troops could stand before such a well appointed army of veterans. In this particular the ministry reasoned fallaciously; for though the colonists were not such old troops as some of the regiments which were sent against them, they were far
from

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Pollard sculp.

Lord

GEORGE GERMAINE.

Printed for T. Robson, Newcastle upon Tyne.

from being irregular. They knew discipline and obeyed command with great exactness, and were determined to venture their lives in the cause they were engaged in. And it was found upon trial, that they were not so easily combated as Lord George Germain and General Burgoyne had imagined.

Besides these forces already mentioned, several nations of savages had been induced to come into the field; a measure which will fix an everlasting disgrace upon its authors, and leave a blot upon the present reign, that nothing but the death of time itself will be able to wipe away. This measure was defended by ministerial advocates upon the supposed necessity of the case: as if from the character of the Indians it were manifest that they could not be still, and if not engaged in the King's service, would join the Americans.—This was a vain and false apprehension; for the colonists had already refused their service, and they had agreed to stand neuter and live quietly. It was only the presents given them by ministerial agents, who wanted them to attend the army for the purposes of scalping and murder, that induced them to take up the hatchet.—General Carleton would not employ them, but in the preceding year civilly dismissed them; his humanity would not permit him to make use of such illicit instruments of war, and as his orders were not so particularly express on that head, he made no use of their service. But now a more high and peremptory authority positively enjoined the making use of them; and it was supposed to be one of the favourite and most enchanting schemes of that authority, to bring forth those barbarians to the field, for the sake of glutting its revenge upon the refractory colonists. It will hardly be credited in after ages, that

Vol. II. P p in

in a reign marked so often with the epithet *pious*, that an order should ever have come forth with the royal sanction to let loose savage barbarians upon helpless old men, women, and children. Whatever were the reasons why General Carleton did not employ the savages in a more early and effectual manner, they were far from giving satisfaction to the ministry and their friends at home. It was insisted that every appearance of lenity was actual cruelty in the effect, because it operated as an incentive to disobedience, and increased the objects of punishment. That on the contrary, partial severity was general mercy: as timely exertions of justice, and strict inflictions of punishments were at all times the sure means of preventing crimes. That the only method of speedily crushing the rebellion, was to render the situation of the actors in it so intolerable, that a cessation from danger and blessing of repose, should become the only objects of their contemplation and hope. That the means were but little to be attended to, when they led to the accomplishment of so great and happy a purpose as the destruction of rebellion, and the restoration of order and legal government. And in all convulsions of states, the innocent were but too frequently involved in the calamities which were intended for the guilty; but such was the lot and condition of mankind, and this evil however much deplored, could not in numberless instances be prevented. This doctrine was supported by the avowed friends of the ministry, whether out of office or in the subordinate departments of the state; and it was undoubtedly agreeable to the opinion of the ministers, and shewed Gen. Carleton's scruples with regard to employing the savages were in no respect acceptable to them.

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The arguments made use of to support this doctrine, were all founded in the first instance upon the most palpable falshoods; for they all take for granted what never was nor can be proved, namely, that the colonists were in a state of rebellion, according to the fundamental laws of the British constitution. There were no laws existing at the time the controversy began, that determined an opposition to unconstitutional acts of parliament, rebellion. It could not therefore be an exertion of justice, to employ savages to enforce new arbitrary statutes, which were contrary to the very genius of the constitution.—According to these court advocates, it would have been equally just to have employed barbarians to have prevented the revolution, or it is still just to employ them to overturn its principles. Before they had endeavoured to crush a rebellion with all the cruelty of savage barbarity, they ought first to have enquired whether it existed, and whether what they so called was not created by themselves. Legal government consists in observing the constitutional laws of the empire, and not in pursuing modern statutes, which are diametrically opposite to the first principles of our fundamental laws. To make acts of power, through the influence of corruption in the legislature, that infringe the liberties and the natural rights of the subjects; and then to determine it rebellion to resist them, is the same thing as to declare the whole code of fundamental statutes rebellious acts, and the framers of them traitors. It would require no more to prove this point, than only to place the old laws of the land and some modern statutes in opposite columns. But it was no wonder that the promoters of this war were not very nice concerning the means they made

use of, seeing they had adopted the Popish maxim, that the end sanctifies the means. After generations, when they read the history of this war, will be equally astonished both at the end and the means made use of to attain it. It is a very curious maxim, that partial severity is general mercy, especially when it is considered that both the guilt and the misery proceed from those that now pretend to have a right to punish. It was such mercy as it would be to take the lives of so many innocent people that the rest may be fitter to be made slaves.

However much Sir Guy Carleton disapproved of making use of the savages, he was now obliged by a special authority to use his influence to bring them over to the measures of government; accordingly presents were liberally distributed among them, which answered the purpose intended. The regular force appointed to this expedition, conducted by General Burgoyne, consisted of British and German troops to the number of 8000; of these 3217 were Brunswickers; watermen and artillery made a corps of about 2000, and the savages about 1200.

Canada was largely rated, and the inhabitants grievously oppressed; they felt sensibly the proportion which they were appointed to furnish towards this campaign. In the proposals laid before the minister, besides the militia and various other kinds of workmen supposed necessary to be immediately attached to the army, and to accompany it on the expedition, chains of the militia, patrols and posts, were expected to occupy the woods on the frontiers in the rear of the army, partly to intercept the communication between the enemy and the ill affected in Canada, partly to prevent desertion, and to procure intelligence,

intelligence, and for various other exigencies which might contribute to keep the country quiet. There was another great call upon them for workmen to compleat the fortifications at Sorrel, St. John's, Chamblee, and the Ile of Noix, which it was supposed, would amount to 2000 men. But a still greater call upon the Canadians, and the more grievous, as it was at their feeding season, was for the transport of all provisions, artillery, stores, and baggage of the army, from the different repositories to the water, and afterwards at the carrying places, beside the corves for making the roads. It was estimated that this service would for some time before, and at the opening of the campaign require no fewer than 2000 men, besides a very large proportion of horses and carts. The ministry certainly did not make a fair estimate of the profit and loss that would arise to the empire in pursuing this expedition; for suppose all things had succeeded according to their wishes, and they had been able to subdue all the colonies, the destruction made in the mean time would not have again been made up for ages to come, nor would the money expended ever again be put into a circulation for the common advantage of the community. This war has been a war founded in ministerial vengeance and ambition, without having so much as a single principle, or one object of common utility in its complexion. The friends and foes of government have both suffered, and would have suffered suppose they had united in supporting their measures without the least war or opposition. Had all the British empire joined mutually in supporting the schemes of the present ministry, without a dissenting voice, and the measures had been pursued for half a century, there would have

have been very little difference between the inhabitants of that empire, and the Indian savages. The tendency of the whole of this administration has been to disperse the spirit of liberty, which is the soul of true greatness, without which neither commerce, arts, or sciences ever flourished.

General Burgoyne, who was now at the head of this expedition was assisted by able and excellent officers. Of these were Major General Philips of the artillery, who had acquired much honour by his conduct in the late war in Germany. He had likewise under him Brigadier General Frazer, Powell, and Hamilton, all officers who had distinguished themselves in former services; and with these the Brunswick Major General Baron Reidesel, and Brigadier General Specht. The army was in every respect in the best condition that could possibly be expected or desired, the troops being, in the stile of the army in high spirits, admirably disciplined, and very healthy.

An expedition was determined to the Mohawk river, and Colonel St. Leger was appointed to the command thereof. The troops employed in this expedition from the army were about 700 or 800, consisting of 200 drawn from the 8th and 34th regiments, a regiment of the New-Yorkers, lately raised by Sir John Johnson, being chiefly emigrants from his own country, adjoining to the intended scene of action, with some Hanau chasseurs, a company of Canadians, and another of newly raised rangers. These were joined by a strong body of Savages, in part conducted, or more properly commanded by officers from Britain and America. The regular force left in Canada, including the Highland emigrants under that denomination, amounted to 3700 men.

The

The army being at length arrived and encamped at the river Bouquet, on the west side of Lake Champlain, and at no very great distance to the northward of Crown Point, General Burgoyne, there met the Indians in Congress, and afterwards in compliance with the customs of those people, gave them a war feast. The speech which he made to the savages upon this occasion has been published. It was calculated in those powerful strains of elocution by which that gentleman is distinguished, to excite their ardour in the common cause, and at the same time to repress their barbarity. For this purpose he took pains in explaining to them the distinction between a war carried on against a common enemy, in which the whole country and people were hostile, and the present, in which good and faithful subjects were largely, and of necessity, intermixed with rebels and traitors. Upon this principle he laid down several injunctions for the government of their conduct, particularly, that they should only kill those who were opposed to them in arms; that old men, women, children, and prisoners should be held sacred from the knife or hatchet, even in the heat of actual conflict, that they should only scalp those whom they had slain in fair opposition; but that under no pretence, subtlety, or colour of prevarication, they should scalp the wounded, or even dying; much less persons in that condition, by way of evading the injunction. And they were promised a compensation for prisoners, but informed that they should be called to an account for scalps. These endeavours did in some measure mitigate, but were not of force wholly to restrain their ferocity, of which some unhappy instances afterwards appeared.

By the most favourable account of this matter which has just now been given from a very impartial authority, it appears that the savages were to be paid both for their prisoners and scalps, only they were to be called to an account for the latter. But it does not seem a matter very clear how they were to be brought to an account, or how the general was to know the difference between a scalp taken from the head of one that was already dead, and one that was alive when scalped. They were to scalp those only whom they had slain in fair opposition, but this was a matter not easily to be decided, and the proclamation that followed soon after this speech, seems to hint that scalps of all sorts might be taken from the heads of those described in the proclamation. General Burgoyne's arguments and the colouring he gives to the cause and characters of the Americans, imply that there could be very small offence in the Indians proceeding to extremities. The horrible denunciations of war, dressed in the most formidable and terrific shapes against those who persisted in hostility, but too plainly hinted, how agreeable Indian barbarity was to the commander in chief.

The General soon after dispersed a manifesto, calculated to spread terror among the contumacious, and particularly to revive in their minds every latent impression of fear, derived from knowledge or information of the cruel operations of the savage, whose numbers were accordingly magnified, and their eagerness to be let loose to their prey described with uncommon energy. The force of that great power, which was now spread by sea and land, to embrace or to crush every part of America, was displayed in full, lofty, and expressive language. The rebellion,
with

with its effects, and the conduct of the present governors and governments, were charged with the highest colouring, and exhibited a most hideous picture of unparalleled injustice, cruelty, persecution, and tyranny. Encouragement and employment were assured to those, who, with a disposition and ability suited to the purpose, should actually assist in redeeming their country from slavery, and in the re-establishment of legal government. Protection and security, clogged with conditions, restricted by circumstances, and rather imperfectly or inexplicitly expressed, were held out to the peaceable and industrious, who continued in their habitations. And all the calamities and outrages of war arrayed in their most terrific forms, were denounced against those who persevered in their hostility.

The army having made a short stay at Crown Point for the establishment of magazines, an hospital, and other necessary services, proceeded, in concert with the naval armament, to invest Ticonderago, which was the first object of their destination. Although the rash and ill conducted attempt made upon that place in the year 1758, with the consequent repulse and heavy loss sustained by the British army, rendered it at that time an object of general attention, it may not at this distance of time be wholly unnecessary to take some notice of its situation, as well as of its state of defence.

Ticonderago lies on the western shore, and only a few miles to the northward, from the commencement of that narrow inlet, by which the water from Lake George is conveyed into Lake Champlain. Crown Point lies about twelve miles farther north at the extremity of that inlet. The first of these places is

situated on an angle of land, which is furrounded on three sides by water, and that covered by rocks. A great part of the fourth side was covered by a deep morass, and where that fails, the old French lines still continue as a defence on the north-west quarter.— The Americans strengthened these lines with additional works and a block house. They had other posts with works and block houses on the left towards Lake George. To the right of the French lines they had also two new block houses, with other works.

On the eastern shore of the inlet, and opposite to Ticonderago, the Americans had taken still more pains in fortifying a high circular hill to which they gave the name of Mount-Independence. On the summit of this, which is called Table-land, they had erected a star fort, enclosing a large square of barracks well fortified and supplied with artillery. The fort of the mountain, which on the west side projected into the water, was strongly entrenched to its edge, and the entrenchment well lined with heavy artillery. A battery about half way up to the mount, sustained and covered these lower works.

The Americans with their usual industry, had joined these two posts by a bridge of communication thrown over the inlet. This was like many other of their performances, a great and most laborious work. The bridge was supported on 22 sunk piers of very large timber, placed at nearly equal distances; the spaces between these were filled with separate floats, each about fifty feet long and twelve feet wide, strongly fastened together with chains and rivets, and as effectually attached to the sunk pillars. On the Lake Champlain side of the bridge, it was defended by

by a boom composed of very large pieces of timber, fastened together by rivitted bolts and double chains, made of iron an inch and half square. Thus not only a communication was maintained between these two posts, but all access by water from the northern side was totally cut off.

It is to be observed, that as the inlet immediately after passing Ticonderago, assumes a new form, suddenly widening to a considerable breadth, and becoming navigable to vessels of burthen, so from thence it also holds the name of Champlain, although it is not yet properly a part of the lake. On the other hand, the southern gut from Lake George, besides being narrow, is also rendered unnavigable by shallows and falls; but on its arrival at Ticonderago it is joined by a great body of water on the eastern side, called on this part, South River, but higher up towards its source, before the junction of the elder branch with the younger, which runs from South Bay, it is known under the appellation of Wood Creek. The confluence of these waters at Ticonderago, forms a small bay to the southward of the bridge of communication, and the point of land formed by their junction, is composed of a mountain called Sugar Hill.

Notwithstanding the apparent strength of Ticonderago, from what we have hitherto seen, it is entirely overlooked, and its works effectually commanded by Sugar Hill. This circumstance occasioned consultation among the Americans as to the fortifying of that mount; but their works were already far too extensive for their powers of defence, and would require ten or twelve thousand men to be effectually manned. It was likewise hoped, that the difficulty

of access to the Sugar Mount, and the rugged inequality of its surface, would prevent the enemy from attempting to profit by its situation.

It would be exceedingly difficult from the information before us, to form any authentic estimate of the number of Americans that were in actual defence of these two posts. It appears by the commander in chief, General St. Clair's exculpatory letter to the Congress, as well as by the resolutions of the council of war, which accompanies it, that his whole force, including 900 militia, who were to quit him in a few days, was only about 3000 men; that these were ill equipped, and worse armed; particularly in the article of bayonets, an arm so essential in the defence of lines that they had not one in ten of their number.— This account would seem not only satisfactory, but conclusive, if it had not been contradicted by others. In a detail of the transactions of the campaign, transmitted by the war office of Massachusetts's Bay to the American deputies in France, and for the conveyance of which a light ship was sent out on purpose, they state St. Clair's force at near 5000 men well equipped and armed. It is however to be observed, that they talk with great bitterness of the general's conduct, as he had done in his first letter to congress, with respect to the behaviour of two of their regiments.— It may also be supposed, that in a statement of their affairs intended to operate upon the sentiments and conduct of a court, from which they already received essential benefits, and looked forward to much greater, they would rather increase the weight of blame upon an unfortunate officer, than detract from the public opinion of their own conduct and power, by attributing weakness to their councils, or inefficacy to their arms.

As the royal army approached to the object of its destination, it advanced with equal caution and order on both sides of the lake, the naval force keeping its station in the centre, until the one had begun to enclose the enemy on the land side, and the frigates and gun-boats cast anchor just out of cannon-shot from their works. Upon the near approach of the right wing on the Ticonderago side, upon the 2d of July, the Americans immediately abandoned and set fire to their works, block-houses, and saw-mills, towards Lake George, and without sally, interposition, or the smallest motion of diversion, permitted Major-General Philips to take possession of the very advantageous post of Mount Hope, which besides commanding their lines in a great and dangerous degree, totally cut off all their communication with that lake. The same supineness and total want of vigour appeared in every thing on their side, except in the keeping up of an ineffectual roar of cannon, which was so much condemned on the other as not to be once returned.

In the mean while, the royal army proceeded with such expedition in the construction of its works, the bringing up of artillery, stores, and provisions, and the establishment of its posts and communications, that by the 5th matters were so far advanced as to require little more time for completely investing the posts on both sides of the lake. Sugar Hill was also examined, and the advantages it presented were so important, though attended with infinite labour and difficulty, from the necessity of making a road to its top through very rough ground, and constructing a level there for a battery, that this arduous task was undertaken, and already far advanced towards its completion,

completion, through the spirit, judgment, and active industry of General Philips.

In these circumstances, a hasty council was on that day held by the American Generals, to which their principal went, as he informs us, already pre-determined as to his conduct. It was represented, that their whole effective numbers were not sufficient to man one half of the works; that as the whole must be consequently upon constant duty, it would be impossible for them to sustain the fatigue for any length of time; and that as the enemy's batteries were ready to open, and the place would be compleatly invested on all sides within twenty-four hours, nothing could save the troops but an immediate evacuation of both posts. This determination was unanimously agreed to by the council, and the place was accordingly evacuated on that night.

However justly this representation of their condition and circumstances was founded, and however necessary the determination of the council was in this present state of their affairs, one apparently capital error on the side of the commanders, must strike every common observer. If their force was not sufficient for the defence of the work, why did they not abandon this resolution in time? Why did they not withdraw the troops, artillery and stores, and demolish the works before the arrival of the enemy? Why did they wait to be nearly surrounded, until their retreat was more ruinous than a surrender under any conditions that could be proposed, a little less destructive in the event, than if the works had been carried by storm?

These are questions that time and better information alone can answer, if ever they should clearly answer, in favour of the American Generals.

The

The baggage of the army, with such artillery, stores, and provisions, as the necessity of the time would permit, were embarked with a strong detachment on board above 200 batteaus, and dispatched, under convoy of five armed galleys, up the south river, in their way to Skeneborough. The main army took its route by the way of Castle-town to reach the same place by land.

July 6th. The first light of the morning had no sooner discovered the flight of the enemy, than their main body was eagerly pursued by Brigadier General Frazer, at the head of his brigade, consisting of the light troops, grenadiers, and some other corps. Major General Reidesel was also ordered to join in the pursuit by land, with the greater part of the Brunswick troops, either to support the Brigadier, or to act separately, as occasion might require, or circumstances direct. The enemy left a prodigious artillery behind them, which with these taken or destroyed in the armed vessels at Skeneborough, amounted to no less than 128 pieces of all sorts, serviceable and unserviceable. They also left some military stores of different sorts, and no inconsiderable stock of provisions in the forts.

General Burgoyne conducted the pursuit by water in person. The bridge and those works, which the Americans laboured hard for ten months to render impenetrable, were cut through in less time by the British seamen and artificers, than it would have cost them to have described their structure. In a word, they did their business with such speed and effect, that not only the gun-boats, but the *Royal George* and *Inflexible* frigates, had passed through the bridge by nine o'clock in the morning. Several regiments

embarked

embarked on board the vessels, and the pursuit up the river was supported with such valour, that by three o'clock in the afternoon, the foremost brigade of the gun-boats was closely engaged with the enemies gallees near Skenesborough Falls. In the mean time, three regiments, which had been landed at South-Bay, ascended and passed a mountain with great expedition, in order to attack the enemies works at the Falls, and thereby cut off their retreat. But their speedy flight prevented the execution of this design. Upon the approach of the frigates, the gallees which were already overborne by the gun-boats, lost all spirit; two of them were accordingly taken, and three blown up. The rebels now giving way to their despair, set fire to their works, stockaded forts, mills, and batteaus, after which they escaped as well as they could up the Wood Creek. This stroke seemed to complete the ruin of that ill-fated army, for their batteaus were deeply loaded, besides their baggage, with ammunition, stores, and provision; so that they were now left naked in the woods destitute of provision, and without any other means of defence, than what they derived from the arms in their hands.

Confusion and dismay equally attended their main body on the left. The soldiers had lost all respect for and confidence in their commanders. It would be fruitless to expect resolution, where no order nor command could be maintained.

Brigadier Frazer continued and supported the chase through the vehement heat of a burning day, with his usual activity and vigour. Having received intelligence that the enemies rear were at no great distance, and was commanded by Colonel Francis, one of their best and bravest officers, his troops lay that night on
their

their arms. He came up with the enemy on the 7th, at five in the morning, whom he found strongly posted with great advantage of ground, and a still greater superiority in point of number. As he expected every moment to be joined by General Reidesfel, and was apprehensive that the enemy might escape if he delayed, he did not hesitate to begin the attack.—— The advantages which they possessed in ground and number, and perhaps more than both, the goodness of their commander, induced them to make a better stand than might have been expected from their condition in other respects.

As Frazer's corps was not supported near so soon as had been expected, the engagement was long;—— and though the light infantry and grenadiers gave several striking proofs of their superiority, affairs were still undecided and critical. The arrival of the Germans was at length decisive. The enemy fled on all sides, leaving their brave commander, with many other officers, and about 200 private men, dead on the field. About the same number, besides a colonel, seven captains, and ten subalterns, were taken prisoners.——About 600 were supposed to be wounded, many of whom perished miserably in the woods. The principal loss on the side of the royal army was, that of Major Grant, a brave officer, who was killed.—— St. Clair, with the van of the American army, was at this time at Charlestown, about six miles farther on.—— Upon the account of this disaster, and of the more fatal stroke at Skeneborough, and under the apprehension of being intercepted at Fort Anne, he struck into the woods on his left, probably uncertain whether he should direct his course towards the New-
Vol. II. R r England

England provinces, and the upper part of Connecticut, or to Fort Edward.

During these advantages on the left, Colonel Hill was detached with the 19th regiment from Skenesborough towards Fort Anne, in order to intercept the fugitives who fled along the Wood Creek, whilst another part of the army was employed in carrying batteaus over the falls, in order to facilitate their movement to dislodge the enemy from that post. In that expedition the colonel was attacked by a body of the enemy, consisting, as he conceived, of six times the number of his detachment, who finding all their efforts in front ineffectual to force the judicious position which he had taken, attempted to surround the regiment. This alarming attempt put him under the necessity of changing his ground in the heat of action. Nothing less than the most perfect discipline, supported by the coolest intrepidity could have enabled the regiment to execute so critical a movement in the face of the enemy, and in such circumstances. It was however performed with such steadiness and effect, that the enemy, after an attack of three hours, were so totally repulsed, and with such loss, that after setting fire to Fort Anne, they fled with the utmost precipitation towards Fort Edward, upon the Hudson's river.

The loss of the royal army in all this service, and in so many different engagements, some of which were warm, and seemed liable to loss, was very small.—The whole in killed and wounded not much exceeding two hundred men.

Such was the rapid torrent of success, which swept every thing away before the northern army in its outset. It is not to be wondered at, if both officers and
private

private men were highly elevated with their fortune, and deemed that and their prowess to be irresistible, if they regarded the enemy with the greatest contempt, considered their own toils to be nearly at an end, Albany to be already in their hands, and the reduction of the northern provinces to be rather a matter of some time, than an arduous task full of difficulty and danger.

At home the joy and exultation was extreme, not only at court, but with all those who hoped or wished the unqualified subjugation, and the unconditional submission of the colonies. The loss in reputation was greater to the Americans, and capable of more fatal consequences, than even that of ground or posts, of artillery, or of men. All the contemptuous and most degrading charges which had been made by their enemies, of their wanting the resolution and abilities of men, even in the defence of whatever was dear to them, were now repeated and believed. Those who still regarded them as men, and who had not yet lost all affection to them as brethren, who also retained hopes that a happy reconciliation upon constitutional principles, without sacrificing the dignity or the just authority of government on the one side, or a dereliction of the rights of freemen on the other, was not even now impossible, notwithstanding their favourable dispositions in general, could not help feeling upon this occasion, that the Americans sunk not a little in their estimation. It was not difficult to diffuse an opinion that the war in effect was over; and that any further resistance would serve only to render the terms of their submission the worse. Such were some of the immediate effects of the loss of those grand keys of North America, Ticonderago, and the lakes.

The Americans were in this stile degraded both by the tories and others, who were either lukewarm in the cause of liberty, or from selfish considerations wished a total reduction of the colonies. But the triumphing of the wicked is short; matters were not long in taking a retrograde turn, and all this triumph was changed into sorrow and mourning.

General Burgoyne continued for some days with the army partly at Skenesborough, and partly spread in the adjacent country. They were under the necessity of waiting for the arrival of tents, baggage, and provisions. In the mean time no labour was spared in opening the road by the way of Fort Anne, for advancing against the enemy. Equal industry was used in clearing the Wood Creek from the obstacles of fallen trees, sunken stones, and other impediments which had been laid in the way by the enemy, in order to open a passage for batteaus, for the conveyance of artillery, stores, and provisions, for camp equipage. Nor was less diligence used at Ticonderago, in the carrying of gun-boats, provisions, yessels, and batteaus, over land into Lake George. These were all laborious works, but the spirit of the army was at that time superior to toil or danger.

General Schuyler was at Fort Edward, upon the Hudson's river, where he was endeavouring to collect the militia, and had been joined by St. Clair with the wretched remains of his army, who had taken a round-about march of seven days through the woods, in which, from the exceeding badness of the weather, with the want of covering, provisions, and all manner of necessaries, they had suffered the most extreme misery. Many others of the fugitives had also arrived, but so totally broken down, that they were nearly as destitute

destitute of arms, ammunition, and all the materials of war, as they were of vigour, hope, and spirit to use them with effect.

Although the direct distance from Fort Anne, where the batteaux navigation on Wood Creek determined, or even from Skenesborough, to Fort Edward was no greater, than what in England would be considered as a moderate ride of exercise, yet such is the savage face, and impracticable nature of the country, and such were the artificial difficulties which the industry of the enemy had thrown in the way, that the progress of the army thither, was a work of much preparation, time and labour. It will scarcely be believed in after times, and may now be received with difficulty in any other part of the world, that it cost an active and spirited army, without an enemy in force to impede its progress, not many fewer days in passing from one part to another of a country, than the distance, in a direct line, would have measured miles, yet such, however extraordinary, is the fact.—Besides that the country was a wilderness in almost every part of the passage, the enemy had cut large timber trees in such a manner, on both sides of the road, as to fall a-cross and length-ways, with their branches interwoven; so that the troops had several layers of these frequently to remove, in places where they could not possibly take any other direction. The face of the country was likewise so broken with creeks and marshes, that in that short space they had no less than forty bridges to construct, besides others to repair; and one of these was of log-work over a morass two miles in extent. All the toils and difficulties were encountered and overcome by the troops with their usual spirit and alacrity. The enemy were too weak, too

much

much dispirited, and probably too much afraid of the Indians, to add very materially to these difficulties.— Some skirmishing and firing there was, however, on every day's march, in which, as usual, they constantly came off losers.

It is true, that General Burgoyne might have adopted another rout to Hudson's river, by which most of these particular difficulties would have been avoided. By returning down the South river to Ticonderago, he might again have embarked the army on Lake George, and proceeded to the fort which takes its name, and lies at its head, from whence there is a waggon road to Fort Edward. To this it was objected, and probably with reason, that a retrograde motion in the height of victory, would tend greatly to abate that panic with which the enemy were confounded and overwhelmed; that it would even cool the ardour, and check the animation of the troops, to call them off from the prosecution of their success to a cold and spiritless voyage; and that their expedition would undoubtedly be checked by the resistance and delay which they must expect at Fort George; whereas when the garrison perceived that the army was marching in a direction, which was likely to cut off their retreat, they would undoubtedly consult their safety in time by abandoning the post.

The enemy abandoned Fort Edward, and retired to Saratoga, at the approach of the royal army, which, from the impediments we have seen in the march, was not until the end of July. The enthusiasm of the army, as well as of the General, upon their arrival on the Hudson's river, which had been so long the object of their hopes and wishes, may be better conceived than described. As the enemy, by previously abandon-

doning Fort George, and burning their vessels, had left the lake entirely open, a great embarkation of provisions, stores, and necessaries, was already arrived at that post from Ticonderago. The army was accordingly fully and immediately employed in transporting those articles, with artillery, batteaus, and such other matters as they judged necessary for the prosecution of their future measures, from Fort George to Hudson's river.

Nothing could exceed the astonishment and terror which the loss of Ticonderago, and its immediate consequences, spread throughout the New England provinces. The General's manifesto, in which he displayed the powers and numbers of the savages, added perhaps to the effect. It was remarkable, however, that in the midst of all these disasters, and consequent terrors, no sort of disposition to submit appeared in any quarter.

The New England government in particular, tho' most immediately menaced, did not sink under their apprehension of the common danger. They, as well as the Congress, acted with vigour and firmness in their efforts to repel the enemy. Arnold, whom we have lately seen in the engagement at Danbury, was immediately sent to the reinforcement of the northern army, who carried with him a train of artillery, which he received from Washington. On his arrival he drew the American troops back from Saratoga to Still Water, a central situation between that place and the mouth of the Mohawk river, where it falls into Hudson's. This movement was to be the nearer at hand to check the progress of Colonel St. Leger, who was now advancing up the former of these rivers. His forces were daily increased, thro' the

the outrages of the savages, who notwithstanding the regulations and endeavours of General Burgoyne, were too prone to the exercise of their usual cruelties, to be effectually restrained by any means. The friends of the royal cause, as well as its enemies, were equally victims of its indiscriminate rage. Among other instances of this nature, the murder of Miss M'Crea, which happened some small time after, struck every breast with horror.——Every circumstance of this horrid transaction served to render it more calamitous and afflicting. The young lady is represented to have been in all the innocence of youth and bloom of beauty. Her father was said to be deeply interested in the royal cause; and to wind up the catastrophe of this odious tragedy, she was to be married to a British officer on the very day that she was massacred.

This tragedy will stand as a deep blot in the annals of the present government as long as the sun revolves in his course around this terrestrial globe.——This massacre, and others its concomitants, will in some future reckoning make that coward tremble who is said to have given it sanction by the authority of his master on this side the Atlantic; and that hero who boasted great things in his sanguinary proclamations, will find the ghosts of innocents haunt him when the weapons of warfare are buried in peace.

Occasion was hence taken to exasperate the people, and to blacken the royal party and army. People were too apt to jumble promiscuously, and to place in one point of view, the cruelty of these barbarians, and the cause in which they were exerted. They equally execrated both.——Whilst they abhorred and detested that army which submitted to accept of such
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GENERAL GATES.

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an aid, they loudly condemned and reprobated that government which would call such auxiliaries into a civil contest; thereby endeavouring, as they said not to subdue but to exterminate a people whom they affected to consider, and pretended to reclaim as subjects. General Gates, in the course of these transactions, was not wanting by several publications to aggravate and inflame the picture of these excesses; and with no small effect.

By this means, the advantages expected from this terror that was constantly excited by these savage auxiliaries were not only counteracted; but this terror rather it may be thought produced a directly contrary effect. The inhabitants of the open and frontier countries had no choice of acting; they had no means of security left, but by abandoning their habitations, and taking up arms. Every man saw the necessity of becoming a temporary foldier, not only for his own security, but for the protection and defence of those connections which are dearer than life itself. Thus an army was poured forth by the woods, mountains, and marshes, which in this part were thickly sown with plantations and villages. The Americans recalled their courage; and when their regular army seemed to be entirely wasted, the spirit of the country produced a much greater and more formidable force.

In the mean time the army under General Burgoyne, in the neighbourhood of Fort Edward, began to experience those difficulties, which encreased as it farther advanced, until they at length became insurmountable. From the 30th of July, to the 15th of August, the army was continually employed, and every possible measure used for the bringing forward of

batteaus, provisions, and ammunition from Fort George to the first navigable part of Hudson's river, a distance of about 18 miles. The toil was excessive in this service, and the effect in no degree equivalent to the expence of labour and time. The roads were in some parts steep, and in others required great repairs. Of the horses which had been supplied by contract in Canada, through the various delays and accidents attending so long and intricate a combination of passage by land, and carriage by water, not more than one third was yet arrived. The industry of the General had been able to collect no more than 50 teams of oxen, in the country through which he had marched, or in this which he at present sojourned. These resources were totally inadequate to the purposes of supplying the army with provisions for its current consumption, and to the establishment at the same time of such a magazine as would enable it to prosecute the further operations of the campaign.—Exceeding heavy rains added to all these difficulties; and the impediments to the service were so various and stubborn, that after the utmost exertion for fifteen successive days, there was not above four days provisions in store, nor above ten batteaus in the Hudson's river.

In these embarrassing and distressing circumstances, the General received intelligence, that Colonel St. Leger had arrived before, and was conducting his operations against Fort Stanwix. He instantly and justly conceived, that a rapid movement forward at this critical juncture, would be of the utmost importance. If the enemy preceeded up the Mohawk, and that if St. Leger succeeded he would be liable to get between two fires; or at any rate, General Burgoyne's
army

army would get between him and Albany, so that he must either stand an action, or by passing the Hudson's river, endeavour to secure a retreat higher up to the New-England provinces. If, on the other hand, he abandoned Fort Stanwix to its fate, and fell back to Albany, the Mohawk country would of course be entirely laid open, the junction with St. Leger established, and the combined army at liberty and leisure to prescribe and chase its future line of operation.

The propriety of the movement was evident; but the difficulty lay, and great indeed it was, in finding means to carry the design into execution. To maintain such a communication with Fort George during the whole time of so extensive a movement, as would afford a daily supply of provision to an army, whilst its distance was continually increasing, and its course liable to frequent variation, was obviously impracticable. The army was too weak to afford a chain of posts for such an extent: continual escorts for every separate supply, would be a still greater drain; and in either case, the enemy had a body of militia within a night's march of White Creek, sufficient to break the line of communication.

Some other source of supply was therefore to be sought, or the design to be dropped, and the prospect of advantage which it presented totally relinquished. The enemy received large supplies of live cattle from the New England provinces, which passing the upper part of the Connecticut river, took the rout of Manchester, Arlington, and other parts of the New Hampshire grants (a tract of land disputed between that province and New-York,) until they were at length deposited at Bennington, from whence they were conveyed as occasion required to the rebel ar-

my. Bennington lies between the forks of the Ho-sick river, before their obtaining that name, and without being touched by either, and not 20 miles to the eastward of Hudson's; a place so obscure, and so incapable from situation of being otherwise, that nothing but the present troubles could have called it into notice. It was however at this time, besides being a store for cattle, a deposit for large quantities of corn, and other necessaries; and what rendered it an object of particular attention to the royal army, a large number of wheel carriages, of which they were in particular want, were also laid up there. This place was guarded by a body of militia, which underwent such frequent changes that its number was necessarily uncertain.

The General saw that the possession of this deposit would at once remove all the impediments that restrained the operations of the army, and enable him to proceed directly in the prosecution of his design.—He accordingly laid a scheme to surprize the place, and entrusted the execution of it to the German Lieutenant Colonel Baum, who had been immediately selected, and was then preparing to conduct an expedition tending to similar purposes, towards the borders of the Connecticut river.

The force allotted to this service amounted to about 500 men, consisting of about 200 of Reidesel's dismounted German dragoons, Captain Frazer's marksmen, the Canada volunteers, a party of provincials who were perfectly acquainted with the country, and about 100 Indians. The corps carried with them two light pieces of artillery.

In order to facilitate this operation, and to be ready to take advantage of its success, the army moved
up

up the east shore of Hudson's river, where it encamped nearly opposite to Saratoga, having at the same time thrown a bridge of rafts over, by which the advanced corps were passed to that place. At the same time Lieutenant Colonel Breyman's corps, consisting of the Brunswick grenadiers, light infantry, and chasseurs, were posted at Batten Kill, in order, if necessary, to support Baum.

The latter in his march fell in with a party of the enemy who were escorting some cattle and provisions, both of which he took with little difficulty, and sent back to the camp. The same fatal impediment which retarded all the operations of the army, viz. the want of horses and carriages, concurred with the badness of the roads in rendering Baum's advance so tedious, that the enemy were well informed of the design, and had time to prepare for his reception. Upon his approach to the place, having received intelligence that the enemy were too strong to be attacked by his present force with any prospect of success, he took a tolerable good post near Santhoick Mills on the nearer branch of what is called afterwards the Hosick river, which is there called Walloon creek, and at about four miles distance from Bennington; dispatching at the same time an express to the general with an account of his situation.

Colonel Breyman was accordingly dispatched from Batten-kill to reinforce Baum. That evil fortune now began to appear, which for some time after continued to sweep every thing before it. Breyman was so overlayed by bad weather, so sunk and embarrassed in bad roads, and met with such delays from the weakness and tiring of horses, and the difficulty of passing

sing the artillery carriages through a country scarcely practicable at any time, and now rendered much worse by the continual rains, that he was from eight in the morning of the 15th of August, to four in the afternoon of the same day, notwithstanding every possible exertion of men and officers, in getting forward about twenty-four miles.

General Stark, who commanded the militia at Bennington, determined not to wait for the junction of the two parties, advanced in the morning, whilst Breyman was yet struggling with the difficulties of his march, to attack Baum in his post, which he had entrenched and rendered as defensible as time and its nature would permit. The loyal provincials who were along with him, were so eager in their hopes, to find what they wished to be real, that when the enemy were surrounding his post on all sides, they for some time persuaded him, that they were bodies of armed friends who were coming to his assistance.—The colonel soon discovered their error, and made a brave defence. His small works being at length carried on every side, and his two pieces of cannon taken, most of the Indians, with several of the Provincials, Canadians, and British marksmen, escaped in the woods. The German dragoons still kept together, and when their ammunition was expended, were nobly led by their colonel to the charge with their swords. They were soon overwhelmed, and the survivors, among whom was the wounded colonel, were made prisoners.

Breyman, who had the hard fortune not to receive the smallest information of this engagement, arrived near the same ground about four in the afternoon, where instead of meeting his friends, he found his detachment

tachment attacked on all sides by the enemy. Notwithstanding the severe fatigue they had undergone, his troops behaved with great vigour and resolution, and drove the Americans in the beginning from two or three different hills, on which they had posts.— They were however at length overpowered, and their ammunition being unfortunately expended, although each soldier had brought out forty rounds in his pouch, they were obliged with great reluctance to abandon the two pieces of artillery they had brought with them, and to retreat in the best manner they could; a circumstance to which the lateness of the evening was very favourable.

The loss of men sustained by these two engagements could not be less than five or six hundred, of whom however the greater part were prisoners.— But this was not the only or the greatest loss. The reputation and courage which it afforded to the militia to find that they were able to defeat regular forces; that neither Englishmen nor Germans were invincible nor invulnerable in their impressions; and the hope and confidence excited by the artillery, and other trophies of victory, were of much greater consequence.— This was the first turn which fortune had taken in favour of the Americans in the northern war, since some time before the death of Gen. Montgomery; misfortune had succeeded misfortune, and defeat had trod upon the heel of defeat, since that period. This was the first instance in the present campaign, in which she seemed even wavering, much less that she for a moment quitted the royal standard. The exultation was accordingly great on the one side; nor could the other avoid feeling some damp to that eagerness

gerness of hope, and receiving some check to that assured confidence of success which an unmixed series of fortunate events must naturally excite.

St. Leger's attempt upon Fort Stanwix, (now called by the Americans Fort Schuyler) was soon after its commencement favoured by a success so signal, as would in other cases, and a more fortunate season, have been decisive as to the fate of a stronger and much more important fortress. General Harkiner, a leading man of that country, was marching at the head of eight or nine hundred of the Tryon county militia with a convoy of provisions, to the relief of the fort. St. Leger, well aware of the danger of being attacked in his trenches, and of withstanding the whole weight of the garrison in some particular and probably weak point at the same instant, and equally well understanding the kind of service for which the Indians were peculiarly calculated, judiciously detached Sir John Johnson with some regulars, the whole or part of his own regiment and the savages, to lie in ambush in the woods, and intercept the enemy upon their march.

It should seem by the conduct of the militia and their leader, that they were not only totally ignorant of all military duties, but that they had even never heard by report of the nature of an Indian war, or of that peculiar service in the woods, to which from its nature and situation their country was at all times liable.— Without an examination of their ground, without a reconnoitering or flanking party, they plunged blindly into the trap that was laid for their destruction. Being thrown into sudden and inevitable disorder, by a near and heavy fire on almost all sides, it was completed by the Indians, who instantly pursuing their fire, rushed in upon their broken ranks, and made a most dreadful

dreadful slaughter among them with their spears and hatchets. Notwithstanding their want of conduct, the militia shewed no want of courage in their deplorable situation. In the midst of such extreme danger, and so bloody an execution, rendered still more terrible by the horrid appearance and demeanor of the principal actors, they recollected themselves so far as to recover an advantageous ground, which enabled them after to maintain a sort of running fight, by which about one third of their number was preserved.

The loss was supposed to be on their side about 400 killed, and half that number prisoners.—It was thought of the greater consequence, as almost all those who were considered as the principal leaders and instigators of rebellion in that country were now destroyed. The triumph and exultation was accordingly great, and all opposition from the militia in that country was supposed to be at an end. The circumstance of old neighbourhood and personal knowledge between many of the parties in the present rage and animosity of faction, could by no means be favourable to the extension of mercy; even supposing that it might have been otherwise practised with prudence and safety, at a time when the power of the Indians was rather prevalent, and that their rage was implacable. For according to their computation and ideas of loss, the savages had purchased this victory exceedingly dear, 33 of their number having been slain, and 29 wounded, among whom were several of their principal leaders, and of their distinguished and favourite warriors. This loss accordingly rendered them so discontented, intractable, and ferocious, that the service was greatly affected by their ill disposition. The unhappy prisoners were however its first objects; most of whom

Vol. II. T t they

they inhumanly butchered in cold blood. The New-Yorkers, rangers, and other troops, were not without loss in this action.

On the day, and probably during the time of this engagement, the garrison, having received intelligence of the approach of their friends, endeavoured to make a diversion in their favour, by a vigorous and well conducted sally, under the direction of Colonel Willet their second in command. Willet conducted his business with ability and spirit. He did considerable mischief in the camp, brought off some trophies, no inconsiderable spoil, some of which consisted of articles that were greatly wanted, a few prisoners, and returned with little or no loss. He afterwards undertook, in company with another officer, a much more perilous expedition. They passed by night through the besiegers works, and in contempt of the danger and cruelty of the savages made their way for 50 miles through pathless woods, and unexplored morasses, in order to raise the country and bring relief to the fort. Such an action demands the praise even of an enemy.

Colonel St. Leger left no means untried to profit of his victory by intimidating the garrison. He sent verbal and written messages, stating their hopeless situation, the utter destruction of their friends, the impossibility of their obtaining relief, as General Burgoyne, after destroying every thing in his way, was now at Albany receiving the submission of all the adjoining counties, and by prodigiously magnifying his own force.—He represented, that in this state of things, if through an incorrigible obstinacy, they should continue a hopeless and fruitless defence, they would according to the practice of the most civilized nations

nations, be cut off from all conditions, and every hope of mercy. But he particularly dwelt upon the pains he had taken in softening the rage of the Indians for their late loss, and obtaining from them security, that in case of an immediate surrender of the fort, every man of the garrison should be spared; whilst on the other hand, they declared with the most bitter execrations, that if they met with any further resistance, they would not only massacre the garrison, but that every man, woman, and child in the Mohawk country would necessarily, and however against his will, fall sacrifices to the fury of the savages. This point he said he pressed entirely on the score of humanity; he promised on his part, in case of an immediate surrender, every attention which a humane and generous enemy could give.

The Governor, Colonel Gansevort, behaved with great firmness. He replied, that he had been entrusted with the charge of that garrison by the United States of America; that he would defend the trust committed to his care at every hazard, and to the utmost extremity: and that he neither thought himself accountable for, nor should he at all concern himself about any consequences that attended the discharge of his duty. It was shrewdly remarked in the fort that half the pains would not have been taken to display the force immediately without, or the success at a distance, if they bore any proportion at all to the magnitude in which they were represented.

The British commander was much disappointed in the state of the fort. It was stronger, in better condition, and much better defended than he expected. after great labour in his approaches, he found his artillery deficient, being insufficient in weight to make
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any considerable impression. The only remedy was to bring his approaches so near that they must take effect; which he sat about with the greater diligence. In the mean time the Indians continued fullen and intractable. Their late losses might have been cured by certain advantages; but the misfortune was, they had yet got no plunder, and their prospect of getting any seemed to grow every day fainter. It is the peculiar characteristic of that people to exhibit in certain instances degrees of courage and perseverance, which shock reason and credibility, and to betray in others the greatest irresolution and timidity; with a total want of that constancy which might enable them for any length of time to struggle with difficulty.

Whilst the commander was carrying on his operations which the utmost industry, the Indians received a flying report that Arnold was coming with a thousand men to relieve the fort. The commander endeavoured to hearten them, by promising to lead them himself, to bring all his best troops into action, and by carrying their leaders out to mark a field of battle, and the flattery of consulting them upon the intended plan of operation. Whilst he was thus endeavouring to soothe their temper, and to revive their flagging spirits, others scouts arrived with intelligence, probably contrived in part by themselves, which first doubled, and afterwards trebled the number of the enemy, with the comfortable addition, that Burgoyne's army was entirely cut to pieces. The Colonel returned to the camp, and called a council of their chiefs, hoping that by the influence which Sir John Johnson, and the superintendants Claus and Butler had over them, they might still be induced to make a stand. He was disappointed. A part of the Indians decamped whilst the
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the council was sitting, and the remainder threatened peremptorily to abandon him, if he did not immediately retreat.

August 22d. The retreat was of course precipitate; or it was rather in plain terms a flight, attended with disagreeable circumstances. The tents, with most of the artillery stores, fell into the hands of the garrison. It appears by the colonel's own account, that he was as apprehensive of danger from the fury of his savage allies, as he could be from the resentment of his declared American enemies. It also appears from the same authority, that the Messafages, a nation of savages to the west, plundered several of the boats belonging to the army. By the American accounts, which are in part confirmed by others, it is said that they robbed the officers of their baggage, and of every other article to which they took any liking; and the army in general of their provisions. They also say, that a few miles distance from the camp, they first stripped of their arms, and afterwards murdered with their own bayonets, all those British, German, and American soldiers, who from inability to keep up, fear, or any other cause, were separated from the main body.


The state of the fact with respect to the intended relief of the fort is, that Arnold had advanced by the way of Half-moon, up the Mohawk river, 2000 men for that purpose; and that for the greater expedition, he had quitted the main body and arrived by forced marches through the woods, with a detachment of 900 men at the fort, on the 24th in the evening, two days after the siege had been raised.—So that upon the whole, the intractableness of the Indians, with their watchful apprehension of danger, probably saved them

them from a chastisement, which would not have been tenderly administered.

Nothing could have been more untoward in the present situation of affairs, than the unfortunate issue of this expedition. The Americans represented this and the affair at Bennington, as great and glorious victories. Nothing could exceed their exultation and confidence. Gansevoort and Willet, with General Starke and Colonel Warner, who had commanded at Bennington, were ranked amongst those who were considered as the saviours of their country. The northern militia began now to look high, and to forget all distinctions between themselves and regular troops. As this confidence, opinion, and pride encreased, the apprehension of General Burgoyne's army of course declined, until it soon became to be talked of with indifference and contempt, and even its fortune to be publicly prognosticated. In the mean time, General Gates, on whose conduct and ability it appears the Americans had placed much reliance, arrived to take the command of the army; an event which gave a new spur to their exertion, and afforded an additional support to their hopes. The arrival of Gates enabled Arnold, who still held the next place in every thing to the commander in chief, and between whom it appears the most perfect harmony prevailed, to set out on that expedition to Fort Stanwix, which has been just related.

During this time General Burgoyne continued in his camp on the eastern shore of the Hudson's river, nearly opposite to Saratoga, where he used the most unremitting industry and perseverance, in bringing stores and provisions forward from Fort George. As a swell of the water occasioned by great rains, had carried

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GENERAL BURGoyNE.

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ried away his bridge of rafts, he threw another of boats over the river at the same place. Having at length by good management obtained and brought forward about thirty days provision, with other necessary stores, he took a resolution of passing the Hudson's river with the army, which he accordingly carried into execution towards the middle of September, and encamped on the heights and in the plain of Saratoga, the enemy being then in the neighbourhood of Still Water.

Though this measure of passing the Hudson's river has not only been a subject of much discussion at home, but also of parliamentary enquiry; yet as it still lies open, without any decision on its merits, and that the general's instructions are not publicly known, nor perhaps all his motives thoroughly understood, we shall not presume to form any opinion upon the question. It will be sufficient to observe, that in his letters to the American minister, he says, That he thinks it a duty of justice to take upon himself the measure of having passed the Hudson's river, in order to force a passage to Albany. And that he did not think himself authorized to call any men into council, when the peremptory tenor of his orders, and the season of the year, admitted of no alternative. He also gives, in a subsequent part of the same letter, the following state of his reasoning, at a time when the army was in very critical and hazardous circumstances. "The expedition I commanded was evidently meant at first to be *hazarded*. Circumstances might require it should be *devoted*; a critical junction of Mr. Gates's force with Mr. Washington might possibly decide the fate of the war; the failure of my junction with Sir Henry Clinton, or the loss of my retreat to Canada, could only
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be a partial misfortune." Whether his retreat was at this period quite practicable, even if his orders had not been to advance at all hazards, is uncertain.

Such it seems were the principles of the general's conduct in some of the succeeding events. As the army advanced along the river towards the enemy, they found the country very impracticable, being covered with thick woods, and a continual repair of bridges necessary. Being at length arrived in the front of the enemy, some woods only of no great extent intervening, the general put himself at the head of the British line which composed the right wing.—That wing was covered by General Frazer and Colonel Breyman, with the grenadiers and light infantry of the army, who kept along some high grounds which commanded its right flank, being themselves covered by the Indians, provincials, and Canadians in the front and flanks. The left wing and artillery under the Major Generals Philips and Reidesel, kept along the great road and meadows by the river side.

The enemy, being incapable from the nature of the country of perceiving the different combinations of the march, issued from their camp in great force, with a design of turning the right wing, and taking the British line on the flank. Being unexpectedly checked in this design, by the strong position of General Frazer, they immediately counter-marched, and the same particularity of country which had occasioned their mistake, now operated as effectual to prevent their discovery, and consequently of taking any advantage of their subsequent movement, they directing the principal effort to the left of the same wing.

The British troops were not a little surprized at the boldness with which they began the attack, and the
vigour

vigour and obstinacy with which it was sustained, from three o'clock in the afternoon till after sunset. Arnold led on the enemy, and fought danger with eagerness, and intrepidity, which though much in his character was at no time more eminently distinguished. The enemy were, however, continually supplied with fresh troops, whilst the weight of the action lay principally for a long time upon the 20th, and 21st, and 62d regiments. It will be needless to say, that they behaved with their usual firmness and gallantry, though it may not be totally superfluous to observe, that the greater part of these three regiments, were engaged for near four hours without intermission.

Most of the other corps of the army, bore also good share in the business of the day. The 24th regiment, which belonged to Frazer's brigade, with the grenadiers and a part of the light infantry, were for some time brought into action, and charged with their usual spirit and bravery. Breyman's riflemen, and some other parts of his corps, also did good service; but these troops only acted partially and occasionally as the heights on which they had been originally posted, were of too great importance to be totally evacuated.

Major-General Philips upon first hearing the firing made his way with Major Williams and a part of the artillery through a very difficult part of the wood, and from that time rendered most essential service.— It seems as if in one instance his presence of mind had nearly saved the army, when in the most critical point of time, he restored the action by leading up the 20th regiment, the enemy having then a great superiority of fire. Though every part of the artillery performed almost wonders, the brave Captain Jones

(who was unfortunately, though gloriously, killed) with his brigade, were particularly distinguished.—Major General Reidesel also exerted himself to bring up a part of the left wing, and arrived in time to charge the enemy with bravery and effect. Just as the light closed, the enemy retired; and left the royal army masters of the field of battle. The darkness equally prevented pursuit and prisoners.

Upon the whole the royal army gained nothing but honour by this arduous struggle and hard-fought battle. They had now grappled with such an enemy as they had never before encountered in America; and such as they were too apt to imagine it could not produce. The flattering ideas that the Americans could only fight under the covert of walls, hedges, or entrenchments, and were incapable of sustaining a fair and open conflict in the field, were now at an end.—This opinion had also been in some measure shaken in the south. Here they met with a foe who seemed as eager for action, as careless of danger, and as indifferent with respect to ground or cover as themselves,—and after a hard and close contest of four hours, hand to hand, when darkness put an end to the engagement, the royal forces but barely kept the field, and the Americans only returned to their camp.

We lost many brave men in this action, and it was not much matter of comfort that the Americans had lost a great number. The army lay all night on their arms in the field of battle, and in the morning took a position nearly within cannon shot of the enemy's camp, fortifying their right wing, and extending their left so as to cover those meadows through which the river runs, and where their batteaux and hospitals were placed. The 47th regiment, with that of Hesse Hanau,

Hanau, and a corps of provincials, were encamped in the meadows as an additional security. The enemy's right was incapable of approach, and their left was too strongly fortified to be insulted.

The zeal and alacrity of the Indians began from this time to slacken.—Though the General complains in his dispatches of the ill effects of their desertion, he does not specify the particular time of their abandoning the army. This close and dangerous service was by no means suited to their disposition and the prospect of plunder was narrowed to nothing. Fidelity and honour were principles for which they had no terms, and of which they could frame no ideas. Some letters had lately passed between Gates and General Burgoyne, in which bitter reproaches relative to the barbarities committed by the savages were thrown out by the one, and those charges were in general denied and in part palliated by the other. The savages likewise received some check on account of the murder of Miss M'Crea. Upon some or all of these accounts, they deserted the army in the season of its danger and distress, when their aid would have been most particularly useful, and afforded a second instance within a short time, of the little reliance that could be placed on such auxiliaries.

A great desertion also prevailed amongst the Canadians and British provincials, nor does it seem as if the fidelity or services of those who remained, were much depended on or esteemed. General Burgoyne had from the beginning, nor did it entirely forsake him at this time, a firm hope of being powerfully succoured if wanted, or at any rate of being met and joined at Albany by a strong force from the army at

New-York. He now received with great difficulty a letter in cypher from Sir Henry Clinton, informing him of his intention to make a diversion on the North River, by attacking the Fort Montgomery, and some other fortresses which the rebels had erected in the Highlands, in order to guard the passage up that river to Albany. Though his diversion fell far short of the aid which the General expected, he however hoped that it might afford essential service by obliging Gates to divide his army. He accordingly returned the messenger, and afterwards dispatched two officers in disguise, and other confidential persons, all separately and by different routes, to acquaint Clinton with his exact state, situation and condition; to press him urgently to the immediate prosecution of his design, and to inform him that he was enabled in point of provision, and fixed in his determination, to hold his present position, in the hope of favourable events, until the 12th of the following month.

In the mean time every means were used for fortifying the camp, and strong redoubts were erected for the protection of the magazines and hospitals, not only to guard against any sudden attacks, but for their security in any future movement which the army might make in order to turn the enemy's flank. The strictest watch on the motions of the enemy, and attention on every quarter to their own security, became every day more indispensable, as Gates's army was continually increasing in force by the accession of fresh bodies of the militia.

The spirit of exertion and enterprize which was now raised in the New England provinces, was become too general, and too much animated by success, to be easily withstood at once in all the different points of

of its direction. Whilst General Burgoyne was fully engaged with Gates and Arnold, and found himself immediately involved in circumstances sufficiently perplexing, all his difficulties were increased, and his situation was rendered much more critical and precarious by an unexpected enterprize of the militia from the other parts of New Hampshire and the head of the Connecticut, totally to cut off all means of communication with Canada, by recovering the forts of Ticonderago and Mount Independence, and becoming again masters, at least, of Lake George.

The expedition was under the direction of General Lincoln, and the immediate execution was committed to the Colonels Brown, Johnston, and Woodbury, with detachments of above 500 men each. They conducted their operations with such secrecy and address, that they effectually surprized all the out posts between the landing place at the north end of Lake George, and the body of the fortrefs of Ticonderago. Mount Defiance, Mount Hope, the French lines, and a block house, with 200 batteaux, an armed sloop, and several gun boats, were almost instantly taken. Four companies of foot, with near an equal number of Canadians, and many of the officers and crews of the vessels were made prisoners; whilst they afforded liberty for a number of their own people, who were confined in some of the works they had taken, and after repeated summons to Brigadier Powel, who commanded, and who gallantly rejected all their proposals, they for four days made reiterated attacks upon the works at Ticonderago and Mount Independence; until finding they were repulsed in every assault, and totally unequal to the service, they at length abandoned the design.

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In the beginning of October Gen. Burgoyne thought it expedient, from an uncertainty of his situation, to lessen the soldier's ration of provisions; a measure, which, however disagreeable to an army, was now submitted to with a cheerfulness which merited the highest regard, and did the greatest honour to the troops. Things continued in this state until the 7th of October, when there being no appearance or intelligence of the intended co-operations, and the time limited for the stay of the army in the present camp within four or five days of being expired, it was judged adviseable to make a movement to the enemy's left, not only to discover whether there were any possible means of forcing a passage, should it be judged necessary to advance, or dislodging them for the convenience of the retreat, but also to cover a forage for the army, which was exceedingly distressed by the present scarcity.

A detachment of 1500 regular troops, with two twelve pounders, two howitzers, and six six pounders, were ordered to move, being commanded by the General in person, who was seconded by those excellent officers, the Major Generals Philips and Reidesel, with Brigadier General Frazer. No equal number of men were ever better commanded, and it would have been difficult indeed to have matched the men with any equal number.—The guard of the camp upon the high grounds was committed to the Brigadier Generals Hamilton and Speight; that of the redoubts and the plain near the river, to Brigadier Goll. The force of the enemy immediately in the front of the lines was so much superior, that it was not thought safe to augment the detachment beyond the number we have stated.

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The troops were formed within three quarters of a mile of the enemy's left, and the irregulars were pushed on through bye-ways to appear as a check on their rear. But the further intended operations of the detachment were prevented, by a very sudden and most rapid attack of the enemy upon the British grenadiers, who were posted to support the left wing of the line. Major Ackland at the head of the grenadiers, sustained this fierce attack with great resolution; but the numbers of the enemy enabling them, in a few minutes, to extend the attack along the whole front of the Germans, who were posted immediately on the right of the grenadiers, it became impracticable to move any part of that body, for the purpose of forming a second line to support the flank, where the great weight of the fire still fell.

The right was still unengaged; but it was soon perceived that the enemy were marching a strong body round their flank in order to cut off their retreat.—To oppose this bold and dangerous attempt, the light infantry, with a part of the 24th regiment, which were joined with them at that post, were thrown into a second line, in order to recover the retreat of the troops into camp.

Whilst this motion was yet in process, the enemy pushed a fresh and strong reinforcement to decide the action on the left, which being totally overpowered by so great a superiority, was compelled by dint of force to give way; upon which, the light infantry and 24th regiment were obliged, by a very quick movement, to endeavour to save the wing from being totally ruined.—It was in this movement, that the brave Brigadier-general Frazer was mortally wounded—An officer whose loss would have been general—

ly felt, and his place with difficulty supplied, in a corps of the most accomplished officers.

The situation of the detachment was now exceedingly critical; but the danger to which the lines were exposed were still more alarming and serious. Philips and Reidesel were ordered to cover the retreat, and those troops which were nearest, or most disengaged, returned as fast as they could for their defence.—The troops in general retreated in good order, though very hard pressed. They were obliged to abandon six pieces of cannon, the horses not only being destroyed, but most of the brave artillery-men, who had as usual, under the conduct of Major Williams, displayed the utmost skill and ability in their profession, along with the most undaunted resolution, being either killed or dangerously wounded.

The enemy pursued their success with great eagerness. The troops had scarce entered the camp, when the Americans stormed it in different parts with uncommon fierceness; rushing to the lines through a severe fire of grape shot and small arms, with the utmost fury. Arnold led on the attack with his usual impetuosity, against a part of the entrenchments into which the light infantry under Lord Balcarras, with a part of the line, had thrown themselves by order. He there met with a brave and obstinate resistance. The action continued very warm for some time, each side seeming to vie with each other in ardour and perseverance. In this critical moment of glory and danger, Arnold was grievously wounded, just as he was forcing his way into, or had already entered the works. This could not fail to damp his party, who after long and repeated efforts were finally repulsed.

Affairs were not so fortunate in another quarter.—Colonel Breyman, who commanded the German reserve, being killed, the entrenchment defended by that corps was carried sword in hand, and they were totally routed with the loss of their baggage, tents, and artillery. This misfortune was not retrieved, altho' orders for the recovery of the post were dispatched by the General ; and his relation of the transaction seems to imply some blame to those who failed in the execution. By this means the enemy gained a dangerous opening on our right and rear. The night only put an end to the engagement.

It would seem that nothing could now exceed the distress and calamity of the army. They bore it with that excellence of temper, and that unconquerable firmness and resolution, which are natural to, and were worthy of British soldiers. It was evidently impossible to continue in their present situation, without submitting to a certainty of destruction on the ensuing day. A total change of position was accordingly undertaken, and as it seems to have been conceived with great judgment was carried into execution during the night, with a degree of coolness, silence, order, and intrepidity, which has seldom been equalled, and will certainly never be exceeded. It was not the movement of a wing or part, it was a general remove of the whole army, of the camp and artillery, from its late ground to the heights above the hospital ;—thus, by an entire change of front, to reduce the enemy to a necessity of forming an entire new disposition. All this was accomplished in the darkness, and under the doubt and apprehension of such a night, so fatally ushered in, and accompanied throughout with circumstances of such uncommon peril, as were sufficient to

Vol. II. X x disturb

disturb the best formed mind, and to shake the firmest resolution, without loss, and what was still more, without disorder.

Many brave men fell on this unfortunate day. The officers suffered exceedingly. Several who had been grievously wounded in the late action, and who disdained an absence from any danger in which their fellows were involved, were again wounded in this.—Among those of greater note, or who were distinguished by higher rank, who fell besides General Frazer and Colonel Breyman, whom we have mentioned, Sir James Clarke, aid de camp to Gen. Burgoyne was mortally wounded and taken prisoner; Major Williams of the artillery, and Major Ackland of the grenadiers, were also taken, the latter being wounded. Upon the whole, the lists of killed and wounded, though avowedly imperfect, and not including the Germans, were long and melancholy.

On the next day, the army, being sensible nothing less than a successful and decisive action could extricate them from their present difficulties, continued without effect during its course to offer battle repeatedly, in their new position, to the enemy. They were preparing, with great coolness, the carrying of measures into execution which were less dangerous, though not less effectual, than the attack of a brave and desperate enemy, in strong and fortified ground. A continued succession of skirmishes were, however, carried on, and these did not pass without loss on both sides.

In the mean time, the British General discovered, that the enemy had pushed a strong body forward to turn his right, which if effected, he would have been completely enclosed on every side. Nothing was left to prevent this fatal consequence, but an immediate

retreat

retreat to Saratoga. The army accordingly began to move at nine o'clock at night; and though the movement was within musket shot of the enemy, and the army encumbered in the retreat with all its baggage, it was made without loss. A heavy rain which fell that night, and continued on the ensuing day, though it impeded the progress of the army, and increased the difficulties of the march, served at the same time to retard, and in a great measure to prevent the pursuit of the enemy. In this unhappy necessity, the hospital with the sick and wounded, was, of course, and must have been inevitably abandoned. In this instance, as well as in every other which occurred in the course of these transactions, Gen. Gates behaved with an attention and humanity, to all those whom the fortune of war had thrown into his hands, which does honour to his character.

On the side of the Americans, the loss in killed and wounded was great; and it is supposed exceeded that of the British. They, however, lost no officer of note; but the Generals Lincoln and Arnold were both dangerously wounded.

From the impediments in the march which we have mentioned, the army did not pass the fords of the Fish Kill Creek, which lies a little to the northward of Saratoga, until the tenth in the morning.

They found a body of the enemy already arrived, and throwing up entrenchments on the heights before them, who retired at their approach over a ford of the Hudson's river, and there joined a greater force, which was stationed to prevent the passage of the army.

—————No hope now remained but that of effecting a retreat, at least as far as Fort George, on the way to Canada. For this purpose,

a detachment of artificers under a strong escort, was sent forward to repair the bridges, and open the road to Fort Edward. But they were not long departed from the camp, when the sudden appearance of the enemy in great force, on the opposite heights, with their apparent preparation to pass the Fish Kill, and bring on an immediate engagement, rendered it necessary to recall the 47th regiment, and Frazer's marksmen, who with Mackey's provincials, composed the escort. The workmen had only commenced the repair of the first bridge, when they were abandoned by their provincial guard, who ran away, and left them to shift for themselves, only upon a very slight attack of an inconsiderable party of the enemy. All the force of discipline, and all the stubbornness derived from its most confirmed habits, were now necessary to support even the appearance of resolution.

The farther shore of the Hudson's river, was now lined with detachments of the enemy, and the bateaux loaded with provisions and necessaries, which had attended the motions of the army up the river, since its departure from the neighbourhood of Still-Water, were exposed, notwithstanding any protection which could possibly be afforded, to the continual fire and attacks of these detachments. Many boats were taken, some retaken, and a number of men lost in the skirmishes, upon these occasions. At length it was found that the provisions could only be preserved by landing and bringing them up the hill to the camp; a labour which was accomplished under a heavy fire with difficulty and loss.

In these deplorable circumstances, councils of war were held, to consider of the possibility of a further retreat. The only measure that carried even the ap-

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pearance of practicability, hard, difficult and dangerous as it was, was by a night march to gain Fort Edward, the troops carrying their provisions upon their backs. The impossibility of repairing the roads and bridges, and of conveying in their present situation the artillery and carriages, were too evident to admit of a question. It was proposed to force the fords at or near Fort Edward.

Whilst preparations were making for carrying this forlorn and desperate resolve into execution, intelligence was received, that the enemy had already with great foresight, provided for every possible measure that could be adopted for an escape, and that this final resort was accordingly cut off. Besides being strongly entrenched opposite to the fords which it was intended to pass, they had a strong camp and provided with artillery, on the high and raising grounds, between Fort Edward and Fort George; whilst their parties were every where spread along the opposite shore of the river to watch or intercept the motions of the army, and on their own, the enemy's posts were so close, that they could scarcely make the smallest movement without discovery.

Nothing could be more deplorably calamitous than the state and situation of the army. Worn down by a series of hard toil, incessant efforts, and stubborn action; abandoned in their utmost necessity and distress by the Indians; weakened by the desertion, or disappointed and discouraged by the timidity and inefficacy of the Canadians and Provincials; and the regular troops reduced by repeated and heavy losses of many of their best men and most distinguished officers, to the number of only 3,500 effective fighting men, of whom not quite 2000 were British. In these circumstances,

cumstances, and this state of weakness, without a possibility of retreat, and their provisions just exhausted, they were invested by an army of four times their own number, whose position extended three parts in four of a circle round them; who refused to fight from a knowledge of their condition; and who from the nature of the ground could not be attacked in any part.

In this helpless condition, obliged to lie constantly on their arms, whilst a continued cannonade pervaded all the camp, and even rifle and grape shot fell in every part of the lines, the British troops retained their constancy, temper, and fortitude, in a wonderful and almost unparalleled manner. As true courage submits with great difficulty to despair, they still flattered themselves with the hope of succour from their friends on the New York side, or perhaps with no less fervent wishes, of an attack from the enemy; thereby to quit all scores at once, and either to have an opportunity of dying gallantly, or extricating themselves with honour. In the mean time, the enemy's force was continually increased by the pouring in of the militia from all parts, who were all eager to partake of the glory, the spoil, or the pleasure of beholding the degradation of those whom they had so long dreaded, and whom they unhappily considered as their most implacable enemies.

At length no succour appearing, no rational ground of hope of any kind remaining, an exact account of the provisions was taken on the evening of the 13th of October, when it was found that the whole stock in hand would afford no more than three days bare subsistence for the army. A council was immediately called; and the general thinking it
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right and just, in a matter so momentous to individuals, as well as the whole, to obtain the general opinion and suffrage of the army, so far as it could with propriety be collected, invited, besides the generals and field officers, all the captains commanding corps or divisions, to assist at the council. The result was, an unanimous determination to open a treaty and enter into a convention with General Gates.

Gen. Gates shewed no marks of arrogance, nor betrayed any signs of being carried away by the present extraordinary torrent of success. The terms were moderate, considering the ruined state and irretrievable circumstances of the army; and that it was already in effect at the enemy's mercy, being equally incapable of subsisting where it was, and of making its way to a better situation. The principal difficulty related to a point of military honour, in which the British generals and troops were peremptory, and Gates far from being stiff.

The principal articles of the convention, exclusive of those which related to the provision and accommodation of the army, in its way to Boston, and during its stay at that place, were, That the army should march out of the camp with all the honours of war, and its camp artillery, to a fixed place where they were to deposit their arms: to be allowed a free embarkation and passage to Europe from Boston, upon condition of their not serving again in America, during the present war; the army not to be separated, particularly the men from the officers; roll calling and other duties of regularity to be admitted; the officers to be admitted on parole, and to wear their side arms; all private property to be sacred, and the public delivered upon honour; no baggage, to be searched or

molested,

molested; all persons of whatever country, appearing to, or following the camp, to be fully comprehended in the terms of capitulation; and the Canadians to be returned to their own country, liable to its conditions.

General Gates fulfilled all the conditions, so far as he was, or should be concerned in them, with the utmost punctuality and honour. His humanity and politeness, in every part of the business, have been much celebrated; without a single detraction, so far as has yet been heard, from the most unfavourable accounts that have been given of his conduct. This was the more praise worthy, as some late as well as former circumstances, had highly enraged the American militia; the army in its last movements, whether from military necessity, or the vexation and ill-temper incident to their situation, or the joint operation of both, having burnt and destroyed many houses, and some of them buildings of great value. The extraordinary and severe execution which now took place upon the North River, would also have afforded too much colour for a different mode of conduct. It is even said, and we do not find it has been contradicted, that this general paid no nice attention to the British military honour and to the character and feelings of those brave troops who now experienced so deplorable a reverse of fortune, that he kept his army close within their lines, and did not suffer an American soldier to be a witness to the degrading spectacle of piling their arms.

The Americans state the whole number who laid down their arms, including Canadians, provincials, volunteers, regulars, and irregulars, of all sorts, at 6752 men. In this number is undoubtedly included, though not specified, all the artificers, labourers, and followers

followers of the camp. They also state the number of sick and wounded left in the hospitals at the retreat from the camp near Still Water, to 528 men, and the loss besides in the army, in killed, wounded, taken, or deserted, from the 6th of July downwards, to 2,933; the total amount of these numbers being 9,213 men. By another account, the number is carried above ten thousand men. They also got a fine train of artillery, amounting to 35 pieces of different sorts and sizes.

During these unfortunate transactions, Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton conducted his expedition up the North river with great success. He had embarked about 3000 men for that purpose, accompanied by a suitable naval force, consisting of ships of war, armed galleys, and smaller vessels, under the conduct of Commodore Hotham. Their first object was the reduction of the forts Montgomery and Clinton, which tho' of considerable strength, being at that time in a very unguarded state, it was determined to attempt by a coup de main. They were situated on either side of a creek, which descended from the mountains to the North river, and their communication preserved by a bridge. Several necessary motions being made to mask the real design, the troops were landed in two divisions, at such a distance from their object as occasioned a considerable and difficult march through the mountains; which was however calculated and conducted with such precision, that the two detachments arrived on the opposite sides of the creek, and made their separate attacks on the forts, at nearly the same time. The surprize and terror of the garrisons were increased by the appearance of the ships of war, and the arrival and near fire of the galleys, which approach-

ed so close as to strike the walls with their oars. The assault on both sides of the Creek was exceedingly vigorous, and the impetuosity of the troops so great that notwithstanding a very considerable defence, both the forts were carried by storm. As the soldiers were much irritated, as well by the fatigue they had undergone and the opposition they met, as by the loss of some brave and favourite officers, the slaughter of the enemy was considerable.

Upon the loss of the forts, the rebels set fire to two fine new frigates, and to some other vessels, which with their artillery and stores were all consumed.—Another Fort called Constitution, was in a day or two after, on the approach of the combined land and naval force, precipitately set on fire and abandoned. Gen. Tryon also, at the head of a detachment, destroyed a new and thriving settlement, called Continental Village, which contained barracks for 1500 men, with considerable stores. The artillery taken in the three forts, amounted 67 pieces of different sizes. A large quantity of artillery and other stores, with ammunition and provisions, were also taken. A large boom and chain, the making of which was supposed to have cost 70,000*l.* and the construction of which was considered as an extraordinary proof of American labour, industry, and skill, was in part destroyed and in part carried away.

Upon the whole, the American loss in value, was probably greater than upon any other occasion since the commencement of the war. Their strength and attention were drawn away to the northward, and other things must have been neglected, whilst they applied both to the principal object.

Our loss in killed and wounded was not great as to number, but some distinguished and much lamented officers

officers fell. Of these, besides Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, who commanded the attack on Fort Montgomery, Major Sill was, from the general esteem he had acquired through his many excellent qualities, universally regretted. Major Grant, of the New York volunteers, and Count Grabouski, a Polish nobleman, and aid de camp to General Clinton, were also slain in the assault on these forts.

The expedition did not end with this success. Sir James Wallace, with a flying squadron of light frigates, and Gen. Vaughan, with a considerable detachment of troops, continued for several days their excursion up the river, carrying terror and destruction wherever they went. At the very time that Gen. Burgoyne was receiving the most favourable conditions for himself and ruined army, the fine village or town of Esopus, at no very great distance, were reduced to ashes, and not a house left standing. The extraordinary devastation which attended every part of this expedition, of the necessity of which we are not judges, was productive of a pathetic, but severe letter, from Gen. Gates, then in the height of victory, to Gen. Vaughan.

On the approach of Gates, the troops and vessels retired to New York, having dismantled the forts, and for a time, at least, having left the river defenceless. But that enterprize, though conducted with spirit and ability, was of little moment in the general account.

Such was the unfortunate issue of the northern campaign; the event of an expedition which was undertaken with the most confident hopes, and for some time pursued with very flattering appearances of success. It was supposed the principal means for the im-

mediate reduction of the colonies; but it has only served, in conjunction with other operations, which in the first instance have succeeded better, to demonstrate the difficulties attending the subjugation of a numerous people at a great distance, in an extensive country marked with strong lines, and abounding in strong natural defences, if the resources of war are not exceedingly deficient, and that the spirit of the people is in any degree proportioned to their situation. It may now, whatever it was in the beginning, be a matter of doubt, whether any superiority of power, of wealth, and of discipline, will be found to over balance such difficulties.

It would not be easy at present, as many things necessary to be known have not yet been fully explained, and improper, as the whole is still a subject of public investigation, to attempt forming any judgment upon the general plan or system of this campaign.—The general conduct of the war this year has already undergone much censure; and undoubtedly, the sending of the grand army at such a distance to the southward, whilst the inferior was left struggling with insurmountable difficulties in the north, when it would seem that their junction or co-operation would have rendered them greatly superior to any force which could have been possibly brought to oppose their progress, seems, in this view things, not to be easily accounted for. It is, however, a subject, upon which no conclusive opinion can yet be formed.

To conclude this part of the history of the American war it may be necessary to observe, that the schemes that were devised frustrated themselves. The appointing of General Burgoyne in the place of Sir G. Carleton threw a damp upon the progress of the war, upon the

the lakes. This officer had the year before carried all thing's successfully with the greatest judgment and humanity also; but all on a sudden the management was taken out of his hands, and an officer appointed who neither knew the country nor the genius of the people; who was indeed brave, but rash and adventurous. Though Carleton contributed as much as he could to the measures of the campaign yet he could not transfuse his own prudence and sagacity into another, nor direct the execution of such difficult adventures when he was not present. The march was long and difficult, hazardous in every step, and a single step fatal; great caution was required, and it required the abilities of Sir Guy Carleton, to have directed the footsteps of such an army through such a wilderness of forests and thickets. Of this officer Gen. Wolfe gave the most flattering testimony by setting him on high above all the British officers then known to him. The changing of this officer, in a great measure frustrated the war upon the lakes.

Another thing which tended greatly to ruin the progress of General Burgoyne, was the proclamation which he published full of bombast threatenings of cruelty and slaughter. It was this made all the country arm at once in their own defence, when they heard their fate determined in such a peremptory manner. Had this general contrived a scheme for his own ruin, he could not have done it more effectually than by thus warning the people what he intended to do. It was this proclamation that roused the colonists and made them all run to arms to defend their own lives and those of their families, from the hands of savage Indians and more savage Europeans. The murder of Miss M'Crea, though it was not immediately

ly known, became like a millstone about the neck of the British affairs in that quarter, ever since; it both produced a damp upon the minds of the authors of the murder, and kindled the keenest fire of resentment in the breasts of all the colonists. They now saw their fate, and endeavoured all that was in their power to prevent it; every man now became a soldier, ready to revenge the blood of his friends upon their murderers. General Burgoyne had not merely an army to combat, but a country of armed men, and could not move a foot but where he was sure to meet an enemy, from the boy of sixteen to the grey hairs of sixty.

The detachments which he sent were also badly arranged, and proper methods of communication were not observed, nor the way secured for a retreat in case of a defeat; he trusted to the valour and discipline of his troops, which though exceedingly good, could not perform impossibilities, as he found in experience. He soon began to find that even the valour of his men was despised, and that they were assaulted and defeated, by men they had mocked, ridiculed, and laughed at. He was truly an object of pity on account of his distress, but on account of his folly an object of laughter.

To conclude the history of this year, it may be necessary to give the reader an extract of the letters which passed between General Burgoyne and General Gates, before the convention at Saratoga, as also the articles of convention themselves. Lord Howe wrote from on board the *Eagle*, June 20, 1776, in this manner, 'I cannot, worthy friend, permit the letters and parcels which I have sent you, to be carried without adding a word upon the subject of the injurious extremities,

mities in which our unhappy disputes have engaged us. You will learn the nature of my mission from the official dispatches which I have recommended to be forward by the same conveyance. Retaining all the earnestness I ever expressed to see our differences accommodated, I shall conceive if I meet with the disposition of the colonies, which I was once taught to expect, the most flattering hopes of proving serviceable in the objects of the King's paternal solicitude, by promoting the establishment of lasting peace and union with the colonies. But if the deep rooted prejudices of America, and the necessity of preventing her trade from passing into foreign channels, must keep us still a divided people, I shall from every private as well as public motive most heartily lament, that it is not the moment wherein those great objects of my ambition are to be attained; and that I am to be longer deprived of an opportunity to assure you personally of the regard with which I am your sincere and faithful servant,

H O W E.

P. S. I was disappointed of the opportunity I expected for sending this letter at the time it was dated, and have ever since been prevented by calms and contrary winds, from getting here to inform Gen. Howe of the commission with which I have the satisfaction to be charged, and of his being joined in it. Off Sandy Hook, July 12, To Benjamin Franklin, Esq; Philadelphia.

Upon the thirteenth of July an answer to this letter was sent by Dr. Franklin to Lord Viscount Howe, in which there are several remarks which had they been attended to, might have prevented the shedding of much innocent blood. The tenor of the letter follows:

I received

I received safe, the letters your lordship so kindly forwarded to me, and beg you to accept my thanks. The official dispatches to which you refer me, contain nothing more, than what we had seen in the act of parliament, viz. offering pardon upon submission, which I was sorry to find, as it must give your lordship pain, to be sent so far upon so hopeless a business. Directing pardon to the colonists, who are the very parties injured, expresses indeed, that opinion of our ignorance, baseness, and insensibility, which your uninformed and proud nation has long been pleased to entertain of us; but it can have no other effect than that of increasing our resentment. It is impossible that we should think of submission to a government, that has with the most wanton barbarity and cruelty burnt our defenceless towns in the midst of winter; excited the savages to massacre peaceful farmers, and our slaves to murder their masters, and is even now bringing foreign mercenaries to deluge our settlements with blood. These atrocious injuries have extinguished every spark of affection for that parent country we once held so dear; but were it possible for us to forget them it is not possible for you, I mean the British nation, to forgive the people you have so heavily injured; you can never confide again in these as fellow subjects, and permit them to enjoy equal freedom to whom you know you have given such just causes of lasting enmity; and this must impel you, if we are again under your government, to endeavour the breaking of our spirits by the severest tyranny, and observing by every means in our power, our growing strength and prosperity. But your lordship mentions the king's paternal solicitude for promoting the establishment of lasting peace and union with the colonies

nies. If by peace is here meant, a peace to be entered into by distinct states now at war; and his majesty has given your lordship power to treat with us; of such peace, I may venture to say, though without authority, that I think a treaty for that purpose not quite impracticable, before we enter into foreign alliances; but I am perswaded you have no such powers. Your nation, though (by punishing those American governors who have fomented the discord, rebuilding our burnt towns, and repairing as far as possible the mischiefs done us) she might recover a great share of our regard and the greatest share of our growing commerce, with all the advantages of that additional strength to be derived from a friendship with us; yet I know too well her abounding pride and deficient wisdom, to believe she will ever take such salutary measures. Her fondness for conquest as a warlike nation, her lust of dominion as an ambitious one, and and her thirst for a gainful monopoly as a commercial one (none of them legitimate causes of war) will all join to hide from her eyes every view of her true interest, and will continually goad her on in these ruinous distant expeditions, so destructive both of lives and of treasure, that they must prove as destructive to her in the end, as the Croisades formerly were to most of the nations in Europe. I have not the vanity, my lord, to think of intimidating, by thus predicting the effects of this war; for I know it will in England, have the fate of all other predictions, not to be believed till the event shall verify it.

Long did I endeavour, with unfeigned and unwearyed zeal, to preserve from breaking, that fine and noble china vase the British empire; for I know,

that being once broken, the separate parts could not retain even their share of the strength and value, that existed in the whole; and that a perfect re-union of those parts could scarce ever be hoped for. Your lordship may possibly remember the tears of joy that wet my cheek, when at your good sister's in London, you once gave me expectations that a reconciliation might soon take place. I had the misfortune to find those expectations disappointed, and to be treated, as the cause of the mischief I was labouring to prevent. My consolation under that groundless and malevolent treatment was that I retained the friendship of many wise and good men in that country, and among the rest, some share in the regard of Lord Howe.

The well-founded esteem, and permit me to say, affection, which I shall always have for your lordship, make it painful for me to see you engaged in conducting a war the great ground of which as described in your letter, is the necessity of preventing the American trade from passing into foreign channels; to me it seems, that neither the obstinacy nor the retaining of any trade, how valuable soever, is an object for which men may justly spill each others blood; that the true and sure means of extending and securing commerce is the goodness and cheapness of commodities; and that the profits of no trade can ever be equal to the expence of compelling it and holding it by fleets and armies. I consider this against us, therefore as both *unjust* and *unwise*; and I am persuaded that cool and dispassionate posterity will condemn to infamy, those who advised it; and that even success will not save from some degree of dishonour, those who voluntarily engaged to conduct it. I know your great motive

tive of coming hither, was the hope of being instrumental in a reconciliation; and believe when you find that to be impossible, on any terms given you to propose, you will relinquish so odious a command, and return to a more honourable private station.

With the greatest and most sincere respect,

I have the honour to be, my lord,

Your lordship's most obedient humble servant,

B. FRANKLIN.

This letter has been truly prophetic, and the warning given in it ought to have been most seriously considered by the government; but such has been the infatuation of the public managers, that they have regarded no warnings from either their friends or their enemies.

Upon the 13th of October when the treaty was first begun General Burgoyne wrote the following card to General Gates.—Lieutenant General Burgoyne is desirous of sending a field officer with a message to Major General Gates, upon a matter of high consequence to both armies. He requests to be informed at what hour General Gates will receive him to-morrow morning.—The answer was, Major General Gates will receive a field officer from Lieutenant General Burgoyne at the advanced posts of the army of the United States, at ten o'clock to-morrow morning from which he will be conducted to head quarters. Dated the Camp of Saratoga, 9 o'clock.

Upon October 14th Major Kingston delivered the following message, to Major General Gates.—After having fought you twice, Lieutenant General Burgoyne has waited some days in his present position, determined to try a third conflict against any force you could bring to attack him. He is apprized of the su-

periority of your numbers and the disposition of your troops to impede his supplies, and render his retreat a scene of carnage on both sides. In this situation he is impelled by humanity, and thinks himself justified by established principles and precedents of State, and of war, to spare the lives of brave men upon honourable terms; should Major General Gates be inclined to treat upon this idea, General Burgoyne will propose a cessation of arms during the time necessary to communicate the preliminary terms, by which, in any extremity, he and his army will abide.

In answer to this the following proposals were made and answers given by General Burgoyne.

I. General Burgoyne's army being exceedingly reduced by repeated defeats, desertion, sickness, &c. their provisions exhausted, their military horses, tents and baggage taken or destroyed, their retreat cut off, and their camp invested, they can only be allowed to surrender prisoners of war.

Lieutenant General Burgoyne answered, that however much reduced his army, they would never admit that their retreat is cut off while they have arms in their hands.

II. The officers and soldiers may have the baggage belonging to them. The generals of the United States never permit individuals to be plundered.

III. The troops under his Excellency General Burgoyne will be conducted by the most convenient route to New England, marching by easy marches and sufficiently provided for by the way.

This article is answered by General Burgoyne's first propositions, which is here annexed.

IV. The officers will be admitted on parole; may wear their side arms, and will be treated with the liberality

berality customary in Europe, so long as they by proper behaviour to continue to deserve it ; but those who are apprehended having broke their parole, as some British officers have done, must expect to be close confined. The answer made to this article was :—There being no officer in this army under, or capable of being under, the description of breaking parole, this article needs no answer.

V. All public stores, artillery, arms, ammunition, carriages, horses, &c. must be delivered to commissioners appointed to receive them.

Ans. All public stores may be delivered, arms excepted.

VI. These terms being agreed to, and signed, the troops under his Excellency General Burgoyne's command may be drawn up in their encampments, where they will be ordered to ground their arms, and may thereupon be marched to the river side to be passed over to Bennington.

Ans. This article inadmissible in any extremity. Sooner than this army will submit to ground their arms in their encampment, they will rush on the enemy determined to take no quarter.

VII. A cessation of arms to continue till sun set to receive General Burgoyne's answer.

(Signed)

HORATIO GATES.

At sun-set Major Kingston met the Adjutant General of Major General Gates's army, and delivered the following message :—If General Gates does not mean to recede from the sixth article the treaty ends at once. The army will to a man proceed to any act of desperation rather than submit to this article. The cessation of arms end this evening.

The following are General Burgoyne's proposals, together with General Gates's answers. The

The answers being given to Major General Gates's proposals, it remains for Lieutenant General Burgoyne and the army under his command to state the following preliminary articles on their part.

I. The troops to march out of their camp with the honours of war, and the artillery of the entrenchments which will be left as hereafter ~~may~~ be regulated.

The troops to march out of their camp with the honours of war, and the artillery of the entrenchments to the verge of the river, where the old fort stood, where their arms and artillery must be left.

II. A free passage to be granted to this army to Great Britain, upon condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest; and a proper port to be assigned for the entry of transports to receive the troops, whenever General Howe shall so order.

Agreed to for the port of Boston.

III. Should any cartel take place, by which this army or any part of it may be exchanged, the foregoing article to be void as far as such exchange shall be made.

Agreed to.

IV. All officers to retain their carriages, bat horses, and other cattle; and no baggage to be molested or searched, the Lieutenant General giving his honour that there are no public stores secreted therein. Major General Gates will of course take the necessary measures for the security of this article.

Agreed to.

V. Upon the march the officers are not to be separated from the men, and in quarters the officers shall

shall be lodged according to their rank ; and are not to be hindered from assembling their men for roll-calling and other necessary purposes of regularity.

Agreed to, as far as circumstances will admit.

VI. There are various corps in this army composed of sailors, batteaux men, artificers, drivers, independent companies, and followers of the army ; and it is expected that those persons, of whatever country, shall be agreed to in the fullest sense and utmost extent of the above articles, and comprehended in every respect as British subjects.

Agreed to in the fullest extent.

VII. All Canadians, and persons belonging to the establishment in Canada, to be permitted to return.

Agreed to.

VIII. Passports to be immediately granted for three officers, not exceeding the rank of captain, who shall be appointed by General Burgoyne, to carry dispatches to Sir William Howe, Sir Guy Carleton, and to Great Britain, by way of New York, and the public faith to be engaged, that these dispatches are not to be opened.

Agreed to.

IX. The foregoing articles are to be considered as only preliminaries for framing a treaty, in the course of which others may arise, to be considered by both parties ; for which purpose it is proposed, that two officers of each army shall meet and report their declarations to their respective generals.

This capitulation to be finished by two o'clock this day, and the troops march from their encampments at five, and to be in readiness to move towards Boston to-morrow morning.

X. Lieutenant General Burgoyne will send his Deputy Adjutant General to receive Major Gen. Gates's answer to-morrow morning at ten o'clock.

Complied with.

(Signed)

HORATIO GATES.

Saratoga, October 15, 1777.

The eight preliminary articles of Lieutenant Gen. Burgoyne's proposals, and the second, third, and fourth of Major General Gates of yesterday, being agreed to, the foundation of the proposed treaty is out of dispute; but the several subordinate articles and regulations, necessarily springing from these preliminaries, and requiring explanation and precision between the parties, before a definitive treaty can be safely executed, a longer time than mentioned by Gen. Gates in the ninth article, becomes indispensibly necessary. Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne is willing to appoint two officers immediately to meet two others from Major General Gates, to propound, discuss, and settle those subordinate articles, in order that the treaty in due form may be executed as soon as possible.

(Signed)

JOHN BURGOYNE.

Saratoga, October 15, 1777.

Major Kingston has authority to settle the place of meeting of officers proposed. Major Kingston settled it on the ground where Mr. Schuyler's house stood. In the time of this negotiation, General Burgoyne sent the following message to General Gates :

In the course of the night Lieutenant General Burgoyne has received intelligence that a considerable force has been detached from the army under General Gates during the course of the negotiations of the treaty depending upon them. Lieutenant General
Burgoyne

Burgoyne conceives this, if true, to be not only a violation of the cessation of arms, but subversive of the principles on which the treaty originated, viz. a great superiority in Gen. Gates's army. Lieutenant General Burgoyne therefore requires, that two officers, on his part, be permitted to see that the strength of the forces now opposed to him is such as will convince him that no such detachment has been made; and that the same principle of superiority, upon which the treaty first began, still subsists.

It does not appear that any answer was given to this message.———The articles of convention follow.

I. The troops under Lieutenant General Burgoyne to march out of their camp with the honours of war, and the artillery of the entrenchments to the verge of the river, where the old fort stood, where the arms and artillery are to be left; the arms to be piled up by word of command from their own officers.

II. A free passage to be granted the army under Lieutenant General Burgoyne, to Great Britain, on condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest; and the port of Boston is assigned for the entry of transports, whenever General Howe shall so order.

III. Should any cartel take place, by which the army under General Burgoyne, or any part of it, may be exchanged, the foregoing article to be void, as far as such exchange shall be made.

IV. The army under Lieutenant General Burgoyne to march to Massachusetts's Bay by the most expeditious and convenient rout; and to be quartered in, near, or as convenient as possible, that the march of the troops may not be delayed when transports arrive to receive them.

V. The troops to be supplied on their march, and during their being in quarters, with provisions by Major General Gates's orders, at the same rate or rations as the troops of his own army; and if possible the officers, horses, and cattle are to be supplied with forage at the usual rates.

VI. All officers to retain their carriages, bat horses, and other cattle; and no baggage to be molested or searched, Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne giving his honour, that there are no public stores secreted therein, Major General Gates will of course take the necessary measures for a due performance of this article. Should any carriages be wanted, during the march for the transportation of officers baggage, they are, if possible, to be supplied by the country at the usual rates.

VII. Upon the march and during the time the army shall remain in quarters in the Massachusetts Bay, the officers are not, as far as circumstances will admit, to be separated from the men. The officers are to be quartered according to their rank, and are not to be hindred from assembling their men for roll-calling and other necessary purposes of regularity.

VIII. All corps whatever of Gen. Burgoyne's army, whether composed of sailors, batteaux men, artificers, drivers, independent companies, followers of the army, of whatever country, shall be included in the fullest sense and utmost extent of the above articles, and comprehended in every respect as British subjects.

IX. All Canadians, and persons belonging to the Canadian establishment, consisting of sailors, batteaux men, artificers, drivers, and independent companies, and many other followers of the army, who come under no particular description, are to be permitted to
return

return there, that is they are to be conducted immediately by the shortest route to the first British port on Lake George, are to be supplied with provisions in the same manner as the other troops, and are to be bound by the same condition of not serving during the present contest in North America.

X. Passports immediately to be granted for three officers, not exceeding the rank of captains, who shall be appointed by General Burgoyne to carry dispatches to Sir William Howe, Sir Guy Carleton, and to Great Britain by the way of New York; and Major Gen. Gates engages the public faith, that these dispatches shall not be opened. These officers are to set out immediately after receiving their dispatches, and are to travel the shortest and in the most expeditious manner.

XI. During the stay of the troops in the Massachusetts Bay, the officers are to be admitted upon parole, and are to be permitted to wear their side arms.

XII. Should the army under Lieutenant General Burgoyne find it necessary, to send for their cloathing and other baggage from Canada, they are to be permitted to do it in the most convenient manner, and the necessary passports to be granted for that purpose.

XIII. These articles are to be mutually signed and exchanged to morrow morning at nine o'clock; and the troops under Lieutenant General Burgoyne are to march out of their entrenchments at three o'clock.

(Signed) HORATIO GATES.

Camp at Saratoga, October 16, 1777.

To prevent any doubts that might arise from Lieutenant General Burgoyne's not being mentioned in the above treaty, Major General Gates hereby de-

clares, that he is hereby understood to be comprehended in it as fully, as if his name had been specifically mentioned.

HORATIO GATES.

This convention, concerning which there appears to have been a great deal of ceremony for very little purpose, shews more the pride and ambition of the British General, than his wisdom and prudence. The requisitions which he made, provided they had not been granted, would have exposed him and his whole army to certain ruin and destruction; for there was not the least probability that he was able to fight such a superior force, which knew his weakness, and were provided for any attack that he could have made. He might, as he threatened, have led on his men, and refused no quarter; but under the pressing influence of hunger and fatigue, it is not to be supposed they would have gained any thing except the honour of falling like madmen, for the sake of a cause which they never examined, but taken upon the word of their officers and commanders. Men exhausted with hunger and fatigue, fainting under a decay of animal spirits, were not soldiers very fit for rushing upon an enemy, three times their number, and supplied with the needful supplies of nature, which they wanted. General Gates knew well what would have been the consequence, but was unwilling to leave the slaughter of a British army, as a monument in history, of the severity of the colonists towards their oppressing brethren. He seems to have humour'd the British General rather as one under an infatuation, than dealt with him as a general of an army.—Gates will be remembered for his humanity, as well as greatness of soul, while history continues to hand down

down the transactions of mankind to posterity; and the convention of Saratoga will remain a proof both of his mercy and politeness.

General Burgoyne certainly made as much by this convention as he possibly could have expected; and much more than his situation promised; but his niceness concerning punctilios, might have marred all his success in it, and brought sudden ruin upon a number of brave and innocent men. The mercy of his enemies, and the prudence of their commander, wrought more for him than either his own wisdom or his merit. Had General Gates and his army been in his situation, there are many reasons to determine us to think that he would not have shewn the same clemency that he himself met with. His daring and bloody proclamation, to set loose the scalping savages upon peaceable and quiet peasants, who were engaged about their rural employments as our people at home, declared a disposition that favoured nothing of mercy or clemency: and it would have been no wonder, if they had measured to this boasting officer that measure which he had threatened to mete out to them. It was however happy that the sword was restrained, and so many lives preserved; and it ought to teach our commanders to shew more mercy than they have done on some occasions. Though our proud nation has declared these colonists rebels, the rest of Europe have a different opinion of them, since they became independent; and our cruelty to them, may on some future occasion, bring severities upon our own heads.

C H A P. XIII.

The confused state of the nation at home.—The Ministry alarmed by the news of the convention at Saratoga.—Conceal it as long as they can.—Occasions many debates in parliament.—A treaty of commerce between the Colonies and France.

THE national expectations were raised to such an high pitch, with regard to the success of the northern army, that the news of its slow operations and embarrassments, began to operate in creating melancholy and apprehensions of disappointment throughout the whole nation. The progress of General Burgoyne in his march from Canada to Albany, was not so rapid and successful as the ministry had given reason to expect in their confidence of boasting. Though some of his advanced parties had been successful and defeated their enemy, yet their own loss was considerable, and their progress to Albany interrupted by so many accidents, that the people at home began to be uneasy, and concluded that the secrets of this expedition were not fairly represented. They had almost anticipated the whole extent of the disaster before the news of it had arrived; and the catastrophe was not more extraordinary than many foresaw it would happen to be. The whole nation was in an universal murmur concerning the issue of this expedition. The friends of the minister endeavoured to colour those delays and disappointments with all their usual arts of apology, and promised sanguinely upon the

the success of the event, from the caution that was used in executing this project.—All their arts were insufficient to disguise their own apprehensions, or to persuade the people that they were not in possession of intelligence the most unfavourable to the nation and dishonourable to themselves. Of all the commanders that were sent to America, there were none in whom the zealous promoters of the war placed greater hopes and confidence than in Gen. Burgoyne; his abilities were extolled beyond the ordinary bounds of commendation, and it was thought impossible that any American force could oppose him. The Scotch nation, who were the most sanguinary promoters of this war, at the same instant that they were reproaching Gen. Howe, passed the most extravagant encomiums upon Gen. Burgoyne. He had threatened the colonists with severities which they approved of, and their sanguine hopes made them believe that he was well able to accomplish his threatenings. Some accounts that came from America preceding the convention at Saratoga, which were not very favourable, were interpreted as reports raised by the patriots to weaken the hands of government; and often ship-masters, who arrived at Port Glasgow and Greenock brought tidings of great comfort to the ministry, which were contrived on their voyages, or received from others, at the second, third, or fourth hands. These unauthenticated reports in a short time lost all credit, and *even* the Scots who thought the success of this expedition infallible, began to doubt and waver concerning its success.

General Burgoyne's success at Ticonderago, with the total defeat and ruin which for a season every where attended the Americans in their precipitate flight

flight on the borders of Lake George, excited the greatest triumph and exultation on the face of the ministry; and whilst it wonderfully raised their spirits, was considered as nearly crowning the hopes of all those who had supported or approved of the war.— So ready are mankind to be elevated above measure with what they fondly wish for and expect. It was observed that the northern expedition was the favourite creature of government. The transactions on the further side of Jersey, and the operations about Philadelphia, were only considered in a very subordinate point of view. As the minister for the American department had all the honour and applause of this measure, which was considered entirely as a creature of his own, it is not to be reckoned wonderful, that both he and his brethren in office should be deeply interested in the event, and approve themselves highly on the appearance of success.

The subsequent dispatches from their favourite general did not long support the hopes which were founded on the first successes. The unexpected difficulties and delays which the army experienced in advancing a few miles from Skenesborough to the southward, were, however, counterbalanced in opinion by its arrival on the Hudson's river, the retreat of the enemy from Fort Edward, their abandoning Fort George and the Lake, by which a free passage was opened from Ticonderago, and St. Leger's success in defeating and ruining the Tryon country militia near Fort Stanwix. All the former and present sanguine expectations which had been formed, were however in a great measure overthrown by the advices which were received sometime previous to the meeting of parliament; an event which was probably this year held

held back in the full confidence of its being ushered in with the particulars of some great and decisive success. Those which came to hand, after a tedious season of expectation, bore a very different complexion. The insuperable difficulties that necessarily suspended the operations of an army in such a country, and under such circumstances, were now practically discovered. The double defeat of Baum and Breyman, by a supposed broken and ruined militia in an attempt to remove or to lessen some of those difficulties, was still more dispiriting, and not in any degree cured by the hopes which the general expressed of support and assistance from the co-operation of Sir William Howe's army; both as it marked a despondency of success from their own force, and that the ministers knew the impossibility of his receiving any support from that quarter. But, as if it had been to crown the climax of ill news and ill fortune, the same dispatches were accompanied with others from Sir G. Carleton, which brought an account of the failure of the expedition to Fort Stanwix, the bold and unexpected attack of the rebels on the side of Ticonderago, and of a still more unexpected and extraordinary event in a short sketch of the doubtful and dangerous action which was fought on the 19th of September, between General Burgoyne and Arnold; which, naked as it was of circumstances, seemed to shew the latter to be the assailant, by the mention of his returning to his camp, when darkness had put an end to the combat.

Although the knowledge of these events seemed to open a view to some of the succeeding misfortunes, and even seemed to presage a part of these severe hardships and calamities which befel the northern army,

my, it was still hoped by those who were most sanguine in their expectations, that the general being so near Albany, could not fail in making his march good to that place; and that then being securely lodged, he would have an opportunity of concerting matters with Sir Henry Clinton, and of their jointly or separately distressing the northern colonies; or if the season and other circumstances did not favour that design, they might determine upon the propriety of maintaining the post at Albany during the winter; or of advancing to New-York, if it was thought more eligible. In the worst case that could happen, it was never doubted but they would be able to make good a retreat to Canada. So great was the faith of the ministry and their sanguinary supporters, in the omnipotence of his army, that they judged it impossible for any force that the Americans could send against it to conquer them; and those who hinted the smallest suspicion of these troops not being invincible, were ready to become the objects of the severest ridicule. Many for a good while had pronosticated the disaster which beset this army, and freely declared their sentiments; but their most rational conjectures were interpreted as proceeding from disaffection to the government, and a spirit of rebellion. Many of the old Jacobites, who had now by means of a secret influence worked themselves into power, or by means of their friends had slipped into places of sinecure, began to speak of rebellion in a new stile, and throw the scandal of it upon the best friends of the British constitution. Some of them even proceeded so far as to affirm that the revolution was itself a rebellion, and that the colonists were no less rebels for pleading their rights from that constitution.

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The heroism of the Frazers, and other chiefs who had made but an indifferent figure at Culloden was now extolled to the skies, and the Scotch Highlanders under their command were represented as the most invincible troops in the world. The colonists were set forth in all the ridiculous attitudes of rebellion, cowardice, and insignificance; so one would have thought that instead of sending such irresistible troops to subdue them, that the very draughts of our army might have served for that purpose. There is always an inconsistency in the language and conduct of men when they are under the influence of prejudice, and ruled by their pride and passions; and of all the characters in society, there are none so ready to give way to these unreasonable affections, as those who are inclined to the lust of dominion and arbitrary power. The noble exertions of the human mind, and the purest principles of freedom and liberty are an eye-sore to men affected with the lust of domination.

Amidst the various contests and debates in parliament, and the disputes at home concerning the American war, the news of the convention at Saratoga, and the surrender of General Burgoyne's whole army threw a considerable damp upon the confidence of the ministry, and almost confounded those who had exceeded all bounds in their extravagance of boasting. While parliament were hotly disputing concerning the measures to be adopted for carrying on the war, and all rational proposals for an accommodation were rejected by a dead majority, upon the third of December, the dismal news of the surrender of the whole northern army arrived, and the first certain accounts thereof were disclosed by the minister who had the

honour of directing it. The astonishment of all could not exceed the confusion of the ministers; they were thunder-struck at the tidings, and a guilty confusion overspread their countenances. Altho' not convinced of their error, nor converted from principles which are a disgrace to human nature, they almost gnashed their teeth with pain, and were reduced to feel the agonies of condemnation. Though the loss of so many brave men and citizens was much to be lamented, yet the indignation of the people, and the ignorance, wickedness, and folly of the contrivers of that unjust and horrid war, carried off a great degree of the sorrow which many felt at the loss and disgrace of our army. As our troops were taken prisoners of war, some thought it more fortunate than if they had been killed in battle, in a cause, the orthodoxy of which had never yet been fully demonstrated by the most sanguine advocates thereof.

It may easily be supposed that those who had been from the beginning against that bloody and unreasonable war, would be ready to let the ministry hear of the folly and weakness of their measures. The minister's declaration in the House of Commons concerning the convention at Saratoga, brought forth the severest as well as the most just and equitable charges against him. The principle and policy of the war were arraigned, and the incapacity of the ministry to carry it on, suppose it had been just, was painted in the strongest colours. The whole plan of the expedition was condemned in the strongest terms; it was declared an absurd, inconsistent, and impracticable scheme, and which the chief of a tribe of savages would have been ashamed to acknowledge. The hero of this scheme was told that they did not judge him by events, but
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had warned him of the fatal consequences of his plan before this event had happened. That they had been laughed at for warning him of what had happened, and told that they were speaking by prophecy. They asked him if he was now satisfied with the truth of their prophecies and predictions. They affirmed that ignorance had stamped every step of the expedition, but it was the ignorance of the minister, and not of the general; a minister that would venture sitting in his closet, not only to direct the general operations, but all the particular movements of a war carried on in the interior desarts of America, and at the distance of three thousand miles.

The northern expedition was perhaps as ill contrived and unsuccessfully executed, as any that is recorded in history. The pretended design of it was to form a junction between Sir William Howe and General Burgoyne, through woods and desarts, rivers and lakes; where many large vessels were to be built, many extensive woods to be cut through, and roads continually impassable, to be levelled, mended, and repaired. This measure might have been effected by sea in less than a month, without much danger, and at a more moderate expence. But the ignorance, and stupidity of the contriver of this expedition is beyond all parallel in history; for at the very time that he intended that the two armies should join, he ordered the one army to march from New-York to the southward, and commanded the northern army from Canada to follow it. This was a strange method for these two bodies to meet in any centre, to march in the same line of direction after each other; but this minister, who ever since his service in the last war had formed ideas of military operations, different from all others
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of mankind, was now determined to practise according to his own plan of manœuvres. He perceived by a kind of intuition all the woods and swamps in America, and had so formed his plan of operation, that the General was not at liberty to deviate one inch from his appointment. In this respect, the General was altogether cramped in his commission, and was under the necessity either to run headlong to his own destruction, or to disobey the orders of his superiors.—Perhaps the commander in chief in this expedition over-rated his own abilities, and rashly engaged to perform a task which he had not perfectly examined, nor thoroughly understood; and he is greatly to be blamed for persisting to execute a plan which he found concerted by folly, ignorance, and ambition. No General who knew the duties of his office would have engaged to pursue the plan of any minister of state, without having a discretionary power of directing the subordinate measures according to the best of his own judgment.

It was fully perceived by all discerning persons, that the minister had no settled plan of the American war, though he obstinately persisted in carrying it on, and would not deviate from the several schemes of his own folly and ignorance which he had begun. Whether he was the dupe of false information, or wilfully contrived inconsistencies, is not altogether evident; but his own account of the state of America was glaringly preposterous. At one time he gave out that they were only a trifling mob, and that nine-tenths of the people were zealous for government; and yet what is exceedingly strange, this large and vast majority suffered themselves to be fleeced and driven like sheep by that ragged handful of their own rabble,

rabble. The next day, when all the feudal dungeons of Germany were to be scoured for military slaves to cut the throats of these rebels, and the substance of Britain exhausted to maintain them, the Americans were become numerous, and powerful. The delusion was become highly contagious, and they were to be brought to their senses by nothing short of the exertion of the whole strength of the mother country.— We were again told that the colonists were all cowards; that the sight of an English grenadier was sufficient to throw a whole province into a panic; but what seemed strangely inconsistent, was, that near 60,000 men, with an immense naval force, should be sent to reduce these cowards and poltroons. This sort of an inconsistency plainly shewed that the ministry had no true intelligence of matters of fact, but were ready to believe those slavish wretches their governors in America, who only told them stories agreeable to their depraved inclinations, and suited their lies to their own interest, and the ambition of the court.

Their affair of Saratoga, was a dismal commentary upon the ignorance and inconsistency of the Minden Hero and his brethren; he could not now deny that one of the best appointed armies that ever had been sent from Europe to America had been obliged to deliver up their arms, and surrender to those that he had represented as a contemptible rabble, without discipline. It was now that the ministers began to talk of peace, and to affirm what all the world know to be false, that they were inclined to peace from the beginning; but the truth of the matter was, they could not tell what to say: they were caught in their own snare, and entangled in toils of their own making.— They now began to feel that the American war was

a very serious affair, and produced events totally beyond the reach of their apprehension. But what methods to pursue were not easily to be determined; they had not wisdom to devise proper plans; they had no desire for peace, and they knew not how to carry on the war. Their enemies began now to collect all their miscarriages, and point out their causes. Among many others, the hiring and employing savages was fully discussed; and it must be allowed that this measure will, as long as the history thereof is handed down to posterity, disgrace the present reign, and those ministers that promoted it. The sums spent in hiring savages were enormous, and their service rather hurtful than useful to those who employed them, and a disgrace to any government. Their method of making war is horrible and shocking to the manners of all civilized nations; it far exceeds the ferocity of any other barbarians that have been recorded by either ancient or modern history. These savages have but two principal objects in all their wars; the one is the indulgence of their native cruelty, by the destruction, or if possible, the extermination of their enemies; and the other, which depends upon the former is the glory of acquiring the greatest number of scalps, which are hung up and preserved with the greatest care in their huts, as perpetual trophies of victory, conquest, and personal prowess.

As they have neither pecuniary emoluments, nor those honorary titles or distinctions which are so flattering in civilized nations to bestow, the rewards of danger and warfare consists in human scalps, in human flesh, and the gratifications arising from torturing, mangling, roasting alive by slow fires, and frequently even devouring their captives. These are the re-

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wards of Indian warriors, and such are the horrors of an Indian war. There is one apology which the ministry made for employing the savages, namely, that if his Majesty had not employed them, that the rebels would have done it. But this, like many others of their apologies, was without all foundation. There was no proof or evidence that the colonists ever intended to employ these barbarians, or had they ever attempted to enter into any offensive alliance with them. All that ever they desired of them was, that they would observe a strict neutrality, and be quiet.— They had actually entered into a treaty of neutrality with five famous Indian nations, which our ministry had bribed to violate, and to act offensively against the colonies. At the very time the Americans were entering into treaties of neutrality with as many of the savages as they could persuade to that measure, the British agents under the direction of the ministry, were hiring the barbarians to destroy the subjects of the empire from one end of America to another.— This was demonstrated by several papers they came before the House of Commons.

The wickedness of this infernal scheme will cleave to the authors of it, and, like a millstone, sink down to destruction all the other measures that ever they shall be engaged in; for the history of mankind cannot shew a single instance where providence ever honoured any persons by being instruments of doing good, who had wilfully and obstinately persisted in doing so much evil. For the sake of having the assistance of savage butchers to massacre old men, women and children, the government paid the enormous sum of 150,000*l.* though they never could bring above 7 or 800 of them into the field. It is a thing beyond all
Vol. II. C c c dispute

dispute, that it was not the intention of the ministry to quash what they called rebellion, but to extrigate the whole race of those malcontents in America.—— For if it had been their intention to have put an end to the rebellion, they would undoubtedly have pursued wiser measures than they have ever yet done. It affords but a melancholy reflection to the subjects of Great Britain to find that the morality of this war is always put out of the question, and the necessity for carrying it on is urged upon principles that would disgrace Indian savages. We have passed the Rubicon, and have entered the field of disgrace and ruin, and for that reason we must not retract, but go on from evil to worse. Such principles of action, when read in history by impartial future ages, will make our posterity shudder to think from what a strange race of men they have descended.

Notwithstanding the folly and madness of all the schemes of the ministry concerning this war, the prime minister in the House of Commons had the effrontery to declare, “that events had turned out very differently from what he had reason to expect.” It is not easy to say what idea some men have of providence, but if this minister actually believes that there is a divine providence he would have no reason to believe that things would fall out otherwise than they have happened; for among all the reasons assigned for this unjust and unrighteous war, there is not one that any sober man could satisfy his conscience with or declare was worthy of the blood of one single subject.

As the ministry now on account of necessity, began to think of terms of reconciliation with the colonies, a great part of the public debates of parliament, and disputes through the nation, were employed on that subject.

subject.—The bill itself, and the commissioners appointed to manage the negotiation did not promise fair for a reconciliation;—they were all the meanest creatures of the court, and of the ministry that were appointed to this commission: and though in their own esteem and that of their friends, they were considered great men, yet no particular action of their whole lives had so distinguished them as to give a sanction to their appointment. The whole of this proceeding was considered by wise men rather as a ministerial farce, than a real intention of reconciliation with the colonies. It was easily foreseen what would be the issue of this comic opera, both from the season in which it was proposed to be acted, as well as from the wisdom of the managers, and the abilities of the actors on the side of Great Britain. A treaty was already concluded between France and America, which was not likely to be disannulled by the congress for the sake of pleasing a ministry that had wantonly and cruelly shed the blood of their best and nearest friends and relations. Nor were they likely to break their faith and their first public treaty with a new ally, and so expose their infidelity to all the world, for the advantage of a parent state, that had behaved as a barbarous and cruel step-mother. And suppose there had been no such obstacles in the way, was it probable that they would listen to any terms from the present ministry or their agents. The whole of this political farce was considered as only a scheme to waste a little money upon a needy nobleman and other two ministerial favourites. One of which had for some time gained the confidence of the people by acting the hypocrite, and had been in training by the mover of the puppets for some years, and was judged worthy to

act a part in this new comedy. The whole of the proceedings at home concerning this conciliatory bill, convinced all parties before the commissioners departed what would be the success of their commission.

While matters were agitated at home according to the different humours and dispositions of party, a sort of key to the commissioners with respect to their success, was sent through the medium of General Burgoyne to the Earl of Thanet, by General Gates, one of the commanding officers in the American service. This conquering General declares his concern at the unhappy rupture between the mother country and the colonies, and says that he could not help feeling for the misfortunes brought upon his native country by the wickedness of that administration who began and had continued that unjust, impolitic, cruel, and unnatural war. He states, that the dismembering of the empire, the loss of commerce, of power and consequence amongst the nations, with the downfall of public credit, are but the beginnings of those evils which must inevitably be followed by a thousand more, unless timely prevented by some lenient hand, some state physician, with the firmness, integrity, and the abilities of a Chatham, joined to the wisdom, virtue, and justice of a Camden. Such a man, he observed, aided by persons as independent in their fortunes as unsullied in their honours, and who never bowed their heads to Baal, might yet save the sinking state. But that great object could only be obtained, he added, by confirming that independency, which the people of the continent of America were determined only to part with along with their lives. Such a minister, he said, would do as all other wise statesmen had done before him. He would be true to the
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interests and welfare of his country, and by rescinding the resolutions passed to support that system which no power on earth can establish, he will endeavour to restore so much of the empire in prosperity and honour, as the circumstances of the times and the mal-administration of those who ruled before him, have left to his government. The United States of America were, he said, willing to be the friends, but would never submit to be the slaves of the parent state. They are, said he, by consanguinity, by commerce, by language, and by affections, which naturally spring from these, more attached to England than to any other country under the sun. Therefore, added he, spurn not the blessing that yet remains. Instantly withdraw your fleets and armies, cultivate the friendship and commerce of America. Thus and thus only can England hope to be great and happy. Seek that in a commercial alliance; seek it ere it be too late, for there only you must expect to find it. These were hints which the ministry might have profited by, had not the things that belonged to their own, and the nation's peace been hid from their eyes.

After these hints, and others of the like kind that had been frequently given by the greatest authority in America, it was altogether vain to send commissioners with any other powers than what had an immediate relation to grant fully and freely those leading objects of this great contest. The commissioners were far from men of either the character or capacity of a Chatham or a Camden, and the ministry were far from granting such powers as were necessary to accomplish a reconciliation. This letter which was intended as a friendly hint to Great Britain, was not allowed to be read in the house where it was communicated

nicated. This had no friendly aspect, at a time when commissioners were going to America to treat about reconciliation; and it plainly shewed, that dissimulation and hypocrisy were at the foundation of the whole proceeding. There could be no more dishonour in reading a letter sent by the rebel officer, than in sending commissioners to negotiate with rebel states. But when men once fall into the maze of inconsistency, there is no end of their wandering. The British ministry wanted one essential principal necessary in all reconciliations, and that is, the spirit of forgiveness; they were determined at the same time that they proposed a reconciliation, to remember their old claims, and indulge their supposition of rebellion and disaffection in the character of the colonists. And it would require more charity than the nature of the thing admits of, for those that are any way acquainted with the character of the British ministry to believe that they intended sincerely to promote a reconciliation.—Had they actually intended to have promoted this desirable end, they would have withdrawn their fleets and armies, and shewed some signs of forgiveness by removing the objects of terror and destruction. This would have intimated a disposition of being reconciled, and inclined the minds of the Americans to have listened to an accommodation. But men coming with arms in their hands, did not shew very significant marks of reconciliation. It was generally supposed that the influence of contractors, and other ministerial tools, a sort of political vermin, that live upon the ruin and fores of the public, had a mighty hand in preventing the success of all conciliatory measures, by voting on the side of every motion that any way tended to clog the negotiation. Among these devourers
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of the community, the reasonableness of the war and the honour of the nation, were constant topics of argument, when their real meaning was their own interest and emolument. While parliament were debating concerning a method of reconciliation, the French had actually signed a treaty of commerce with the Americans, and had a fleet ready to sail to support it. Of all this the ministry were either ignorant, or at least pretended to be so; and when they were required to speak explicitly upon the subject, replied they had only heard of these things. It was not long till the minister was obliged to bring the French King's declaration to the House, with many grievous complaints of the treachery of the French, and their perfidy, in breaking the faith of treaties. This was considered as a deserved rub to the minister and the ambassador at Paris, who had not endeavoured to be better informed concerning matters of so great importance to the nation. As to the breach of faith in transgressing treaties, it did not appear that there was any treaties that considered the American independence as forbidden in it; or that the French might not enter into a treaty with these colonists, provided they were free states, as well as England did with the States of Holland. The charge of perfidy, supposing the French might in former cases have deserved it, could not in this be so well applied to them; and it was considered as a ministerial cant used in all case when nations entered into war.

The doctrine of French perfidy was fully published by the friends of the minister, more with a design to inflame the nation against the Americans than against the House of Bourbon. It was believed that the people in general would now consider the war in a new light

light and engage heartily against the colonists, because they had entered into a treaty with the French King. Whatever might be the secret views and designs of the parties, yet there appeared nothing in the face of the public transactions, uncommon, unjust, or unreasonable. The ministry had, by a course of violent and unconstitutional measures, driven the colonists to a state of independency, and they had now published that independency, and declared themselves free states to the world. In the view of the powers of Europe, the American colonies belonged no more to Great Britain than the United States of Holland belonged to the Spanish monarchy: they could not in entering into any treaty with the thirteen colonies, or states in America, be considered as guilty of infringing any treaty that had been formerly made between any nations in Europe, unless this case had been expressed in such a treaty. It was undoubtedly as little imagined by any state in Europe that Great Britain would have behaved so impolitically as to drive her colonies to the step they had now taken, as that it is unjust for any power in Europe to enter into a treaty of commerce with them. The whole force of this charge of perfidy depends upon the justice of our conduct with America, and of her right to declare herself independent, when she could not possess those natural rights which the laws of England have secured to all the subjects of the British empire. It might not even be incumbent upon the French to enquire into the nature of the claims of parties; the question which they principally were concerned to know was, the matter of fact, whether the colonists were independent states? If Great Britain in her hour of folly and madness, had driven them from her, it was no perfidy

perfidy in any other nations to serve their own interest by entering into a commercial negotiation with them.

The idea of the treachery of the French, and that now the causes of the war were changed, or at least in some measure altered, produced a wonderful change upon the minds of many who otherwise disapproved the proceedings against the Americans. Some by confounding the ideas of the justice of the American resistance, with those of the injustice of the French interference, began to view them as one object, and thought that the whole was now a French war:—and others through the hope of particular gain, engaged heartily in the contest, and commenced hostilities for the sake of plunder. A great number of privateers were fitted out by combinations of merchants, and gentlemen, to distress the trade of the French, under the notion that the French were their enemies for making a treaty with the colonists, by which their monopoly of trade was interrupted. The justice and morality of the cause were totally put out of the question, and private interest was the grand spring of action and leading motive for manslaughter, bloodshed, and plunder.

The convention of Saratoga had for some time been matter of altercation at home; the troops who were made prisoners of war had not been sent home according to agreement, and the ministerial writers were now busily employed in publishing the perfidy of the Americans, as well as the treachery of the French. The cause and circumstances of this delay were not as yet known in Britain, and every one was left to indulge his own conjecture. As nothing could be affirmed for certain, the hirelings of the ministry, whose consciences generally are not very scrupulous with re-

Vol. II. D d d gard

gard to truth, sounded with a loud alarm, that all the articles of convention had been broken by the congress, and they as well as the French, were a faithless as well as rebellious assembly. As circumstances concerning this transaction were not sufficiently known for impartial persons to form a judgment upon, these scribblers were suffered to go on without any reply or contradiction. The ground of this accusation was a complaint of the British officers concerning their quarters near Boston, as being neither conformable to their expectation nor rank, or to the terms of convention and capitulation. Upon this head, General Burgoyne in his complaint to the congress, had expressed himself in strong terms, which they considered as charging them with a violation of the conditions of the convention, and with a design in him and his men to consider the capitulation as broken, for as he had charged them with infringing the articles, they conceived that he did not consider himself bound by them, when once he and his men were out of their power.— They also insisted that they had sufficient reasons to believe that the soldiers had not delivered up all their accoutrements, which they considered as a breach of the articles of capitulation. Their resolution upon this head the writers of the Annual Register call a paltry resolution, shameful in its nature, and highly disgraceful to the congress. But these authors ought to have remembered that those that are unfaithful in little will also be unfaithful in much; and one article of convention is really as binding as another. The charge of infringing the capitulation depends upon the matters of fact, whether the men did secret their accoutrements, or whether the Americans could really afford the British officers as good quarters as they thought they

they had reason to expect from their rank, and the terms of capitulation? The authors already mentioned are obliged to acknowledge, that the British commanders had made a requisition of some deviation from the terms of convention, which they say was rather unlucky in point of time. They had requested the embarkation of the convention troops, either at the sound, near New-York, or at Rhode Island, instead of Boston, which was the place appointed for their departure. And in consequence of the hope entertained that this proposal would have been complied with, the transports for the conveyance were assembled at Rhode Island. The congress refused to comply with this requisition, alledging that it afforded grounds of suspicion, that the measure was proposed merely to afford an opportunity to the convention troops, to join their fellows with an intention of making some pretence for evading or breaking the terms of capitulation, and continuing to act in America to the great detriment of the common cause. What confirmed this suspicion, they said, was, that the 26 transports which were provided at Rhode-Island were insufficient for the conveyance of 5 or 6000 men in a winter voyage to Europe: and that in the present state of things, with respect to provisions both in the British fleet and army, it was scarcely possible that they could have been victualled for so long a voyage and so great a number of men in so short a time. When all those things are considered it will not appear so plain that the Americans transgressed the articles of convention; but that if there was any infringement of them, that it was on the part of Great Britain and her officers. But what confirms the matter, that the colonists did not break the convention, is, what General Burgoyne declared in the House of Commons,

namely, that the convention was not broken, but suspended, which was owing to our own government not ratifying the agreement. It appears now perfectly clear from what that General hath himself acknowledged, that the Americans have had good reasons for what they have done; and all that the hirelings of the court have said is no more than that common slander which they threw forth against all whom they do not consider in their interest.

The colonists on their part accuse our armies of the greatest barbarities and cruelty, which they executed upon inoffensive women, old men, and children, unprovoked, and for no reason, unless to satisfy an innate principle of wanton savageness, equal to that of their brethren of the Indian tribes. It were to be wished, that the British troops had behaved with more humanity, both for the sake of their own character and that of the nation they belonged to; but when the causes and first principles of the war are considered, the execution and effects of it could not be well expected to be otherwise than they have happened. The Americans were first painted in all the ugly and detestable colours of disaffection and rebellion, and represented as a people of the most abominable and factious principles; unworthy of favour, fair play, or even existence. Men in a military profession are not in general over nice in examining the truth of government descriptions; they are its servants, and reckon themselves obliged to obey the mandates thereof implicitly. The several acts of severity which they commit, they generally impute to their orders, and consider the actions and the guilt which attends them, the property of their employers. Slaughter to them appears in the same light with their other military exercises, a necessary

cessary effect of superior command, for which the first authority is only accountable. The burning of *Æsopus*, and killing so many unarmed people, though it may appear to those who view objects in a moral light as shockingly cruel, in the first instance, yet to soldiers it appears no more than an accident of war, with which no man's conscience was concerned.

It is somewhat surprizing, that the humanity with which General Gates treated General Burgoyne and his army, should not have had some effect upon the future conduct of our army, and made them more merciful to people who had shewn so much clemency to their brethren. Yet all this favour and politeness shewn by the colonists was repaid by fresh and repeated acts of military barbarity. Such is the caprice of erroneous principles when once they are assumed, that they dispose men to reason preposterously and to draw conclusions that cannot be justly inferred from any data given in reason or human nature. It was argued in defence of British cruelty, that the objects thereof were rebels, and that no cruelty to such was unjust; that it came not under the notion of cruelty, but justice, which was absolutely necessary to support the honour of the laws and the government. That the mercy shewn by the Americans proceeded from a consciousness of their error and guilt, or from an hypocritical policy to throw a reproach upon our army, by unprincipled acts of clemency.—This method of reasoning proceeded upon taking for granted a point which is yet exceedingly doubtful; namely, that the grounds of the war on the part of Britain were sufficiently clear and just; and that the principles of rebellion on the side of the colonists were abundantly plain from our laws and constitution,———These are points
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which ought to have been self-evident before the war had been begun; and beyond all suspicion before it had been carried on with so much severity and bloodshed.

Whatever might be the opinions of the ministry, the nation in general were of a different opinion; the people were shocked at the reports of such unprovoked acts of barbarity, and spoke with great freedom concerning the authors of the war.——

The common people in general, by following nature more closely than those in high life, judge with more impartiality concerning right and wrong; their minds are not warped by the prejudices of party, nor entangled in the toils of court sophistry and intrigue.——

Vox populi—vox Dei, is a more universal rule than a great many people will allow it to be; the people, unless when very powerful means are used to corrupt them, seldom judge wrong concerning public affairs; and though by courtiers and ministerial demagogues, they are accounted the scum of the earth, yet they are rather the salt thereof, from whence the favour of truth flows, and is discerned among them when it is to be perceived no where else.

As the congress were inexorable with regard to all the solicitations and remonstrances of General Burgoyne and the British officers, and their measures appeared now to be settled points with them. It was alleged, that their resolution, which suspended the ratification of the convention of Saratoga, proceeded from the expectation of the ratification of a treaty between them and France; and that they only made the non-ratification of the convention by Great Britain a pretence for their not fulfilling their part of the agreement. All this is exceedingly problematical. Tho' these

these circumstances might each of them have their particular influence, yet they had warrantable grounds to suspend the convention. It was necessary that the quarters of the convention troops should be discharged by the government of Great Britain, which as yet had taken no steps for that purpose, nor given any security for defraying the expences which the troops had incurred during thier stay at Boston. There is no doubt but as they had reasonable causes for suspending the convention, that they had also other political reasons for making use of these causes. They were closely pressed by a part of the King's forces, at that time in actual possession, of the most considerable of their cities, for greatness, wealth, and commanding situation, they considered that suffering those convention troops to be sent to Europe from whence they might be easily replaced, would turn the scales of war against them, and therefore as they had sufficient proofs of the troops having in some instances transgressed the convention, though they might have in other cases overlooked such a transgression: yet as their own safety depended much upon the opportunity they now had of taking the advantage thereof, they reckoned themselves sufficiently justified in what they did. It is not in any degree doubtful that our ministry, notwithstanding all their complaints of infidelity on the part of the colonists, would have taken the same advantage of circumstances of the same nature.

It does not however appear that the Americans were influenced by any certainty of the treaty with France, when they passed their resolution suspending the ratification of the convention, for the resolution was passed on the 8th of January, and the ratification of the treaty did not arrive in America till the 2d of May.

May. The colonists were sufficiently provoked to take some resolute steps, for their country was most dreadfully harrassed, wasted, and burnt by our troops. The British forces, instead of carrying on a regular war, began now to act as free-booters and plunderers. Colonel Abercromby made some predatory excursions into the Jerseys, and on the Delaware, where he killed some men, and carried off as much booty as he could find. By our accounts at home he sustained no loss in these excursions; but from some accounts which have been received from that quarter of the world, is confidently affirmed that his loss was greater than his advantages; and that though he did much mischief, that he paid well for it in loss of men, which then was severely felt. The loss of the Americans on these occasions was exceedingly great, but this only tended to exasperate them, and not to humble them; it roused their spirits, but did not depress them, and they exerted all their powers to make reprisals whenever they could find an opportunity. Their privateers were in general pretty successful in taking British vessels, and ventured even so far as to make attacks upon our coasts. Cunningham and Jones, two captains of privateers, created much alarm upon the coasts of Ireland and Scotland, and the latter had well nigh set fire to Whitehaven on the coast of England; he landed some of his men in the bay of Kircudbright, and plundered the house of Lord Selkirk, of all the plate that was in it. And it is supposed that had his Lordship been at home, that Jones intended to have carried him off a prisoner. The enormity of this offence of Captain Jones was aggravated by the ministry with epithets of rebellion, villainy, and injustice; and his character described as one of the most abominable

abominable in the world. The Americans who employed him were charged with all his past iniquities, as well as with his present crimes, and they were now considered as the most daring invaders that ever existed upon this habitable globe. The people who brought this charge did not consider that the Americans had learned this method of attack and plundering from the British government and troops, and were ready to return the accusations with double force upon the English nation; which had without provocation burnt their towns, murdered their inoffensive farmers, women and children, in the most wanton and cruel manner. It was, truly, exceedingly ridiculous to hear the complaints and accusations that were brought at this time against the Congress and the Americans, for invading our coasts, when our troops were carrying sword and fire into their country as far as they durst go. The most inveterate enemies of the Colonies could not say that these freebooters upon our coasts, had as yet committed any barbarities; but had behaved with an address suitable to the most civilized characters in carrying on war. They had ravished no women, murdered no old men or children, nor behaved rudely to any people beyond the common rules of the fairest war; and yet no Turks nor savages could be represented in a worse point of light. Paul Jones was represented as the chief of traitors to his country, while as yet his identity was not fully ascertained nor could any tell to what country he belonged, This adventurous freebooter, whatever might be his country or character, was just as honest a pirate as any other of the commanders of privateers upon the coast. In any nation, to give authority to men to assault honest traders upon the high seas, because of the quar-

rels of princes, or states, is to give sanction to companies of robbers, and by the authority of government to give men liberty to commit the most flagrant injustice.

It may appear, in some future period, exceedingly strange, that at the very time that Great Britain was appointing commissioners to treat with the colonists concerning a reconciliation, that even at that moment she was committing the most cruel and barbarous depredations upon the coasts and in the country of the Americans. Towards the end of May, some expeditions from Rhode Island were very destructive to the colonists. These plundering parties spared neither ships, boats, stores, houses, nor places of worship; all things sacred and profane, were disposed of in the same manner, that is, were consumed by fire. Private property, as well as public stores, were destroyed, and every thing useful to man that the fire could consume was in many places reduced to ashes. The officers who were employed in these expeditions, who were generally as zealous as the soldiers in acts of depredation, being ashamed of what they had done, laid the blame of burning private houses upon the violence and rage of the men, and said they were contrary to their orders and intentions. This was considered as only an apology to cover in part those enormities, which they could not vindicate either to the world or their own consciences.

The Americans made many charges of cruelty, some of which were but too well founded against the troops of Britain on these occasions. Particularly the refusing of quarter, and of slaughtering men in cold blood, several of whom neither had arms in their hands nor were in any military capacity. On the
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side of Rhode Island, the charges were of the most positive nature; and they complained of the troops for carrying off the most peaceable inhabitants of the country, and detaining them as prisoners of war, until they should in some future time be exchanged for an equal number of soldiers taken on their side. It was replied in defence of our officers and men, that as all men in that country were obliged by their laws to carry arms from sixteen to sixty, they were therefore to be considered, and treated as soldiers at all times, whether they were found in actual service or not.— This was very feeble and weak reasoning: for the same thing may be said of Englishmen at home. They are bound by the laws to serve in the militia from a certain age to another period of their lives, and in any similar case ought to be made prisoners of war.

These were methods not very likely to produce a reconciliation, though this practice was considered by many at home as the most certain and probable method of effecting it. Like all the other schemes of our ministry these barbarous methods produced a quite contrary effect to what they were intended. They roused the minds of the colonists, and heated their resentment to such a degree, that they were more ready to seek to be revenged, than to be reconciled to men who were continuing to do them such essential injuries. It was impossible for the Americans to believe that these persons ever intended to be reconciled, who were continuing to spill their best blood, and lay all their country waste by fire and sword wherever they could find an opportunity. These were such signatures of reconciliation, as are not usually practised by those who have sincere friendship in their hearts.— From these circumstances it was easily foreseen, that

Great Britain was neither sincere in her intentions, nor indeed desired reconciliation upon any other principle than unconditional submission. And nothing but the strongest legislative assurance that she would stand to an agreement, could have warranted the colonists to treat with her commissioners. Suppose the Americans had even been disposed to have accepted the terms proposed in the commission, yet they could not have trusted the security that was given for the performance of the articles. The men that offered these terms were the very men that were wasting their country, and shedding their blood, who could not be trusted in any thing, as they had not the confidence of their own nation, and could not possibly have the confidence of the people they were slaughtering and destroying. It was therefore necessary, that a deed of the whole legislature should be given before commissioners had been sent to treat concerning a reconciliation.

There was still an apprehension that ruled in the minds of the British ministry, and which uniformly led them into many blunders, namely, that the colonists were greatly divided among themselves. Under the influence of this apprehension, they imagined that the plan of reconciliation which they had formed, and with which they themselves were scarcely satisfied, would be so alluring to the colonists that they would throw off the authority of the congress, and accept of the terms of reconciliation. Before the conciliatory bills were fully reduced into form and shape, a rough draught of them was sent off to America to Governor Tryon, at New York, for him to circulate among the people of the revolted colonies at large. This produced a worse effect than had been foreseen, by our
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court politicians. It greatly astonished and provoked their own army at New-York and other parts in America; their indignation was raised at the affront thereby put upon them, and nothing could exceed the degradation which they felt from the concessions in this bill. They had been made to believe that they would be supported with sufficient aid to carry on the war with vigour, and to finish it soon. The nature and circumstances of the war, and the long course of injuries and losses which had been offered and received, had by this time rendered every individual a party in the contest. The soldiers had been taught to think that nothing less than absolute conquest on their side, and unconditional submission on the other could bring the war to a conclusion. They blushed at the recollection, and thought their personal honour wounded in the recantation which was now made of all that haughty language and treatment, which they had been accustomed to hold out, or offer to rebels. Military men, in general, do not examine deeply into the merits of a cause, where present hope of advantage, or martial honours are to be acquired. Justice and equity are but seldom annexed to the ideas of offensive war. When once hostilities are begun, in the ideas of soldiers, resistance in defending the most sacred rights is considered an injury. And whoever fights against them is considered as their enemies, though they themselves are the unjust invaders, and alone come under the notion of enemies. The officers and soldiers at this time felt the disappointment more severely, as they had been made to expect a reinforcement of 20,000 men, and instead of this assistance had only received an inconsistent and absurd paper substitute. It is not easy to describe the

surprise

surprize and amazement of the officers in the army; they vented their indignation against the ministry in louder acclamations than ever they had done against the Americans, and did not only curse the managers in their hearts, but burst out into violent execrations of the loudest nature. The numerous body of American refugees found themselves in a worse situation; their feelings were more pungent and exquisite than even those of the army. They had fled to the army in expectation of soon having the leading rule and the chief possessions of America in their power, together with the hopes of gratifying their revenge upon those whom they thought had used them ill. They found not in the bills any security to them for the thing they expected, and they knew what they deserved at the hands of their countrymen. A more dismal situation cannot be conceived, than their apprehension suggested to them.

The method of publication of these bills produced as bad an effect as the sending of them. They had been sent through the country by Tryon in the best manner he could, which was considered by the Congress as an insidious method to divide the people and to corrupt them. They therefore shewed such a contempt of this method of proceeding, that they ordered the bills immediately to be published in their Gazettes, and shewn to all America, with very profitable notes and commentaries. The address of the Congress and General Washington on this occasion, might have taught our ministry and commissioners the characters of the men they had now to deal with.—General Washington, in answer to a letter from Governor Tryon, in which he desired him to circulate several copies of the draughts of the bills sent him
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among the men and officers of his army, inclosed in his letter to him a printed newspaper, in which they had been inserted by order of the Congress, accompanied by the resolutions of that assembly upon the subject. This shews in what sovereign contempt these papers and their authors were held in by the congress, and how little they feared their influence among the people. Governor Turnbull, in answer to a similar letter sent to him, observed that propositions of peace were usually made from the supreme authority of one contending power to the like, or similar authority of the other: And that the present was the first instance within his recollection in which they had been addressed to the people at large of the opposite power, as an overture of reconciliation. He proceeded,—“There was a day when even this step from our then acknowledged parent state, might have been accepted with joy and gratitude, but that is lost, and past irrevocably. The repeated rejection of our sincere and humble petitions, at the commencement of hostilities; the inhumanity which has marked the prosecution of the war on your part, in its several stages; the insolence which displays itself on every petty advantage; the cruelties which have been exercised on those unhappy men, whom the fortune of war has thrown into your hands; all these are insuperable bars to the idea of concluding a peace with Great Britain, upon any other conditions, than the most absolute and perfect independence.” He concluded his letter with the following observation upon the restoration of union by a lasting and honourable peace, which he declared to be the ardent wish of every honest American, namely, ‘The British nation may then find us as affectionate and valuable friends, as we are now determined

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and fatal enemies, and will derive from that friendship more solid and real advantages, than the most sanguine can expect from conquest.'

It must have greatly mortified the pride of Governor Tryon to find that his papers were treated with so much contempt by the Congress, and still more on the account that they produced no effect upon the people. These were the two ends of this publication of the rough draughts of these bills: first, to intimidate and frighten the Congress, and, secondly, to divide the people. Neither of these designs happened to take any effect. What the ministry at home imagined would create divisions among the colonists, united them more closely together; for they saw that Britain first wanted to make them behave like knaves, and then to treat them like fools; to make them break their agreement with an ally that had assisted them in their distress, and throw themselves into the hands of tyrants and persecutors, who had slaughtered their people, and wasted their country. During the the time these transactions were carrying on, neither the Congress nor General Washington were remiss in making vigorous preparations for another campaign; whilst both in their public acts set forth to the people the hopes of, its being the last, and of their driving the British forces out of America. General Washington had now fully proved their patience and submission in their long winter encampment; he therefore struck off all the unnecessary baggage of both men and officers to the closest bounds of necessity, and made every other reformation which, made them nimble in service and effective in action. He also wrote a public letter to the farmers in the middle colonies, requesting them to fatten cattle for the army,

army, for the ensuing campaign. By this experiment he found now his name and character operated in their esteem.——The Congress, among other things which shewed their attention to the war, issued a resolution strongly urging the young gentlemen of the different colonies, to raise a body of light cavalry at their own expence, during the campaign; promising them such allurements, as were calculated to reconcile that order of men to the restraints and duties of a military life, in the simple rank and character of private volunteers.

The perfect knowledge of the ratification of the treaty between France and America, had not yet arrived on the western continent, though it was generally believed it had taken effect. The agents for our government were on that account more busy to render it ineffectual by using all the means directly or indirectly that were in their power. Nor were the Congress wanting on their part in using the most probable and rational means to baffle all the attempts of their enemies, and to render the British commission of no effect. After several deliberations and resolutions, a declaration was published by the Congress, That any man or body of men, who should presume to make any convention or partial agreement with commissioners under the crown of Great Britain, should be considered and treated as enemies to the United States. That the United States could not with propriety, hold any conference or treaty with any commissioners on the part of Great Britain, unless they should as a preliminary thereto, either withdraw their fleets and armies, or else in positive and express terms acknowledge the independence of the states. And in as much as it appeared to be the design

Vol. II. F f f of

of their enemies, to lull them into a fatal security, they called upon the several states to use the most strenuous exertions, to have their respective quotas of troops in the field as soon as possible; and that all their militia might be held in readiness to act as occasion should require. All their resolutions upon this subject were unanimously agreed to, notwithstanding that we were assured at home, that the Congress was divided and that there were scarcely two of them of one opinion. These means of deception were very fatal to our ministry, for they totally ruined their credit with the nation; for their most sincere friends, who echoed all they said, did not even believe them: and often when they really told the truth they were not believed, till people were convinced by other means of the certainty thereof.

The fatal day at last approached which finished the separation between Britain and America; Silas Deane arrived express from Paris at York-Town, where the Congress had assembled since the loss of Philadelphia, with those instruments that stamp'd a seal upon that separation. He had sailed from France in a royal frigate of 28 guns, appointed for the purpose, and and brought with him copies of the two treaties of alliance and commerce, for the ratification of the Congress, which had been concluded between France and the United States. The last of these was the first that had been executed, being signed on the 30th of January; the treaty of alliance was dated the 6th of February. Mr. Deane also brought an account of many other matters that were highly pleasing as well as what related to the negociation, and its ratification.

The joy of the Americans was by this transaction raised to an high pitch, and could only be equalled
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by their public demonstrations thereof. The Congress immediately published a Gazette, which, beside a summary account of the general information they had received, exhibited some of the most flattering articles of the treaties, with their own observations upon them to the people; the equity, generosity, and honour of the French King were extolled in an high degree. In this paper they seemed to count upon Spain as being already a party virtually in the alliance; and to consider the naval force of both united in their cause. They also seemed to depend much upon the friendship of other powers, and exulted in the favourable disposition of Europe in general to America. It was a scheme of the greatest folly for the court of Great Britain to pretend to bring about a reconciliation between this nation and America, according to Lord North's conciliatory bill; the colonists were now independent states, and had procured an alliance that was likely to support that independency; without first acknowledging that independency there was not the smallest probability that ever a treaty would commence. The sending of commissioners after they knew of this treaty between France and the colonies, was a scheme fraught with folly, weakness, and absurdity.

About six days after Mr. Deane arrived at York-Town, General Sir Henry Clinton arrived to take the command of the army at Philadelphia, in the room of Sir William Howe. This was alarming and grievous to the officers and soldiers, who exceedingly regarded Gen. Howe, and he was held in great esteem by them all. In the beginning of June, the commissioners from England arrived in the Delaware. The Earl of Carlisle, Mr. Eden, and Governor Johnstone, were

joined mutually in this commission. These commissioners appear to have had more confidence in the success of their commission, than the nature and contents of it, or the season in which it came promised them. Upon the 9th of June, immediately after their arrival, they dispatched a letter with the acts of parliament and a copy of their commission, and other papers to the president of the Congress; but their secretary Dr Ferguson who was intended to carry the papers; and to act as an agent for conducting the negotiation upon the spot with the Congress, being refused a passport for that purpose, they were obliged to forward them by the common means of conveyance. Never were commissioners from any court, so much disliked and held in such contempt, as our commissioners were by the American Congress. When the letter and commission came to hand, it was long debated whether they should be read, and it was with difficulty they were admitted to be taken the smallest notice of.

The commissioners proposed at their first beginning of this business, several concessions and arrangements, which in a more early period would have restored peace and felicity to the whole empire. They offered to consent to the immediate cessation of hostilities by sea and land—to restore a free intercourse and to renew the common benefits of civilization, through the several parts of the empire. To extend every freedom to trade, that the respective interests on both sides could require.—To agree that no military force should be kept up in the different states in North America, without the consent of the general Congress, or of the particular assemblies.—To concur to measures calculated to discharge the debts of America,
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and to raise the credit and value of paper circulation. To perpetuate the common union, by a reciprocal deputation of an agent or agents from the different states, who should have the privilege of a seat and voice in the parliament of Great Britain; or if sent from Britain in that case, to have a seat and a voice in the assemblies of the different state, to which they might be deputed respectively, in order to attend to the several interests of those by whom they were deputed. And in short to establish the power of the respective legislatures in each particular state, to settle its revenue, its civil and military establishment, and to exercise a perfect freedom of legislation, and internal government; so that the British states throughout North America, acting with Great Britain in peace and war, under one common sovereign, might have the irrevocable enjoyment of every privilege, that was short of a total separation of interest, or consistent with that union of force on which the safety of the common religion and liberty depends. These were humbling concessions, and shewed the meanness of the ministry, who in the hour of their distress, were ready to grant much more than would have been accepted with thankfulness when their pride would not suffer them to listen to any reasonable accommodation. They despised the most humble and reasonable petitions, which did not require the half of what now they were ready to propose themselves, when they might have known that their proposals could not be accepted. There are none so mean spirited in the time of adversity, as those that are haughty in the time of success and prosperity. The minister was now lying prostrate at the feet of these colonists to whom he had declared he would not listen, till he had them at his

his feet. The history of this transaction may be a warning to future ministers, and crowned heads may learn from hence, that to govern with mildness and in mercy is the surest method to extend government, or keep the possession of what they enjoy. Mankind are not born with chains about their necks, nor with saddles on their backs, to be bound when princes please, or to be ridden upon when they have a mind.

These papers produced several long debates in the Congress, which were renewed upon different days, from the eleventh till the seventeenth of June, but their answer which they returned by Henry Laurens, was sufficiently brief, significant, and conclusive.— They observed to the commissioners, that the acts of the British parliament, the commission from their sovereign, and their letter supposed the people of those states to be subjects to the crown of Great Britain, and were founded upon the idea of dependence, which was totally inadmissible. They informed them that they were inclined for peace, notwithstanding the unjust claims from which the war originated, and the savage manner in which it had been conducted. They would therefore be ready to enter upon the consideration of a treaty of peace and commerce, not inconsistent with treaties already subsisting, when the King of Great Britain should demonstrate a sincere disposition for that purpose. But the only solid proof of that disposition would be an explicit acknowledgement of the independence of those states, or the withdrawing of his fleets and armies.

Thus, an opportunity was lost which cannot be called back to Great Britain, by procrastinating the means till the season was over. Such were the conditions which an unhappy concurrence of events induced

duced on the one side, and what the operation of the same cases rendered inadmissible on the other. The Congress, at the same time, issued an unanimous approbation of the conduct of General Washington, in refusing a passport to Dr. Ferguson. This was a mortifying stroke to the pride of the Professor of Moral Philosophy, who had left the charge of his pupils to another, for the office of secretary to the commissioners, with an intention, as was supposed, to raise money in a shorter way, than by teaching dry morals in an university. His History of Cival he imagined would introduce him to the Congress; and Governor Johnstone made a sort of merit of his reputation in the republic of letters.—But however famous he might be in the republic of letters his commission rendered him unfit for the republics in America.

When the British commissioners found that they could obtain no access to the Congress, they employed themselves in addressing the people at large, which the Congress were so far from interrupting, that they gave free scope to the controversy without engaging in it themselves. The commissioners seem to have carried along with them an idea, which at the time of their appointment, was endeavoured with great care to be established in England, and which had from the beginning misled the ministry in all their measures, namely, “that the bulk of the Americans were well affected to the British government, and that the greatest part of the remainder were only held in a state of delusion by the Congress,” they accordingly, when the negotiation failed, directed their publications in appeals to the people at large; seemingly thereby to realize in some degree the charges so repeatedly made on the other side, that their only object was
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under the insidious appearance of conciliation, to excite either a separation amongst the colonies, or the people to tumults against their respective governments. For the purpose they published the following manifesto and proclamation,—“ Having amply and repeatedly made known to the Congress, and having also proclaimed to the inhabitants of North America in general, the benevolent overtures of Great Britain towards a re-union and coalition with her colonies, we do not think it consistent either with the duty we owe to our country, or with a just regard to the characters we bear, to persist in holding out offers which in our estimation required only to be known to be gratefully accepted; and we have accordingly, except only the commander in chief, who will be detained by military duties, resolved to return to England a few weeks after the date of this manifesto and declaration. Previous however, to this decisive step, we are led by a just anxiety for the great objects of our mission, to enlarge on some complaints which may not have been sufficiently understood, to recapitulate to our fellow subjects the blessing which we are empowered to confer, and to warn them of the continued evils to which they are at present blindly and obstinately exposing themselves.

“ To the members of the Congress we again declare, that we are ready to concur in all satisfactory and just arrangements for securing to them and their respective constituents, the re-establishment of peace, with the exemption from any imposition of taxes by Great Britain, and the irrevocable enjoyment of every privilege consistent with that union and force on which our mutual prosperity, and the safety of our common religion and liberties depend. We again assert that
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the members of the Congress were not authorized by their constituents, either to reject our offers without the previous consideration and consent of the several assemblies and conventions, their constituents, or to refer us to pretended foreign treaties, which they knew were delusively framed in the first instance, and which have never yet been ratified by the people of this continent. And we once more remind the members of the Congress, that they are responsible to their countrymen, to the world, and to God, for the continuance of this war, and for all the miseries with which it must be attended.

To the general assemblies and conventions of the different colonies, plantations, and provinces above-mentioned, we now separately make the offers which we originally transmitted to the Congress; and we hereby call upon and urge them to meet expressly for the purpose of considering whether every motive, political as well as moral, should not decide their resolution to embrace the occasion of cementing a free and firm coalition with Great Britain. It has not been, nor is it our wish, to seek the objects which we are commissioned to pursue, fomenting popular divisions and partial cabals; we think such conduct would be ill suited to the generous nature of the offers made and unbecoming the dignity of the king and the state which make them. But it is both our wish and our duty to encourage and support any men or bodies of men, in their return of loyalty to our sovereign and affection to our fellow subjects. To all others, free inhabitants of this once happy empire, we also address ourselves. Such of them as are actually in arms, of whatsoever rank or description, will do well to recollect, that the grievances, whether real or supposed,

Vol. II. G g g which

which led them into this rebellion, have been for ever removed, and that the just occasion is arrived from their returning to the calls of peaceful citizens. But if the honours of a military life are become their object, let them seek those honours under the banners of their rightful sovereign, and in fighting the battles of the united British empire, against our late mutual and natural enemies.

To those whose professions it is to exercise the functions of religion on this continent; it cannot surely be unknown that the sovereign power with which the Congress is endeavouring to connect themselves, has ever been averse to toleration and inveterately opposed to the interest and freedom of the place of worship which they serve; and that Great Britain, from whom they are for the present separated, must both from the principles of their constitution, and of protestantism, be at all times the best guardian of religious liberty, and most disposed to promote and extend it.—To all those who can estimate the blessings of peace and its influence over agriculture, arts, and commerce, who can feel a due anxiety for the education and establishment of their children, or who can place a just value on domestic fecerity, we think it sufficient to observe, that they are made by their leaders to continue involved in all the calamities of war, without having either a just object to pursue, or a subsisting grievance which may not instantly be redressed.

But if there be any person who, divested of mistaken resentment, and uninfluenced by selfish interest, really think that it is for the benefit of the colonies to separate themselves from Great Britain, and that so separated they will find a constitution more mild, more free, and better calculated for their prosperity than that which

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we are impowered and disposed to renew and improve; with such persons we will not dispute a position which seems to be sufficiently contradicted, by the experience they have had. But think it right to leave them fully aware of the change, which the maintaining of such a position must make in the nature and future conduct of this war, more especially when to this position is added, the pretended alliance with the court of France. The policy, as well as the benevolence of Great Britain, have thus far checked the extremes of war when they tended to distress a people still considered as our fellow subjects; and to desolate a country shortly to become again a source of mutual advantage; but when that country professes the unnatural design, not only of estranging herself from us, but of mortgaging herself and her resources to our enemies, the whole contest is changed; and the question is, how far Great Britain may, by every means in her power, destroy or render useless a connection contrived for her ruin and the aggrandizement of France. Under such circumstances, the laws of self preservation must direct the conduct of Great Britain; and if the colonies are to become an accession to France, they will direct her to render that accession of as little avail as possible to her enemies.

If there are any who notwithstanding these reasonings, say the independence of those colonies will in the result, be acknowledged by Great Britain; to them we answer without reserve, that we neither possess nor expect powers for that purpose; and that if Great Britain could ever sink so low, as to adopt such a measure, we should not have thought ourselves compellable to be the instruments in making a concession which in our opinion would be calamitous to the colo-

nies for whom it was made, and disgraceful as well as calamitous to the country from whom it is required. And we think proper to declare, that in this spirit and sentiment we have regularly written from the continent to Great Britain.

It will now become the colonies, regularly to call to mind their own solemn appeals to heaven in the beginning of the contest, that they took arms only for the redress of grievances, and that it would be their wish, as well as their interest to remain for ever connected with Great Britain. We again ask them whether all their grievances real or supposed, have not been amply and fully redressed;—and we insist that the offers we have made leave nothing to be wished in point either of immediate or permanent security; if those offers are now rejected, we withdraw from the exercise of a commission with which we have in vain been honoured; the same liberality will no longer be due from Great Britain, nor can it either in justice or policy be expected from her.

In fine, and for the further manifestation, as well of the disposition we bear, as of the gracious and generous purposes of the commission under which we act, made and passed the last session of parliament, intituled, an act to enable his majesty to appoint commissioners with sufficient powers to treat, conduct, and agree upon the means of quieting the disorders now subsisting in certain colonies, plantations, and provinces, in North America, having been pleased to authorize and empower us to grant a pardon or pardons, to any number or description of persons, within the colonies plantations and provinces of New Hampshire, Massachusetts's Bay, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, the three lower
Counties

Counties on the Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. And whereas the good effects of the said authority and powers, towards the people at large, would have long since taken place if a due use had been made of our first communications and overtures; and have thus far been frustrated only by the precipitate resolution of the members of the Congress not to treat with us, and by declining to consult with their constituents, we now in making our appeal to those constituents, and to the free inhabitants of the continent in general, have determined to give them what in our opinion, should have been the first object of those who appeared to have taken the management of their interests, and adopt this mode of carrying the said authorities and powers into execution. We accordingly hereby grant and proclaim, a pardon or pardons, of all and all manner of treasons or misprision of treasons, by any person or persons, or by any member or description of persons within the said colonies, plantations, or provinces, counceled, commanded, acted or done, on or before the date of this manifesto, and proclamation. And we further declare and proclaim, that if any person or persons, or any number or description of persons, within the said colonies, plantations, and provinces, now actually serving, either in a military or civil capacity, in this rebellion, shall at any time, during the continuance of this manifesto, and proclamation, withdraw himself or themselves, from such civil or military service, and shall continue thenceforth peaceably as a good and faithful subject or subjects, to his majesty, to demean himself or themselves such person or persons, or such number or description of persons, shall become and be fully intitled to, and hereby

hereby obtain all the benefits of the pardon or pardons hereby granted; excepting only from the said pardon or pardons, every person, and every number and description of persons, who after the date of this manifesto and declaration, that under the pretext of authority, as judges, jurymen, ministers, or officers of civil justice, be instrumental in executing, and putting to death any of his Majesty's subjects within the said colonies, plantations, and provinces.

And we think proper further to declare, that nothing herein contained is meant, or shall be construed to set at liberty any person or persons, now being prisoner or prisoners, or who during the continuance of this rebellion shall become a prisoner or prisoners. And we offer to the colonies at large or separately, a general or separate peace; with the revival of their ancient government, secured against any future infringements, and protected for ever from taxation by Great Britain. And with respect to such further regulations, whether civil, military, or commercial, as they may wish to be framed and established, we promise all the concurrence and assistance, that his Majesty's commission authorises and enables us to give. And we further declare, that this manifesto and proclamation shall continue and be in full force *forty days* from the date hereof, that is to say, from the third day of October, to the eleventh day of November, both inclusive.

And in order that the whole contents of this manifesto and proclamation may be more fully known, we shall direct copies thereof both in the English and the German languages to be transmitted by flags of truce to the Congress, the general assemblies or conventions of the colonies, plantations, and provinces, and to several

ral persons both in civil and military capacities within the said colonies. And for further security in times to come, of the several persons, or members or descriptions of persons, who are, or may be, the objects of this manifesto or proclamation we have set our hand and seals to thirteen copies thereof, and have transmitted the same to the thirteen colonies, plantations and provinces above mentioned, and we are willing to hope, that the whole of this manifesto and proclamation will be fairly and freely published and circulated, for the immediate general and serious consideration, and benefit of all his Majesty's subjects on this continent. And we earnestly exhort all persons who by this instrument forthwith receive the benefit of the King's pardon, at the same time that they retain a becoming sense of those lenient and affectionate measures, whereby they are now freed from many grievous charges which might have risen in judgment, or might have been brought in question against them to make a wise improvement of the situation in which this manifesto and proclamation places them; and not only recollect that a perseverance in the present rebellion or any adherence to the treasonable connection attempted to be framed with a foreign power, will after the present grace extended, be considered as a crime of the most aggravated kind; but to vie with each other in eager and cordial endeavours to secure their own peace, and promote the establishment and prosperity of their country, and the general weal of the empire. And pursuant to his Majesty's commission, we hereby require all officers civil and military, and all others his Majesty's loving subjects whatever, to be aiding and assisting unto us in the execution of this manifesto and proclamation, and of all the

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matters herein contained "Given at New-York, this third day of October, 1778."

This manifesto was signed by the commissioners and published as far as possible among the colonists. Mr. Drayton, one of the delegates for South Carolina, made a large and severe answer to it, where all the arguments of the commissioners were treated in a very masterly and animated manner, which plainly shewed, that whatever excellencies the British Commissioners might have in other respects, they were inferior in the exercise and management of argument and literary composition, to this single combatant who had now engaged them. The technical law terms, and formal phrases of this manifesto, were matter of mere laughter to the American *literati*; and in short the proclamation was handled in such a manner, that the whole intended effect thereof was rendered quite abortive—The justice of its first principles were absolutely denied, and the supremacy of the mother country over the colonies since the act of independency, considered as ridiculous and absurd. Pardons and remissions so fully offered to those that were considered in a state of rebellion, were treated with contempt, as supposing what the colonists did not admit, that free states could be in a state of rebellion with respect to any other power. The clemency and mercy of the sovereign, was viewed in a very different light by the Americans, from what it was represented by the commissioners, and they considered all the present offers thereof as stratagems of policy to lead them into a snare. What the commissioners observed with regard to their solemn appeals to Heaven, in the beginning of the contest, "that they took arms for the redress of grievances only, and that it was then their wish as well

well as their interest to remain for ever connected with Great Britain; they accounted it the greatest sophistry when used in an argument at this time. Great Britain had rejected all their former petitions, and treated all their earnest requests with scorn: and it was now out of her power to redress the new and fresh grievances that they had reason to complain of since these petitions had been presented. The commissioners could not rise from the dead, their beloved friends and dear relations, whom their haughty nation had slain in a cruel and unreasonable war; nor was it in the power of Britain, through a succession of ages, to make reparation for the injury she had done them.

She had driven them by her violence and cruelty, to declare themselves independent, and to enter into a treaty with foreign powers for their assistance, and wanted now to redress their grievances, at the expence of the blood of their friends, the ruin of their country, and their public faith. Had Britain offered sooner, the half of what she now proposed, it would have been accepted thankfully, and gratefully received; but the time was now past for redressing of grievances, in the manner proposed by the commissioners.

The Americans told the publishers of the manifesto, that they had already concluded a solemn treaty with France, on the footing of, and for establishing of their independency. That if they now treated with the Commissioners upon the ground of dependence, they should at once break their treaty with France, forfeit their credit with all foreign nations, be considered as a faithless and infamous people, and for evermore be cut off from the hope of foreign succour or resource. At the same time they would be thrown

Vol. II. H h totally

totally on the mercy of those, who had already pursued every measure of fraud, force, cruelty, and deceit for their destruction; as neither the King, the ministers, nor the parliament of England would be under the necessity of ratifying any one condition, which they agreed upon with the commissioners. Or if ever they found it necessary to ratify them for the present purpose, it would be to call a new parliament to undo the whole. Nothing, they said, could be trusted to an enemy whom they had already found so faithless, and so obstinately persevering in malice and cruelty. The fraudulent intention of the proposed negotiations, they said, was strongly evinced by the Commissioners, who went far beyond their avowed powers; being neither warranted by the commission, nor by the acts of parliament which they presented. These arguments had more effect upon the minds of the people, than all the pompous promises and threatenings in the manifesto and proclamation. The whole proceedings of the commissioners were considered as political craft to ensnare, intangle, and seduce the people; that having once put them off their guard, they might be more easily subdued, and brought to accept the terms which were proposed to them.

There were several concurrent circumstances which tended to frustrate this negotiation. It was too long in being proposed, for if our ministry actually intended a reconciliation, they ought to have made their offers thereof before the French treaty was concluded: for it was quite irrational to suppose, that a people who were possessed of the smallest degree of honour or principle, would immediately break a solemn treaty, and the first of the kind they had ever been engaged in. The imagination of success, on the part of the Commissioners,

commissioners, must have proceeded from the idea of what they themselves would have done in the like circumstances, or what they believed was lawful to be done on such an occasion. The conduct which they were in this transaction authorized to pursue, marks, with the strongest emphasis, the opinion of the ministry, with regard to treaties of the most solemn nature: that when their own ambition, pride, or interest, are to be fulfilled, they account it no crime to break a positive argument. If it was lawful for the Americans to break their new treaty with the French, it could be no crime in any others to do the same thing. And the ministry, through the channel of their commissioners, were now publishing to all the world, their opinion of the faith of treaties; that were no longer to be observed, than something which they supposed better might be obtained. This kind of proceeding gave the world reason to believe that the charges brought against our ministry in the French and Spanish rescripts, were not without foundation; and that the charges of perfidy brought against the French were more than balanced by our present conduct expressed in this new commission. Many thought that the charges of perfidy came with an ill grace from a court, that had with great solemnity sent out commissioners with power and authority, to persuade and enforce a reconciliation upon principles of the basest infidelity towards a party who had lately engaged in a treaty with an independent people. There were no reasons to persuade our ministry, that the Americans would keep their faith to Britain if they should pursue the doctrine they were now taught by the English Commissioners; for men who should break such a solemn treaty as they had now entered into with the

French nation, could not be supposed to be a people to be trusted in any matter whatsoever.

The abandoning Philadelphia, which had been the object of near two years contest, and the precipitate retreat of our army, were no ways favourable to the proposed negociation. This having happened about the time of the arrival of the Commissioners, was of itself sufficient to have frustrated the intention of the commission. Men with a commission from a sovereign whose forces were retreating, and had just abandoned the advantage of two years war, could not promise themselves great success in any treaty; and the more advantageous the offers which they should make in such circumstances were, the more their concessions were likely to be considered as proofs of weakness, and not of any good intention. The reason of the British troops abandoning Philadelphia is one of those mysteries of the present war that has not as yet been unveiled, or cleared up on this side the Atlantic, with any degree of consistency. It has been alledged that the reason of this precipitate retreat proceeded from the knowledge of the French squadron under D'Estaing being upon the coast; but whatever might be the apprehensions of the General, from circumstances he had learned in England before his embarking for America, of a French force coming to that part of the world, it is plain that neither the army nor navy apprehended any such thing, till after the 5th of July, when Lord Howe received the intelligence, by his cruisers, that D'Estaing's fleet had been seen on the coast of Virginia. It was indeed happy for both the fleet and army that they had made their escape before D'Estaing's arrival; for had the French fleet shut up the Delaware, their case would have been very critical,

if not absolutely desperate. But it does not appear from any thing that has yet been published to the world, that this new danger was in the least apprehended by Lord Howe, who ought to have been in the secret as well as Sir Henry Clinton, nor has General Clinton ever given it as a reason of his abandoning Philadelphia, that a French fleet was upon the coast. It would appear that the evacuation of Philadelphia was determined before Sir William Howe returned to England, and that there were some reasons independent of the arrival of the French fleet, which made it necessary to abandon that city.

Experience, during the winter, had taught our generals that the Americans were determined to assault them with all their force, as soon as they could find a suitable opportunity; they had also discovered by their attack upon them at German-Town, that in case of an universal or general engagement, that matters would at least be doubtful. They could not remain cooped up in Philadelphia, and they could not march into the country without risking a battle with great disadvantage. In case of a defeat they could not get aboard their ships but with the greatest danger.—They had no hopes of any reinforcement from Britain which had been promised last year, and the troops were much weakened through skirmishes, sickness, and other circumstances attending war and a foreign climate. It was plainly perceived, that though they were in the possession of Philadelphia, that they could not continue in that city, nor in case of a defeat make a safe retreat from it on board their ships, as there was not such free access to ships of war for their defence in time of embarking as at New-York.

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From the attack they experienced in their retreat, it plainly appears that General Washington had his troops in readiness, and was designed to have attacked them in the city of Philadelphia, or to have given them battle provided they had come to the field.— From the apprehension of the uncertain consequences of such an attack, as now all hope of supply from England was lost, they thought it most convenient to retreat to New York, where the fleet could more conveniently assist, or relieve them in case of any disaster. It was exceedingly unfavourable to the Commissioners, that the army was obliged to make such a precipitate flight, at the very time they were offering their conciliatory proposals; and it was not probable that even the wavering part of the people would give much attention to the addresses of Commissioners with a flying army at their heels. From the very beginning of the war our commanders seem to have had their chief dependence upon the fleet; for without the aid and assistance thereof they never performed any action worthy of any particular consideration.

The evacuation of Philadelphia was as unexpected as it was alarming to the friends of government, and their advocates were greatly at a loss to account for a measure, the reasons of which appeared totally mysterious to them. They were almost ashamed to confess the fact itself, and for some time remained in suspense concerning the authenticity of the accounts which informed them of the event. The distress of the American army during the winter, had been described in such strong terms, and their inability to make any longer an opposition to the King's forces, that the retreat from Philadelphia appeared so ænigmatical, that they could not tell how to account for it. It was given out that Sir Henry Clinton intended
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some home stroke, by which he would put an end to the war, and bring the colonists to absolute submission; for as the particulars of the retreat, and the subsequent losses, were for a time concealed, it was always hoped that General Clinton had some great object in view, when he evacuated a city of so much importance for its situation to the British forces.—

What he was about to do, and the marvelous effects of his proceedings, were published with as much confidence as if they had already been accomplished, and those who were no friends to General Howe, were at this time more extravagant in their predictions concerning the success of Sir Henry Clinton. Whether they really believed what they affirmed is much to be doubted; it rather appeared that their expression of their hopes concerning the success of General Clinton were intended as accusations against General Sir William Howe, for not having fulfilled their expectations in reducing the Americans. It was not long till the character of this officer was severely attacked from all quarters in ministerial newspapers, and pamphlets, and his services depreciated with much rancour and abuse. This was principally intended as a defence of the ministry, especially of that state officer who led the American department; the advocates for the court, could now devise no other method of defending their measures, than by reproaching General Howe for partiality and inactivity in discharging the office of general. This reproach came with an ill grace from those who had but a little time before extolled Sir William Howe, both for conduct, courage, and the management of the war. The result of the matter was, that all the officers that were sent to America during this war had found in experience,

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that it was different from what the ministry had represented it, and that all the parts of the plan for carrying it on were founded in error and mistake; that it was a plan totally disjointed and uncemented in all its principles and parts, and could be executed by no officer with any certainty of success. It was this made all the general officers desire to be recalled one after another as soon as possible, and to quit a scene of action where there was nothing to be expected except disgrace and disappointment. Sir William Howe became now the chief object of court resentment, and all the ministerial scribblers were set loose upon him, who did not spare to give him a liberal share of abuse. While the disputants at home were vigourously supporting their different opinions concerning the success and issue of the war, the actors on the principal stage were more warmly engaged, in the hottest and warmest season of the year, in acting their parts with various success

Upon the 18th day of June the British army evacuated Philadelphia to the surprize of all Europe. It had been given out with the greatest confidence that this city, as being most central, was to be held as a place of arms and resource, for carrying on the war in both the northern and southern colonies; and it was generally supposed that the Americans were not able to drive the British forces out of it, nor were they able to face our troops in the open field. The news of this sudden retreat and evacuation, greatly puzzled all the ministerial connoisseurs in politics, and they were greatly embarrassed to assign proper reasons for such a hasty and precipitate measure. Philadelphia had been considered as a great object only twelve months before, and it was then confidently affirmed that the reduction of that city would deter-
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mine the fate of America; it had only been held one winter with much difficulty, and was now suddenly given up without assigning any reason for such an evacuation. This gave room for many conjectures, no ways favourable to the wisdom and prudence of the conductors of the war, as different parties, in judging of circumstances, could not in idea, form a plausible conjecture concerning the reasons of this sudden and precipitate retreat; this phænomenon was equally puzzling to the friends of the ministry, and those that were enemies to the war. It was some time before the court advocates could recover themselves from the consternation into which they were thrown by this disagreeable intelligence.

The whole British army passed the Delaware without any interruption or danger, for which they were much obliged to the good and wise management of Admiral Lord Howe, who on that and several other occasions, discovered a knowledge in his profession beyond what is common to many. General Washington had received information of the design of evacuating Philadelphia, and had already sent General Maxwell with his brigade to reinforce the Jersey militia, and to throw all the obstructions possible in the way of the march of our army; that by interrupting their march he himself might be enabled to bring up his force in proper time, to make an advantage of those opportunities, which it was reasonable to suppose, so long a march, through so dangerous a country would have afforded of attacking them with great success. This detachment, when joined by the militia, broke down the bridges, but did not attack our army, because the British forces were vastly superior in numbers to the American corps under the

Vol. II. 111 command

command of General Maxwell. The latter, on account of this superiority, was obliged to abandon the strong pass at Mount Holly without venturing any opposition. Notwithstanding this, Maxwell had cut out so much work for our army, that their march was exceedingly slow, and attended with incredible fatigue; the impediments were innumerable, and the weather was excessively warm, so that the march of the army was fatiguing beyond the measure of human conception. It would have required a great consciousness of the justice and equitableness of any cause, to have enabled men to suffer so much toil and labour in supporting it.

The British troops were incumbered with an enormous baggage, comprehending provisions, and the number of wheel-carriages and loaded horses was so great, as to cover the extent of twelve miles in the narrow line in which the troops were obliged to march on account of the situation of the country. One part of this incumbrance was necessary for the subsistence of the army; for unless they had carried their provisions along with them, they would have found none in the country through which they were marching, as all the people were their enemies, and had cut off all means of subsistence from the troops, which was not within their immediate comprehension. It was therefore necessity, as well as wisdom, that determined General Clinton to carry along with him such an enormous train of baggage. It would have argued the most consummate folly, to have risked the fate of a whole army, for the trouble that attended the conveyance of a certain and sufficient supply of things absolutely necessary. General Maxwell's expedition began to be more and more felt; though he had not engaged

engaged our army, nor killed any of the troops with the weapons of war, he had done them infinite mischief. The heat of the weather, which was then excessive, with the closeness of the narrow roads through the woods, and the constant labour of renewing and repairing bridges in a country, every where intersected with creeks, and marshy brooks, were severely felt. Such hardships and difficulties could not be supposed to have been undertaken without very pressing causes; and we must certainly suppose that Philadelphia was considered as a place altogether untenable by the British forces, otherwise they would not have undertaken such an hazardous and fatiguing march in a season of the year, when such enterprizes, under such circumstances, are next to impossible to perform. There is still something of mystery in this transaction, which has not been confessed by our court politicians, and which, on this side the Atlantic, has not been perfectly unveiled. Gen. Washington, or some other of the colonists, perhaps could unfold this mystery, and lay open the secret. It carries all the evidence implied in moral certainty, that our troops believed they could not keep Philadelphia, or that our ministry were mad to order such an evacuation without any solid reason, and to expose the troops to so much danger. From the many impediments which the army met with in its march, its progress was exceedingly slow; and this is the only reason by which we can account for its spending so many days in passing through so narrow a country. There were many interruptions in this march, which our accounts of it conceal or gloss over in the most favourable manner. One particular difficulty which greatly embarrassed the general, was, whether to take the

direct road to Staten Island across the Rariton towards the left, or turn from Allen's-Town to the right, and march toward the sea coast to Sandy-Hook. The first was the straightest and nearest march, but had some difficulties which Sir Henry Clinton desired much to avoid. He was informed that the Generals Washington and Lee, with the American army, had already passed the Delaware; and had also heard that General Gates with the northern army was advancing to join them on the Rariton. These were circumstances which had not been foreseen in their full light, at the time of evacuating Philadelphia, when it was intended to lead the army towards the left, in the direct way to Staten Island. The difficulty of passing the Rariton with the enemy in front, when the troops were incumbered with such heavy baggage, was a matter of the most serious consideration: For in case of a defeat, or even of a repulse, the provision of the army might have been lost, and the troops reduced to the extremity of famine and distress. Besides, it appears to have been the intention of General Clinton to avoid if possible, any general engagement with the provincial forces upon this occasion. Since the affair at German-Town, the British Generals had become somewhat more cautious in courting a general action than they had formerly done; they had, on that occasion, experienced what the colonists were able to attempt, and that they were not so much upon the reserve of standing an attack in the open field, as had been always supposed, and constantly set forth in the boasting gasconades of court writers. It was probably one chief reason for evacuating Philadelphia, that our force might not run the hazard of a general experiment of American intrepidity,

pidity, as in case of any great disaster arising from some desperate attack, it would have been impossible to have recruited the army, or to have received assistance from Britain in proper time to have saved the army's total ruin. The same cause that operated in making Sir Henry Clinton abandon Philadelphia, prevailed in determining him, if possible, to avoid an engagement in his march towards New York. For these reasons, he resolved to pursue the right hand course towards the sea, as the most safe and eligible in his present circumstances.

General Washington, who had crossed the Delaware far above Philadelphia, at a place called Coryel's Ferry, was apprehensive that the slow motions of his enemies were intended to lead him into the low countries, and then, by a rapid movement on the right, endeavour to gain possession of the strong heights above him, and so enclose him to the river, and force him to an engagement under every disadvantage. In this particular he was certainly deceived, as the situation of the British forces rendered them incapable of any such rapid movements; but the slowness on the one side retarded the motions of the other. It is however exceedingly probable, from all the various circumstances attending the marches on both sides, that General Washington intended to have made his chief attack at the passage of the Rariton; which from all probable circumstances, he concluded would have been the course of their march, and which he knew would have afforded great advantage in an attack.—General Clinton certainly intended at first to have marched in the manner, and in the course, which Washington apprehended, until at Allen's town, he found that Washington was before him; when being
apprehensive

apprehensive that the attack would become general, and probably the issue doubtful, he was under a necessity of altering his march towards the sea coast, by which he gained in his march, and they lost in proportion. It was some time before the colonists perceived that the British forces had departed from their expected line of direction. It was necessity, not design or foresight, as has been alledged by some, which made the British General change the direction of his march. When he marched out of Philadelphia he did not imagine that his retreat would be so suddenly observed, or that Gen. Washington would have been so ready as to have gained the Rariton before he had passed it; but in this he was deceived, and for this reason he altered his march, and took the right hand road leading to the sea coast. The fleet was a special object of his hope, which he expected would endeavour to be ready to receive his troops in case of any disaster. This was a special reason why he altered his course, and marched towards the coast; for it is plain that he avoided as much as possible to come to any general engagement with the colonists, while he was at a distance from the fleet.

As soon as General Washington perceived that the British troops had altered their course, and were marching towards the sea coast, he immediately changed his plan, and sent several detachments of his best troops, under the command of the Marquis de la Fayette, to harass the army in its march, while he advanced at a proper distance with all his force. As the advanced parties of the provincials came near to the rear of the British forces, and the situation became critical, General Washington ordered General Lee, with two brigades, to reinforce and take the command

command of the advanced corps. This party consisted of about five thousand men, according to the account which General Washington gave under his own hand. Others who speak from conjecture, have set forth, that this corps consisted of more than five thousand, but there is no certainty in this conjecture.

Sir Henry Clinton in his march to a place called Freehold, judging from the number of the provincials that hung upon his rear, that their main body was not far distant, began to be in concern for the baggage, which had always been for good reasons, a principal object of his attention. He wisely resolved to free that part of the army from this incumbrance and impediment, he therefore placed the baggage under the management of General Knyphausen, who led the first column of the army. The other, which covered the march, was now disengaged and ready for action, and was composed of the best troops in the army, commanded by the general himself. This corps consisted of the third, fourth, and fifth brigades of British, two battalions of British, and the Hessian grenadiers, a battalion of light infantry, the guards, and tenth regiment of light infantry. These were troops, that had been heretofore accounted invincible, and which none of the provincials durst so much as face in the open field; with these brigades Gen. Clinton endeavoured to make the best defence he could, though it appears that he was not free of fear with regard to the event; for he had ordered General Knyphausen to march at break of day with all the carriages and baggage, and to direct their course to Middle-town, which lay at twelve miles distance on their way, in an high and strong country. The commander

mander in chief, with the second division, continued some hours on the ground in the neighbourhood of Freehold, both to cover the march of the baggage, and to afford time for the long range of carriages to get clear on their way. This caution and care was exceedingly necessary as the event proved; for it was not long till the American force appeared advancing in their rear, and pursuing them with an intention to attack them.

Upon the 25th of June, about eight o'clock in the morning, when the army began to march, some parties, of the provincials appeared in the woods and attacked the troops upon the left flank; these being only flying parties, were made to retire by the light troops. But as the rear-guard descended from the heights of Freehold, into a valley about three miles in length and one in breadth, several columns of the colonists appeared also descending into the plain, who about ten o'clock began to cannonade the rear. At the same time that this attack was made upon the rear, the general received intelligence that two strong bodies of troops were marching to flank the army; this in the modern military stile, was called marching in force on both sides to attack them in the flanks. This greatly alarmed the general, for he perceived that it was their design to attack the baggage, and as the carriages were then entangled in narrow defiles for some miles, it seemed a matter of the greatest consequence to guard against this danger. As the affair appeared to be critical, the general devised the only method that could have been at that time fallen upon to deliver himself out of that embarrassment. He resolved to make a vigorous attack upon that body which hung upon his rear and harraressed it, which he concluded

cluded would call back the flanking parties to the assistance of those that were thus engaged, and thereby give an opportunity to the baggage to escape. For although General Washington was marching with his whole army, which was believed to be far greater than it really was, yet as the main body was separated from this advanced corps which attacked Lord Cornwallis in the rear, by two considerable defiles, he did not imagine that he could pass a greater body of troops through those narrows, during the execution of that measure which he intended, than what the force along with him was able to oppose; whilst on the other hand, even with that division of the army, Washington's situation would be sufficiently critical, provided he should come upon him, whilst he was struggling in the defiles. He was however doubtful of this matter, and to guard against every possible result that might happen in case of a general engagement, he called back a brigade of the British infantry, and the seventeenth regiment of light dragoons from Knyphausen's division, and left them orders to take a post that would effectually cover his right flank, being the side on which he was most jealous of being attacked. In the mean time the Queen's light dragoons had engaged with some of the American cavalry, under the Marquis de Fayette, and put them to flight, and had driven them back upon their own foot. The General then made dispositions to attack the Americans in the plain; but before he could advance, they unexpectedly fell back, and posted themselves in a strong situation, on the heights above Monmouth House. The weather in this season of the year is in those parts always exceedingly warm; but upon this day it was so violently hot as to be

Vol. II. K k k scarcely

scarcely exceeded by the most sultry summers of that continent. This was a very disagreeable circumstance to our army, which was already very much fatigued by their march, and the severe labour of clearing the way and repairing bridges. The most vigorous exertions were, however, at this time necessary, and the circumstances of our army, required a more than ordinary vigour to make good their march, and save their baggage. The British grenadiers had now sufficient employment for all their valour and intrepidity: This body with the village of Freehold on their left, and the guards on their right, began the attack with great fury. The provincials were aware of their impetuosity, and guarded against the effects of it; and according to appointment, gave way after a short attack, and led their enemy directly upon the second line, which was ready to receive them. It was here the very flower of the British army was resisted in a manner they never expected: Their fierce attack was resolutely sustained, and their fury so much abated by the bold resistance of the colonists, that they were forced to be witnesses of their enemies forming themselves, when they thought they had totally routed them, in a new advantageous post, from whence they were not able to drive them. Our accounts of this engagement are very unfairly given, and the circumstances of this battle are prescribed with such a partiality to Sir Henry Clinton, and the valour of the British troops, that the writers themselves, instead of doing honour to the general and his men, afford sufficient hints to enable others to infer, that there was much more understood than they were willing to express. They allow, that according to their own stile, after the enemy was completely routed, they, with,

with a very unusual degree of recollection as well as resolution, took a third position with so much judgment, that their front was covered by a marshy hollow, which scarcely admitted the possibility of an attack. This does not well agree with a complete and total defeat. The truth of the matter is, that the whole manner and method of the colonists proceedings was but one plan. They perceived the intention of the British general, and knew the pressing circumstances he was in; that he intended to make a resolute and vigorous attack, to save his baggage, and if possible to defeat that advanced party that hung upon his rear. They therefore provided against a desperate attack, by forming in two lines, and taking new posts, to which they retired regularly when they were severely pressed. This both saved their men, and fatigued their enemy, and afforded new advantages which the English forces could not obtain. By the resistance which our men had met with from the first and second lines, but especially from the second, their vigour was sufficiently abated, and they found from experience, that those men whom they had so often determined to be cowards, were very different from what they apprehended.

General Clinton found from the vigorous resistance the provincials had made against his best troops, and from the post they had now taken, that the issue would be very doubtful should he attempt to dislodge them from the post they were now in. After he had made some dispositions, as if he meant to attack them, by bringing up the second line, and making the light infantry and rangers turn to the left, he desisted from the attempt. His best troops had now done

all that they were able to do; they were over-powered with heat, wearied with fatigue, and had been severely handled in the two former attacks; and the others that were now ready to have made the third, were neither of the same character for intrepidity, nor in case of a repulse, were they likely to have made a good retreat in their present situation. He therefore thought it better not to press the affair any further. In this he behaved prudently, for as he had as yet been engaged with but a part of the American army, and the main force was advancing, he would have been obliged to have engaged fresh troops, with an army already very much fatigued by the former actions. He had so far gained his intention, with regard to the baggage, as the convoy was now without the reach of danger. The American army made a bold attempt to cut off the retreat of the light infantry, which laid the general under the necessity of making some new arrangements, which, considering the excessive heat of the day, were exceedingly difficult to be effected, but were absolutely necessary for the preservation of the army. The British forces at length returned to the post, from whence the provincials had at first retreated, after quitting the plain.

The event justified the opinion of General Clinton, with respect to the Americans design on the baggage, and the propriety of his attacking the provincials at the time, and in the manner he did. Two brigades of the American light troops had passed our army, one on each flank, with that view, and had made the attempt, but were repulsed by the fortieth regiment and the light horse. Matters, however, were like

to turn very serious and critical, and Sir Henry Clinton began to perceive, should he persist in the engagement, that the issue would be very doubtful, as the colonists were advancing, and seemed eager in maintaining the dispute; he therefore thought it prudent to pursue the baggage as fast as he was able. Our accounts of this affair set it forth in this manner: "Sir Henry Clinton having now fully attained his object, for the Generals Knyphausen and Grant, with the first division and baggage, were arrived at Nut-Swamp near Middletown, could have no inducement for continuing in his present situation. The troops had already gained sufficient honour, in forcing successively from two strong positions, a corps of the enemy, which he was informed, amounted to near 12,000 men, and the merit of the service was much enhanced by the unequalled circumstances of heat and fatigue under which it was performed. The enemy were much superior in force to the division immediately under his command; and if the equality had been even nearer, it would still have seemed imprudent to have hazarded an engagement, at such a distance from the rest of his army, in a country not only hostile, but which, from its nature, must have been ruinous to strangers, under any circumstances of defeat. And as the heat of the weather rendered marching by day intolerable, so the moon-light added to eligibility of the night, for that purpose. Upon some or all of these accounts, the troops having reposed till ten o'clock, the army was again put in motion, and they marched forward to join their fellows"

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When matters are faithfully compared, it does not appear that there were any such great numbers of American troops present at this engagement: That only the 5000 men, that were sent to harra's the march of our troops were all the force that had yet been engaged. That those troops, by the order of Gen. Lee, had retreated, and were again rallied by the command of General Washington, and made such an impression upon our forces, as gave the General reason to believe, that, provided he should adventure the issue of the action, it would at least be very doubtful. It was plain to the impartial part of our army, that the colonists upon this occasion, withstood, with much bravery, the very best of our troops, and seemed to behave like veteran soldiers. The grenadiers, the very chosen troops from all the regiments, together with the guards, who generally claim the post of honour, found in experience, that they could support their honour with difficulty, against the attacks of men who fought for the rights of human nature, more than for the empty honours of war. The former boasting of our officers and men, and the contempt in which they held the Americans, began now more to decrease, and our officers began to find that caution was now a very necessary part of practice in carrying on the American war.

The loss on our side is represented as very considerable in point of the number of the slain, but particularly grievous by the loss of the brave Colonel Monckton, who had behaved with much military bravery in several former actions, and had been grievously wounded, both in the last war and the present. After several narrow escapes in the field,
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he was reserved to be killed on this day, at the head of the second battalion of grenadiers. A very particular circumstance rendered this day and action remarkable, and unparalleled in the History of America. Fifty-nine soldiers perished, without receiving a wound, merely through excessive heat and fatigue. Some of the Americans are said to have suffered in the same manner, though bred in the country and inured to the climate. Of all the actions since the commencement of the war, our troops were in this exposed to the greatest hardships, though they sustained greater loss of men in some others. A good part of the management of this retreat, and conducting of our troops out of danger, depended upon General Grey, whom our accounts do not mention in the whole of this affair: He had some narrow escapes having his horse killed under him, and the heads of some soldiers, which had been taken off by cannon-balls lying beside him, when he recovered from the entanglement of his horse. And there is much reason to conclude that the loss of this day has not as yet been fully ascertained. The account which the Americans give of the loss on our side is different from ours, and has some internal marks of authenticity in them, not so clearly to be perceived in our official representations. From the plainest and best accounts it appears that though our men behaved with much bravery, yet they were hard pressed, and with difficulty supported their march, which they were obliged to do in the night, when they escaped by the favour of darkness.

The Americans claimed great honour to that detachment of their troops, which was engaged in the
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action; they also claimed the advantage in the engagement, though our people affirm that they did this without any ground. However it must be allowed to have been a considerable advantage to the Americans, to know that they could engage the best troops in Britain in the open field, and with equal, if not inferior numbers, withstand them and even in the conclusion make them glad to retreat with considerable loss. It had often been said that our officers and men, desired nothing so much as to have an opportunity of engaging the provincials in the open field, when they were fully assured that they could fight them at any odds whatsoever. The time was now arrived when they might easily have made the experiment, and verified this declaration to the world. The Americans, instead of being much more numerous than our men, do not appear to have had equal numbers engaged in this action; and yet they not only stood their ground, but obliged their enemies to retreat with such precipitation, as had all the external marks of a flight. From all accounts that can be depended upon, it cannot as yet be made appear, that General Washington had more troops in his whole army, than Sir Henry Clinton had in his; it must therefore proceed from other causes than superiority of numbers, that the colonists had any advantage in this action. There were some particular things, that were much against them. The behaviour of one of their own generals appears to have been much to blame, and tended much to have interrupted their march: From what principle he acted, is best known to himself, but it is sufficiently evident that he disobeyed the orders of his commander in chief, by
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ordering his detachment to retreat, when there was visibly no occasion; for that same corps under another commander, recovered their station, and supported it till their enemies fled in the night, and got out of their reach. The Americans themselves affirm, that they would have obtained a complete and decisive victory, if it had not been from the conduct and disobedience of General Lee. That officer had, some time before, by an exchange, obtained a release from his long confinement at New York; and we have already observed that he was appointed to take the command of that detachment, which was ordered to harass the British army, and to interrupt its march.

It appears from General Washington's account of the action, that had General Lee obeyed his orders, and not retired after the first fire, that the British troops would have been more severely handled; for as these very same troops rallied and supported their station after they had retreated, provided they had stood their ground at first, the action would have been more sharp and bloody. General Washington says, that being informed, that if once the British army gained the high and strong country of Middle-Town, no attempt could afterwards be made upon them, with the smallest prospect of success, he accordingly determined to fall upon their rear, immediately upon their departure from the strong grounds in the neighbourhood of Freehold, on which they had encamped during the night of the twenty-seventh. He communicated the intention to General Lee, with orders to make his disposition for the attack, and to keep the troops lying upon their arms in constant preparation;

paration; which he also practised himself in the main body. Having received an express at five in the morning, that the British army had begun their march, he immediately dispatched an order to General Lee to attack them, acquainting him at the same time, that he was marching directly to support him, and that for the greater expedition, he should cause his men to disencumber themselves of that part of the baggage which they carried upon their backs. To his great surprize and mortification however, when he had marched about five miles, he met the whole advanced corps retreating, which they informed him was by the order of General Lee, without their making the smallest opposition, excepting the single fire of one detachment, to repulse the British Light Horse. General Washington found the rear of the retreating troops hard pressed by our forces; but by forming them a new, under the brave and spirited exertions of their officers he soon checked the advance of the British forces; and having by this means gained time to plant some batteries of cannon, and to bring up fresh forces, the engagement hung in an equal poize for some time. In this situation (he continues) the enemy finding themselves warmly opposed in front, made an attempt to turn his left flank; but were bravely repulsed by some detached parties of infantry. A similar attempt upon the right was made, and they were repulsed by General Green, who afterwards, in conjunction with General Waine, took such posts, and kept up so severe and well-directed a fire, as compelled the British forces to retire behind a defile, where the first stand had been made, in the beginning of the action. In that situation

tion, in which their flanks were secured by thick woods and morasses, and their front only assailable through a narrow defile, he notwithstanding made dispositions for attacking; but the darkness came on so fast, as not to afford time for surmounting the impediments in their way. The main body, however, lay all night upon their arms, in the place of action, as the detached parties did in their several posts which they had been ordered to take, under a full determination of attacking the British army when the day appeared: But the British forces retreated in such profound silence in the night, that the most advanced posts, and those very near them, knew nothing of their departure until morning.

Our accounts of this action is not only imperfect, but contrary to that which General Washington has given; but we may gather from the circumstances of both, that the British troops were far from being victorious on this occasion. It would have been much to their interest as well as their honour, now, that they had the Americans in the open field, where they had long professed to wish to have them, to have shewn their absolute superiority, by defeating this army, which would have tended much to have brought the colonists to the terms of the Commissioners, who were now waiting to bring the Americans to some temper, with regard to their ideas of reconciliation. Nothing could be more unfortunate than this affair, to the designs of the commissioners: their threatenings were now despised, and the boasted valour of the British forces considered only in a common point of light. The best troops in the English army had now been made to retreat, before men, to whom they had

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long given the names of a rabble, cowards, and poltroons. This was not likely to operate favourably in behalf of the wishes of the Commissioners. It is plain from all circumstances, that our troops had a fair opportunity to exert all their valour, seeing the very guards and the invincible grenadiers had just as much duty in this action as they were able to perform, and yet so far were the colonists from giving ground or running away, that they lay all night upon their arms, waiting to renew the action in the morning, when our brave men slipped away silently in the night, and got beyond the reach of danger.

It was undoubtedly wise and prudent in Sir Henry Clinton to take the measures which he adopted to save his army; for it does not appear that, suppose he had engaged with all his forces, and stood a general action to the end, he would have had any hopes of any other sort of victory than would have ruined him. The Americans were determined to have stood to the utmost, and from what happened during the time of this action, it appears what might have been the issue, provided it had been general. General Clinton had foreseen this from the beginning, and endeavoured to guard against the fatal consequences he perceived would follow a rash and general engagement. Both he and Sir William Howe had perceived, since the affair of German Town, that without greater reinforcements than they had reason to expect from Britain, that a general action would be very dangerous. They found they had to encounter a General, who was not easily to be circumvented, and whose troops had now by experience, both learned the art of war, and had acquired that mechanical

nical courage which proceeds from frequent action; and what was more, were animated with ideas of liberty, a thing for which those, possessed of great minds, will rather die than live without. The slaves of arbitrary power, when under strict discipline, and the command of good officers, will occasionally fight bravely, but when the action is over, they cool and turn languid for want of animating principles; but the spirit of liberty is a natural and perpetual fire that never ceases to animate the heart till all virtue is gone, and then there is nothing worthy of striving about. The speculations of some selfish men concerning duty and obedience to government, may please themselves and their party, either for a chamber meditation, or a blinding apology for unjustifiable actions, but will never satisfy any rational enquirer, who has nothing except truth for the object of his enquiry. To suppose that there are not limits set to power, as well as known rules of obedience, beyond which neither governors nor subjects ought to proceed, is to introduce a scepticism in government, that will soon put an end to all order, right and, property. The claim of rulers will always encrease unless circumscribed by laws, till they leave nothing for others to enjoy except what depends upon their grace and favour; and provided that they were absolutely perfect and full of grace and truth, there would be no danger from their encroachments: But as the world affords so many instances of graceless rulers, it is necessary we should have some better security for our privileges, than their favour. Men that carry their views no further than the immediate gratification of their appetites, or their own private worldly

worldly interest, will proceed according to the feelings which these produce; but remove these and they have no springs of action. Generous and liberal minds extend their good wishes to all men, and consider their own private interest inseparably connected with the common weal. Hence they are influenced to oppose every power that encroaches upon the common rights of mankind, and find themselves obliged to resist it as the common enemy of society.

The number of killed and wounded in the action of this day has never been exactly ascertained; for the Americans declared that they buried four times as many of the British troops, as our accounts say were killed. How many of the colonists were killed in this action, it was impossible for the British army to know as they left the field to their enemy, and retreated as fast as they could. Our Gazette could with no propriety give a list of any more killed on the side of the Americans, than they acknowledge in their accounts, because our ministry could have no certainty with regard to the matter of fact. General Washington says that our men carried off all their wounded, except four officers and about forty soldiers: This he could not know except by one of these two ways, either by being informed by the wounded which were left in the field, or by computing the proportion of the wounded to the slain they had buried; and if it be true what our accounts have constantly asserted, that the proportion of wounded on our side was always much greater than the slain, there must have been a greater number of wounded carried off the field by the army. It is highly probable that the accounts on both sides may not be exactly according to truth; but

but it may reasonably be supposed, that as the American cannon were for a time well served, and played with great fury upon our best troops, that more were wounded than four officers and forty soldiers. Ever since the action of Bunker's Hill, we have reason to be suspicious of our Gazette account of the killed and wounded, in the several actions which happened in America.

After this action, both the commanders in chief highly commended the behaviour of our officers and men; and there were undoubtedly good reason for such commendation on both sides, so far as the praise extended to courage and bravery; but in point of morality there must have been a great difference on the one side or the other. Many lives were lost, and much blood spilt, which might have been spared, had not that unhappy dispute commenced. One cannot read the history of such fatal transactions, without reflecting upon the reasons and causes of them; for it always implies some great error on the one side, or perhaps on both, when such hostile proceedings are pursued. In all civil wars recorded in history, their causes and springs have been derived from bad government or from bad administration of the laws and police of nations. The people have never been unreasonable when government have been virtuous, nor has it been found that subjects thought of revolting or rebelling till they were evidently oppressed. It is an easy matter, for those that are supported by the spoils of others, to cry out against them as factious and rebellious, but were they to change places and circumstances, it would make a great alteration. All government recorded in history have, when they de-
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parted from the principles of the constitution of nations, been ready to call out against rebellion in their subjects, when they opposed their oppressive and absurd measures: the force of reason and justice bears but little weight with men who are determined upon supporting their own measures, for the sake of gratifying their lust of power, or the cravings of appetite.

General Washington gave high and unusual praise to his officers and men, and expressed his obligations to their zeal and bravery: He said the behaviour of the troops in general, after they had recovered from the surprize occasioned by the retreat of the advanced party, was such as could not be surpassed; and he represented them to the Congress in such a light as made that body express their most zealous acknowledgment of their service, in the most public manner. Such a public approbation from the Congress was very flattering to the army, but particularly to the commander in chief and his officers; in which they considered this action as a battle, and the result as a great and important victory, obtained over the grand British army, under the immediate command of their general. In this they were not altogether wrong, for though the trophies of victory were small, yet they kept the field, and the British troops retreated, which had all the usual appearance of a victory: And this victory was so compleat as to clear both the Jerseys and Philadelphia, of an enemy that had done them much injury.

The evacuation of the city of Philadelphia, and the flight of the British army through the Jerseys to New-York, was equal to a victory in the view of the Americans.

ricans. It shewed them that our army did not consider themselves of sufficient force to adventure southward to Virginia, or Maryland, without the assistance of the fleet; and that, without aid of the navy, they were at present able to make no important conquests. The conjectures concerning this precipitate flight among parties at home was various, and there were few that could determine certainly, what were the real causes thereof. The friends of the court and the ministry represented this retreat of Sir Henry Clinton, as a military exploit, almost equal to that of Xenophon and the ten thousand Greeks, so much famed in ancient history; and it was said that nothing so great and glorious had been performed since the beginning of this war. That General Clinton would now soon bring the Americans to a sense of their duty, and the war to a happy and glorious conclusion. Such was the infatuation of this party, that our greatest losses were interpreted advantages; and what all the world considered as our disgrace, was considered by those commentators as our glory and honour. There were others who considered the flight from Philadelphia in another point of view, and probably in its true light: They said that our troops could not keep possession of Philadelphia without risking an engagement, and that the danger from such a proceeding would have been exceedingly great.—That as they had now no expectations of any reinforcement from Britain for a season, and were uncertain when any might be sent, they were under a necessity to secure themselves in the best manner they could, and always keep near to the sea, where they might have free access to their ships, in case of imminent danger. There had been no force sent to America,

Vol. II. M m m since

since the beginning of the war, that was competent to make a conquest of that continent by land; the troops durst never proceed far into that country, for when they advanced any distance from their ships, they were sure to meet with such vigorous attacks, as taught them the danger of the enterprize by reducing their numbers. Nothing could be more romantic than to imagine that men would give up their liberties and become slaves, when they had health and strength, and arms in their hands; or that they would tamely give up all that was dear to men without making all the resistance they could. Three millions of people upon their own ground, and in a country which they know and are acquainted with, will defend themselves against any quantity that can be sent out of seven millions, at the distance of three thousand miles, across a tempestuous ocean, through the various chances of winds, tides, and storms. It is an easy matter to form plans and make up estimates upon paper, to draw charts, and describe voyages in a cabinet; but it is quite a different matter to muster troops, man fleets, and conduct them across the Atlantic to America. What all wise impartial people foresaw, from the beginning of this unhappy and unnatural war, the ministry at last in experience found and could tell, provided their pride and ambition would permit them, how difficult it is to carry on war in America. The war with France and Spain, while we had the colonists to assist us was but play to this new, impolitic, and unrighteous enterprize.

The British troops having made the best of their way during the night after this engagement, had advanced so far, as rendered the pursuit impracticable, and all attempts to interrupt their embarkation at Sandy-Hook,

Sandy-Hook, fruitless. For this reason General Washington detached some light troops to observe the motions of the enemy, and drew off the main body of his army to the borders of the North River. The loss of the colonists, in point of killed and wounded, was not great, but they lost two good officers, who were much lamented: Colonel Bonner of Pennsylvania, and Major Dickenson of Virginia, the loss of whom was severely felt.

There was a circumstance which happened in this engagement, which occasioned some speculation both in America and at home, and produced different effects in the minds of different parties. The behaviour of General Lee was severely censured by General Washington, who is also said to have used some very harsh and severe expressions, in the face of the army, when he met General Lee, on the retreat of his corps from the place of action, amounting to a direct charge of disobedience of orders, want of conduct, or want of courage. This produced two passionate letters from General Lee, who was now put under arrest, with an answer from General Washington on the same day or night of the action. A court martial was instantly demanded, and as instantly appointed, and so speedily carried into execution, as to be opened at Brunswick on the fourth of July. The charges brought against General Lee were: First, disobedience of orders, in not attacking the enemy upon the 26th of June, agreeable to repeated instructions: For misbehaviour before the enemy on the same day, by making an unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat: And lastly, for disrespect to the commander in chief, by the two letters that have been mentioned. The result of the court, after a trial which lasted until

the 12th of August, was, the finding of General Lee guilty of the first charge; the finding him in part guilty of the second, of misbehaviour before the enemy, by making an unnecessary, and in some few instances a disorderly retreat. They also found him guilty of disrespect to the commander in chief, and sentenced him to be suspended from any command in the armies of the United States, for the term of 12 months. To form a just and true opinion of the justice of his sentence, it would be necessary to know the several particulars of the charges, with their circumstances as they really stood. According to what appears from Gen. Lee's own letter, and the American account of the action, it would appear that General Lee either failed in obedience to command, or was deficient in his usual courage and intrepidity. This might probably arise from certain mechanical reasons which will upon all occasions affect the most brave and courageous. He had been long under severe confinement, and had been very hardly used; the manner of his confinement, and the want of necessary fresh air, and wholesome food, might reduce his constitution and affect his nerves, whereby he might perceive objects of danger in a different light, from what he would have done in his ordinary state of vigour. It is not improbable that he might have a real want of necessary courage for such an important command at this time, and for fear of mismanaging through rashness, might through that apprehension be deficient in what otherwise was his duty. Though in all this he could not be criminal, yet the operation was the same in the action, as if it had been done with design; and as the court were only to proceed upon common reasons, according to the evidence before them,

them, they were not likely to find any apology for an action that had a tendency to produce such fatal consequences. It does not appear that there was any partiality in the behaviour of the court martial, nor did General Lee afterwards complain of their sentence; the necessity of the time required that every step of misconduct in officers should be marked with displeasure, that others might take warning, and pay proper regard to their duty. The discipline of free states, in all ages, when there were virtue or vigour in their constitution, has been represented by history as exact and severe; and though they have been zealous of liberty, and jealous of the rights of mankind; yet they considered a man's engaging to perform a duty which he either could not or would not perform, a crime punishable by the laws: and that it is not inconsistent with liberty, to mark with disapprobation, manifest neglect of duty, or betraying of trust. The freedom of the people, in all free nations, can only be supported by a strict adherence to the laws that are instituted for the support thereof. To be remiss in executing these laws, is the ready way to lose liberty. If men, in forming of States, were so wise as to make no more articles than are necessary to support that freedom they went to maintain, and never to turn remiss in the administration of them, it would be the only thing to continue liberty and national felicity. Partiality in administering justice, is a sure way to destroy freedom: this has been the bane of nations, and the ruin of empires. Strict and exact discipline in armies, upon principles of justice, is necessary, to keep every one to their duty, but it ought at the same time to be considered, that no more duties ought to be imposed than reason and justice

justice requires every man, in his station, to fulfil. To multiply duties beyond the limits of necessity or justice, is to create transgressions by law. What is just and reasonable is easily perceived, and men can have no dispute concerning this point, if they will only judge concerning others as they would wish them to judge if the case was their own. But this can only happen when virtue is predominant, and when the common weal takes place of all private interest.

The British army, after much fatigue and weariness through the heat of the weather and the labour in the late action, arrived at the heights of Navesink, in the neighbourhood of Sandy-Hook, on the last day of June, where they were met by the fleet under Lord Howe from the Delaware, where they had been detained by calms in the river for some time, but had most fortunately arrived the day before the approach of the army. It was a very fortunate circumstance for our army, that the fleet was so ready to receive them, otherwise they might have been in great jeopardy, had the Americans pursued them close. In the preceding winter, the peninsula of Sandy-Hook had been cut off from the continent, and converted into an absolute island by a violent breach of the sea; a circumstance then of little consequence, but which might now have been fatal to our army. By the fortunate arrival of the fleet, at the instant when its assistance was so critically necessary, by the ability of the noble commander, and the extraordinary efforts of the seamen, this impediment was speedily removed. A bridge of boats was completed with great expedition, and the whole army passed over this new channel on the 5th of July, and were afterwards conveyed to New-York. Neither the army nor navy as yet, knew
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the circumstances of danger and ruin, in which they had been so nearly involved.

A French fleet of great force had now arrived on the coast, of which neither the army nor navy had till this time received the smallest notice. This unexpected event filled the minds of all the officers with new apprehensions, and the dangers which they had lately escaped, appeared small to those which they now apprehended. They had as yet been masters of the seas in that quarter, and could move where they pleased, whenever they were in danger by land; but now two evils stared them in the face, they were obliged to change their position on the continent for the sake of having free access to our ships, but now the fleet itself was in danger, which greatly increased their apprehensions.

The danger to which our fleet and army were now exposed, had been foreseen and foretold by those who were in the opposition in parliament, and the sailing of the French fleet under the command of the Count D'Estaing had been published long before our ministry had made any provision against its operations. Some warm representations had been made concerning the supineness and negligence of our admiralty, in several speeches in parliament, to which the ministry were unable to reply with any degree of satisfaction to either their friends or enemies. The incapacity of our ministry had as bad an effect upon public affairs, as if they had proceeded with a real intention to ruin the nation, and there were not wanting some, who both said as well as thought, that they really intended the events which happened. This latter does not appear to have been the case, but the effects of their incapacity were equally fatal

to the public interest. It was little benefit to the public to be informed, that they did not act wrong through treachery and design, when they did the same things through incapacity; and would not give up employments and offices, which they could not discharge with honour to themselves, nor safety to their country.

Information had been received a long time before the sailing of the Toulon fleet, that it was preparing and would be ready to sail in a short time, yet our admiralty disregarded these notices, and suffered the French squadron, under the Count D'Estaing, to pass the limits of the Mediterranean, and to carry destruction to our fleet and army in North America, and afterwards fire and sword to our West India islands. It was of small advantage to the nation to know, whether the present misfortunes had happened through the treachery or incapacity of the ministry, or from that fatality that had constantly attended all their measures. They had banished, by their counsels, all wise and honest men from the presence of their sovereign, and were now employing him in holiday pageants at Spithead, to divert the attention of the people from their immediate danger, whilst our colonies and foreign dependents were neglected,—our glory stained,—and the British flag disgraced. The opposition in parliament asked the ministry, and with great propriety, whether it lessened the calamities of the nation to know, that the pillaging of their coasts during the summer, the alarm and terror into which different parts of the kingdom had been thrown, under the apprehension of invasion, together with the destruction of their commerce, and the loss of public credit, proceeded merely from the incapacity

city of the ministers; Or that the calling out of the militia without arms, and sending them to be encamped without tents or field equipage sprung from the same cause? But to which ever cause the foregoing instances may be attributed, no doubt, said they, can be entertained, that it was the most thorough conviction of their incapacity, which produced the French rescript, the dangerous measure on which it was founded, and the insult and contumely which the British flag has undergone in the ports of Spain. Nothing less than such conviction, could have emboldened those nations to venture upon such a conduct, nor could any other possible direction of the affairs of Great Britain, have drawn upon it such insult and injury.

They asked, if any man in his senses could give a vote of credit to a ministry, who were always last to learn what they should be first to know? Who could be so insensible of the sudden emergencies to which such a season as the present was liable, that when the account arrived of a transaction which every body expected, and which they should have long guarded against, only one of them was to be found, and the rest were so dispersed in the course of their pleasures, that a sufficient number of them could not be procured for holding a council, until the hour of debate and determination was lost. Thus had we lost that advantage of the wind, which its known and natural course in the month of April afforded; and now see our fleet embayed at Portsmouth, and likely to continue there, from its having as naturally and regularly taken the opposite direction.

Who then, they said, could trust such ministers? or was it even possible to estimate their guilt? Was there any thing more wanting to seal that fatal character of their administration, which carried no other distinction, than the regular and successive circumstances of ruin, in which they had involved their country? But it seemed, that the disgrace of a Burgoyne was to be atoned by the destruction of a Howe: and the want of information, relative to the union of France and America, to be compensated by the ignorance of D'Estaing's sailing and destination. A gentleman of distinction, on that side, ended his speech with eager exclamation: 'Whither is the spirit of England fled! Where is the wisdom that used to pervade her councils! Where are the terrors gone, with which she was wont to fill the bosoms of those who dared to insult her! Britain, he feared, was betrayed; treachery and corruption vied with each other, to see which should first effect her downfall and disgrace.' The ministers said they were confident, that if the gentlemen on the other side were acquainted with the preparations that had been made, and the effectual care taken to prevent this country from invasion, they would not so rashly condemn them for treachery; nor charge them so hastily with incapacity. The utmost exertions had been used, as well with respect to the navy, as to every other mode of preparation and defence. And though no fleet had yet failed to oppose the Toulon squadron, that was properly to be attributed to the advantage of supply which the French derived from their register, and which at all times enabled them to man out a fleet sooner than we could; but it by no means afforded
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ADMIRAL BYRON.

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any just ground for the repeated charges of incapacity made against the ministers. They besides insisted, that in the present circumstances of danger to which the nation was exposed, under the immediate threat and apprehension of an invasion, it would have been highly imprudent and unwise to have weakened the home defence, by any detachment from the grand fleet, until such a force was provided as would have been adequate to the different services.— And if it had been otherwise, and that detachments could have been spared, still they contended, that it would not have fitting to send out a squadron to oppose D'Estaing, without some clue for its guidance in meeting him, which could not be obtained until some light was thrown on his destination or object.— It was hoped, that if D'Estaing was bound to North America, Lord Howe would be able to use such means of defence, as would prevent any immediate consequence of moment; but in the worst that could happen, Admiral Byron, with the fleet under his orders at Portsmouth, would arrive in time on the coast, to take full vengeance for any insult that was offered.

The American minister acknowledged, that appearances were against the ministry; but appearances were not to justify a condemnation; a full enquiry into the circumstances might place this case in a very different light. For his part he was ready to meet every scrutiny, and wished punishment to fall where it was deserved. When the dispatches arrived, he took the speediest means to convene the ministers from the country, where some of them then were.— That from the time of their arrival, the greatest ex-

pedition had been used by him, in sending the orders of council to the proper officers at Spithead; but misfortunes were not always to be avoided. He hoped, —he wished heartily that our affairs might have a happier turn. The painful pre-eminence of office he said, was at such a time, little to be envied: and for his part, if any gentleman of talents, and inclination to serve his country, wished to come into his place, he was ready to resign it. This speech of the minister agreed but ill with what had been confidently asserted some short time before, concerning the state of the navy; for if they durst not venture to send as many ships as were sufficient to prevent the Toulon Squadron from sailing to America, for fear of an attack upon our own coast, it was plain that our navy in the esteem of the ministry themselves, was not fit to combat the fleets of France and Spain. This was an observation that could not escape the notice of those in the minority.

Whatever were the causes of the mismanagement at this time, it is manifest that worse measures could not have been pursued; for had the French fleet not been prevented by storms, more than by the wisdom of the ministry, both our fleet and army had been exposed to the greatest danger, if not totally destroyed. Though the ministry were informed in the month of February of the number of ships that composed the Toulon Squadron, of the arrival of Count D'Estaing, and of the day on which he intended to sail, and also knew that he did sail on the 13th of April, yet our fleet continued lying at Spithead till the latter end of May; nor was a single measure taken to prevent the dreadful effects which were to be expected from

from this formidable squadron. The first Lord of the Admiralty had, upon the 20th of November, last year, informed the public, that there were forty-two ships of the line fit for service, of which thirty-five might put to sea at an hour's warning, and the remaining seven would be ready in a fortnight; yet when the service of these ships was required, the first Lord of the Admiralty was found not worthy to be depended upon. Though vast sums of money had been granted beyond all example in any former war, yet when there was occasion for action, our fleets were always in want of some one thing or other. Sometimes they wanted men, sometimes rigging, at other times small beer; so that one delay always succeeded another, when their service was required.

Our army had not well arrived at Sandy Hook, when they received the intelligence, from some of Lord Howe's cruisers, that a new enemy had appeared on the coast of America. Lord Howe had received information on which he could depend, that Count D'Estaing was seen off the coast of Virginia, with a fleet of twelve or thirteen sail of the line of battle ships. It was fortunate for our fleet and army that this fleet did not come so far as the Delaware, before our fleet was sailed to New-York, otherwise it might have been in the power of D'Estaing to have destroyed the whole; or had he met the transports in their passage as they were encumbered, and only under the convoy of two ships of the line and some frigates, the consequence is obvious. The state of the army, as well as that of the fleet, would have been deplorable, and the loss of the latter would have issued in the loss of the former; for as the army
could

could not then, by any possible means, have pursued its way to New-York, and would have been enclosed on the one side by the American army, and on the other by the French fleet cut off from all supply and provision, and destitute of every resource, the consequence must have been that they must have either all perished, or have surrendered as General Burgoyne did at Saratoga. The badness of the weather, more than the wisdom of our ministry, saved our army and fleet, for by various storms Count D'Estaing was so interrupted in his voyage, that he did not arrive so soon as he might have done, provided the weather had continued favourable and the wind fair. And after all his interruptions, had he directed his course directly to New-York, instead of Chesapeak Bay, the consequence to our fleet and army would have been much the same; for he would have come upon both in a shattered condition, entangled with laying or passing the bridge at Sandy-Hook. In either of which circumstances, destruction must have been the consequence, and the event of such a nature and magnitude as had not been experienced in any late ages. To Britain it must have been fatal, as her army, upon which she had spent immense sums, and her fleet, upon which she depended for the preservation of her western dominion, would have been no more. But the principal object D'Estaing had in view, was to surprize our fleet in the Delaware, and to enclose our army in Philadelphia, whereby he imagined he would gain the same point, which, if he had known, and pursued his course, he might have more effectually gained by sailing to New-York. A more
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remarkable and signal escape and deliverance is not easy to be pointed out.

Though the degree of the danger was lessened by the favour of Providence, it was not immediately altogether removed. A heavy cloud as yet hung over both the fleet and army, and how it would burst and dispel, was as yet altogether uncertain. It required great forecast to perceive in what manner the French would proceed, or to understand whether it was possible for them to effect with their great ships what only could be ruinous to our fleet. Upon the fourth day after the account was received of his arrival on the coast, and subsequent advice of his having anchored at the Delaware, D'Estaing appeared suddenly and unexpectedly in sight of the British fleet at Sandy-Hook. He had a great force, and as yet in good good condition, having twelve ships of the line and three frigates of superior size. Among the first there were some ships of great force and weight of metal, one carrying 90, another 80, and six carrying 74 guns each; and the squadron was said to have eleven thousand men on board. On the other side, the British fleet under Lord Howe, consisted of six 64 gun ships, three of 50, and two of 40 guns, with some frigates and sloops. Most of the line of battle ships belonging to Lord Howe had been long at sea, and were on that account in a very indifferent condition, and were wretchedly manned. The principal balance to these disadvantages, and which was the most essential remedy for the several other evils that were attendant on our fleet, was the superior abilities of their commander, and the excellency of their other officers. It would be difficult to find in all Europe, either such another sea-officer as Lord Howe, or such
assistants

assistants as these inferior officers that were under him. He had a consummate knowledge in naval achievements, and understood almost every possible circumstance that might happen in such a critical situation. He provided against all the evils that might happen, as much as his circumstances and the force under his command would permit. His preparations were masterly and judicious, and his success in the end, answerable to the wisdom of his conduct. There was one thing much in favour of Lord Howe: He was in possession of Sandy Hook and the harbour, the entrance of which is covered by a bar, and from whence the inlet passes to New-York. To force this passage was not an easy task, though it is believed that D'Estaing intended to make the grand attack at this point, force the passage, and attack the English fleet in the harbour. Had this been speedily executed the ruin of our fleet would have been inevitable; for tho' Lord Howe had made every possible preparation for defence that the time would admit of, yet from the wind's blowing contrary, and many other unavoidable accidents, the ships were not arrived in their respective stations and situations of defence; nor had there as yet been time to chuse those situations with that judgment which was afterwards exercised when the French fleet appeared without Sandy Hook.— In these circumstances had D'Estaing pushed the advantages arising from the surprize, and passed the bar directly and made his attack, neither the advantages of situation, nor any eminence of ability or valour on the one side, could have been sufficient to have counteracted the vast superiority of force on the other. The engagement would have undoubtedly been dreadful, and probably in that respect, might have been

been a singular phenomenon unknown in naval history; but the greatest degree of human valour must require a proportional degree of strength, to render its operations effectual.

It has been disputed whether or not it was practicable for the large vessels, under the command of D'Estaing to pass through the straits and over the bar. Some are of opinion that this might have been done, and performed with prudence. Others affirm that it was altogether impracticable, and could not have done without exposing the large ships to certain ruin and destruction. If this latter was the case, it would appear that our fleet, after it came within the Hook, was in so great a danger as has been represented. But if the other opinion be true, it must be allowed, that the irresolution or want of knowledge of the French Admiral were the principal things that saved our fleet and army. Had this French commander been possessed of such a spirit of enterprize as to have made this attempt and succeeded, Great Britain would have received such a blow as she had not experienced for some ages past.— Lord Howe had no force sufficient to combat such superiority of men and metal, and no timely provision had been made for his assistance by the government at home. It was for this reason affirmed by some, that the ministry intended to make a sacrifice of this noble commander to their party pique and political revenge. Whatever may have been the real cause of their conduct, there was sufficient reasons to draw such inferences therefrom.

There was a wonderful zeal prevailed at this time in the fleet and army to give the French a warm reception.

All ranks and degrees endeavoured to excel one another in readiness to assist in all enterprizes necessary for making a noble resistance. A thousand volunteers were immediately dispatched from the transports to the fleet. The remainder of the crews could not restrain their indignation at being left behind, and used every possible means by hiding themselves in the boats to escape on board the men of war, so that the agents could, it is said, scarcely keep by force so many hands as were sufficient to keep watch in their respective ships. The masters and mates of the merchantmen and traders at New-York, solicited employment with great earnestness, and took their stations at the guns with the common sailors. Others hazarded every thing by putting to sea in light vessels, to watch the motions of the enemy, and perform other necessary services.

One man in particular, with an uncommon disinterestedness and gallantry, went beyond any thing almost recorded in history; he offered to convert his vessel in which his whole hope and fortune lay, into a fire-ship, to be conducted by himself, and refused with scorn, every proposal of indemnification or reward. It is a great pity to employ British sailors in any cause except what has a true moral basis, and which may be vindicated upon the purest principles of truth; for as they are not ready to enquire into the reasons or causes for which they are led on to action, it is cruel to mislead them. When danger is in view they disregard it, and court enterprize with an uncommon zeal, without ever enquiring concerning either the principles or end of their proceedings. Though many of them are pressed into the service against their will,
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yet when once they are under command, they will fight as they are ordered without so much as thinking about the causes or reasons of the war.

This fit of military enthusiasm spread through all branches of the war department, and the soldiers emulated the sailors in desire to be led on to action. The light infantry and grenadiers, who were not well recovered from their wounds and fatigue, contended with such eagerness to serve on board the men of war as marines, that the point of honour was obliged to be decided by lots. The bravery and magnanimity displayed on this occasion, described the national character of both men and officers, and does great honour to their country. Two things at this time contributed much to this readiness for enterprise in both the navy and army: The first was, the popularity of the noble commander, and the confidence founded on his great abilities; and the second was, that antipathy which generally prevails in the minds of the British soldiers and sailors, against the French, who now, as they thought, had unjustly interfered in the present war. As to the principles or reasons of the war, the greatest part, as is always the case, had never in the least considered them: the government had settled that point, and they accounted it their business to obey. The officers in general, like other soldiers of fortune, were only fighting for themselves, with a view to preferment; and their eagerness for action proceeded more from a desire of signalizing themselves as soldiers of the ministry, to obtain in their turn an exaltation of place and emolument, than for any ideas they had of the morality of the war, or its political utility.

The French fleet continued at anchor, in the situation already mentioned, taking in water and provisions for eleven days. D'Estaing knew well that as he had not profited of the first opportunity that was presented to him, that any attempt made by his fleet, after all the preparations on the other side had been compleated, and the judicious positions of the British admiral were fully finished, would have been ineffectual and hazardous, and perhaps ruinous to his fleet; he therefore desisted from the attempt. The British seamen were now under great agitations: the mixed passion, of grief and indignation wrought wonderfully on their minds, and appeared manifestly in their countenances. They now saw themselves shut up by a French fleet, and endured the mortification of seeing a British squadron insulted in their own harbour, and the French flag flying in triumph without. What greatly added to their chagrin was, that they beheld every day vessels under English colours, who were ignorant of the situation of affairs at Sandy-Hook, taken under their eye by the enemy. They looked out every day with the utmost anxiety, and in the most eager expectation for the arrival of Byron's squadron. This was an unusual situation to a British squadron, and not easily endured by officers and men, who had been accustomed to triumph so frequently, over the French fleets, wherever they met them. We may easily conceive that it would raise severe sensations in the breasts of the British seamen, to be cooped up in a harbour, only to be witnesses of the capture of the ships of their own nation, and to bear the insults of the French fleet, riding triumphant before

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fore their port, without daring to go out to attack them.

On the 22d of July, D'Estaing's fleet appeared under way, and as the wind was favourable and the rising tides at the highest, the water having risen that afternoon thirty feet on the bar, it was expected that he intended to carry his threatening into execution, and to try the experiment of passing the bar to attack our fleet in the harbour; and that that day would have afforded one of the hottest engagements, and the most desperate action that had ever been fought between the two rival nations. Every thing was at stake on the side of Britain. If the naval force was destroyed, the vast fleet of transports and victuallers, with the army, must have fallen along with it; for the conflict could not have ended without victory or ruin. The French admiral considered the attempt to be too dangerous, and desisted from this undertaking. He directed his course another way, and was out of sight in a few hours.

It was a happy circumstance for Britain, that the French admiral went off at this time: His stay at Sandy-Hook was extremely critical, and nothing could have been more fortunate than his departure at the time he went away. For if Admiral Byron's fleet had arrived in the shattered condition in which it at last arrived at New-York, it must have fallen a defenceless prey into the hands of D'Estaing's squadron, which would have been a loss most severely felt. Byron's squadron is said to have been in many respects badly equipped and provided; and in this feeble situation it had the misfortune of meeting with unusual stormy weather for the season; and being separated

parated in different storms, and lingering through a tedious passage, arrived scattered, broken, sickly, dismasted, or otherwise damaged, in various degrees of distress, upon different and remote parts of the coast of America. Providence, though it had not favoured our Squadron with an agreeable passage, had compensated the danger it was in, by preserving it from the hands of our enemies; and though the loss by the storm was considerable, yet none of the fleet had as yet fallen into the hands of the French, which afforded this satisfaction, that the enemy had not been strengthened by our loss on this occasion.

Lord Howe was still in an uneasy situation: His fleet was not sufficiently powerful to resist that of D'Estaing in the open sea, and he had the mortification to find himself still in jeopardy, should the French fleet return, before he was favoured with a reinforcement. It was, however, a fortunate circumstance, that on the 30th of July, the *Renown* of 50 guns, from the West Indies, the *Reasonable* and *Centurion* of 64 and 50, from Halifax, and the *Cornwall*, a 74 gun ship, of Admiral Byron's Squadron, all arrived singly at Sandy-Hook. It is easy to conceive what an agreeable sight this was, both to the army and navy, who were in an uneasy suspense, both with regard to the intentions of the French Squadron, and what was best to be done on that occasion. Though our fleet was still inferior to that of the French, yet it was a fortunate circumstance that the *Cornwall* was in better condition than any of the rest of the fleet, because Lord Howe had no ships of equal force to combat the large vessels of the fleet of D'Estaing. This circumstance of the arrival of so many ships, raised the spirits

spirits of our men, and rendered them all eager for fighting; but the project of the French Admiral was as yet a secret, and our force was still too much inferior to risque a battle in the open sea. By what means this scheme of the French failed is as yet a secret: It would appear that the ministry of France, in concert with the commissioners from the colonies, had formed a very rational plan of operation, which could not have missed of its intended effect, under the management of a skilful and intrepid commander, D'Estaing appears to have mismanaged the execution of this plan, for want of judgement, and not for want of courage. The several steps which he took upon this occasion were erroneous, and his conduct was fraught with folly and incapacity. Had he pushed on his measures with vigour, as soon as he approached, he could not have failed of success, but his lingering without the bar for so long a time, was exceedingly imprudent, and void of wisdom.

The failure of this excellently contrived scheme, which had been founded in great wisdom, by the French ministry, and the American deputies, at Paris, for the surprize of the British fleet and army, either on the Delaware or its borders, obliged the commander to take new measures. He now fixed upon Rhode Island, as a place that would admit the mutual and joint operation of his new allies by sea and land. This seems to have been the motive which determined D'Estaing to depart from Sandy Hook: and for this purpose General Sullivan assembled a number of troops in the neighbourhood of Providence, for an invasion of the Island on its north end, from the continent; whilst D'Estaing was to enter the harbour of Newport.

Nowport near its southern extremity, and after destroying the shipping, by a powerful assault on the works facing the sea, to place the British forces between two fires. On the 25th of July the French fleet blocked up, or entered the several inlets, between which Rhode Island, and its adjoining lesser islands, are inclosed, and which, from a communication, more or less navigable in the different branches, between the open sea and the back continent. The main body cast anchor without Brenton's Lodge, about five miles from Newport: two of their line of battle ships ran up to the Naraganset passage and anchored on the north end of the island of Conanicut, where they were shut up several days from rejoining the fleet, by contrary winds; while some of their frigates, entering the Seconnet passage, occasioned the blowing up the King-Fisher sloop and two armed gallies, which could not otherwise avoid falling into the hands of their enemy.

Major-General Sir Robert Pigot, who commanded the British forces, took every measure in the power of a brave and experienced officer, that could tend to a vigorous and most obstinate defence. The troops, artillery, and cattle, were immediately conveyed from the island of Conanicut; the troops at the out posts of Rhode-Island were in constant readiness, at the first signal, to join the main body; the works to the sea were strengthened by every possible means, and the seamen belonging to the vessels that were destroyed, as well as those that could be spared from others, were called to their favourite occupation, by serving the artillery.

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The transports (which must otherwise have fallen into the enemy's hands) were sunk in different parts of those channels and passages, which might have afforded them an opportunity of attacking the works with advantage. The royal frigates were removed as far from danger as possible: but as their loss and destruction were inevitable, in the prosecution of the enemy's design, they were dismantled of their artillery and stores, and the necessary measures taken for securing the latter part of the alternative. Two opposite bays, in the inlets on the eastern and western sides of the island, compress it so much, as to form a kind of isthmus, by which the southern end, that spreads into the ocean, is connected with the main body. The town of Newport is just within this peninsula, and facing the island of Conanicut; the space between both, forming a bay, which includes or forms the harbour. The inlet to the harbour from the sea, called the Middle Channel, is narrow, and enclosed by Brenton's Point, and the opposite point of Conanicut, which forms the southern extremities of both islands. A bar of high grounds, which crosses the isthmus from channel to channel above Newport, was strongly covered with lines, redoubts, and artillery; so that the peninsula might be considered as a garrison, distinct from the rest of the island, and under the protection of a superior naval force, might in a great measure defy any attempts from the northern side, supposing that an enemy had made good its landing in such circumstances. But the enemy being masters of the sea, rendered the task of defence, under the apprehension of an attack on both sides at the same time, exceedingly arduous. The commander had however, just before, received a reinforcement

of five battalions; the troops were in excellent condition and spirit; and the body of seamen, both with respect to labour and danger, were no small addition to their means of resistance.

The force destined against them by land, was not so considerable as their information had led them to apprehend. The business on that side, seems to have been committed mostly, if not entirely, to the northern colonies, who were those immediately concerned in the event. General Sullivan is, however, said to have assembled about 10,000 men, of whom, at least, half were composed of volunteers from New England and Connecticut. As the operations of the French fleet were regulated by those of the army on the land, they continued inactive, until Sullivan was in condition to pass over from the continent to the north end of the island. On the 8th of August, finding that measure in forwardness, and the wind being favourable, they entered the harbour under an easy sail, cannonading the town and batteries as they passed, receiving their fire without any material effect on either side. They anchored above the town, between Goat-Island and Conanicut, but rather nearer to the latter, on which both the French and Americans had parties for some days. When it was discovered that the enemy intended to enter the harbour, our commanders were thrown into the utmost confusion: They found it out of their power to preserve his majesty's ships that were in that station, and it was a great mortification to set fire to vessels that were so necessary in those parts, and of which they were likely to be in much need, for the purposes of war, and safety to themselves and the land forces. They were, however, obliged to make a virtue of necessity,

necessity, and to burn the *Orpheus*, *Lark*, *Juno*, and *Cerberus* frigates, and soon after to sink the *Flora* and *Falcon*. Our people were now obliged to pursue the measures which they had boasted they had driven the colonists to observe, and they found at this time the poignant influence of that reflection, do as you would be done by. Some of these officers and their crews had been engaged in burning expeditions in several parts of the coast of America; but the sweetness of the application was now brought home to themselves, and they began to feel the full force of their own practice, turned against them, aggravated with the grievous reflection, that they now suffered no more than they well deserved. The loss of these frigates were at home considered as only a trifling matter, and the ministry and their friends affected to bear it in a very stoical manner. It was at the same time sufficiently manifest that they felt severely the present disaster, though they spoke lightly thereof, and wanted to have it otherwise believed. When Lord Howe received the news of the danger Rhode-Island was in, from the French fleet and the American troops, he was much perplexed what measures to take. His squadron, notwithstanding the late reinforcements, was in many respects inferior to that of D'Estaing. The difference in point of number of ships was little, but there was a great difference with respect to the number of men and the weight of metal. It was dangerous to hazard an engagement in these circumstances, and without doing, there was no hope of saving the island. The admiral was, however, determined to attempt every thing which resolution, under the government of reason and wise conduct, could effect; and though the case was dif-

sicult and hazardous, he did not despair of giving such relief to the island, as would at least render it an arduous enterprize for the French to carry their designs into execution. He studied all the collateral advantages that might be obtained to render his success probable, and endeavoured to balance the superiority of the enemy with superior skill and activity. He was indeed superior in point of number of ships to the French Admiral, for his squadron now consisted of one 74, seven 64, and five 50 gun ships, besides several frigates; but the difference, in other respects, was manifest from the rates of the ships, the number of men, and the weight of metal. But every experiment that had the smallest degree of probability of success on its side was now to be tried, and he was determined that nothing should be neglected that was in his power to perform. The narrows, in which the French squadron was now involved, gave some turns of advantage, and the ignorance of the French mariners, with regard to the inlets and passages, afforded still a strong expectation that the large ships might be entangled in such a manner as not to be of greater service than light vessels. Lord Howe had received advice that the French squadron were separated, and some of them involved in the channel, and the bulk of them lying without, afforded some reason to hope that he might bring on an engagement upon more equal terms than could have been expected.

In the midst of all the preparations and eagerness for action, there were several unavoidable interruptions which came in the way, that he could not reach Rhode Island till the month of August, the day after the French fleet had entered the harbour. From the situation in which the French fleet now lay, he was enabled

enabled to keep a communication with Gen. Pigot; but this was but indifferent consolation, as the result was, that under the present consolation, as the affording him any essential relief was wholly impracticable. Information of this sort was really worse than none at all, for it was ready to dispirit the men upon land, and gave them reason to conjecture that matters were really worse than they were. It must be allowed that the situation of both our fleet and army was still exceedingly critical, and the wisest officers amongst them could but promise little upon the head of any effort that they should make on this occasion. The circumstances of both parties were suddenly altered by the change of the wind to the north east, upon the following day, when the French Amiral stood out to sea with his whole fleet, those in the passage of the Naraganset, as well as those in the port. Lord Howe very justly considered the weather gage too great an advantage to be added to the superior force of the enemy, and contended for that object with all the skill and judgment worthy of an able and experienced sea officer. The French Admiral, notwithstanding the superiority of his force, was as earnest to preserve this advantage as the English was to gain it. This trial of skill in sea operations prevented an engagement for all that day; but the wind on the following day continuing adverse to the designs of Lord Howe, he determined to make the best of the present circumstances, and to engage the enemy; forming the line in such a manner as to be joined by three fire-ships, which were under the tow of as many frigates.

All the preparations for this resolute engagement, and the whole design, were frustrated by a violent storm that now arose, which made the warriors
glad

glad to lay aside the thoughts of a battle for the present, and apply their utmost care and diligence to preserve themselves and their ships from being swallowed up in the tempestuous billows.——A strong gale of wind, which gradually increased to a tempest, and continued for forty-eight hours, not only put off the engagement by separating the fleets for the present, but shattered them in such a manner, and caused so much damage on both sides, as rendered an engagement for some time impracticable. Some people of a particular way of thinking, were ready to observe, that the Providence which raised this storm, was more favourable to our fleet than the merits of the cause it was engaged in deserved, and that Lord Howe, who in his own heart did not approve of the war, but was merely influenced by a point of honour, ought to have acknowledged the hand of Providence, and given up the pursuit of a cause which his conscience disapproved. It is most probable, that had an engagement happened, that our fleet must have suffered a defeat, which would have been of direful consequences to the army, and also to the whole nation. The storm was one of those accidents that was violent in the operation but salutary in its effects, and in all appearance was the instrument of saving our fleet.

Both sides suffered greatly in this tempest; the French felt it severely, having two of their capital ships dismasted, and others very much shattered. We are informed, by our accounts of this tempest, that some untoward situations and unusual circumstances were produced by this conflict of the elements. That the Languedoc of 90 guns, the French Admiral's own ship, had lost her masts, and was met in that condition
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by the *Renown*, Captain Dawson, on the evening of the 13th, who attacked her with such fury, as well as judgement and advantage, that no doubt could have been entertained of the event if the day-light had continued: But the darkness of the night, and freshness of the gale, whose violence was not yet ceased, compelled Captain Dawson to give over the attack, after he had poured several broadsides into her, and had, besides other apparent damage, shot away her rudder. He is, however, said to have laid to all the night as closely as possible, with an intention to renew the attack in the morning; but the appearance of six French men of war, by whom he was chased at day-light, and who were supposed to be led that way by the noise of the firing, put an end to Dawson's hope, and relieved the French admiral from his urgent distress. This matter is differently related by some who pretend to know this affair. The *Renown* was severely handled by this dismasted French vessel, and received so much damage from her heavy metal, that it was with difficulty she made her escape; and that though she had continued her operation, it would have been doubtful whether she might not have been sent to the bottom. That the resolution to make her escape, proceeded as much from her present distress, as from the fear of the approaching ships. She however fortunately got clear, without her prize, and with some degree of gladness that she was not made a prize herself. It is very remarkable that the same good and evil fortune happened to the *Preston*, Commodore Hotham, another 50 gun ship, which fell in with the *Tonnant*, a French 80 gun ship, which she would have taken, provided fortune and power had favoured her design. The French ship had only her
main-mast

main-mast standing, and the commodore attacked her briskly, with the same spirit and effect with which Captain Dawson had engaged the Languedoc. But the night again coming on, and the next morning brought the French fleet to assist the Tonnant, and disappoint the commodore, as had happened to the Renown before. That two such remarkable cases might happen so exactly like one another, is not impossible, though the probability thereof is not so very manifest; and considering how ready our English seamen are to magnify their own valour, and to discredit that of the French, it affords rather grounds to believe that there is somewhat of hyperbole in the history of this affair. Not only the French, but some of our own men who were concerned in the action, have said that it was neither in the power of the Renown nor the Preston, to have taken the ships they were engaged with, and that, after the engagement, they were glad to get off with the loss they themselves had sustained. It was certainly brave in Captain Dawson and Commodore Hotham, to give some broadsides to two large ships in distress; but as they themselves had shared of the storm, and met with their own misfortunes, it is not very probable that they were able to take two such good ships, with so large a number of men on board, and carrying such superior metal. It was happy that they escaped, after having shewn their intrepidity for the honour of the British flag.

The stories that are told concerning the acts of prowess on this occasion, which were introduced by means of this tempest, have much the appearance of some of the episodes which Homer introduces concerning the Trojan war, where some most desperate engagement

ments were fought between particular heroes, wherein both escaped, after having done all that brave men could do, by the favour of some interposition of providence, which snatched the victory out of the hands of those who were just upon the point of conquering.

Advantages did not wholly attend one side during this tempest; both sides had their turns of prospect of advantage with similar disappointments. The *Isis* of 50 guns, Capt. Raynor, was eagerly chased by a French 74 gun ship, supposed either to have been the *Zelev* or *Cæsar*. The French ship was much the better sailer, and the situation, with respect to the storm, was the same, they having both escaped the effects of its fury. In this unequal contest, in which the greatest resolution and skill is said to have been displayed, a close and desperate engagement was maintained with the greatest obstinacy on both sides, for an hour and a half, and within the distance of pistol-shot. At the end of that time the *Isis* had obtained so manifest a superiority in the action, that the French ship was glad to put before the wind, and call in the aid of all her sails to escape from so determined an enemy. The *Isis* had suffered so much in her masts and rigging as to be incapable of attempting a pursuit. The history of this action given in our papers, has more the appearance of a *novel*, than of an impartial account of matters of fact. The stories are so ingeniously introduced, the valour of parties displayed in a certain light, and after each side has acted the part assigned them, either some fresh gale of wind, or sails, are called in to save the one and disappoint the other of the victory. The accounts

Vol. II. Q q q of

of this storm, and the several incidental engagements which happened on this occasion, may in some distant period afford a foundation for a tolerable epic poem, which may equal, if not exceed the wars of Troy, and hand down the achievements of the English and the French at Rhode-Island, to future generations.

Our historians affirm that it is not easy to determine whether to admire more the gallantry exhibited in this singular action, or the modesty of the brave commander in his account of it. This was indeed so extreme, that his Admiral was obliged in some degree to supply the defect, by acquainting the Admiralty, that the honour of the day was not more owing to the resolution of the captain, or the intrepidity of his officers and crew, than to the professional skill and ability of the former. Without derogating from the skill or intrepidity of Capt. Raynor, it is plain that there was more of necessity than choice in this engagement with this French ship; and that whatever advantage he had gained, it did not amount to any more than saving his own ship, as the French vessel continued to have the use of masts and rigging, of which the *Isis* was deprived. Neither does it appear, whether it was the storm that separated them, or that it was a matter of choice in the Frenchman to get off.

There is no manner of doubt but that the English fleet behaved well, and the honour and bravery of the British commanders and sailors might have been fully represented, without warping in so much of the marvellous, as to give impartial enquirers reason to call in question the truth of the history. There was nothing which happened, but what might have been expected

expected from the abilities of Lord Howe and the officers that were under his command ; but those circumstantial accounts of the battle in the storm appear somewhat too romantic to be admitted into history without some grains of allowance. Our partiality for our countrymen ought not to lead us to embellish matters so much, as to exceed those rules of probability which the nature of things admit of ; for in exaggerating too much particular circumstances, the truth of history is liable to be suspected. There are some things that, by great exertions of skill and intrepidity, are in the power of brave men to effect, and on some particular occasions do happen, and can be well attested ; but a connected chain of marvellous exploits, where storms and tempests throw all into confusion, has not a sufficient degree of probability.

The loss of men was considerable on both sides, though according to our accounts, the French lost a great deal more than we did. Mr. Bougainville, the famous and philosophical navigator, who was commander of the ship that engaged Capt. Raynor, is said to have lost his arm in the action. The loss in the Isis is said to have been very trifling ; but this is according to the ordinary reckoning of all exploits in this American war. The concealment of our loss has been one of the constant schemes of the ministry to keep up the spirits of the people, and to hide the malignity of their own mismanagement from the eye of the public. The young Duke of Ancaster is said to have acquired great honour in this action : He acted as a volunteer, and behaved nobly. Had he lived and been employed in the service of his country,

he promised to have been an ornament to the British nation; but by a premature death, his country was deprived of one of its ornaments, and from whom she had reason to expect the most essential services.

The British squadron suffered considerably in the storm, and though, according to the best accounts, it was not so much damaged as that of the French, yet the damages were so considerable as to keep the ships at Sandy-Hook and New-York some time to repair their loss, which hindered them from pursuing those advantages which they are said to have gained. On the 20th of August the French fleet returned to Rhode-Island, where they anchored without the harbour, and sailed from thence to Boston on the 22d, in order to repair their shattered ships. Lord Howe, with great expedition, got his fleet repaired, and pursued with great earnestness, hoping to overtake them before they reached Boston, but in this he was disappointed. Our expectations at home were greatly raised by the extravagant accounts which the ministerial agents had published concerning the advantages which Admiral Howe had gained over D'Estaing. and we were given to expect that not only the whole French fleet would be destroyed, but that Boston would soon be reduced by the English admiral.

Tidings of this atchievement were for some time expected, and people were impatient to hear of the total ruin of the French fleet, and the recovery of Boston; when instead of this, they received the news of an American army landing on Long-Island. Gen. Sullivan had landed on the north end of that island, in the month of August, with a design to co-operate with D'Estaing and the French troops which he had
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on board his ships. On the very day that D'Estaing went out of the harbour to meet Lord Howe, General Sullivan landed off Howland Ferry, and had the French fleet succeeded in their enterprize, the ruin of our army had been inevitable. The weather was extremely bad, and prevented his getting up his stores for some days, and of course retarded the progress of his army. On the seventeenth they however broke ground on Honeyman's-hill near the British works, and began to construct batteries and form lines of approach. This alarmed our forces much, because though they did not much dread an attack upon their front, they were yet afraid, that while they were engaged with Sullivan in front, they should be attacked in the rear or in the flanks, by the French land forces, which they heard were aboard the fleet. Our troops were however, as active as possible, and prepared to make the best defence they could. This was a sad change of situation to the British troops, which they had now experienced ever since they left Philadelphia. On other occasions they had been accustomed to attack and pursue, but now they were obliged to stand upon the defensive. It has been observed that General Pigot was under no great apprehension from the force upon his front; the general object of apprehension was the concurrent assault of D'Estaing on the town and works towards the water, but the great point of danger was his landing a body of troops on the southern peninsula, which would have laid the garrison open in the rear, whilst they were desperately engaged in the front and flank, in defence of their works.

Lord

Lord Howe's arrival in this critical instant, happily removed these apprehensions of danger, in a great measure, and D'Estaing's departure to Boston removed them entirely. The French admiral did not act wisely in sailing out of the harbour to meet Lord Howe. He was secure in that station against a much superior force than what Lord Howe commanded, and might have continued in the harbour in spite of all that the English admiral could have done. The nature of the port, and the narrowness of the passage from the sea, with the means of defence afforded by the island of Conanicut, which was occupied by himself and his allies, formed altogether such a strong security to his fleet, that scarcely any naval superiority could have justified an attempt upon it. He ought in the first place to have secured his main object, which was now in his power, before he put to sea, to engage or seek for Lord Howe. In this case he would have fulfilled the design of his commission, and given effectual aid to his allies, whom he came to assist. It must have been either vanity or stupidity that governed him on this occasion, for he lost the best opportunity he possibly could have wished for, to have given such an effectual blow to Great Britain. It was thought that his vanity was the principal cause of this false step which he took. The glory of conquering an English admiral of so great a name, and vanquishing a squadron of English men of war, was thought to be the temptation that seduced the Count D'Estaing into that error into which he now fell. It is exceedingly amazing that vanity should have so far bewildered his imagination, as to make him a fool to the world, by giving up a certainty in hopes of
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what was very uncertain. But it appears still more strang that he should have neglected to retrieve his error when he had it again in his power, when he returned to anchor the second time before Rhode-Island. For if he had entered the harbour and co-operated with the Americans, after he came back in conformity with their earnest expectations, the state of the garrison would have been very perilous, and he would have had a fair opportunity of regaining, by one stroke, the failure of success in his grand scheme. He would have now had an opportunity of conciliating the affection of his new allies, who were not a little disgusted at his former unsuccessful proceedings, by giving them an idea, which they were not very ready to entertain, of the vigour and efficacy of the French councils and arms. It has been observed, with a great degree of truth, that his two dismasted ships could not have been repaired, nor the rest of his squadron refitted at Rhode-Island; but as they might have continued safe there for any length of time, if he had succeeded in his object, this objection does not appear to be of sufficient weight for its being abandoned. But it is probable that there were other reasons for his abandoning that situation, and the project which he had first in view. He probably had heard of Admiral Byron's squadron being near at hand, and was afraid of being blocked up in Rhode-Island harbour, where he could not repair nor refit his shattered fleet, and could not tell by what means he might get out of that station, and his whole fleet might have been lost for want of reparation, or fallen a prey to the enemy that was watching an opportunity to destroy it. It is, upon the whole, manifest that the Count D'Estaing was not sufficiently qualified

for executing that project which seems intended, by sending that fleet to America. The whole of his conduct appears irrational and preposterous, fraught with folly and inconsistency. Both his conduct at Sandy-Hook, and his going out to sea to meet Lord Howe, were actions, rather of a man that was not endowed with reason, than that of an admiral entrusted with such an important command. He seems to have paid no regard to the necessity of his new allies, who had been seduced through hopes of his assistance, to land their troops on Rhode-Island, with a design of drawing hence the British forces. The Americans complain loudly of his conduct; both the army on the island and the northern colonies exclaimed, That they had been led into an expedition of prodigious expence, labour, trouble, and danger, under the assurance of the most effective operations of the French fleet. That under that sanction that had committed their lives and liberties on the invasion of an island, where, without a naval force and protection, they were likely to be enclosed like wild beasts, in a toil: and, that in this situation they were first deserted for a vain and fruitless pursuit, and then totally abandoned, at the very time they had brought the business, on their side, to the point of accomplishment.

The colonists saw plainly through the misconduct of the French admiral, and judged of it in its true light: They perceived his vanity, pride, and want of conduct, and spoke freely of both, though they observed decency in their expressions. By this foolish proceeding, the Americans upon the island were brought into great danger, both by the discretion of the New-England and the Connecticut volunteers,
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some division of those that remained with him. It is said that those that remained were scarcely equal in number to the garrison of English troops that were upon the island. Sullivan on this pressing occasion, acted the part of a wise and prudent commander, and extricated himself out of this difficulty in a manner that would have done honour to the greatest of generals; and his troops behaved like veterans of the first rank. His management, in the whole, was directed with the most consummate wisdom.

General Sullivan having begun to send off his heavy artillery and baggage on the 26th of August, he retreated from his lines on the 29th; and though he was closely pursued and attacked vigorously and repeatedly in every quarter where there was an opening made, yet the British forces could make no impression upon his troops, so as to interrupt their march, till they had reached the north end of the island, which they did with very little loss. So well had he taken his measures, and so judiciously had he chosen his posts, that the utmost vigour of the British troops could not make any impression upon his forces, so as to gain any advantage of consequence. It was the cause of no small chagrin to the British troops that they could not gain any advantage over a number of militia, not superior to themselves in any thing except a general, who had planned his march in such a manner, that it was impossible for the British troops to attack them with any hope of success. When Sullivan reached the north end of the island, he was from the nature of the ground, and the situation of his posts, in a state of security. He had now time to pass his army over by way of Bristol

Vol. II. R r and

and Hoyland Ferries, on the night of the 30th, to the continent without interruption. It was a fortunate circumstance for General Sullivan, that he was gone from the island at the time when General Clinton arrived, which was soon after he had reached the continent; for the united force of Clinton and Pigot would have been much more than a match for Sullivan's troops. Time and experience produces strange effects, and removes differences that some people account impossible. The Americans, who had in the beginning of the war, been the sport of Great Britain, and the object of ridicule of her officers and soldiers, were now become the most respectable antagonists, and in some instances, superior to her best troops.

Lord Howe, after having refitted his fleet with all the expedition he could, sailed for the Bay of Boston on the same day that General Sullivan abandoned Rhode Island, but upon his arrival found, to his great mortification, that D'Estaing had got there before him. His vexation was increased, when he found by a close inspection, that he was effectually covered in Nantasket Road, by the batteries erected, and the means of defence taken by the Americans and the French on the adjacent points and islands, that an attack upon him was utterly impracticable, with any prospect of success or advantage. It was expected at home, from the ministerial accounts that were published, that both Boston and the French fleet would soon fall into the hands of our navy, as the French were said to be in want of all things necessary, and Boston was in a very wretched situation, in want of necessary provision, and in no state of defence.

fence. To enforce these suggestions, it was reported that an irreconcilable variance had arisen between the French troops and sailors, and the townsmen, on account of the former saying mass, and performing other services of the Church of Rome, in the city of Boston: That the colonists had refused to supply D'Estaing's fleet with necessary provision; and that all things tended to an open rupture between the colonists and the French. The assurance and plausibility with which these reports were published made them gain credit for a time, among those who did not enter deeply into an enquiry concerning their authenticity; but in a short time they were found to be mere contrivances of court paragraph writers, intended to keep up the spirits of the people at home, and to prevent the stocks from falling below the standard of national credit.

When the hopes of the nation subsided, with regard to the success of our fleets in America, for no account was as yet received concerning Admiral Byron, the merchants concerned in the West-India trade began to be greatly alarmed for the fate of the islands, in which the greatest part of their fortunes was contained. They waited in a body, upon Lord Sandwich, and Lord George Germain, acquainting them, That since the last remonstrance relative to the protection of their properties in the Leeward Islands, they had been roused to a more immediate sense of their danger, by the capture of Dominica; a capture, the suddenness of which, and the easy manner in which it was effected, that could but give them the strongest fears about many more of the islands, where they had a property (including Jamaica) of no less

than fifty millions of money: They therefore prayed their Lordships, particularly the First Lord of the Admiralty, that they would take such measures as to themselves seemed most fitting, for the further security and protection of those islands. They received for answer from Lord Sandwich, "That the Board of Admiralty, no doubt, had the general protection of commerce at heart, but that the Count D'Estaing's fleet had so much disarranged all the purposes of that board that a home defence was to be the first object." Upon this they asked his Lordship, whether he had any positive information that the Count D'Estaing had gone again to the West Indies. To which he answered, he did not at present positively know, but that if he had, Admiral Byron had orders to pursue him wherever he went, and he hoped would be soon able to give a good account of him. The same body renewed their application three days after, for the protection of their property, with greater earnestness, on account of some fresh advices they had received, and received the same answer. They then called upon his Lordship to take notice, that they had discharged the duty they owed to themselves and the public, and retired. Some time the year before the First Lord of the Admiralty had publicly declared, that he had a fleet ready sufficient to combat the whole force of the House of Bourbon, but now he sufficiently hinted that there was necessity of home defence, and that he was not able to keep the French from our own coasts. Though money had been granted for building and manning a fleet, according to the desire of the ministry, yet now we were become the sport of the House of Bourbon, and forced to defend our own coasts against a French invasion.

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This made the First Lord of the Admiralty appear exceedingly mean in the eyes of the public, and made Britain look mean in the eyes of all the powers of Europe ;—which in the last reign, under the influence of a minister of true capacity had made France and Spain yield in all quarters of the world, and all the nations of Europe pay her proper respect. Meanness and treachery to the public had marked every footstep of the present ministry, and falsehood and folly had disgraced their councils ever since they came into office.

It was not for want of information that the Admiralty suffered the French fleet to get the start of them in going to America; for upon the 11th of April they were informed that D'Estaing was to sail from Toulon between the 12th and 15th of that month, with ten ships of the line and five frigates; but it was said the destination of the fleet was not known. Upon the 13th of April the Admiralty also received advice, that D'Estaing had arrived at Toulon the 27th of March with unlimited powers, and had added two ships to his squadron; and on the 21st of April they were informed, that after the arrival of D'Estaing at Toulon, the work was doubled to compleat that armament. A list of his whole fleet, with the number of guns and the names of the commanders, was received on the 27th of April, with an account of his intention of sailing the next morning, and on the same day advice was received by express, of Count D'Estaing's squadron having set sail the 13th, at four in the afternoon, with a fair wind. Yet notwithstanding this information, the French fleet was suffered to pass the Straits without opposition, and
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was in the American seas before our fleet was ready to sail. This negligence or incapacity of the first lord of the admiralty, was much blamed by the nation, and even by some of the best friends of the ministry, who were now ashamed of his conduct, because he had boasted so much and done nothing.

The alarm which D'Estaing's fleet created among the traders to the West Indies, produced a petition to the king, from the planters and merchants, trading to those parts, wherein they represent, "That, on the commencement of the unhappy divisions between this kingdom and the colonies in North America, being impressed with a proper sense of duty to his Majesty, and of the circumstances of their situation, they represented to his ministers their apprehensions of the dangers and distresses to which the sugar islands were necessarily exposed: That the fatal consequences thus apprehended, had in a great measure been unhappily experienced, during the last three years, by a general scarcity of provisions in all the islands (in some of them nearly approaching to a famine) and by want of almost every article essential to the culture of their plantations; so that their estates and property had been considerably impaired in value, and continued exposed to future diminution; whilst their effects were captured on the high seas to a very great amount: That although they had early and anxiously represented to his Majesty's ministers, the necessity of an adequate protection for the islands, they had now to lament, from the loss of Dominica, and the imminent danger of other islands, that the frequent applications which they had made for protection, had not had the desired effect: That they
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were now in the most anxious state of suspense, from the delay of the succours from New York to the Leeward islands, which had been so unseasonably afforded, as to leave all those islands exposed to the further hostile attempts of the enemy. And though the assurances of protection given to them by his majesty's ministers, had tended to remove their immediate apprehensions, yet they appeared too general and precarious to quiet their minds, as to the safety of the Leeward islands: whilst the important island of Jamaica had been left almost to its own efforts; which from the comparatively small number of white inhabitants, were become peculiarly severe, and, joined to the suspension of culture necessarily consequent on military duty, must in time prove ruinous; a naval force being the principal security of the islands in general. Labouring under the weight of these calamities, they said they could nor avoid further humbly expressing to his majesty, their melancholy apprehensions, lest the desolating system, which appeared to them to have been lately denounced by his majesty's commissioners in North America, might be productive of consequences, to them at present, not fully foreseen, nor sufficiently foreseen by his majesty's servants. What mostly alarmed the merchants whose property was chiefly in those islands, was that the French and Americans should practice, according to the system publicly avowed by the commissioners and lay waste and destroy all the islands as far as they could. The merchants were not singular in their apprehensions on this head; for thirty-one lords in parliament expressed the same fears and apprehensions, in their dissent from a vote in the higher house, December

ember 7, this year, upon an address to his majesty, to express the displeasure of that house, against the manifesto of the commissioners, concerning the cruel measures that were threatened in that manifesto.—When the question was put upon the motion, it was, by a great majority, rejected, and the following reasons of dissent from the vote, were given by thirty-one lords, which shew their minds on the subject.

I. Because the public law of nations, in affirmance of the dictates of nature and the precepts of revealed religion, forbids us to resort to the extremes of war upon our own opinion of their experience, or in any case to carry on war for the purpose of desolation. We know that the rights of war are odious, and, instead of being extended upon loose constructions and speculations of danger, ought to be bound up and limited by all the restraints of the most limited construction. We are shocked to see the first law of nature, self-preservation, perverted and abused into a principle destructive of all other laws; and a rule laid down, by which our own safety is rendered incompatible with the prosperity of mankind. Those objects of war, which cannot be compassed by fair and honourable hostility, ought not to be compassed at all. An end that has no means, but such as are unlawful, is an unlawful end. The manifesto expressly founds the change it announces, from a qualified and mitigated war, to a war of extremity and desolation, on the certainty that the provinces must be independent, and must become an accession to the strength of an enemy. In the midst of the calamities, by which our loss of empire has been preceded and accompanied; in the midst of our apprehensions for the farther calamities which impend over us, it is a matter of
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of fresh grief and accumulated shame, to see, from a commission under the great seal of this kingdom, a declaration for desolating a vast continent, solely because we had not the reason to retain, or the power to subdue it.

II. Because the avowal of a deliberate purpose of violating the law of nations must give an alarm to every state in Europe; all common wealths have a concern in the law, and are its natural avengers. At this time, surrounded by enemies and destitute of all allies, it is not necessary to sharpen and embitter the hostility of declared foes, or to provoke to enmity neutral states. We trust, that by the natural strength of this kingdom we are secured from a foreign conquest, but no nation is secured from the invasion and incursions of enemies. And it seems to us the height of phrensy, as well as wickedness to expose this country to cruel depredations, and other outrages too shocking to mention (but which are all contained in the idea of the extremes of war and desolation) by establishing a false, shameful, and pernicious maxim, that, where we have no interest to preserve, we are called upon by necessity to destroy. This kingdom has long enjoyed a profound internal peace, and has flourished above all others in its arts and enjoyments in that happy state. It has been the admiration of the world for its cultivation and its plenty for the comforts of the poor, the splendor of the rich, and the content and prosperity of all. This situation and safety may be attributed to the greatness of our power. It is more becoming, and more true, that we ought to attribute that safety, and the power which procured it, to the ancient justice, honour, humanity, and generosity of the kingdom, which

Vol. II. S f s brought

brought down the blessing of providence on a people who made their prosperity a benefit to the world, and interested all nations in their fortune, whose example of mildness and benignity at once humanized others, and rendered itself inviolable. In departing from those solid principles, and vainly trusting to the fragility of human force, and to the efficacy of arms, rendered impotent by their perversion, we lay down principles, and furnish examples of the most atrocious barbarity. We are to dread that all our power, peace, and opulence, should vanish like a dream, and that the cruelties which we think safe to exercise, because their immediate object is remote, may be brought to the coasts, perhaps to the bosom of this kingdom.

III Because, if the explanation, given in debate, be expressive of the true sense of the article in the manifesto, such explanation ought to be made, and by as high authority as that under which the exceptionable article was originally published. The natural and obvious sense vindicates, that the extremes of war had hitherto been checked: That his majesty's generals had hitherto forbore (upon principles of benignity and policy) to desolate the country; but that the whole nature and future conduct of the war must be changed, in order to render the American accession of as little avail to France as possible. This in our apprehensions, conveys a menace of carrying nothing. And, as some speeches in the House (however palliated) and as some acts of particular cruelty, perfectly comfortable to the apparent ideas in the manifesto, have been lately exercised, it becomes the more necessary, for the honour and safety of this nation

nation, that this explanation should be made. As it is refused, we have only to clear ourselves to our consciences, to our country, to our neighbours, and to every individual who may suffer in consequence of this atrocious menace, of all parts of the guilt, or in the evils that may become its punishment. And we chuse to draw ourselves out, and to distinguish ourselves to posterity, as not being the first to renew, to approve, or to tolerate the return of that ferocity and barbarism in war, which a benificent religion, enlightened manners, and true military honour, had for a long time banished from the Christian world.

Amidst all the horrors of war, and the expectations of battles, our officers and army, on occasions, relaxed into the most childish and trifling diversions. When Sir William Howe was about to come away to England, and leave the army, out of respect to him, the following miscellaneous entertainment was exhibited, which I shall give in the words of a letter from an officer to his correspondent in London.

“ For the first time in my life I write to you with unwillingness. The ship that carries Sir William Howe will convey this letter to you; and not even the pleasure of conversing with my friend, can secure me from the general dejection I see around me, or remove the share I must take in the universal regret and disappointment which his approaching departure hath spread throughout the whole army. We see him taken from us at a time when we most stand in need of so skilful and popular a commander. When the experience of three years, and the knowledge he hath acquired of the country and people, have added to the confidence we always placed in his conduct and

S I s 2

abilities

abilities. You know he was ever a favourite with the military; but the affection and attachment all ranks of officers in his army bear him, can only be known by those who have at this time seen them in their effects. I do not believe there is upon record an instance of a commander in chief having so universally endeared himself to those under his command; or of one who received such signal and flattering proofs of their love. That our sentiments might be the more universally and unequivocally known, it was resolved amongst us, that we should give him as splendid an entertainment as the shortness of the time, and our present situation, would allow us. For the expences the whole army would have contributed; but it was requisite to draw a line somewhere, and twenty-four field officers joined in a subscription adequate to the plan they meant to adopt. I know your curiosity will be raised on this occasion; I shall therefore give you as particular account of our *mischianza* as I have been able to collect. From the name you will perceive that it was made up of a variety of entertainments. Four of the gentlemen subscribers were appointed managers, Sir John Wrottesly, Colonel O'Hara, Major Gardiner, and Montresor, the chief engineer. On the tickets of admission, which they gave out for Monday the 28th was engraved, in a shield, a view of the sea, with the setting sun, and on the wreath, the words, *Luceo disudens, austo splendore resurgam*. At the top was the general's crest, with *vive vale*. All round the shield ran a vignette, and various military trophies filled up the ground. A grand regatta began the entertainment. It consisted of three divisions. In the first was the Ferret galley, having

having on board several general officers, and a number of ladies. In the centre was the Huffer galley, with Sir William and Lord Howe, Sir Henry Clinton, the officers of their suite, and some ladies. The Cornwallis galley brought up the rear, having on board General Knyphausen and his suite, three British generals, and a party of ladies. On each quarter of these galleys, and forming their division, were, five flat boats lined with green cloth, and filled with ladies and gentlemen. In front of the whole were three flat boats with a band of music in each; six barges rowed about each flank to keep off the swarm of boats that covered the river from side to side. The galleys were dressed out in a variety of colours and streamers, and in each flat boat was displayed a flag of its own division. In the stream opposite the centre of the city, the Fanny armed ship, magnificently decorated, was placed at anchor, and at some distance a-head lay his Majesty's ship the Rœbuck, with the admiral's flag hoisted at the fore-top-mast head. The transport ships, extending in a line the whole length of the town, appeared with colours flying, and crowded with spectators, as were also the openings of the several wharfs on shore, exhibiting a most picturesque and enlivening scene. The rendezvous was at Knight's Wharf, at the north end of the city. By half after four the whole company was embarked, and the signal being made by Vigilant's manning ship, the three divisions rowed slowly down, preserving their proper intervals, and keeping time to the music that led the fleet. Arrived between the Fanny and the Market Wharf, a signal was made for one of the boats a-head, and the whole

lay upon their oars, while the music played, *God save the King*, and three cheers given by the vessels were returned from the multitude on shore. By this time flood tide became too rapid for the galleys to advance, they were therefore quitted, and the company disposed of in the different barges.

This alteration broke in upon the order of the procession, but was necessary to give sufficient time for displaying the entertainment that was prepared on shore.

The landing place was at the old fort, a little to the southward of the town, fronting the building prepared for the reception of the company, about four hundred yards from the water, by a gentle ascent. As soon as the general's barge was seen to push for the shore, a salute of 17 guns was fired from the *Rœbuck*, and after some interval, by the same number from the *Vigilant*. The company, as they disembarked, arranged themselves into a line of procession, and advanced through an avenue formed by two files of grenadiers, and a line of light horse supporting each file.

This avenue led to a square lawn of 150 yards on each side, lined with troops, and properly prepared for the exhibition of a tilt and tournament, according to the customs and ordinances of antient chivalry.— We proceeded through the centre of the square. The music, consisting of all the bands of the army, moved in the front. The managers, with favours of blue and white ribbands in their breasts, followed next in order. The general, admiral, and the rest of the company succeeded promiscuously. In the front appeared the building, bounding the view through a
vitta,

vista, formed by two triumphal arches, erected at proper intervals, in a line with the landing-place. Two pavilions, with rows of benches, rising one above the other, and serving as the advanced wings of the triumphal arch, received the ladies while the gentlemen ranged themselves in convenient order on each side. On the front seat of each pavilion were placed seven of the principal young ladies of the country, dressed in Turkish habits, and wearing in their turbans the favours with which they meant to reward the several knights who were to contend in their honour.

These arrangements were scarce made, when the sound of trumpets were heard at a distance; and a band of knights dressed in antient habits of white and red silk, and mounted on grey horses, richly caparisoned in trappings of the same colours, entered the list, attended by their esquires on foot, in suitable apparel, in the following order: Four trumpeters, properly habited, their trumpets decorated with pendant small banners;—a herald in his robes of ceremony; on his tunic was the device of his band, two roses intertwined, with the motto, *We droop when separated*. Lord Cathcart, superbly mounted on a managed horse, appeared as chief of these knights; two young black slaves, with sashes and drawers of blue and white silk, wearing large silver clasps round their neck and arms, their breasts and shoulders bare, held his stirrups. On his right hand walked Captain Hazard, and on his left Captain Brownlow, his two esquires, one bearing the lance the other the shield. His device was Cupid riding on a lion, the motto, *Surmounted by Love*. His lordship appeared in honour
of

of Miss Auchmuty. Then came in order the knights of his band, each attended by his esquire, having his lance and shield. First knight, the hon. Capt. Cathcart, in honour of Miss Ann White, his esquire, Captain Peters, the device, a heart and sword, motto, *Love and Honour*. The second knight, Lieutenant Bygrove, in honour of Miss Craig, his esquire Lieut. Nichols, the device, Cupid tracing a Circle, the motto, *Without End*. The third knight, Captain Andre, in honour of Miss M'Chew, his esquire, Lieutenant Andre, the device, two game cocks fighting, the motto, *No Rival*. The fourth knight, Captain Horneck, in honour of Miss N. Redman, the esquire Lieutenant Talbot, the device, a burning heart, and the motto, *Absence cannot extinguish*. The fifth knight, Captain Matthews, in honour of Miss Bond, his esquire, Lieut. Hamilton, device, a winged heart, the motto *Each Fair by Turn*. The sixth knight, Lieutenant Sloper, in honour of Miss Shipen, esquire, Lieut. Brown, device, a heart and sword, motto, *Honour and the Fair*.

After they had made the circuit of the square and saluted the ladies as they passed the pavilions, they ranged themselves in a line, each that in which were the ladies of their device; and the herald (Mr. Beaumont) advancing into the centre of the square, after a flourish of trumpets, proclaimed the following challenge: The knights of the Blended Rose, by me, their herald, proclaim and assert, that the ladies of the Blended Rose, excel, in wit, beauty, and every accomplishment, those of the whole world; and should any knight or knights, be so hardy as to dispute or deny it, they are ready to enter the lists with

with them, and maintain their assertions, by deeds of arms, according to the laws of antient chivalry. On the third repetition of the challenge, the sound of the trumpets was heard from the opposite side of the square, and another herald with four trumpeters, dressed in black and orange, galloped into the lists. He was met by the herald of the blended rose, and after a short parley, they both advanced in front of the pavilions, when the black herald (Lieutenant More) ordered his trumpets to sound, and then proclaimed defiance to the challenge in the following words :

The knights of the burning mountains present themselves here, not to contest by words, but to disapprove by deeds, the vain-glorious assertions of the knights of the blended rose ; and enter these lists to maintain, that the ladies of the burning mountains are not excelled in beauty, virtue, or accomplishments, by any of the universe. He then returned to the part of the barrier through which he had entered ; and shortly after, the black knights, attended by their esquires, rode into the lists, in the following order : Four trumpeters preceding the herald, on whose tunic was represented, a mountain sending forth flames, with this motto, *I burn for ever*. Captain Watson, of the guards, as chief, dressed in a magnificent suit of black silk and orange, and mounted on a black managed horse, with trappings of the same colour with his own dress, appeared in honour of Miss Franks. He was attended in the same manner as Lord Cathcart. Captain Scot bore his lance, and Lieutenant Littleton his shield. The device, a heart with a wreath of flowers, and the motto *Love and*
Vol. II. T t t *Glorv.*

Glory. Six other knights, with esquires, devices, and mottos, suitable to the occasion, at last advanced, and after they had rode round the lists and made their obeisance to the ladies, drew up fronting the black knights, and the chief of these having thrown down his gauntlet, the chief of the black knights directed his esquire to take it up. The knights then received their lances from their esquires, fixed their shields on their left arms, and making a general salute to each other, by a very graceful movement of their lances, turned round to take their career, and encountering in full gallop, shivered their spears. In the second and third encounters they discharged their pistols. In the fourth they fought with their swords. At length the two chiefs spurring into the centre, engaged furiously in single combat, till the marshal of the field, Major Groyne, rushed in between the chiefs, and declared that the fair damsels of the blended rose and the burning mountain, were perfectly satisfied with the proofs of love, and the signal feats of valour given by their respective knights; and commanded them, as they prized the future favour of their mistresses, that they would instantly desist from further combat. Obedience being paid by the chiefs to this order, they joined their respective bands. The white knights and their attendants filed off to the left, the black knights to the right, and, after passing each other at the lower side of the quadrangle, moved up alternately till they approached the pavilions of the ladies, when they gave a general salute.

A passage being opened between the pavilions, the knights preceded by the esquires, and the band
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of music, rode through the first triumphal arch, and arranged themselves on the right and left. The arch in honour of Lord Howe, presented two fronts in the Tuscan order. The pediment was adorned with various naval trophies, and at the top was the figure of Neptune, with a trident in his right hand. In a niche on each side stood a sailor with a drawn cutlass. Three plumes of feathers were placed on the summit of each wing, and in the entablature was this inscription, *Laus illi debetur et alme gratia major*. The interval between the two arches was an avenue 300 feet long and 34 broad; it was lined on each side by a file of troops, and the colours of all the army planted at proper distances, had a beautiful effect in diversifying the scene. Between these colours the knights and esquires took their stations. The bands continued to play several pieces of music. The company moved forward in procession, with the ladies in the Turkish habits in front; as these passed they were saluted by their knights, who then dismounted and joined them, and in this order we were all conducted into a garden that fronted the house, through the second triumphal arch dedicated to the general. This arch was also built in the Tuscan order. On the interior part of the pediment was planted a plume of feathers and various military trophies. At the top stood the figure of Fame, and in the entablature this device, *I bone quo virtus tua te vocet pede fausto*. On the right hand pillar was placed a bomb shell, and on the left a flaming heart. The front next the house was adorned with preparations for the fire-work. From the garden we ascend a flight of steps, covered with carpets, which led into a spacious

hall; the pannels painted in imitation of Sienna marble, enclosing festoons of white marble. The surbase and all below was black. In this hall and in the adjoining apartments were prepared tea, lemonade, and other cooling liquors, to which the company seated themselves; during which time the knights came in, and on the knee received their favours from their respective ladies. One of these rooms was afterwards appropriated for the use of the Pharoah table; as you entered it you saw on a pannel over the chimney, a *cornu copiae* exuberently filled with flowers of the richest colours; over the door as you went out, another presented itself, shrunk, reversed, and emptied.

From these apartments we were conducted up to a ball room, decorated in a light elegant stile of painting. The ground was a pale blue, pannelled with a small gold head, and the interior filled with dropping festoons of flowers in their natural colours. Below the surbase the ground was of rose pink, with drapery festooned in blue. These decorations were heightened by eighty-five mirrors, decked with rose-pink silk ribbands, and artificial flowers; and in the intermediate spaces were 34 branches with wax lights, ornamented in a similar manner. On the same floor were four drawing-rooms, with side-boards of refreshments, decorated and lighted in the same stile and taste as the ball room. The ball was opened with the knights and their ladies; and the dances continued till ten o'clock, when the windows were thrown open, and a magnificent bouquet of rockets began the fire works. These were planned by Capt. Mount Trefor, the chief engineer, and consisted of
twenty

twenty different exhibitions displayed under his direction, with the happiest success, and in the highest stile of beauty. Towards the conclusion, the interior part of the triumphal arch was illuminated amidst an uninterrupted flight of rockets, and burning of balloons. The military trophies on each side assumed a variety of transparent colours. The shell and the flaming heart on the wings, sent forth Chinese fountains succeeded by fire pots. Fame appeared on the top spangled with stars, and from her trumpet blowing the following device, *Tes Lauriers, sent immortels*; a fauter of rockets, bursting from the pediments, the *feu d'artifice*. At twelve supper was announced, and large folding doors, hitherto artfully concealed, being suddenly thrown open, discovered a magnificent saloon of 210 feet by 40, and 22 feet in height, with three alcoves on each side, which served for side-boards. The ceiling was the segment of a circle, and the sides were painted a light straw colour, with vine leaves, and festoon flowers, some in a bright and some in a darkish green. Fifty-six large pier glasses, ornamented with green silk, artificial flowers, and ribbands, and a hundred branches with three lights in each, trimmed in the same manner as the mirrors, eighteen lustres, each with twenty four lights, suspended from the ceiling, and ornamented as the branches; 300 wax tapers disposed along the supper tables; 430 covers, 12,00 dishes, 24 black slaves in oriental dresses, with silver collars and bracelets, ranged in two lines, and bending to the ground as the general and admiral approached the saloon; all these forming together the most brilliant assemblage of gay objects, and appearing at once, as we entered

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by an easy descent, exhibited a *coup d'oeil*, beyond description magnificent. Towards the end of supper the herald of the Blended Rose, in his habit of ceremony, attended by his trumpets, entered the saloon, and proclaimed the King's health, the Queen and Royal Family, the army and navy with their respective commanders, the knights and their ladies, and the ladies in general; each of these toasts was followed by a flourish of music. After supper we returned to the ball-room, and continued to dance till four o'clock.

Such is the description, though a very faint one, of the most splendid entertainment, I believe, ever given by an army to their general; but what must be most grateful to Sir William Howe, is the spirit and motives from whence it was given. He goes from this place to morrow; but as I understand he means to stay a day or two with his brother, on board the Eagle at Billingsport, I shall not seal this letter until I see him depart from Philadelphia.

I am just returned, Sunday the 24th, from conducting our beloved general to the water-side, and have seen him receive a more flattering testimony of the love and attachment of the army, than all the pomp and splendor of the *mischianza* could convey to him. I have seen the most gallant of our officers, whom I least suspected of giving such instances of their affection, shed tears while they bid him farewell. The gallant and affectionate general of the Hessians, Knyphausen, was so moved, that he could not finish a compliment he began to pay him, in his own name and that of his officers who attended him. Sir Henry Clinton attended him to the wharf, where Lord Howe


Howe received him into his barge, and they are both gone down to Billingsport. On my return I saw nothing but dejected countenances."

This new exhibition of chivalry, which appears to have been founded upon the plan of the renowned Knight of La Mancha, can scarcely be considered as worthy either of the expence that was bestowed upon it, or of the characters of the British officers who devised it and put it into execution. The whole of this unfortunate and baneful war, has, since the beginning of it, through all its stages, been a very strange *mischianza*; a miscellany of expence, injustice, and disappointment. Don Quixote, and his renowned esquire, in all their adventures, scarcely ever engaged in one more absurd and ridiculous, than the American war; and in some future period, the inhabitants of the world will be ready to conclude that the story concerning this war has been founded upon those principles of knight errantry, which naturally lead men to very strange and wonderful adventures. In the midst of so dangerous and unfortunate a war, it might have been expected that the British officers, would have been otherwise employed than in expending their money in empty shews and regattas, or in daffling with the ladies of the ruined colonies. Whatever regard might be expressed in pompous *shew* to Sir William Howe, yet it must be accounted a very strange method of expressing it; and the silent grief of General Knyphausen expressed his regard more fully than the whole expence of the *mischianza*. This miscellaneous entertainment was a prologue to that adventure which was soon after made by our army in passing through the Jerseys to Sandy-Hook,
where

where the knights of the blended rose, and those of the burning mountain, were under the necessity of performing a real tournament for their own preservation, where the honour of their ladies was but indifferently supported. Had they foreseen what was so soon to happen, it would have, in a great measure, suppressed some of that wanton folly which appeared in the exhibition of the *mischianza*. It was truly a very foolish resolution to transmit this piece of madness over the Atlantic, to Great Britain, with so much approbation.

This seems to have been the only summer since the beginning of the American war when the parties had leisure to perform trifles, and relax from the severities of military discipline. The Americans, on their side, but for a different reason had also a sort of *mischianza* in their congress. Monsieur Gerard had arrived at Philadelphia some time in the summer, as plenipotentiary from the French King, and had an audience of the congress. This happened in less than three months after General Howe's *mischianza*, so that Philadelphia, thnt had been, during the winter, the seat of arms, and the rendezvous of war, was, during the summer, turned into a city of pleasure, filled with all the gaiety of knight errantry, and the splendour of a court. As some account has been given of the splendid entertainment which was made to Sir William Howe, by the officers of the army, it will be necessary to shew the reception which Monsieur Gerard received from the congress at his first audience, as minister and plenipotentiary of the French King. This will help to relieve the minds of the readers from the fatigue of an uniform contemplation of destruction

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ADMIRAL KEPPEL.

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struction and slaughter, and prepare them for a view of those barbarities that will be laid open in the future part of this history. The manner in which Mons. Gerard was introduced, the letter from the French King, which he delivered, his speech to the Congress, and the president's answer, shall be given in their own words.

Last Thursday, August 11th, being the day appointed by Congress for the audience of the Sieur Gerard, minister and plenipotentiary from his most Christian Majesty, that minister received audience accordingly. In pursuance of the ceremonial established by Congress, the Hon. Richard Henry Lee, Esq; one of the delegates from Virginia, and the Hon. Samuel Adams, one of the delegates from Massachusetts Bay, in a coach and six provided by Congress, waited upon the minister at his house. In a few minutes the two delegates entered the coach, Mr. Lee placing himself at the minister's left hand, on the back seat, Mr. Adams occupying the front seat; the minister's chariot being behind received his secretary. The carriages being arrived at the State House in the city, the two members of Congress placing themselves at the minister's left hand, a little before one o'clock, introduced him to his chair in the Congress chamber.

The president and Congress sitting, the minister being seated, he gave his credentials into the hands of the secretary, who advanced and delivered them to the president. The secretary of Congress then read and translated them; which being done, Mr. Lee announced the minister to the president and Congress: at nine, the president, the Congress, and the minister rose together; he bowed to the president and the Congress; they bowed to him, whereupon

Vol. II. U u u the

the whole seated themselves. In a moment the minister rose and made a speech to the Congress, while they were all sitting. The speech being finished, the minister sat down, and giving a copy of his speech to his secretary, he presented it to the president. The president and the Congress then rose, and the president pronounced their answer to the speech, the minister standing all the time. The answer being ended, the whole were again seated, and the president giving a copy of the answer to the secretary of Congress, he presented it to the minister. The president, the Congress, and the minister then rose together; the minister bowed to the president, who returned the salute, and then to the Congress, who also bowed in their turn; and the minister having bowed to the president, and received his bow, he withdrew, and was attended home in the same manner in which he had been conducted to the audience.

Within the bar of the house the Congress formed a semi-circle on each side of the president and the minister; the president sitting at one extremity of the circle, at a table upon a platform elevated two steps; the minister sitting at the opposite extremity of the circle, in an arm chair, upon the same level with the Congress. The door of the Congress chamber being thrown open, below the bar, about 200 gentlemen were admitted to the audience, among whom were the vice-president of the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, the Supreme Executive Council, the speaker, and members of the House of Assembly, several foreigners of distinction, and officers of the army. The audience being over, the Congress and the minister at a proper hour, repaired to an entertainment, given by the Congress to the minister;

ster ; at which were present, by invitation, several foreigners of distinction, and gentlemen of public character. The entertainment was conducted with a decorum suited to the occasion, and gave great satisfaction to the whole company.

The Congress gave the following account of this audience, signed by their president and secretary.

IN CONGRESS, *August 6, 1778.*

According to order, the Hon. Sieur Gerard being introduced to an audience by the two members for that purpose appointed, and being seated in his chair, his secretary delivered to the president a letter from his Most Christian Majesty, which was read in the words following :

Very dear great Friends and Allies,

The treaties which we have signed with you, in consequence of the proposals your commissioners made to us in your behalf, are a certain assurance of our affection for the United States in general, and for each of them in particular, as well as of the interest we take, and constantly shall take, in their happiness and prosperity. It is to convince you more particularly of this, that we have nominated the Sieur Gerard, Secretary of our Council of State, to reside among you in the quality of our minister and plenipotentiary. He is the better acquainted with our sentiments towards you, and the more capable of testifying the same to you, as he was entrusted on our part to negotiate with your commissioners, and signed with them the treaties which cement our union. We pray you to give credit to all he shall communicate to you from us, more especially when he shall assure you of our affection and constant friendship for you. We pray

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God, very great Friends and Allies, to have you in his holy keeping.

Your good Friend and Ally,

(Signed) LOUIS.

The minister was then announced to the President and the House, whereupon he arose and addressed Congress, in the speech, which, when he had finished, his Secretary delivered the same in writing to the President, as follows :

Gentlemen,

The connection formed by the King my Master, with the United States of America, is so agreeable to him, that he could no longer delay sending me to reside among you for the purpose of executing it. It will give his Majesty great satisfaction to learn, that the sentiments which have shone forth on this occasion justify that confidence with which he hath been inspired by the zeal and character of the United States in France, the wisdom and fortitude which have directed the resolutions of Congress, and the courage and perseverance of the people they represent ; a confidence which you know, gentlemen, has been the basis of that truly amicable, and disinterested system, on which he hath treated with the United States.

It is not his Majesty's fault that the engagements he hath entered into did not establish your independency and repose, without the further effusion of blood, and without aggravating the calamities of mankind, whose happiness it is his highest ambition to promote and secure. But since the hostile measures and designs of the common enemy have given to engagements, purely eventual, an immediate, persuasive, permanent, and indissoluble force, it is the opinion of the

the King my master, that the allies should turn their whole attention to fulfil those engagements in the manner most useful to the common cause, and best calculated to obtain that peace which is the object of the alliance.

It is upon this principle his Majesty has hastened to send you a powerful assistance, which you owe only to his friendship, to the sacred regard he has for every thing which relates to the advantage of the United States, and to his desire of contributing, with efficacy, to establish your repose and prosperity, upon an honorable and solid foundation. And farther, it is his expectation, that principles, which may be adopted by the respective governments, will tend to strengthen those bonds of union, which have originated in the mutual interest of the two nations.

The principal object of my instructions is to connect the interests of France with those of the United States. I flatter myself, gentlemen, that my past conduct in the affairs which concern them, hath already convinced you of the determination I feel to endeavour to obey my instructions in such manner as to deserve the confidence of Congress, the friendship of its members, and the esteem of the citizens of America.

To this speech the President was pleased to return the following answer :

S I R,

The treaties between his Most Christian Majesty and the United States, so fully demonstrates his wisdom and magnanimity, as to command the reverence of all nations. The virtuous citizens of America, in particular, can never forget his beneficent attention to their violated rights; nor cease to acknowledge the hand of a gracious providence, in raising them up so
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powerful and illustrious a friend. It is the hope and opinion of congress, that the confidence his majesty reposes, in the firmness of these states, will receive additional strength from every day's experience. The Assembly are convinced, Sir, that had it rested solely with the Most Christian King, not only the independence of these States would have been universally acknowledged, but their tranquility fully established. We lament the lust of domination which gave birth to the present war, and hath prolonged and extended the miseries of mankind. We ardently wish to sheath the sword, and spare the further effusion of blood; but we are determined, by every means in our power, to fulfil those eventual engagements, which have acquired positive and permanent force from the hostile designs and measures of the common enemy. Congress have reason to believe, that the assistance so wisely and generously sent, will bring Great Britain to a sense of justice and moderation, promote the common interest of France and America, and secure peace and tranquility on the most firm and honourable foundation. Neither can it be doubted, that those who administer the powers of government within the several states of this union, will cement that connection with the subjects of France, the beneficial effects of which have already been so sensibly felt. Sir, from the experience we had, of your exertions to promote the true interests of our country, as well as your own, it is with the highest satisfaction, Congress receive, as the first minister from his Most Christian Majesty, a gentleman, whose past conduct affords a happy presage, that he will merit the confidence of this body, the friendship of its members, and the esteem of the citizens of America. The secretary of
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the Congress then delivered to the minister a copy of this reply: whereupon the minister withdrew, and was conducted in the manner in which he was brought to the house.

The whole management in this affair plainly shewed that the Congress understood their business, and had sufficient address to receive a French minister, as well as to flatter the vanity of his master; they said nothing mean or what was beneath their character, or that of the Most Independent States, and expressed a greatness of mind in midst of calamities, which would have done honour to the ancient Romans. It will be proper here to give some account of the eventual alliance which was the foundation of this formal introduction of a French minister into the American Congress. Our ministry were fully warned that this treaty was going on before it was concluded, and had it in their power to have prevented it, to the advantage of their sovereign and the interest of their nation. But the foolish idea of etiquette and a false notion of honour, prevented them from saving thousands of innocent lives, and millions of treasure to Great Britain. To yield to the colonies, whom they had so unjustly injured, and give up the golden dream they had been indulging for so long a time, was an idea they could not at all relish. They knew that any permanent agreement with America, could not be made while they continued in office, because America could never trust them who had so wantonly and cruelly spilt her blood, and ravaged her towns in the most barbarous manner. To give up their offices was to give up the emoluments that attended them, which was much dearer unto men of their character, than either the honour of their sovereign or the happiness

of the empire. Though they knew of the French treaty, they suffered it to go on without acquainting parliament till it was finished, and then they proposed a plan of reconciliation which the renowned knight of La Mancha would have been ashamed of. They proposed to the colonists to break their faith with France in the first public treaty that ever they made, and expose themselves to all the world as the most faithless of mortals. This, they knew, could not be complied with, and of consequence they would keep their places and continue the war. They had also some friends to serve, and the office of commissioner was a lucrative employment. Even this commission was put into the hands of men the most unlikely to gain credit in America: A young nobleman of little experience, who was never remarkable in managing his own affairs with honour to himself, was placed first in a commission to settle the difference between Britain and her colonies. To this beau of a nobleman, was joined, an apostate patriot, a general of the army, and a pettifogging lawyer, who was remarkable for nothing but in being a pensioner and a pliant voter on the side of the ministry. To all these was added, as a secretary, a Scotch professor of moral philosophy, who left his school, and his scholars, to the care of another, to cross the Atlantic under the pretence of procuring peace, but in reality to glean some of those benefits which the bounty of government was now so ready to bestow. Among the whole, it is doubtful, though their characters had been more respectable, whether there was as much judgment as was necessary to execute a commission of so great importance. It was certainly an affront to the nation, and a discredit to the commission, that it was left to the management

nagement of the *needy*, the *covetous*, and the *vain*. It was certainly believed by the contrivers of this plan of reconciliation, that it could not succeed, and was never meant as a scheme to answer the ostensible purpose. It even did not answer that design for which it seems to have been principally intended, namely, of fixing upon the colonists the charge of being, from the beginning, determined upon independency on Great Britain. The nature of the commission, as well as the method in which it was managed, plainly shewed, that dominion, and not public utility, was the great spring of all our public actions. The desperate principles contained in the manifesto published by the commissioners, fully declared that the dominion of Britain was of more consequence than all the revenue of America and the lives of near three millions of subjects. It is almost the case with all men, that those who commit an injury can never forgive those they injure: for the principle of wickedness which determines them to behave injuriously, pushes them on to proceed, and they can find no end but in the total ruin of those who resist their malevolence. Had not our ministry been infatuated in their measures with their own folly, and resolutely bent, at all events, upon pursuing their fatal scheme, they would have proposed their reconciliation before the French treaty; and there is good reason to suppose that, provided the faith of the nation had been properly given for the fulfilment of the scheme, it would have been listened to, and put an end to the war. The French court improved the opportunity, and we lost it, it is to be feared, for ever. For it does not appear very probable that Great Britain, in her present, redu-

duced state of finance, will ever be able to force America into dependence, assisted by both France and Spain. A view of the treaty, which the colonies have entered into with France, will shew how hopeless an opinion it is to imagine that Britain can regain her supremacy over America. This treaty is called, A Treaty of Alliance, eventual and defensive, between his Most Christian Majesty Louis the Sixteenth, King of France and Navarre, and the Thirteen United States of America; and consists of twelve articles. The introduction mentions the several States particularly which enter into this alliance, and the several reasons for so doing, and is perhaps as well expressed as any deed of the same nature that has appeared concerning any public transaction for some ages past. The tenor of it follows :

The Most Christian King, and the United States of North America, to wit, New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, having this day concluded a treaty of amity and commerce, for the reciprocal advantage of their subjects and citizens, have thought it necessary to take into consideration the means of strengthening those engagements, and of rendering them useful to the safety and tranquility of the two parties; particularly in case Great Britain, in resentment of that connection, which is the object of the said treaty, should break the peace with France, either by direct hostilities, or by hindering her commerce and navigation, in a manner contrary to the rights of nations, and the peace subsisting between the two crowns.—And his Majesty and the said

said United States having resolved, in that case, to join their councils and efforts against the enterprizes of their common enemy, the respective plenipotentiaries, empowered to concert the clauses and conditions proper to fulfil the said intentions, have, after the most mature deliberation, concluded and determined on the following articles :

A R T. I.

If war should break out between France and Great Britain, during the continuance of the present war between the United States and England, his Majesty and the said United States shall make it a common cause, and aid each other mutually with their good offices, their councils, and their forces, according to the exigency of conjunctures, as becomes good and faithful allies.

A R T. II.

The essential and direct end of the present defensive alliance is, to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, of the said United States, as well in matters of government as of commerce.

A R T. III.

The two contracting parties shall, each on its own part, and in the manner it may judge most proper, make all the efforts in its power against its common enemy, in order to attain the end proposed.

A R T. IV.

The contracting parties agree, that in case either of them should form a particular enterprize, in which the concurrence of the other may be desired, the party whose concurrence is desired, shall readily and with faith join to act in concert for that purpose, as

far as circumstances and its own particular situation will permit, and in that case, they shall regulate, by a particular convention, the quantity and kind of succour to be furnished, and the time and manner of its being brought into action, as well as the advantages which are to be its compensation.

ART. V.

If the United States should think fit to attempt the reduction of the British power remaining in the northern parts of America or the islands of Bermudas, those countries or islands, in case of success, shall be confederated with, and dependent upon the said United States.

ART. VI.

The Most Christian King renounces, for ever, the possession of the islands of Bermudas, as well as of any part of the continent of America, which, before the treaty of Paris, 1763, or in virtue of that treaty, were acknowledged to belong to the Crown of Great Britain, or to the United States, heretofore called British colonies, or which are at this time, or have lately been under the power of the King of Great Britain.

ART. VII.

If his most Christian Majesty shall think proper to attack any of the islands situated in the Gulph of Mexico, or near that gulph, which are at present under the power of Great Britain, all the said isles, in case of success, shall appertain to the court of France,

ART. VIII.

Neither of the two parties shall conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain, without the formal

mal consent of the other first obtained, and they mutually engage not to lay down their arms, until the independence of the United States shall have been formally and tacitly assured by treaty or treaties that shall terminate the war.

ART. IX.

The contracting parties declare, that being resolved to fulfil, each on its own part, the clauses and conditions of the present treaty of alliance, according to its own power and circumstances; there shall be no after claims or compensation, on one side or the other, whatever may be the event of the war.

ART. X.

The most Christian King and the United States agree to invite or admit other powers, who may have received injuries from England, to make a common cause with them, and to accede to the present alliance, under such conditions as shall be fully agreed to and settled between all parties.

ART. XI.

The two parties guarantee mutually, from the present and for ever, against all other powers, to wit, the United States to his Most Christian Majesty the present possessions of the Crown of France in America, as well as those she may acquire, by the future treaty of peace; and his Most Christian Majesty guarantees, on his part, to the United States, their liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, as well matters of government as of commerce, and also their possessions, and the additions or conquests their confederations may obtain during the war, from any of the dominions now or hereafter possessed by Great Britain in North America; conformable to the
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fifth and sixth articles above written, the whole as their possessions shall be fixed, and assured to the said States, at the moment of the cessation of the present war with England.

A R T. XII.

In order to fix more precisely, the sense and application of the preceding article, the contracting parties declare, that in case of a rupture between France and England, the reciprocal guarantee declared in the said article, shall have its full force and effect the moment the said war shall break out; and if such rupture shall not take place, the mutual obligations of the said guarantees shall not commence until the moment of the cessation of the present war between the United States and England, shall have ascertained their possessions.

A R T. XIII.

The present treaty shall be ratified on both sides, and the ratification shall be exchanged within the space of six months, or sooner if possible.

This is the famous treaty between France and the Colonists to which the latter were driven by the perverse pride and stupidity of men who, instead of being qualified for governing an empire, appear not fit to be trusted with the charge of a herd of the vilest animals. It might easily have been perceived that a measure of this kind would be the issue of the violence and tyranny of Great Britain towards the Colonies.

Though this alliance appears unnatural, as being an union of papists and protestants against a government which bears the name of protestant, yet the urgent necessity of the case, and the palpable tyranny of

of the British ministry, justify the expedient on the part of the colonists. It was certainly inconsistent in any protestant power to employ such a tyranny against its own subjects, as that which the English employed against America. The history of savage nations does not furnish us with examples more brutish and barbarous than some that are said to have been made on the coasts of America. It is a matter of the most serious consideration to all Christian nations, whether a government, that is said to be from God, can ever be exercised and applied to the destruction of the governed, except when their crimes are such as admit of no dispute, but are self evident. The human understanding cannot well conceive, that men's lives should be taken away by interpretations of laws which have always been, in the eye of reason, of a doubtful nature. The American war, and all the bloodshed and loss that has attended it, have had no other foundation than certain inferences of state, drawn from modern institutes, not consistent with the essential laws of the empire.

Such as pursue political quarrels for the sake of dominion so far as to shed blood, it is of small consequence whether they are papists or protestants; for it is certain that they, in that case, not only act inconsistent with the Christian religion, but with the first principles of all moral laws. The colonists have no good reason, for the known principles of the French, to put much confidence in them, and if they be wise they will be upon their guard, and watch them carefully. But in their present situation it could be no criminal action to emancipate themselves from tyranny, by any lawful means, though the instruments might
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not be such as they altogether approved. The treaty is altogether political, and depends upon certain mutual good offices, which whoever fails in are guilty of a breach of faith. With regard to the French being papists our government can have no handle, seeing they themselves have established popery in one part of their dominions, and have shewn a good inclination to have it introduced into the rest. The Americans have been reproached for entering into a treaty with the French against their King and country; but this reproach falls doubly upon the heads of those who rendered their King and their country aliens to them, by denying them the common rights of subjects, and persecuting them with fire and sword, because they claimed those common rights which all British subjects claim, and to which they have a constitutional title. In some after time men will judge more impartially of the nature of this dispute, and will perhaps conclude that the French nation, instead of doing an unjust action in assisting America, have done a righteous and humane deed in assisting the oppressed. We may call them our enemies on that account, but provided they do us no more injury, we will have no just reason to complain. There is something absurd in the opinion of those who wish well to America, and at the same time are for doing all the mischief possible to the French; for unless the assistance which France has given America, she has done no manner of injury to us. There is not much reason to put confidence in the French nation, more than in any other papists, but there is truly no reason to put confidence in any princes at all, or nations where policy is the only rule of duty. History has undoubtedly

undoubtedly a right to set forth the state of facts, that future times may know the justice or injustice, as well as the reasons, of the war.

While this war was still going on, the nation in general felt the baneful effects of it, and complaints were uttered throughout all the empire, from the effects it had upon all ranks of people. Even those who were most violent for carrying it on complained of its effects, and confessed the nation would be ruined; while either the wickedness of their own hearts, or a false notion of etiquette and honour, made them rather desire to ruin themselves and the nation, than not obtain the ruin of the Americans, whom they so mortally hated. Their constant language was,—The colonies must be subdued; we have passed the rubicon, and cannot go back without shame and disgrace. Thus, under the severest apprehension of destruction in proceeding, the conductors of the war, without hope, still went, till all the corners of the empire cried out of oppression; from one end to the other. Except those who were daily living upon the ruins of the public, all parties were loudly complaining of distress with regard to trade, commerce, and every article of business. Those who were the best judges of the distresses concerning trade and commerce, and who expressed their sentiments in the warmest, and at the same time, in the most decent manner, were but little regarded by the highest authority of the nation, whose business it was to have more especially considered the reasons of those complaints. The sense of the whole nation was this year well expressed in the address and petition of the commons of the city of London

asssembled in common council, which was presented to his Majesty upon March 13, this year. The address and his Majesty's answer, will better express the temper of the nation and the disposition of the government than any that might be substituted in their place.

We, your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects the lord mayor, aldermen, and commons of the city of London, in common council assembled, attached to your Majesty's royal house by principle, to your person by the truest affection, and to the honour and prosperity of your government, by every interest that can be dear to the heart of man; in this present deplorable state of the affairs of this once great and flourishing country, with most profound humility, implore leave to lay ourselves at your Majesty's feet, to represent to your Majesty the sentiments and wishes of a faithful and afflicted people.

When this civil war was first threatened, your loyal city of London, in concurrence with the sense of many other respectable bodies of your kingdom, and many of the wisest and best of your subjects did most humbly deprecate this evil, foreboding, but too truly, the charges, calamities, and disgraces, of which it has hitherto been productive, and the great distresses to which it is still likely to subject this kingdom: Your faithful people, on that occasion, had the misfortune to receive from your Majesty, an answer, more suitable to the imperfect manner in which (they fear) they expressed sentiments full of duty, than your Majesty's own most gracious disposition, their inviolable reverence to their sovereign, and their unshaken zeal for his glory. They retired in a mournful and respect-
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ful silence, patiently waiting the disposition of providence, and the return of your Majesty's favour and countenance, whenever experience should fully disclose, in its true light, the well founded nature of their apprehensions, and the fatal tendency of those councils by which the nation has been misled.

For misled and deceived, your Majesty and many of your subjects have been. No pains have been omitted to hide from both the true nature of the business in which we were engaged; no arts have been left untried to stimulate the passions of your subjects in this kingdom; and we are confident that infinitely more skill and attention have been used to engage us in this war, than have been employed to conduct it to honour or advantage, if honour or advantage could be obtained by any conduct in such a war.

We have been industriously taught to suspect the professions, and to despise the resistance of our brethren, (Englishmen like ourselves) whom we had no sort of reason to think deficient in the sincerity and courage which have ever distinguished that name and race. Their inclinations have been misrepresented, their natural faculties depreciated, their resources mis-calculated, their feelings insulted, until fury and despair supplied whatever might be defective in force.

We have seen a whole army, the flower of the trained military strength of Great Britain and her allies, scattered in the wilderness of America, lay down their arms, and owing their immediate rescue from death to those very men whom the murders and rapines of the savages, (unhappily employed) had forced from husbandmen into soldiers, and who had been painted

in such colours of contempt as to take away all consolation from our calamity. We have seen another army equally brave, and equally well commanded, for two years in an almost continued course of victory, by which they have only wasted their own numbers, without decreasing the strength of the resisting power, without leading to any sort of submission, or bringing to your majesty's obedience, even the smallest and weakest of thirteen revolted colonies. The union of those provinces amongst themselves and their animosity to your majesty's administration, have only been increased, by the injudicious measures taken, to break the one and subdue the other. Fleets and armies are maintained, in numbers almost equal, and at an expence comparatively far superior, to what ever has been employed in the most glorious, and most successful struggles of this country, against a combination of the most formidable monarchies of Europe. A few inconsiderable detached islands, and one deserted town on the continent, where your majesty's combined army has a perilous and insecure footing, are the only fruits of an expence exceeding twenty millions, of ninety-three ships of war, and sixty thousand of the best soldiers which could be procured either at home or abroad, and appointed for that special service.—Your majesty's forces, both by sea and land, have, we are told, done all that could be expected from the most accomplished discipline, and the most determined courage; and yet the total defeat of some of these forces, and the ineffectual victories of others, have almost equally conspired to the destruction of your power, and the dismemberment of your empire. We should be unpardonably negligent of our duty to your
majesty,

majesty, to ourselves, and to our country, if we did not thus solemnly express our feelings upon this dreadful and decisive proof of the madness with which this attempt was originally made, and which faithfully following it through every step of its progress, and every measure for its execution, has completed, by uniform misconduct, the mischiefs which were commenced in total ignorance. We are convinced that not the delusions of artful and designing men, (which, like every thing false, cannot be permanent) but the general sense of the whole American people, is set and determined against the plans of coercion, civil and military, which have been hitherto employed against them. A whole, united, and irritated people, cannot be conquered. If the force now employed cannot do it, no force within our abilities will do it.

The wealth of this nation is great, and our disposition would be to pour it out with the most unreserved and cheerful liberality, for the support of the honour and dignity of your crown; but domestic peace and domestic œconomy are the only means of supplying expence for war abroad. In this contest our resources are exhausted, whilst those of our rivals are spared, and we are, every year of the continuance of this war, altering the balance of our public strength and riches in their favour.

We think ourselves bound, most dread sovereign, to express our fears and apprehensions to your majesty, that, at a time when your majesty's gracious speech from the throne has hinted, and your vast naval preparations in a stile much more explicit, announced to us and the world, the critical state in which we stand with regard to the great neighbouring powers,

powers, we have not the comfort to learn, from that speech, from any assurance of your majesty's servants, or even from common fame, that any alliance whatever has been made with the other great states of Europe, in order to cover us from the complicated perils so manifestly imminent over the nation. We have as little reason to be certain that alliances of the most dangerous kind are not formed against us.

In this state of anxious doubt and danger, we have recourse to the clemency and wisdom of your majesty, the tender parent and valiant guardian of your people, that you will graciously take such measures as may restore internal peace, and (as far as the miserable circumstances into which the late destructive courses have brought us will permit) re-unite the British nation, in some happy, honourable, and permanent conjunction, lest the colonies, exasperated by the rigours and continuance of war, should become totally alienated from their parent country; lest every remaining spark of their affection should be extinguished, in habits of mutual slaughter and rapine; and lest in some evil hour, they who have been the great support of the British strength, should become the most formidable and lasting accession to the constant enemies of the power and prosperity of your kingdoms.

We humbly hope and trust, that your majesty will give all due efficacy to the concessions, (we wish these concessions may not have come too late) which have been proposed in parliament; and we have that undoubted reliance on the magnanimity of your majesty's enlarged and kindly affection, that we are under no apprehensions of your majesty being biassed by private

vate partiality to any set of men in the case where the good, where the very being of your people is at stake; and with an humble confidence we implore and supplicate your majesty, that nothing may stand in the way of those arrangements, in your councils and executive officers, which may best forward the great, necessary, and blessed work of peace, and which may tend to rescue your affairs from unwise and improvident management, and which may obtain, improve, and secure the returning confidence of all your people. In such measures and such arrangements, and for such ends your citizens of London will never fail to give your majesty their most affectionate and steady support.

His majesty's opinion of this war appears to have been very different from that of the citizens of London, as is evident from his answer to this Address and Petition, which he returned in the following words:

I can never think that the zeal of my subjects, the resources of my kingdom, and the bravery of my fleets and armies, can have been unwisely and improvidently employed, when the object was to maintain the constitutional subordination which ought to prevail through the several parts of my dominions, and is essential to the prosperity of the whole: but I have always lamented the calamities inseparable from a state of war; and shall most earnestly give all the efficacy in my power, to those measures which the legislature has adopted for the purpose of restoring, by some happy, honourable, and permanent conciliation, the blessings of peace, commerce, affection, and confidence, between the mother country and the colonies.

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This answer, though one of the most soft and plausible that had been given for some time, expressed sentiments of a very different signification from those in the petition. The idea of constitutional subordination, in the royal dialect, has a different meaning from what the citizens of London understood by subordination. The subduing the colonists to the will of parliament, which was the same with the will of the minister, was the royal idea of constitutional subordination; but the citizens supposed that there were some things which had received the authority of the legislature, that were directly contrary to the constitution, and that some modern statutes were directly subversive of the ancient laws of the land, and contrary to the great charter of the nation. They imagined, as was natural for sober men to do, that justice which is a thing self-evident, could never clash with the constitution, but in such parts as the constitution was either imperfect or erroneous, and that in the present case the justice of the constitution and the modern acts of the legislature, were greatly at variance. The colonists were persecuted with a cruel war for claiming, as their right, what they were entitled to by the constitution, and what Englishmen at home both claimed and enjoyed: This they thought both unjust and impolitic; and, provided the plain principles of justice were observed, nothing could appear more unrighteous than the American war. But it is chiefly owing to a system of morals which now seems to be publicly professed that justice and civil policy are set at variance; for some political writers have of late maintained it as a first truth, that the punishment of sins mentioned in the decalogue do not extend to politics,—which is the same thing as to say that

that under the colour of politics, men may do what they please without being accountable for their actions. Upon this principle our ministry will fairly clear themselves of the guilt of injustice and bloodshedding in this cruel and wicked war. But upon this principle it must be also maintained that there is as little crime on one side as on the other, and that the colonists, upon the same principles of policy, are guiltless in the whole of their resistance; so that the present and all other wars, are innocent, harmless, and political plays, for which no man shall be accountable hereafter. This is a doctrine, so destructive of all morality, that it is no wonder that its friends proceed from evil to worse. And truly this principle is the sole basis of this dreadful and pernicious war. Those who think in the old-fashioned manner, and consider that all policy ought to be established in honesty, will not soon become profelytes to such dangerous doctrine. The amount of principles of this sort is, that there is no danger in the world to come, arising from any thing that politicians do in this, or rather that there is no after reckoning to be dreaded. If this is the case, there is as little good to be hoped for, and therefore those who shall think proper, for their own humour or any other reason, may, with all safety, for any thing that will happen hereafter, provided they can secure themselves from punishment in this life, or are willing to suffer it, carry off such politicians in the most decent manner they can. In this case his majesty's crown is in a tottering situation, and his safety very pernicious. Those pretended friends of the constitution are not even to be trusted in matters of the smallest consideration; for it is impossible they can be faithful beyond the idea of their present pri-

vate interest. It is impossible for any good man, but to pity his majesty, when he is served by such unprincipled persons, who, under pretence of being friends, teach his subjects that there neither is nor can be duty belonging either to God or their lawful sovereign, beyond the limits of their own private interest.

When such doctrines are publicly sent through the country in government newspapers, it ought to alarm every lover of his country and king; and the friends of the glorious revolution, ought to watch, with care, every motion of men who give up the first principles of all laws and government, to the lust of the ambitious or the will of the proud. These tools of wickedness and despotism, think no shame to scandalize the best friends of the British government, and the constitution, and to affirm that there is no more in their professions of patriotism, than to worm themselves into places of preferment and emolument; but in this they only judge from their own principles and feelings, which dispose them to think that all men are like themselves, and not from any certain lineaments of character in those they scandalize. From men of such abandoned principles, has this ungenerous, ungracious, and baneful war proceeded, and is by them still carried on, which has abridged his majesty's dominions, retrenched his revenues, and is likely to endanger the honour of his family, and that glory with which the Brunswick line might have reigned over one of the largest empires of the world, in peace and safety, for ages to come.

The Americans had now for some time past been meditating to act upon the defensive as well as upon the defensive: the notion of the British forces being invincible, was no longer a predominant idea, and the
provincials

provincials were now convinced that they could attack them in their turn, with great probability of success. Accordingly they attacked and took Fort Independence which was in the possession of our army, with very inconsiderable loss. A full account of this transaction has never fully transpired to Britain, and we are as yet uncertain of the particulars. Many of the accounts received about the end of this year, are very uncertain. The greatest part of them are taken from Rivington's Gazette, which is a paper of no credit, and which cannot be depended upon. The skirmish near White Marsh, in December this year, was a pretty smart one, and the loss on both sides is variously reported. Our accounts say that the Americans lost two hundred men, and their accounts do not make ours any less; by comparing both accounts there appears to have been little advantage gained on either side, but much blood spilt to little purpose. As our army could not bring the provincials to any general engagement, nor was it judged prudent to proceed beyond the reach of their ships and armed vessels, they carried on a sort of predatory excursions in certain parts, where they could, by surprise, attack any village where they suspected there were any stores or provisions fit for carrying on the war. This, by means of the shipping, was not difficult to effect. In these plundering excursions they often behaved with such rigour as was inconsistent with that modern profession of humanity of carrying on war among civilized nations. The dwellings of inoffensive peasants, the houses of women and children, with churches and places devoted to the worship of the Most High, fell victims to the fury of these plundering expeditions. An expedition to

the town of Warren, which was undertaken in the month of May, by Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, may serve as a specimen of what was to be expected in this late season of the year, when winter was coming on, and dwellings were now so necessary to the inhabitants of that and all other cold countries. This expedition which was omitted on account of giving place to the successive progress of the main army, shall be now given in the words of General Pigot, in his letter to Sir Henry Clinton, where the account is particularly accurate in most particulars, except in the loss which our troops sustained in the expedition.

“ IN a former letter I had the honour to acquaint you with the arrival of General Sullivan at Providence, to take the command of the troops of this State. You was likewise informed, that it was the prevailing opinion he was sent there on purpose to make an attack upon this island, whenever a convenient opportunity offered. Every day since has afforded new and sufficient cause to confirm this suspicion; and having procured intelligence that a number of large boats and gallies were ashore on the West side of the river, and below Hickamuck bridge, all under repair, with a number of cannon and stores, Commodore Griffith and myself were of opinion that no time should be lost to take advantage of this unguarded situation of the rebels, having certain information that there was only a guard of ten men upon the boats, and not more than 250 men on the whole peninsula from Warren to Bristol Ferry, and that it was not possible any considerable force could be assembled and come to their assistance before the boats were destroyed, the whole business finished, and the troops
safely

safely re-embarked. Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, of the 22d regiment, being ordered for this command, with eight battalion companies of the 22d regiment, the flank companies of the 44th regiment, and Capt. Noltenins's company of Hessian chaffeurs, the whole making about 500 men, marched the evening of the 24th inst. from Newport to Arnold's Point, where they embarked about 12 o'clock on board the flat-bottom boats, under the direction of Captain Clayton and Lieutenant Knowles of the navy; and it is with pleasure I send you the following agreeable report of Col. Campbell's success and proceedings while on this expedition. He has acquainted me that the boats proceeded up the harbour towards Warren River. His Majesty's ship *Flora* moving up the *Papasquash* point to cover the operation of the troops, and the other ships changing their station, so as to give every assistance in their power. Soon after day-break the troops landed undiscovered a mile above Bristol, and three miles below Warren; and Col. Campbell detached Capt. Seix, of the 32d regiment, with 30 men, to *Papasquash* Point, to take and destroy the rebel battery of one 18 pounder, which was easily effected, and a captain of artillery and seven privates made prisoners. The main body moved on towards the town of Warren, and, after taking the precaution of establishing posts to secure the passes, proceeded to *Hickamuck* River, where they found the boats without a guard, or any one to molest them. They were immediately collected in several heaps, and the whole set fire to, amounting to 125 boats, many of them fifty feet in length. A galley of six twelve pounders, two sloops, one of them loaded with stores, with a quantity of materials for building and repairing, were likewise

wife burnt, as was a mill and bridge across the river. The guns of the galley, together with three eighteen pounders, mounted on travelling carriages, were spiked, the trunnions knocked off, and the carriages burnt. This service being effectually performed, the troops returned to Warren. The party of chasseurs left there had destroyed a park of artillery, consisting of two 24 pounders, two 18 pounders, and two 9 pounders, mounted on travelling carriages, with side boxes, ammunition, and side arms complete, by spiking up the guns, burning the carriages, limbers, &c. In the town of Warren they discovered a house full of ammunition, combustibles, and other warlike stores, and some casks of rum, rice and sugar, which was blown up and the whole destroyed. A new privateer sloop, mounting 16 four-pounders, and fit for sea, was burnt in Warren River. The town-house, church, and several houses, were likewise burnt to the ground. The objects of this enterprize being thus far effected, the troops returned by the way of Bristol. On the march, near Warren, two field pieces were spiked up, and a light three pounder, abandoned by the rebels, was rendered useless by being spiked, and the carriages broken to pieces. Two three-pounders in a redoubt on the road were destroyed in the same manner. In marching through the town of Bristol, one 18 pounder was spiked, and a military store was blown up, and the church and town house burnt. By this time a party of the rebels had assembled, and kept up a constant fire upon the rear, from two field pieces and a number of small arms, till the troops gained the height above Bristol Ferry, where they spiked up two 18 pounders in the
rebel

rebel battery, and then made the signal for the flat-bottomed boats to advance from Papasquash river.— Upon their arrival, the whole detachment embarked with regularity and good order, under cover of our fort on the opposite shore, and the *Flora* man of war and two galleys, (the *Pigot* and *Spitfire*) the latter having been taken from the rebels the same morning by Lieut. Kempthorn of the *Nonfuch*. The rebels ventured to ascend the hill with one field piece, but not before the troops were all embarked, and the boats at a great distance from the shore. This essential service was performed with very inconsiderable loss; Lieutenant Hamilton of the 22d. regiment, four Hessian soldiers, and eight British were wounded, and two drummers missing. It is impossible to ascertain the loss the enemy sustained, but I believe it to be of no great moment, for though they kept up a heavy fire upon our rear at times, it was always at a great distance, under cover of their field pieces, and from behind walls, which rendered the fire of our men very uncertain. The following is the number of prisoners taken: one colonel, three field officers, two captains, two lieutenants, and fifty-eight persons, most of them soldiers, or belonging to the militia.

“ These successes of the navy and army, in their several operations, I hope, will convince the rebels that it is in the power of this garrison to annoy, lay waste, and distress their persons and property, whenever they are inclined to do so.”

In this account there is no reason assigned for burning the church and the town house, and it would appear that it was done through mere wantonness, or some particular pleasure that our officers and soldiers
had

had in destroying places of religious worship; for in all the wars that are recorded for these hundred years past, we do not find as many places of worship destroyed by armies with design, without any sufficient reason, as have been destroyed in this American war.

In another letter from General Pigot there is an account of his burning some saw-mills, with all the circumstances minutely particularized, which will give some insight of the method of carrying on this war. It is dated from Newport, May 31, and is as follows:

“ A FEW days ago I had the pleasure of acquainting you with Lieutenant-colonel Campbell’s success in destroying the rebels shipping, boats, cannon, magazines, &c. and having information that there was a large quantity of boards and planks at Fall River, and the only saw-mills that are in this part of the country, the commodore and I were of opinion it would be doing great service if the whole could be destroyed. To effect which 100 men of the 54th regiment, commanded by Major Eyre, embarked last night in flat-bottomed boats at Arnold’s Point, having the Pigot galley and some armed boats for their protection and convoy; unfortunately the galley got aground in passing Bristol Ferry, but the boats proceeded, and arrived a little after day-break at the proposed place for landing. They were discovered some time before they reached the shore, and the alarm signal was given by the discharge of cannon and small arms. When the troops attempted to land, they were fired upon by a strong guard; however the gun-boat soon dispersed them, and they landed and pushed forwards to two mills,

mills, the one for sawing and the other for grain, which were set fire to and entirely consumed, together with a very considerable quantity of boards and planks for building boats or privateers. The major finding a greater number of men in arms than he expected, and being apprehensive the opposition would increase, thought it more prudent to retire than advance farther to the other mill, as the chief object of the expedition was answered, by destroying the principal saw-mill, and all the boards and planks. In returning to the boats they set fire to the rebel guard-room, a provision store, and nine cedar-boats; many sacks of corn were destroyed in the mills. His loss was two men killed, and Lieut. Goldsmith and two men wounded. The rebels loss is thought to be more considerable. When the tide made, the galley got afloat; but in towing her off, Lieutenant Congleton, of the *Flora* man of war, was much wounded, and two men unfortunately killed. I have great pleasure in acquainting you, that on this expedition the navy and army behaved with their usual spirit and firmness."

As we have already given a short account of Gen. Sullivan's retreat from Rhode Island, it may be necessary, for the sake of comparing accounts, to give the reader a view of the antecedent circumstances thereof, in the language of our own-generals. General Pigot, in his letter to General Clinton, gives the following detail of circumstances:

"THOUGH by several letters since the 29th of July last, more especially by that I had the honour of writing by Lieutenant-colonel Stuart, and the accuracy of his intelligence, your excellency will have been informed of the state of affairs here to the 28th

Vol. II. 4 A instant;

instant; yet, as many of those letters, from the uncertainty of the communication, may not have reached you, a summary of the transactions since the 29th of July, when the French fleet arrived, to the last period will not be unnecessary, and may help to explain subsequent events.

“ From the first appearance of the fleet to the 8th inst. our utmost exertions were directed to removing to places of security the provisions, ammunition, military and naval stores, which were either on board ship or on the wharf, preparing a fortified camp, and disposing every thing for resisting the combined attacks of the French and the rebels upon us; I immediately withdrew from Conanicut, Brown’s provincial corps, and two regiments of Anspach, which had been stationed there. The next morning the guns on the Beaver Tail, and Dumplin batteries, the former of which was directed with some effect against two line of battle ships that entered the Narraganset passage, were rendered unserviceable, as the fleet entering the harbour, would cut off all communication with that island; of which the French Admiral soon took a temporary possession, and landed the marines of his squadron. During this period, from the movements of the French ships in the Seconet, on the 30th, the King’s Fisher and two gallies were obliged to be set on fire; and afterwards on the 5th instant, the four advanced frigates, from the approach of two of the enemy’s line of battle ships from the Narraganset, were likewise destroyed, after saving some of their stores, and securing the landing of the seamen.

“ When it was evident the French fleet were coming into the harbour, it became necessary to collect our
forces

forces, and withdraw the troops from the north parts of the island, which was accordingly done that evening. I likewise ordered all the cattle on the island to be driven within our lines, leaving only one cow with each family, and every carriage and entrenching tool to be secured, as the only measures that could be devised to distress the rebels, and impede their progress.

“On the 8th instant at noon, the French fleet (which from its appearance, had continued with little variation, at anchor about three miles from the mouth of the harbour) got under way, and standing in under a light sail, kept up a warm fire on Brenton's Point, Goat Island, and the north batteries, which were manned by the seamen of the destroyed frigates, and commanded by Capt. Christian, and Lieutenants Forrest and Otway of the navy, who returned the fire with great spirit and in good direction. The last of these works had been previously strengthened, and some transports sunk in its front, as an effectual measure to block up the passage between it and Rose-island.

“The next morning we had the pleasure to see the English fleet, and immediately sent on board to communicate to Lord Howe our situation and that of the enemy. By nine o'clock the following day the French fleet re-passed our batteries, and sailed out of the harbour, firing on them as before, and having it returned with equal spirit on our side. By this cannonade from the ships on both days, very fortunately not one man was hurt, or any injury done, except to some houses in town.

“ I shall now proceed to inform your excellency of the movements of the enemy from the 9th instant when they landed at Howland's Ferry.

“ The badness of the weather for some days must have prevented their transporting of stores, or being in readiness to approach us, as they did not make their appearance near us till the 14th when a large body took possession of Honeyman's-hill.

“ To repel any attempts from that quarter, a breast-work was directed to be made along the heights from Green End to Irish's Redoubt, which was strengthened by an abbatis.

“ On the 17th the enemy was discovered breaking ground on Honeyman's-hill, on the summit of which, and on the right of the Green End Road, they were constructing a battery. The next day another was commenced by them for five guns to their left, and in a direct line with the former, which was prepared for four. On this day a line of approach was likewise begun by them from the battery on the right to Green End Road, which works we endeavoured to obstruct by keeping a continual fire on them. The 19th the enemy opened their left battery, which obliged our encampment to be removed farther in the rear. This day we began another line for the greater security of our left, from Irish's Redoubt to Fomini-hill; and I directed a battery of one 24 and two 18 pounders to be raised on our right breast-work, to counteract those of the enemy which was opened the following day, when they were observed busied in forming a second approach from the first, to a nearer distance on the road.

At

“ At noon the French fleet again came in view, much disabled and anchored off the port, where it continued till the 22d, when it finally disappeared.

“ This day the rebels were constructing two other batteries, much lower down the hill than the former, one on the right for five, the other on the left of Green-Hill-Road for seven guns, both which were opened the next day, when I found it necessary to attempt silencing them, and therefore ordered a battery for seven heavy guns on commanding ground, near Green-End, which from the obstructions given by the enemy's fire, could not be completed till the 25th, when the rebels thought proper to close the embrasures of their lower batteries, and make use of them for mortars. During this time they had been constructing on the Height of the East-Road, another for one of 13 inches, and this day began a third approach in front, and to the right of the lower batteries.

“ The 26th observing the enemy to discontinue their works, and learning from deserters they were removing the officers baggage and heavy artillery, I detached Lieut. Colonel Bruce, with 100 men of the 54th regiment, in the night, over Eaton's Beach in quest of intelligence, who with great address surprized and brought off a picquet of two officers and 45 men, without any loss. Some of Col. Fanning's corps, at different times exerted themselves in taking off the people from the enemy's advanced posts; but little intelligence to be depended upon was ever obtained from them; nor were other attempts to procure it, more efficacious, as from all that could be learned, it was doubtful whether their intentions were to attack our lines or retreat.

“ On

“ On the 27th the Sphynx and two other ships of war arrived; and I had the honour of being informed by Colonel Stuart of your excellency's intention to reinforce this post.

“ On the following day the Vigilant galley took a station to cover the left flank of our army; and at ten o'clock that night the rebels made an attempt to surprize a subaltern's picquet from the Anspach corps, but were repulsed, after killing one man and wounding two others.

“ The 29th at break of day, it was perceived that the enemy had retreated during the night, upon which Major-General Prescott was ordered to detach a regiment from the second line under his command, over Easton's Beach, towards the left flank of the enemy's encampment, and a part of Brown's corps was directed to take possession of their works. At the same time Brigadier-General Smith was detached with the 22d and 43d regiments, and the flank, companies of the 38th and 54th, by the East-road, Major General Lofsberg marching by the West-road, with the Hessian chasseurs and the Anspach regiments of Voit and Seaboth, in order, if possible, to annoy them in their retreat; and upon receiving a report from General Smith, that the rebels made a stand, and were in force upon Quaker's Hill, I ordered the 54th and Hessian regiment of Huyn, with part of Brown's corps, to sustain him; but before they could arrive, the perseverance of General Smith, and the spirited behaviour of the troops, had gained possession of the strong post on Quaker's Hill, and obliged the enemy to retire to their works at the North end of the island. On hearing a smart fire from the
chasseurs

chasseurs engaged on the West road, I dispatched Col. Fanning's corps of provincials to join Gen. Lossberg, who obliged the rebels to quit two redoubts made to cover their retreat, drove them before him, and took possession of Turkey-Hill. Towards evening, an attempt being made by the rebels to surround and cut off the chasseurs, who were advanced on the left, the regiments of Fanning and Huyn were ordered up to their support, and, after a smart engagement with the enemy, obliged them to retreat to their main body on Windmill Hill.

“After these actions the enemy took post in great numbers on Windmill-Hill, and employed themselves in strengthening that advantageous situation.

“This night the troops lay on their arms on the ground they had gained, and directions were given for bringing up the camp equipage. Artillery was likewise sent for, and preparations made to remove the rebels from the redoubts; but by means of the great number of boats, they retreated in the night of the 30th over Bristol and Howland's Ferry; thus relinquishing every hold on the island, and resigning to us its entire possession.”

The expedition of General Grey against Martha's Vineyard, to wage war with sheep and oxen, shews that our generals were at a great loss how to proceed, and that they could now carry on no enterprize which had the least prospect of being decisive, or was worthy of the expence that was now bestowed in carrying it on. Notwithstanding the bravery of Gen. Grey, and the conduct with which he managed his expedition, yet it is plain from his own account, that it was only a temporary excursion, which could not
be

be supported much longer than the moment of the execution, The General's account of his expedition is dated on board the Carysfort. Whitestone, Sept. 18, 1778, and is as follows:

IN the evening of the 4th instant, the fleet, with the detachment under my command, sailed from New London, and stood to the eastward with a favourable wind. We were only retarded in the run from thence to Buzzard's Bay, by the altering our course for some hours in the night, in consequence of the discovery of a strange fleet, which was not known to be Lord Howe's until morning. By five o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th, the ships were at anchor in Clark's Cove, and the boats having been previously hoisted out, the debarkation of the troops took place immediately. I proceeded without loss of time to destroy the vessels and stores, in the whole extent of Accushnet River, (about six miles) particularly at Bedford and Fair-Haven, and having dismantled and burnt a fort on the East-side of the river, mounting 11 pieces of heavy cannon, with a magazine and barracks, compleated the re-embarkation before noon the next day. I refer your Excellency to the next return for the enemy's losses, as far as we are able to ascertain them, and for our own casualties.

“ The wind did not admit of any further movement of the fleet the 6th and 7th, than hauling a little distance from the shore. Advantage was taken of this circumstance to burn a large privateer ship on the stocks, and to send a small armament of boats, with two gallies, to destroy two or three vessels, which being in the stream, the troops had not been able to set fire to.

“ From

“ From the difficulties in passing out of Buzzard’s Bay into the Vineyard Sound, through Quickett’s Hole, and from Headwinds, the fleet did not reach Holmes’s-Hole harbour, in the island of Martha’s Vineyard, until the 10th. The transports with the light infantry, grenadiers, and 33d regiment, were anchored without the harbour, as I had at that time a service in view for those corps, whilst the business for collecting cattle should be carried on upon the island. I was obliged by contrary winds to relinquish my designs.

“ On our arrival off the harbour, the inhabitants sent persons on board to ask my intentions with respect to them, to whom a requisition was made of the arms of the militia, the public money, 300 oxen, and 10,000 sheep. They promised each of these articles should be delivered without delay. I afterwards found it necessary to send small detachments into the island, and detain the deputed inhabitants for a time, in order to accelerate their compliance with the demand.

“ The 12th I was able to embark on board the vessels, which arrived that day from Rhode Island, 6000 sheep and 130 oxen.

“ The 13th and 14th were employed in embarking cattle and sheep on board our own fleet; in destroying some salt-works, in burning or taking in the inlets what vessels and boats could be found, and in receiving the arms of the militia. I here again refer your excellency to returns.

“ On the 15th the fleet left Martha’s Vineyard, and after sustaining the next day a severe gale of wind, arrived the next day at Whitestone, without any material damage.

“ I hold myself much obliged to the commanding officers of corps, and to the troops in general, for the alacrity with which every service was performed.”

The whole progress of our army in America began to be exceedingly slow, and the several exertions in the various excursions and expeditions, were carried on with a degree of timidity, which plainly indicated an apprehension that they had to deal with an enemy whose importance was rather to be dreaded than despised. In all motions for supplies of forage, the principal care was first to observe the motions of the enemy, and to guard against an attack of the militia or provincial forces, who generally make such furious attacks upon the foraging parties, as made them purchase dearly the small supplies they obtained. The losses on these occasions were generally as much concealed as possible, to keep up the spirits of the troops, and to deceive the public at home; but in spite of all secrecy, as much transpired as declared that our power, influence, and hopes, were very much upon the decline.

It has been one of the misfortunes of this war, that it began in injustice, and has been carried on with lies and dissimulation. The expedition to Egg-harbour, the attack on the village of Tappan, are represented as successful expeditions, where only one or two are said to be killed; whereas, some who were engaged in these excursions, and have come home since, give a very different account of them.

General Cornwallis's expedition, referred to in Sir Henry Clinton's letter of October 8th, is set forth as a most successful one, though it was attended with both loss and danger. The only successful part of it was that which was conducted by General Grey, who,

who, indeed, was the soul of every action where he was present, yet that general is far from giving such windy accounts of the success of our army, as our Gazettes have done after manufacturing the letters, which the ministers had received from the British commanders. The ministry have indeed been sometimes deceived by ignorant self-interested persons, who, destitute of all knowledge of what was transacted, have affirmed the grossest falsehoods, through the influence of corrupt prejudices. Even some who never were ten miles from New-York, and who were unacquainted with the whole transactions on either side, have had the vain effrontery to affirm that the Americans never fought, never could fight, and never would fight. The testimony of General Grey, a character of the first rank in every view, whether as a gentleman, a citizen, or an officer, is contradicted with regard to the very object of his own senses, by persons that were never acquainted in the smallest degree, with any transactions of the American war.*

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* A pedantic school-master, who, like the good Mr. Galloway, was obliged to leave America for conscience-sake, has lately published a pamphlet, wherein he positively affirms, That the Americans never fought, nor could fight: and that all those that have been killed on our side, have killed themselves or one another: for it is certain that many thousands have been slain, and if the Americans never fought, it is manifest they could never kill our men. This Mr. Robinson confesses that he was never twelve miles out of New-York, so of consequence, as he had nothing to do but receive intelligence, he must be undoubtedly the best authority to depend upon.

He ought, however, out of good manners to his English reader, before he had set down to write a pamphlet, first considered whether he could write English, and not have exposed himself and wearied his reader, with illiterate and ungrammatical falsehoods. If he intended to write a romance, he ought to have done it genteely, and not disgraced his order, by imitating his own language, of which he is said to be a teacher. It is somewhat surprising that men should pay so little regard to truth and consistency, as to affirm what thousands can, from the fullest certainty, contradict. With a design of throwing the misdeeds of the ministry, upon the officers

The expedition to Egg-harbour was perhaps as well conducted as the nature of the thing would admit of, and there was neither want of bravery in the men nor conduct in the officers, but the greatest human wisdom and courage. No officers can do more than what is competent to them. A whole continent roused with jealousy of their liberties, and fired with an enthusiasm of all that is dear to men, were likely to make efforts and exertions, that those that are lukewarm in the cause of freedom, or slaves to despotism, have no ideas of. It is no way strange, that those at home, who either do not love true liberty, or are under the influence of baser passions, should think it incredible for others to risk their lives for what they set no value upon. It must appear a thing incredible to them: and it is on this account that they have, through the influence of their incredulity, determined that our officers have not done their duty. They cannot persuade themselves that men, not soldiers by profession, and serving without hire, would venture their lives for what *they* reckon a phantom, or a mere creature of the imagination. They therefore infer that the generals have not done their duty, but lengthened out the war for the sake of emolument.

Our

officers and generals who have commanded in America, some who, a few years ago, affirmed publicly that the colonists were the most consummate cowards in the world, have now exalted them above the greatest heroes of antiquity. They have made General Washington, with 3000 men, oppose General Howe with 16,000, chase Sir Henry Clinton out of Philadelphia, pursue him through the Jerseys, and make him take refuge in New-York; they have made 17 American small ves-

sels resist 50 English men of war, which American ships, three years ago, durst not peep out of the harbour: And what is strangest of all, these things happened all at the same time; for when Gen. Howe was neglecting his duty he was victorious; when Sir Henry Clinton was retreating he was conquering, and when Lord Howe was betraying his king, he, at the same time, by these authors' own accounts, was taking and destroying all the American ships.

Our gains and advantages in America were far from being equal to our waste of treasure and loss of men: In every expedition the loss was double; for we both destroyed our own colonies, and lost a great number of our army, without any hope of subduing the one or speedily recruiting the other. To all this was added the loss of the island of Dominica, in the month of September this year, which was taken by the French on the 17th of that month, an account of which was given by Lieut. Governor Stuart, in the following words.

“ I AM exceedingly sorry, that so soon after closing my dispatches, I have the mortification to acquaint your lordship that this island is in the possession of the French King.

“ In the morning of the 17th inst. at half past four, upon hearing a gun from our battery and signal post at Cashacron, or Scot’s Head, and observing the signal for an enemy, I ordered Young’s battery of Roseau, being near me, to repeat it, in conformity to instructions for taking up signals; about a quarter of an hour afterwards a second gun was fired, and the signal still continued; and day-light shortly after appearing, I discovered some vessels coming round the point, and soon perceived, instead of ours, a white flag flying on the battery. These observations, and the increasing number of vessels which came in sight, soon convinced me that they were enemies, who had forced the battery, and were coming to attack the island. I instantly ordered the alarm to be given for assembling of forces: In the mean time the ships and vessels stood for a place named Point Michel, two miles south of Roseau, and, as they approached, I discovered that they consisted of four frigates, ten
armed

armed sloops and schooners, with about 20 others, being transports with troops. About 6 o'clock boats were seen going on shore at Point Michel, and men landing from them in great numbers, as they were beyond the reach of our guns, they affected their landing without opposition.

“ I had at this time made the best disposition I could to impede their approach to the town. I had detached Lieutenant Ross, the only officer of artillery we had in garrison, with six matrosses, and Lieutenant Jones, of the 48th regiment, an officer, of militia, and a volunteer of the 48th regiment, Mr. Warner, with 24 men, half regulars of the 48th and half militia, to defend the battery at Loubiere, which was about half way between Roseau and the place where the enemy were landing. Capt. Grove, commanding the detachment of the 48th regiment, was posted in Young's battery in the town of Roseau, our most important post, with Lieut. Fenton, and 29 men of the 48th regiment, and forty militia; 30 militia, with some matrosses, were thrown into Melville's battery: A detachment of artillery, militia, with others, were placed with two field-pieces on Jolly's Hill, to oppose their march towards Charlotte Town, and Capt. Man, the chief engineer, commanded the remainder of the militia, a few volunteer troopers and others, on the new battery at Guey's Hill.

“ The landing of the enemy, amounting at least to 2000 men, was in three divisions: the first of which we could pretty nearly distinguish on their way to be about 600, marching towards us, as soon as they were landed, under a very brisk fire from all our batteries on that side: and on their being within 200 yards of Loubiere battery, all the artillery ammunition

tion being expended, which had been carried there, as it was unfinished and had no magazine, Lieutenants Rofs and Jones, with their parties, retired, the first joining the party at Melville's battery, and the other that on Jolly's Hill, according to directions I had given: the enemy in the mean time took possession of Loubiere battery; but our heavy fire from our others soon obliged them to quit, and to shelter themselves under cover of the highlands on the Roseau side of Loubiere river, where they took post, waiting for the other two divisions, which we could see in full march from Point Michel to join them.

"We soon discovered they had sent a considerable detachment, amounting, as we have been informed, to 300 men, being grenadiers and chasseurs, to the heights of Dumoulin's Hill; some of them were already on the ridge, ready to attack us on the rear of Guey's Hill and Melville's battery.

"The main body, now reinforced by the arrival of the other divisions, had begun to form, in order to advance to the town. A large body of the enemy was then discovered to be landing under cover of a frigate, on the north side of the town, consisting according to the information we have since received, of about five hundred privateers men and people of colour. These several attacks, it seems, were to have been made at the same time, for which we have been informed, signals were to have been given from the heights.

"Three of the frigates at the same time approached us in different directions, to cannonade Young's battery and the town.

It was now about twelve o'clock, when I received a message on Jolly's Hill, on the point of which I was reconnoitering

reconnoitering the disposition of the forces of the enemy, from the council of the island and others of the principle inhabitants, requesting, that, on account of the most critical and dangerous situation of the colony, I would call a council of war. My zeal for his majesty's service, my affection for his subjects, and my own honour, were inducements for me to comply with their requests, and to assemble the military officers as soon as it was possible.

“ The opinion of the council, on consideration of the force of the enemy and our own, I send your lordship enclosed. I accordingly sent a flag of truce to the enemy, to know what terms would be granted to us if we should be inclined to capitulate; resolving at the same time to accept of none but such as would be honourable to his majesty, and beneficial to his subjects, or to resist to the last extremity, A parley for an hour was consented to by the Marquis de Bouille, who commanded the French troops; and the articles of capitulation which I now send to your lordship were agreed to on his part and mine. During the time of the parley one of the French ships called the *Tourterelle* fired two broad sides upon Young's Battery and the town, which had very nearly broken it off, and brought us into immediate action.

“ The enemy in the attack must have lost considerably, but they at present conceal the number; the loss to his majesty was only two privates of the 48th regiment. The different attacks of the enemy were commanded by the Marquis de Bouille, governor-general of Martinico, the Marquis Duchelleau, now governor of Dominica, Count de Tilly, Viscount Damas and Chevalier Jeffrey, a lieutenant-general and engineer.

“ The

“ The detachment of the 48th regiment, with the detachment of artillery, embarked this day for Grenada, which I conceive to be best for his Majesty’s service. I intend leaving Dominica as soon as I have given solidity in establishing terms of capitulation, and will take the first opportunity to return to Europe.”

The military transactions of this year ended neither with honour nor advantage to Great Britain: All things in every quarter of the Globe, except the East Indies, wore a frowning aspect. In that quarter the Company’s forces were successful, and the French interest almost totally reduced. This answered one purpose for the ministry, which though it was of no real service in the general cause, yet helped them to cover over their weakness and infirmity by a confident boasting of the weakness of the French, and what they would do in another campaign to that perfidious enemy, in other parts of the world. The nation would have probably suffered these deceptions to have passed without much notice, had the people been hearty in the American war; but as they generally abhorred its principles, they were much averse to raising money for carrying it on, and generally interpreted the want of success to the want of justice in the cause in which the nation was engaged. They moreover considered this war as a conflict between the ambition of the government and the rights of the people, and were disposed to consider the case of the Americans as what would be their own, provided they would refuse submission to new statutes, which were inconsistent with the old laws of the constitution. Neither the hearts nor

Vol. II, 4 C prayers

prayers of the people went along with this unnatural war, which made all the measures concerning it both heavy and offensive. The self-interested, who were waiting for favour and preferment, were zealous enough in the cause, though they were not even willing to risque much in support of it, except when they found their immediate interest concerned.

It is a thing that appeared extraordinary to many, that the supplies should have been granted with so little opposition, when no account had been given of the manner of their application, nor the smallest hopes that the nation would ever, by any further advantage, recover the loss which it had already sustained by the war. Many of the first characters in the nation had been in the opposition from the commencement of this contest, and from principle had opposed all the measures of the ministry, because they considered them unjust and erroneous; while others were sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other, according as their hope of interest or preferment prevailed. At the conclusion of this campaign the hopes of the most sanguine in favour of the American war were become exceedingly feeble, while their desires and inclinations were as strong as ever.—One party, though they perceived the project of subduing the Americans impracticable, were, by their interests and situations unwilling to give it up; these still flattered the nation that another effort would certainly prove successful; another party, though not so immediately interested, from an apprehension that it was dishonourable to yield in any particular to our own colonies, were for ruining both, rather than tarnish the dignity of Britain by the smallest condescension.

Without

Without enquiring in the justice or equity of the war, they considered that Britain, when once engaged, should never yield upon any consideration. These latter proved but weak politicians, and were sufficiently disposed to be dupes to others, who had much deeper designs.

While both the nation at home, and the colonies abroad, were groaning under the weight and burden of the war, and every year new taxes were added to the former oppressions, the nation did not in the least remit in its luxury, vices, and dissipation. All the usual extravagances were pursued, and diversions carried on, as if the nation had been teeming in from all points of the compass. The expences of public shews, and court entertainments, rather encreased than diminished with the burdens of the nation, and even at the time that we were threatened with a foreign invasion, not one fashionable pleasure was restrained. Even the time appointed for religious humiliation and devotion, was made the occasion of idleness and dissipation, by those who professed to be most deeply interested in the fate of the nation. The more sober and thoughtful also turned listless, and began to be careless about the alarming events that seemed to be approaching, that nothing could rouse them to a sense of their danger, at the same time that they were murmuring and complaining of the badness of the times. Religion was turned into a mere form of godliness, and true zeal was departed from all ranks; order, in the practice of religion, was deemed enthusiasm, and laughed out of countenance by those who had formerly shewn some examples thereof. The most solemn and sacred

things were made servants to men's appetites, interests, and pleasure, and the fear of sin and transgression, except where immediate punishment was visible, seemed to have taken wing to some other climate. Animosity, arising from the spirit of party, came to so great a height, that friends who formerly had supported the social character, became aliens to one another; mutual affection, the true bond of society, declined to an amazing degree, and rancor and malignity raged with unbounded violence. The friends of the ministry, and of the American war, were shewing their resentment, by declaring what they thought those in opposition deserved, and scarcely would allow them a right to live in this world.

The Jacobites and Tories, who, a little more than thirty years ago, had been in actual rebellion against the King and the laws, were now broke loose in abusing all who were against the American war, with the opprobrious names of rebels. The meanest and most unjust personal abuse was published in Jacobite News-papers, managed by Papists and Tories, against men who had nothing to defend them except their own innocence. This produced a general irritation of parties, and some times made the opposition expose matters of fact, which otherwise would have passed in oblivion. But on some occasions the publishing of the most notorious facts became dangerous, and were construed by judges and court lawyers to be libels punishable by law, when the unhappy publishers were severely fined or imprisoned for an example to others.

The Papists, who had, ever since the passing of the Quebec Bill, considered the ministry as their friends employed their pens and interest in support-

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ing this unnatural war, and the priests began to shew an insolence unknown for many years past. This produced some reflections upon their characters and religion, which had lain dormant for a great while. It was alledged that it did not become men, who had all sworn allegiance to the Chevalier de St. George to give the epithets of rebel or traitor to men who were the truest friends of his present majesty, and the revolution settlement. As all the popish clergy, who take orders abroad, in the English colleges, are, by the authority of the Pope, obliged to swear allegiance to the Pretender when they enter upon holy orders, it gave them no small offence to hear this secret published over all Great Britain. Whether our ministry actually knew this secret or not, may probably be disputed, but it is what the papists cannot deny, and what some of the first character openly confess. This was considered by the friends of the constitution as treason against our king and the laws, and was animadverted upon with some warmth and zeal. —The tempers of men being more and more agitated by this controversy, produced more acrimonious reflections on both sides, so that frequently that decency which is even due to an enemy, was transgressed. Those reflections which proceeded from zeal and want of temper, were imputed to malevolence and ill-nature; and the friends of the ministry, on their part, were careful to make it believed, that the arguments of the opposition proceeded from disloyalty and disaffection to government; for though they knew in their hearts, that the King had not more loyal subjects, yet because they were in opposition to their measures, they wanted every one to believe they were traitors.

But

But what seemed the most unfeasible conjecture in the heat of this disputation, was that the opposition were the cause of protracting the war, when it was well known, that every supply which the ministry judged necessary was granted according to their desire. The whole management was in their own hands, and they raised as many men, and as large sums of money as ever they had a mind. Had the nation been ever so unanimous, they could not have done more than was done, and provided wisdom and justice had been the principles of action, the supplies were abundantly sufficient. But the want of judgment and justice in planning and executing this unnatural war, was the sole cause of all our miscarriages, from the beginning hitherto. Those who are engaged in a party, through interest, ambition, or some other base passion, may throw the blame of want of success in this war, on whom they please; but suppose it had been ever so successful, no wise or good man could, in his conscience, have determined it to be just. The crimes for which the colonists have been so violently prosecuted by war, have never been proved, by the most zealous advocates for carrying it on, deserving thereof, unless the laws of the constitution are ambulatory, and are always to be determined by the will and pleasure of the ruling powers. Reason and common sense will readily teach every impartial enquirer that the causes of this war, were ambition in government, and a desire to extend dominion beyond the ancient statutes. Whatever may be the issue and event of this unhappy contest, posterity will conclude that the colonists have made a noble struggle for what nature and reason teach all men to revere and pursue,

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as far as they have power and ability. The wealth and power of Britain may enable her to maintain the conflict, and probably in the end make her victorious, but impartial posterity, removed far from both parties, will judge of the principles of the war, and not determine by its success.——Julius Cæsar, though he was successful in destroying the Roman liberty, and established the power of the emperor above the senate and the laws, is far from being considered by posterity as having done an honourable and a just thing. It was his success that laid the foundation of slavery in Rome, and though the government had more of the shining tinsel of external majesty, yet it lost its ancient glory and strength, which was for 800 years supported by liberty, and the virtue of its citizens. The laws established at the glorious revolution in Britain, have for ninety years made the nation flourish in peace and abundance; the justice and liberty implied in their character, and practised by all ranks, has made her flourish, the envy and astonishment of all Europe: But if she depart from these glorious principles, and suffer these statutes to be violated, which have so long upheld her peace and supported her glory, she will soon become the scorn of the nations, and a reproach over all the world. It will be unwise, from a pretence of more wisdom and improvement, to remove land marks and first principles, which have been known in experience to have been so beneficial and salutary to all ranks. Our sound and wholesome laws made at the revolution, have exalted our sovereign to a pitch of true glory, and the nation to dignity it never knew before: Under their influence the empire has been extended, the subjects enriched

beyond

beyond the limits of former periods, and both the crown and the legislature arrived at a dignity unknown in former times. To lose all these advantages, and sacrifice them at the shrine of dominion and despotism, will sink us below all degrees of comparison, and make us in reality, less than the least of the nations. The American war, if continued, will either be the æra of liberty to them, or the æra of slavery to both them and us: this is what all good subjects will undoubtedly deprecate and strive against, let interested men say what they please. This contest with America will be a period in history, which posterity will mark with an emphasis of admiration and astonishment; and ages to come will declare that there lived a race of men beyond the Atlantic that made a noble struggle to be free.

END OF VOLUME SECOND.

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